Introduction
The reasons for writing the book: a contribution to the history of civil society

It is a feature of our times that the influence of the international context over all aspects of our lives has increased enormously. This is as true for the private sphere as it is for collective action, for individual citizens just as much as for governments and organizations. Connections with other societies, and more in general with processes in the world, have become more and more numerous and all-pervasive.

For Europeans this change of epochs has coincided with the introduction of the Euro – which constitutes a real crossing of the Rubicon in the journey towards political union. The Euro will in fact have an extraordinary effect in increasing the influence of the European dimension in the various nation-states of Europe. It will, therefore, increase the complexity of Italian life, forcing us to take account of factors which in the past were considered extraneous. This change in general, external conditions is already beginning to have its effects on political and intellectual debate in Italy. There is still much hesitancy, and the heritage from the past often holds us back. There is no doubt, however, that a blast of fresh air has entered the Italian climate, and this leads us to hope that further, major reforms can be achieved in the near future.

European societies will obviously need to draw on all their resources to cope with and manage the new social and economic conditions. In particular, civil society – pluralistic, but at the same time singing in unison - has a major role to play. It is civil society which can give strength to the reform of society and imprint some of its own organizing principles on the society as a whole. It is this faith in the capacities and the importance of civil society which has underlain the writing of this book describing the activities of the Giovanni Agnelli Foundation since 1976, for our work provides an example of how organizations of civil society can affect political and intellectual debate.

Tracing the history of our activities seems useful not only for the sake of the Foundation itself but also for the history of Italian civil society. That history has not been particularly glorious in the first fifty years of the Republic – indeed civil society has often been restricted in its action, and often humiliated. However, this means that those areas where it actually has been lively should not be neglected. Even minor experiences can be useful in giving Italy's civil society a tradition and a history – and thus fruitful in building the new political, social and governmental arrangements which are emerging. It would therefore be useful if other cultural institutions (especially Foundations) followed our example and described their experience.

The recent past of Italian civil society is usually seen as dominated by charities and voluntary action, and by associations. The contribution made by foundations, especially cultural foundations undertaking research and stimulating public debate, has often been

ignored. My main aim in writing this book is, therefore, to fill this gap, in the hope that others will follow in my footsteps and enrich the picture.

The activities of the Giovanni Agnelli Foundation

To introduce the reader to the themes of the book it seems useful to remind readers of how the Foundation has been present in public debate – and especially in the press - in Italy in recent years. First of all, we should recall the major programme on federalism; here the Foundation took a leading role by proposing a set of reforms of the state and administrative arrangements. Connected with this programme was the proposal for a "network capital" – the idea that, for both economic and political reasons, a number of national functions should be re-located among Italy's principal towns.

Secondly, readers may recall the programmes we have devoted to voluntary action in art and culture, to foundations, to social cooperatives, to models of the university, or to civil society. Or our commitment to dialogue between cultural universes, our studies of the differentiated world of Islam, or of immigrants in Italy and Europe. They may remember our international conferences on Arab Christians in the Middle East, or our research on the economic and demographic prospects of the Mediterranean. Or perhaps the programme of studies and relations which we have recently launched on present-day Russia – that new, poorly-understood and enigmatic society, a society which may or may not wish to be fully European.

Readers may have read about these activities in the press, may have taken part in an event we organized, or may have seen or bought one of our books. They may, therefore, have asked themselves how the Foundation came to undertake that study, or publish that book. In the present work, I try to satisfy that legitimate curiosity, describing the intellectual and cultural path the Foundation has gone down, arriving at our current programmes and activities.

The Foundation's vocation - to study the conditions which make progress in Italy possible

Before going any further, it should be said what the Agnelli Foundation is. The Giovanni Agnelli Foundation was founded in 1966 by IFI and FIAT to commemorate their founder, Senator Giovanni Agnelli.

At the time foundations (especially foundations which had the purpose of stimulating intellectual and cultural debate) were a real rarity in Italy. Setting up a foundation to commemorate a major figure in the history of industry would have been normal in Anglo-American culture – especially in the United States – but it was highly innovative in continental Europe. The reasons for this differing confidence in foundations have roots in the institutional history of the United States and the European states. Areas where absolutism reigned in the seventeenth and eighteenth century – i.e., Europe – naturally mortified civil society, for the choice was made to give the state a monopoly over resources intended for public, general use. In the United States, where absolutism never established itself, there has always been another channel (and, indeed, one which has always been preferred) for managing resources for purposes of collective interest – these resources have always been managed whenever possible by the civil society. Legislation and culture have made this decentralized, pluralist use of resources much more common in the United States than it has been in continental Europe.

In Italy, as in the Latin countries more generally, it is only in the last ten years or so that it has been widely accepted that a sharp break is necessary, and that we need to give

much greater trust and responsibility to civil society – and therefore to those essential parts of civil society which are foundations. Today there are foundations which manage libraries, museums and hospitals, which help drug addicts, organize art exhibitions or conduct medical or technological research. Such foundations may operate at the level of a town, a region, a nation, or internationally. So what category of foundation does the Agnelli Foundation belong to?

The Foundation's founders gave it a task which was wide without being vague. The charter refers explicitly to "furthering and spreading knowledge of the conditions on which Italy's progress in economic, scientific, social and cultural fields depends". It is therefore the Foundation's task, as laid down in its statutes, to contribute to Italy's progress. This means not the progress of a firm or of an industry, or a social group, but the progress of Italy. An Italy which is interpreted intelligently – to include Turin and the hundred cities of Italy, the country's regions, Europe, Italian Americans, Italian culture in the world, and the great themes of international debate (which inevitably influence what happens in Italy).

The Foundation's charter is clear that the aim must be to study "the conditions on which Italy's progress depends" – that is to say, the policies which can lead to progress. In other words, the invitation is to study how we can fish better, not to offer a few fish for immediate consumption.

Over the years the Foundation has tried to remain faithful to this original programme. Italy has changed radically in the meantime and the Foundation has tried to adapt or if possible even to foresee change before it actually arrives. So we have changed the contents of our research and the way we are organized internally in this attempt to keep faith with our original charter. This has given rise to a kind of cultural foundation which is a rarity on the Italian and European scene.

The contents of the book

We may ask: how can a cultural foundation go about recounting its history? How can it communicate the sense of its work and the role it has played in the wider society?

Foundations have charters, which act as their constitution, laying down their ultimate aims and reasons for existence; and they have property of their own so that they can carry out their work independently. However, we might also say they have a "soul" – made up of the culture which they express, the style of their work, the way they are organized, the assessment they make of the external world and the way in which they approach that world. And they have a voice, made up of the ideas they express – their analyses, their policy proposals, the intellectual frameworks they employ, and so forth. A cultural foundation like the Giovanni Agnelli Foundation organizes its activity via conferences, seminars, research and publications. In reality, these are tools for expressing ideas. Without ideas, a cultural foundation does not express its identity. Or rather: the ideas a foundation expresses are the parameter which allow us to understand, describe, and qualify its identity and its "soul".

At the Giovanni Agnelli Foundation ideas have always been particularly important, because we have often operated on border territory, where the line of demarcation has been very important to define our collocation in Italian society, and to communicate the logic and foundations of a programme, a finding, or a proposal with precision.

Ideas constitute the essence of the identity of a cultural foundation. They form the equivalent of the calculations an architect or engineer makes to make sure a building will stand up. Unless the right calculations are done correctly, the building will collapse. Ideas function for a cultural foundation in the same way: they support it and give it life, open (or close) its perspectives and horizons. This importance of ideas is clearly evident in the case of the Agnelli Foundation, for we can trace their emergence over a relatively long time period, lasting several decades.

When an idea is mistaken, a cultural foundation is cut out of the market - in other words, it is overtaken by events, sidelined and marginalized. When an idea is a "good" one, and a foundation anticipates events, and perhaps influences them, its importance grows, it ensures that it will be able to continue its work in a long-term perspective, it shows that it is useful to society, it achieves the aims it was set up to achieve. In the case of the Giovanni Agnelli Foundation, it contributes (within the limits of its means, obviously) to progress in Italy.

The present book, therefore, is essentially the description of the main ideas which the Foundation has used. Ideas we have taken over and made our own, or ideas we have worked out ourselves (or helped to work out). Ideas which (in my judgement) are still valid and useful in Italian debates today. It is important to stress that these are ideas which are "managed" – that is to say, ideas which have become cultural intitiatives (a seminar, a conference, a programme of activity). These are ideas which have given substance and life to the Foundation. Indeed, we might say that they were the Foundation.

Obviously, the book does not go over individual conferences, books published, etc. This would be too complex, and is something which may be done in the future. I have tried to pick out those ideas which have been crucial in deciding our strategic decisions – the decision to undertake a programme, and to select a particular field of interest, the crucial decisions affecting the way we work, and our relationship with the external world. My aim is to give an overview which conveys the overall sense of the Foundation's work beyond that of individual intitiatives. A sense of what the Giovanni Agnelli Foundation's work meant at a time when cultural foundations were rare and poorly-known institutions in Italy. For we might even say that cultural foundations in Italy were experimental and futuristic (let us hope that Italy's future will be full of cultural institutions, and, more in general, full of bodies of a vibrant, complex civil society).

The book will also say something of the Foundation's organizational criteria, and of our way of working – for both are crucial in ensuring the success of an initiative. Ideas are fundamental, but they are disarmed and inactive unless appropriate managerial and organizational criteria also exist. The Foundation has been present, over the years, not only with its ideas, but also by providing an example of how a foundation works, and organizational factors have been crucial here. Finally, the Foundation has shown how a body of civil society can be actively present, constructive and independent in political and intellectual debate, and it has acted as an example of awareness of what role a cultural institution can play in a mature, complex society.

The book has a number of indisputable limits. First of all, it is the product of an internal vision of the Foundation. It therefore provides a picture as seen from the inside,

without taking account of how we are viewed by the external world, and by the press in particular[1].

The second limitation is that I have not been able to undertake analysis of individual pieces of research, even though these have their own unity and their own independent cultural place. For a number of pieces of research it would be worth undertaking a disciplinary reading – in other words, a reading of their significance within a particular discipline, or within the context of debates over the particular problem in question. However, once again, this would imply the writing of a very different sort of book.

No doubt other limitations could be added. However, one merit might also be mentioned. The present book is an indispensable accompanying guide to the reading of the various *Catalogues of Activities* we have published over the years[2].

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[1] In reality a preliminary analysis of how the Foundation is presented in the press and on television has already been carried out. I have deliberately avoided taking account of the findings of this study. This is partly because otherwise I would have had to write a very different sort of book, and partly because the research is not yet finished. In the future an essay on the Foundation's image in the mass media may be published, but it will have to be organized in its own way, certainly not from the point of view of the Foundation seen from the inside.

[2] Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, *1976-1986: dieci anni d'attività*, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1986; Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, *1977-1987: a ten year report,* Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1987; Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, *1976-1990: quinze ans d'activité*, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1990; Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, *1990-1993: quattro anni d'attività,* Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1993. See also Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, *Catalogo delle attività, 1993-1999.*

The Foundation and the public it is aiming to influence and debate with

As has been mentioned, the Foundation was founded in 1966. It had a difficult start mainly because of the difficulty of finding ways of working which were suited to Italy and to Italian culture at the time. The uncertainty lasted about ten years, and ended with a real crisis in the institute's work and identity in 1975.

The present writer began working with the Foundation in 1967 and became Director in 1976, with the mandate of radically overhauling its organizational structure, cultural collocation, and programmes.

The 1970s deeply influenced the Foundation because it inevitably found itself bound up in the ideological battles of the time between the model of Western society and the various models of real socialism. It was neither possible nor desirable to be neutral: the stakes were too high. The side the Foundation chose was obvious enough, considering its origins and the culture of its leading members. There was also a consideration of "legitimate defence": for while foundations are an essential part of civil society in a liberal, democratic society, they were not, and are not, compatible with a bureaucratized, state-dominated one.

Our cultural collocation was therefore settled on an instinctive basis, and no alternatives were even conceivable. The question of what one might call our "political-instrumental" collocation was more complex. What relationship should we establish with Italian society, with the political parties, and with the world of ideas? I explain the decisions we took in Part One of this book. However, I may say straight away that the solution to these issues was facilitated by a number of facts.

The first of these was the Foundation's "aloneness". It did not belong to the world of academic culture, it was far-removed from and basically alien to the world of politics, it was close to the world of business, but worked in full autonomy, and with motivations and activities which were radically different from those of business activity. The collocation which was most appropriate was the one which we took up in the subsequent years – that of a cultural institution in civil society. This stopped us from trying to take on the role of "advisor to the prince" – i.e., to some political party – and led us to take up a more complex stance.

In the 1970s the Foundation shared the governing parties's stance regarding Italy's international stance, and its fundamental values. However, we wished to act as a stimulus by offering criticism, which we hoped could be constructive and give rise to fruitful proposals. In taking up a constructive, broadly policy-oriented approach of this kind, the Foundation was being innovative. Due to our distance from government, but also out of the belief that this would be wrong culturally, we never wished to become involved in institutional engineering or in making directly-applicable policy proposals. Instead, we wished to orient our work to the social, economic, and above all, cultural aspects of the "decisions" which needed to be made in public plicy. Rather than adressing itself to a generic, undifferentiated public, the Foundation thus sought out "priority" interlocutors.

This priority public in general were members of elites in some sense. In some cases these were those with responsibilities within an occupation. During the years 1978-82 industrial managers and middle managers were particularly important as a public; in the 1980s secondary school teachers were the main public for our programmes on education. In our programmes on promoting Italy's image, we took the ethnic-cultural group of Italian Americans as our prime public. With our programme of studies

predicting the future (1983), we widened the field to include all elites, including political and business elites, and this orientation has since remained. Our programme of studies on the future was envisaged as "aiming to build a dialogue with, and stimulate, a range of very different interlocutors – from families, and thus public opinion in a general sense, to the little community of technological and scientific researchers, to groups with uncertain boundaries such as entrepreneurs, managers, and politicians"[3].

The uses of research and cultural initiatives

Our allegiance to the tradition of free-market liberalism has always been openly stated, in public statements and elsewhere. Our general approach has therefore been that of "informing, creating culture, creating consensus", above all among our priority publics. In a few cases, we went beyond this, as when we involved industrial managers and middle managers in the research on themselves and on their problems.

From the years 1976-80 onwards, we proceeded in this direction, for fear of issuing what former President Einaudi called "useless sermons". We felt that the Enlightenment tradition in Italy gave too much emphasis to government and too little attention to the social, economic and cultural dynamics of society. As we said at the time[4], a defect of the Enlightenment tradition was that it was too abstract: this led to a proclivity to preaching, or to denunciation of evils – a feature which often characterized reform politics. Too many factors linked to social life (in its economic but especially its cultural aspects) in contrast were under-rated and neglected.

Almost all the Foundation's activities can be placed within the framework of one overall objective – that of encouraging the cultural conditions whereby some process or new phenomenon (nearly always a complex one) can be governed, or some innovation achieved in Italian society. It would be possible to compare the Foundation's experience with the theoretical frameworks which attempt to explain the relationship between social research and political and social innovation[5]. However it seems preferable to describe what the Foundation has not been.

The Foundation has never wished to carry out social engineering – not even with its (1994) proposals for reforming the state in a federal direction. We have never wished to go down this road first of all because we are far-removed from the political system. Secondly, because we have wanted to put the emphasis on fostering the cultural conditions for achieving innovation, rather than on ready-made projects which were immediately applicable. Our decision was influenced by our assessment that decision-making processes in Italy are pathologically fragmented and dispersed, and political and social innovation difficult to achieve.

The Foundation has often had policy plans in mind, but it has never had a "customer", someone commissioning a piece of research. We have always commissioned our own work, and have always been able to do so due to our financial

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[3] Marcello Pacini, "Perché *Futurama*", in Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, *Futurama*, Turin, Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1983, p.65.

[4] See below, Part One.

[5] In his article "Le scienze sociali e i liiti dell'illuinismo applicato", Angelo Panebianco describes the ways the social sciences link up to the political system (in A. Paneianco ed, *L'analisi della politica. Tradizioni di ricerca, modelli, teorie,* Bologna, Il Mulino, 1989). See also Alberto P. Martini on the role of American institutes of policy analysis and their collocation in the American system: "Aiutare lo stato a pensare (e il pubblico a capire). L'esperienza americana della *policy analysis*", Turin, Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, May 1996, "Contributo di ricerca".

independence and ability to fund our own research – a situation which is unusual in Italy. The Foundation has always laid down its own "agenda", on the basis of preliminary research findings, it has sought to influence the general attitudes and culture of elites, seeking to "convince" them (if that is the right expression) of the correctness and adequacy of its analyses and proposals. It has always been a question of promoting conclusions which are the product of research – not a question of defending pre-conceived stances.

The Foundation has always been culturally autonomous. Its legitimacy to undertake work, and its authority to advance (often innovative) proposals derive exclusively from its own work. This has had cumulative effects and with the passage of time interest in our work has objectively increased.

The four foundation stones of our independence

Autonomy in its cultural choices and its work has been the hallmark of the Foundation. This autonomy naturally has bases.

One first essential basis for the autonomy of the Foundation is its internal culture. I am thinking in particular of the culture of its Chairman, Giovanni Agnelli, and its Deputy Chairman Umberto Agnelli. It was they who originally wished to start the Foundation in 1966, for they belonged to that tiny minority of Italians who were personally familiar with the workings of foundations and the role they played in the United States. In a way, the setting up of the Foundation might be described as a political act, for it was an expression of confidence in Italy and its future as a Western country, a country with a social and political system capable of hosting the new institute and appreciating its aims. And indeed the statement of the basic aims of the Foundation, contained in our founding charter, does indeed constitute a genuine political declaration – especially if we place it in the context of the times. This "original" culture has influenced all aspects of the Foundation's life, for it has allowed us to be "autonomous" naturally, helping us to be autonomous in all our work; the mere fact that our founders considered autonomy natural for a foundation has been a constant strength.

A second factor of crucial importance has already been mentioned – financial self-sufficiency. The only point to add here is that self-sufficiency has had to be managed. That is to say, we have always had to bear this constraint in mind when planning our activities. The need to balance our books has always been a management policy, and this has meant choosing appropriate organizational tools. The organization of our work in programmes has been useful here, since it has allowed us to focus resources and avoid dispersiveness and waste[6].

A third essential basis for autonomy and independence has been a "strong" cultural frame of reference, made up of a number of non-negotiable principles, i.e., values.

In the work of the Foundation liberal, democratic values are the basic culture, the basic criterion for selection, the measuring rod by which we assess problems and situations. These have made up the "strong" guidelines permanently orienting us in an ambiance which has constantly produced, and continues to produce, major elements of change.

When we made public the overall direction of our new activity in 1976 we said we were giving priority to "the most valid and innovative elements of Western culture and tradition, such as the pluralist conception of society, the existence of legal safeguards as tools for promoting and protecting democracy, the distinction and separation of roles and functions in society and government, the encouragement of participation, , of self-government and of de-centralization, while respecting the mechanisms and procedures of representative democracy, the values of responsibility and of individual and group professionalism"[7].

It may seem superfluous nowadays to mention these values so explicitly, but this was not the case in 1976. The cultural situation at the time was highly charged with ideology, and the Gramscian idea was widespread that the hegemony of a culture was both legitimate and inevitable. Anyone who was outside the "dominant" culture of the time found it useful, and even nececessary, to make an explicit statement of their

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[6] See the section below on "The main vehicle for our activity: the programme".

[7] Marcello Pacini, in *Notiziario Giovanni Agnelli*, 1, October 1976, p.1.

cultural collocation. Our reference to the "Western tradition" (and to those elements of the latter which I listed) thus formed a quiet but clear declaration that we did not form part of the dominant culture of the time.

The Foundation has always remained loyal to this stance. With time, the cultural situation in Italy has radically changed. Nowadays, fortunately, reference to Western values has become the basic glue of society. We cannot fail to rejoice in this change. Nonetheless, we have always tried to accompany this transformation critically and non-dogmatically. So we have been careful to avoid any kind of "pan-Westernism". In the course of its history, the West has had many faces, and not all the "Wests" are suitable models. We should always maintain a critical capacity for discernment. In our work, therefore, we have often sought out our "favourite West". We did this when we had to define the Euro-American cultural universe. More importantly, we placed selected elements of the Western tradition at the basis of our programmes and our work[8]. The values of the liberal, democratic tradition, and the determination to combine efficiency and solidarity form a connecting thread linking up our first activities in the years 1976-80, our 1980s research on the future of Italian society, and our current programmes on federalism, social pluralism, and the role of cities[9].

The Foundation has not been content to draw on particular values in its choice of programmes; we have also made them the explicit focus of cultural activity. The reference to values is delicate: there is a risk that one will slide over into rhetoric or into begging the question, and others may accuse one of naïveté. This last is a highly dangerous accusation for a cultural institution, for it implicitly throws in doubt its social justification – its usefulness. It is normally believed, in fact, that in the secular world appeal to values is the privilege of high-ranking politicians – part of whose official function is thought to involve the use of noble rhetoric. Over the years, there have been various concrete ways in which we have touched on the problem of values.

Between 1977 and 1978, during the last years of confrontation with the ideology which prophesied the need for an end to work, years dominated by a climate where work was being continually "disputed" in Italy, we launched a series of activities to reflect precisely on work. Our intention was to study cultural attitudes to work, and we intended explicitly to re-assert the importance of work as a positive value. To avoid the risk of preaching a sermon, we took as the basis of our work the findings of an analysis of work carried out in particular contexts, plus evidence from textbooks, and from a sample of Italian society[10].

A second way in which we have taken values as the centre of activities has been more prescriptive – our prize for ethics in advanced societies. In this case the credibility and authoritativeness of the prize-winners legitimated our initiative[11]. Since 1997 the prize has been dedicated to dialogue between the cultural universes, and to the search for a core of common values shared by all the major world cultures. The reference to

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[8] See below, Part Two, "Criteria and contents of international cultural relations in the 1980s: the encounter with cultural universes".

[9] See Marcello Pacini, "Cosa valgono i valori", *Nuova società*, 98, V. 18 March 1977, p.50-53.

[10] See below, Part One, "Seeing work positively".

[11] See below, Part Three, "The Senator Giovanni Agnelli International Prize for the Ethical Dimension in Advanced Societies".

values could not be more explicit here, for the centre of the prize is its aim to reaffirm the universality of human rights[12].

The fourth foundation of our cultural autonomy has been the chance to have our own point of view – one which has often differed from the opinions prevalent in society at large – on many of the issues dealt with in our work. These independent viewpoints have been created on the basis of frameworks built up within the Foundation. This capacity for independent judgement has expressed itself in particular decisions over what approach to take: for example, in the case of our programmes with Italian Americans, in the research on the futrure of Italian society, in the proposals for a federalist reform of the state, in our understanding of the internal complexity of cultural universes, and in the initiatives for dialogue with the Islamic world which have resulted. It has been possible to build up a "point of view" of this kind above all in those programmes where the Foundation had general conceptual frameworks and paradigms capable of explaining individual events.

This attention to conceptual frameworks and interpretative paradigms has given our programmes sound foundations, and also breadth and lasting value.

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[12] See below, Part Four, "The Senator Giovanni Agnelli International Prize for Dialogue between Cultural Universes".

A major guiding principle: the link with the world

It is of course possible to divide the Foundation's history into various periods. Nonetheless, there is great consistency running right through that history - for example, our attentiveness to the international scene. This international orientation is evident both in the fact that we have constantly been aware of the need to study developments on the world stage in our attempts to grasp the nature of social and economic transformations; and in the fact that "international cultural relations" have always constituted one of the ways the Foundation has shown its commitment to working towards the progress of Italian society.

Within this overall framework, we have, of course, had more specific objectives. Prominent among these has been promotion of Italy and Italian culture. Programmes devoted to these objectives were very important up until 1992[13]. A second major objective has been that of ensuring Italian culture is represented in cultural and intellectual debates on the international stage. I have already mentioned the Senator Giovanni Agnelli Prize for Dialogue between Cultural Universes[14], which is dedicated to what is perhaps the central problem of the era of globalization - how to find a core of values shared by all the major cultures, which will make it possible to reaffirm the universal nature of human rights (a universality which is currently disputed). The Prize - the only one of its kind - is based on our idea of cultural universes, and is organized with the help of an international network of scholars. It is one example of how Italy, and Europe, can intervene in a debate which is of central importance for all.

The Foundation has always had its own way of relating to the cultural dimension of other countries, and has always seen international cultural relations as independent from economic or political relations. In addition, it has always conceived of international cultural relations as relations between cultures - so foundations and similar institutions are simply the tools and mouthpieces of the cultures they represent. We set this approach out systematically in the mid 1980s[15], but it has underlain all our international activity since 1978. This intellectual framework has been sufficiently robust to adapt to the new features which have appeared on the world scene since 1989 - that massive spread of globalization which has multiplied the links between the world framework and national societies enormously.

These connections between the national and international level have become all-pervasive, affecting all aspects of social life, and hence all citizens. We are all in the position of having to take decisions over matters of which we know almost nothing, or (and this is usually worse still) matters we know only superficially. We find ourselves forced to run desperately after solutions to difficult problems, which are distant from our own culture, and which really require much more serious study. The urgency of the question derives partly from the fact that the dimensions are immense (think, for example, of the size of immigration from Africa and Asia), but also from the fact that many of the decisions we take now will have irreversible consequences. The international dimension has dropped down, as it were, into the internal life of national

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[13] See the chapters on "Promoting Italy and relationships with Italo-Americans", and "Beyond the West: international cultural relations in the 1980s" in Part Two of this book.

[14] See Part Four, "Cultural problems of Globalization".

[15] See below, Part Two, "Criteria and contents of international cultural relations in the 1980s: the encounter with cultural universes".

societies. This new situation is evident in European countries; it is a situation which Italy is particularly ill-equipped to tackle.

Today therefore, contact between cultures does not just occur at the international level, but also within the heart of national societies. There is therefore a natural, unbroken continuity between analysis of the establishment of an immigrant population and analysis of how we may improve relations between two countries and two societies. In practice, of course, there are large differences, the two types of issues requiring different forms of organization, different degrees of urgency, and different concrete political solutions. However, in conceptual and cultural terms, the differences are slight, or even unimportant. It should be stressed, in addition, that we are dealing with problems which are particularly serious. The solutions we adopt are liable to have irreversible consequences on the very essence of our social and political arrangements.

These are just examples of a more general and all-pervasive "internalisation" of the international dimension. The Foundation constantly tries to view Italian issues in the context of the great transformations which are occurring at the world level. In my view, this is the only approach which can produce adequate and suitable solutions. At the same time, however, we need to be pragmatic, and to subject the theories, judgements and proposals which we find in the culture of other countries to critical attention. This kind of non-ideological approach which does not accept an idea merely because it comes from outside, but is selective and critical, is only feasible if we remain capable of developing our own, independent conceptual and interpretative framework. The Foundation can serve as a useful example from this point of view.

Europe: a constant point of reference

A whole chapter of this book is given over to describing the ways in which the Foundation has linked up with Europe[16]. Here in the Introduction, I need only say that Europe has been a familiar and friendly dimension for us, an ambiance where we have been able to draw on a shared culture, where we have often been able to take examples of good practice to imitate, and in any case always study attentively. Finally, we might say (borrowing a term from industry) that Europe has acted as our "domestic market" for researchers working on our projects.

These two aspects of our relationship with Europe (an example to imitate and a source of scholars) have often overlapped. It is not surprising, therefore, that our ties with Europe have gradually become stronger over the years. This was symbolized when in 1989 we decided to publish an English edition of our journal *21st Century*, and decided to describe the Foundation on the title page as "an Italian and European foundation". This description of ourselves has never been mere empty rhetoric, but has been part of our everyday practice.

The influence of Turin, the city where we have our roots

In the Foundation's culture the idea of the city is central. We see cities as having been the actors in the most glorious stage of Italian history, and see them as having a

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[16] See below, Part Four, "The Foundation and Europe".

strategic role in the building of the future[17]. When we were promoting Italy in America in the 1980s, cities had a crucial, central place. It was perfectly natural, therefore, that we should have a special relationship with Turin, and this was in fact the case right from the years 1976-80. Part Six of the present book describes our activities regarding Turin - and I refer readers to those pages.

In the present Introduction, on the other hand, it is worth emphasizing the influence which Turin has had on the Foundation's organizational culture. First of all, the city (well-known for its hard-working people) has helped us appreciate "work". We at the Foundation have always had a positive attitude to work; we have, indeed, organized research programmes and activities around the theme of work[18]. Originally, our programme "promoting the image of Italy" added the words "and Italian work"[19]. Secondly, the fact that Turin and its economy are so open to Europe and the world has had the effect of widening our horizons, confirming us in our conviction that we need constantly to bear in mind the international dimension of matters.

In addition, economic change pushed Turin into the geo-economy before the rest of Italy, and this meant that we at the Foundation were alerted to the importance of globalization and its logic at an early stage. Many other cities, less integrated into the geo-economy, and less immediately affected by international competition and economic re-structuring, would have given us less stimulus vis-à-vis globalization and the international dimension; if we had been located in another city, our sense of priorities might well have been partially different, and we would therefore have had a different operational agenda. The fact that we are sited in Turin has meant that we have been surrounded by industrial culture in all its dynamism, its logic of permanent, continuous change - and all its contradictions.

Turin's industrial culture has also given the Foundation its style of management, so it has always seemed not just possible but fully natural that the search for efficiency should be incorporated into our research programmes and activities. Above all, it taught us to manage via objectives - which is indispensable if the results of an activity are to be properly assessed.

All these factors justify the assertion I have sometimes made that if the Foundation had been located in another city it would inevitably have worked differently.

Fostering cultural conditions in Italian society

I have already mentioned that most of the Foundation's programmes have had the objective of a) improving understanding in Italy of crucial aspects of change occurring in the world (although this international orientation has always been present at the Foundation, we strengthened it after 1989); b) fostering the cultural, intellectual conditions which make it possible for suitable policies, capable of tackling the new situation, to be worked out, managed, shared, or at least accepted.

Many of our programmes have included not just research and promotion but also a policy aspect. This was the case, for example, with our programme on demographic decline and family policy. Some programmes have put forward specific policy

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[17] See below, Part Five, "The role of cities".

[18] See Part One, "A positive conception of work".

[19] See Part Two below, "Promoting Italy's image and relationships with Italian Americans".

proposals - such as our proposals for federalism and for a "network capital", ideas we see as a suitable response to globalization[20].

Culture is an extraordinary strength and without an adequate culture any innovative project is doomed to failure. In democratic regimes, culture only becomes truly effective when it is generally shared within society as a whole, and citizens actively participate in it. When we are faced with new problems, we therefore have the huge task of spreading an adequate culture, and understanding new phenomena and developing policies to deal with them lucidly and consistently. This applies to numerous situations in present-day Italy - we might think, for example, of the need to understand the effects of the new geo-economy on Italy's various local and regional economies. The question takes on added weight and complexity when we are dealing with less negotiable features of culture, such as values. To continue the example started above (in the section headed "Our guiding principle: keeping in touch with the world"), we might think of policies for receiving non-European immigrants, where there are very deep differences among various sections of Italian society. These differences concern policy over entry, but also over the kind of policy which should be adopted over reception and integration. Yet disagreements over the most suitable kind of approach in this second area often stem from inexact knowledge of the cultures of the immigrants. In many cases, positive or negative stereotypes dominate views, or perhaps direct, personal knowledge of individuals, which, however, has no scientific value. All this constitutes a serious problem because policies for the reception and integration of immigrants have strategic importance, since it will change, permanently, the nature of our country, given that at least some of the immigrants will become Italian citizens, with all the rights that implies, starting from the right to vote.

The urgency of the problem, and the fact that it cannot be put off, means that cultural institutions have big responsibilities on their shoulders. They need to encourage the rapid spread of a culture among elites and among public opinion as a whole which provides a culture which is as adequate as possible a basis for taking decisions. Such a body of knowledge needs to be informed and to be specific (i.e., it should not be generic), so that it recognizes the complexity of the situation, and sees the very real differences existing between the various immigrant groups[21].

In reality, the majority of our programmes at the Foundation fit into this category of encouraging a given culture, or encouraging the conditions for cultural development. Even those which at first sight seem to be more directly oriented towards support for a particular policy - such as our programme on reforming the state in a federalist direction - are primarily concerned with encouraging a new culture and new attitudes. So even though we put forward a very precise set of policy proposals on federalism, in my view these proposals were useful mainly in making the idea of federalism legitimate - an objective which could be seen to have nothing subversive about it, and might indeed help Italy to cope with the new international challenges it was facing. Our intervention was thus useful not so much for its specific proposals - which certainly existed - but in the way it influenced general attitudes in the public debate. Whatever the original intentions of our various studies and pieces of research, the outcome was that we provided a useful input into the debate over bringing federalism to Italy. In particular, we made a useful contribution in bringing out the link between federalism and the new

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[20] See below, Part Five, "The role of cities" and "Reform of the state and federalism".
[21] See below, Part Four, chapter on "The cultural problems of globalization".

geo-economic situation in a globalized world. This is, therefore one more example of our approach at the Foundation, and the way in which a hopefully accurate interpretation of key world trends can stimulate proposals for innovations within Italian society.

Some general aspects of our approach

Our approach at the Foundation has been marked by a number of distinctive tendencies. The first of these is our desire to anticipate change. In 1989 we suggested that this desire to anticipate change should be a trait of any cultural foundation. On numerous occasions I have argued that a foundation like our own is doing its job when it succeeds in identifying change just before it becomes the object of political debate or social tension, or an economic problem.

In 1981 the Foundation started a programme of studies predicting various aspects of the future of Italian society[22]. However, even aside from this programme, our general approach has been that of reading "signs of the future" in today's society (to borrow a slogan from our *Futurama* programme).

Our task has been made easier in many cases by the fact that Italy has often lagged behind in its perception and introduction of change. Often, what was the near "future" in our country was already the "present" in other countries, in Euope or elsewhere. This was so, for example, in the case of the risks of demographic decline, and the need to stimulate political debate on the consequences of such decline; true also for the difficulties and dangers of migration policy; for the merits and opportunities offered by the voluntary sector; or for the importance of culture in international relations and the need to build permanent dialogue between the various cultures of the world. In general, we have succeeded in setting an agenda which has been ahead of the cultural and political debate in Italy as a whole.

A second general feature of our approach has been that we have tried to avoid organizing activities, and research in particular, in fields where other Italian organizations are already active. This criterion also fits in with our wish to cover gaps in the Italian intellectual debate.

In addition, this criterion has helped us to improve the efficiency of our initiatives, giving us a competitive edge by dealing with "new" areas which lengthened the time span during which our studies have been relevant, and altogether making the Foundation more "useful".

A third general feature of our programmes which is worth mentioning is that we dedicate equal attention to economic and social issues and to cultural and ethical issues and questions of values. In some cases, we have even tried to tie the two sides together in parallel, as in the 1980s when we conducted a programme on technological innovation and one on the cultural conditions which would encourage technological innovation, and on the current state of technological culture in Italy. Likewise, in the 1990s, we tried to study the effects of globalization on both culture and on the geo-economy.

A fourth general feature of our approach is its multi-disclipinary nature. It is thus worth stressing not only that we have tackled a very wide variety of themes, but also

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[22] See below, Part Three, "The future and technology".

that, in studying individual problems, we have employed a great variety of intellectual tools. Research conducted by the Foundation has never been limited by disciplinary barriers, and still less by being tied to one particular theoretical approach. On the contrary, when the subject of the research has made it possible, we have often combined different methodological approaches. Since we have been tackling complex phenomena such as international migration, local development or change in the family, it was natural for us to have recourse to forms of knowledge which complemented each other. This has often paid off, for it has stimulated fruitful exchanges and dialogue between specialists of various disciplines (whereas within the confines of academe, there is often little dialogue across disciplinary boundaries). Adopting a multi-disciplinary perspective has influenced the relationships we have with researchers, and also the way we organize work within the Foundation itself. In many cases it has been necessary to "push" researchers into abandoning the safety of their established disciplinary problematics and into tackling problems lying on the boundaries of several disciplines. It has also often been necessary to undertake the job of "filling in" the interstitial grey areas between disciplines - a job which could not have been done by outside experts but has required work to be carried out within the Foundation. In the case of a number of research programmes, such as that on reform of the state, the level of interest among political elites, and the level of media coverage, would never have been so high if it had not been for the interdisciplinary synthesis achieved by the Foundation's staff.

The main vehicle for our activity: the programme

The usual organizational framework at the Foundation is a "programme". This is an original organizational form, invented at the beginning of the 1980s, consisting of a set of coordinated actions, aiming at the achievement of particular cultural objectives via a complex series of activities of research, communication and cultural promotion over a number of years. So it is a set, or sequence, of studies, seminars, conferences and exhibitions coordinated together within a clear, well-defined conceptual framework.

In other words, every progamme needs to have its own intellectual bases which will outlast change in the external context. Each programme needs its own legitimation and its own independent usefulness. In addition, each programme has had to face the market of culture and of ideas alone. This has certainly increased the complexity of our activities, but equally certainly has increased the effectiveness of individual activities.

Organization in programmes has made it possible to achieve a coherent sequence which includes careful research, presentation of results, and initiatives for promoting and spreading knowledge and understanding of these findings. The outcome has been that our main programmes have been given a strong image (some have even said, as strong as that of the Foundation itself).

Our programmes have a life cycle: they have grown, split up into separate sections, given birth to entire new programmes. This books describes most of them. None of the programmes have ever been non-communicating monads, however: indeed, although managed separately, we have always taken advantage of opportunities for cooperation with other activities being carried out at the Foundation. So there are some important cases of synergy. Thus in the late 1980s there was significant synergy between our demographic research and our studies on international migration. More recently, in the

late 1990s, there has been significant synergy between our studies of geo-economics, demography, law and culture in the Mediterranean.

Our organizational model

During the years 1976-80 the Foundation adopted an organization of a type which an organizational theorist of today would define as "flat and flexible". Flat because from 1976 onwards the number of hierarchical levels was reduced to three (the Board, the Director, and the staff). (In the years prior to 1976 there had been at least five levels.) This organizational form has made it possible to share a cultural approach over the activities and objectives of the Foundation, and it has allowed rapid, efficient decision-making. Since 1981 the Director has been part of the Board; and has always felt thoroughly in tune both with the Board and with its Chairman, Giovanni Agnelli.

Our organization has been flexible in the sense that it has always had a very small in-house staff and a wide array of external researchers, advisors and experts - individual scholars, institutes and ad hoc work groups.

It is worth saying that the decision to adopt this kind of organizational form was not easy. Our ways of working naturally needed to be adapted to the cultural objectives we were aiming at, and to the Italian situation. For once, experience of how things were done abroad was of no use to us. Indeed, during the early years of the Foundation's existence (1966-75) adoption of an American model of organization was the source of many problems. For example, although the distinction between "funding foundations" and "working foundations" was familiar to us, it could not be applied directly in Italy. We needed to find an "Italian way" of organizing a cultural foundation.

Normally the factors which influence choice of an organizational model are the cultural objectives, the financial resources available, the legal framework, and other features in the external environment. In our case, however, the decisive consideration was the valuing of the organization of intellectual work in Italy.

In the United States a foundation wishing to pursue our objectives would have adopted an organizational model based around groups of researchers within the Foundation. This was not feasible in Italy. This was not just a question of financial resources or the cultural implications of carrying out research primarily in-house. It was also a matter of the constraints imposed by the market for intellectual labour in Italy - constraints which had become evident during the preceding phase of the Foundation's existence. The Foundation had already suffered from the ill effects of a rigid organization of intellectual labour, dominated by the public sector, split off into watertight compartments and discouraging any kind of mobility. The American "dream" blinded the Foundation in the first years of its life: too many specialists were taken on, who rapidly became obsolete - thus posing problems which were terrible for the individuals involved.

That flexibility which, in the USA, is achieved via mobility of "professional" foundation staff between the various foundations, and between these, the universities and government agencies, could not be achieved in Italy unless we adopted appropriate forms of organization. The Foundation thus had to maintain adequate flexibility among those carrying out work on its programmes by ensuring that new personnel could be brought in as the Foundation moved on to new fields of interest. At the same time, however, we needed to ensure there was continuity and a distinctive framework not just

in organizational and managerial terms but also in cultural terms. It was therefore decided to opt for a structure with a small number of internal staff and large numbers of outside experts (academics or free-lance researchers) who accepted to cooperate on particular research projects. Research carried out within the Foundation thus aimed primarily at establishing the overall frameworks, making explicit our aims and objectives, and reflecting on the results of our research findings and on the consequences for future projects - in other words, those aspects which are most oriented to innovation and planning.

Over the years, the exact balance between internal staff and external contracts has been very flexible: it has never been codified or formally laid down, let alone cast into bureaucratic rules. The particular balance chosen at any one time has depended on the nature of the programmes and their contents.

To take two examples from the 1980s, in our *Futurama* programme, almost all the research was carried out within the Foundation itself, whereas our "Science and Transcendency" programme[23] was undertaken almost exclusively by outside scholars. The most common situation is where external experts carry out the individual pieces of research and internal staff draw up the overall framework and the more policy-oriented implications. It should be noted that individual pieces of research are usually decided upon only when the necessary conceptual and planning framework has been worked out. Obviously, coordination within any one programme, or between programmes, and the organizing of debate and the publicising of findings has always been done solely by internal staff.

This organizational form has allowed the Foundation to be innovative and entrepreneurially active, has provided our relations with the outside world, and especially with universities, to be regulated satisfactorily, and it has made it possible to decide on programmes with great flexibility - something which has been crucial, given the great transformations which have taken place over the last twenty years in Italy, Europe, and the world.

The various phases in the life of the Foundation

The Foundation's history can be divided into a number of phases, which vary according to the variable taken into consideration. From an organizational point of view, the first years 1976-80 can be separated from the later years. We might say that in the course of these four years the cultural and managerial conditions emerged which made it possible to achieve a definitive organizational and managerial framework.

The decision to have a slim, simplified organization was taken in 1976. The Foundation took shape as a distilled "essence" which would be capable of being innovative and entrepreneurial, and one which was forced to set up a way of monitoring the outside world and creating a network of experts who would be capable of linking up and working with the Foundation's own staff.

By1980, the Foundation had found its own, original organizational form, which it has maintained up until now, based on "programmes", an organizational form which is flexible enough to take various shapes, using various combinations of external

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[23] See below, Part Three, "The culture of Italians. Technology and relationships between science and transcendency".

researchers and internal staff, in accordance with the needs of particular themes and problems.

If we consider the phases in the Foundation's history from the point of view of the contents of its activities rather than the form taken by its organization, things become more complicated.

First of all, it should be said that there are a number of major continuities running throughout long stretches of the Foundation's history. For example, the programme of cultural relations with American society which lasted up until 1992 was first started in 1976. Over time, this programme developed into several programmes (such as that for promoting Italy's image, or that for renewing ties with citizens of Italian origin in America and Australia), and became part of a more general aim (promoting Italian culture abroad); but the substance has not changed.

Other themes which were the object of the Foundation's interest in 1976-80 have had a different history. Our interest for the voluntary sector started in 1977 and came to an initial conclusion in 1980. In the years which followed interest was intermittent: we might say that it continued rather like a karstic river, continually present under the surface but only occasionally surfacing. Today the voluntary sector is present in our programme on pluralism in Italian society.

In 1976-80 the Foundation took initiatives on reform of the state, on decentralization, on reinforcing local autonomy, and on the self-government of the industrial districts. Our interest for regional government started in this context of a concern to encourage social pluralism and pluralism in government institutions, and more in general in the context of interest in economic and social actors in local and regional areas. These activities ceased in 1979, but were taken up again, with differing motivations and in a different context, in the early 1990s, in the programme on the "Reform of the State" and in our studies on federalism.

In 1980 the Foundation took a number of important cultural and management decisions. among these was the decision to seek "knowledge" concerning a curious and little-trod area - the future of Italian society. This involved initiatives for studying Italian culture vis-à-vis technological change - and more in general to find out how ready Italians were to face to respond actively to the challenges of technological modernization. Of very great significance at the end of the 1980s was our study of the culture of Italian scientists, and our related involvement in the debate on the relationship between science and transcendence (including the organization of an international conference on this theme).

If we had to draw up a balance sheet of research carried out in the 1980s, we could not overlook the complexity, yet the robustness, of this three-fold orientation: - research on the future and on the impact of technology on the economy and society, research on the relationship between science and transcendence, and the research on the culture of Italians and their attitudes towards technology.

In the 1980s the second major current was that of international cultural relations, a theme which has already been mentioned, the promoting of Italy's image and Italian culture, and relations with Italian Americans. 1989 was a great year in world history, but also in the Foundation's history, for it was in that year that we undertook a general review of all our programmes. The outcome of this reorganization was continuity with the past in terms of our methodological approach and in terms of our style of management, combined with shifts to new themes and problems.

Today the Foundation's activities continue to be two-sided, with one side turned to the world, in an attempt to understand the processes and cultural phenomena which characterize our epoch, and one side turned towards Italy in order to seek the most suitable responses to the new situation of globalization. It was via this route that (after a gap of fifteen years) we re-discovered the themes of reform of the state, social pluralism, the role of cities as a response to the challenge of globalization. Naturally (it seems hardly necessary to say this) the Foundation can only concern itself with a few aspects of globalization.

One final way in which we might divide up the Foundation's history is to consider the organizational techniques used. I have already described the organizational framework of the "programme". I might add that the early 1980s also saw the emergence of a distinction between two types of programme - those which aimed to study a phenomenon or problem, and those which aimed to identify what ought to be the Italian response to that phenomenon or problem. Within the Foundation, we refer to this second type of problem as a "response programme" - dealing with the response to external conditions, to the future, to globalization. Gradually, it has become a habit to make a link between analysis of a world phenomenon or process (i.e. something which is almost always an independent variable, which we can therefore only take as given) and study of how Italy could respond in terms of policies, and cultural, social and governmental innovations. This tendency has gradually become more established and has become a usual part of the way we approach things.

Some management policies

Public relations policy. We have always tried to make relations with the public as transparent and clear as possible, using clear language to communicate information which is precise, not vague, to explain the immediate reasons for our initiatives, and the background thinking behind them.

Nowadays the public is more familiar with foundations, and Italian society as a whole has grown up culturally. One of the most significant results of our activity over the years has been that of providing a concrete example of what a foundation can be. Perhaps we have still not done enough, for even nowadays (albeit only occasionally) we still encounter misunderstandings about what the role of a cultural foundation is - even though we are operating in a society based on the distinction between civil society and political system, and the idea that these two spheres should be in a state of dialogue with each other, but should never be confused in terms of their roles or functions.

The need for clarity was therefore very much in the interests of the Foundation itself. And from 1976 onwards, great importance has been given to communication with the public. This does not just mean giving out news briefs, but above all seeking a positive relationship with the press and the mass media, who we see as potentially difficult, yet indispensable, partners if our efforts are to bear fruit. We have always believed, in other words, that the way our initiatives are presented in the press and the media is not just a question of the Foundation's "image", but is a question of the actual substance of our work. For if our work is not reported accurately and reasonably fully, there is a risk that it will be in vain.

As part of this policy of transparency, all our publications include an introduction or presentation written by the director. For we have always considered it essential to explain the reasons why we have decided to launch a programme, carry out a piece of research, or organize a conference or a seminar. Above all, we have always considered it indispensable to place individual initiatives in their wider framework, to make them more comprehensible and to fully explain the Foundation's reasons for undertaking them.

In our public relations policy, we have always been aware that the Foundation is a body working in the voluntary sector, so cannot measure its success by market parameters. This is one further reason why we have wanted to be particularly careful in explaining the reasons for our actions.

Interlocutors and tools of communication. I have already indicated what our policy is towards the main publics for our activities. From the 1980s onwards we have seen our work as being intended for a number of publics - academics and experts, political, social and economic elites, and the educated general public. This last category has taken on increasing importance, especially in the last ten years. This is true for two reasons. First of all, the educated public is objectively more important and influential than it was in the past. Secondly, one of our fundamental convictions (one which has deeply influenced all our activity) is that we need to make all citizens aware of the consequences of globalization, for it is only if we are all convinced of what needs to be done that we will be able to find adequate responses. Thus the question of what tools of communication are to be used, of how our findings are to be transmitted, has always been seen as a crucial one - as important as the activity of study and research.

The normal path of communication towards the outside commences with presentation of the findings of a piece of research, or with a conference or press conference. In many cases, our work (research or reports) are published in a form suitable for the general educated public in our journal *21st Century*. They are then published in full. The findings of a single piece of work may therefore be communicated in four different forms. There is communication to a very wide public via a press conference; a very restricted, specialist communication via a conference; communication to a public identified on an ad hoc basis - the public to whom *21st Century* is sent; a final, more general and less controllable form of communication, to a relatively small number of readers, via a book.

Being a working foundation. A special aspect of relations with the outside world is constituted by requests for financing. Luckily, we have managed to keep to a real golden rule - golden in its propitious consequences for the Foundation - which might be described in the following terms. Declare all requests ineligible on principle, and never make any exceptions for any reason. In this way we do not enter into discussion of the merits of individual proposals, but simply decline proposals as a matter of principle and management policy. The Foundation has always been a working foundation, and thus only works on initiatives it has worked out itself. It thus works rather like a journal (NO !!!): one is invited to contribute. This policy has made it possible to set up a solid and effective dyke against the tide of requests for financing which come in from all over the world. For as soon as the Foundation announces an initiative, it receives dozens of proposals on related themes. In 1990, for example, we received 179 requests for financing, including 81 from Italy, 22 from the United States, 12 from Great Britain, 7 from France, and 57 from other countries. To fund all these requests we would have needed ten times the resources we actually possess.

The reasons behind the requests for financing were invariably noble, and nearly all (though not all) the proposals were interesting, in theory. It would have been politically disastrous to enter into discussion over the merits of the proposals. Among those behind the proposals were a number of famous names - ranging from ex-President Carter, who wished to start up a radio station in Moscow, to a former candidate for the White House, who wanted to write a book on the future of Europe. We decided, therefore, that the only option was to stick firmly to our principle of internal planning.

Initiatives and themes not included

This book does not cover all the Foundation's activities. Moreover, even among those which are covered, some are allocated much more space than others: so one may be given an entire chapter, while another is summarised in a few lines or dismissed with a reference to our *Catalogue of Activities*. This is inevitable. Any text aimed at an outside public must set firm quantitative limits and have its own internal economy. Secondly, the aim of this book is to trace the essential lines of the Foundation's activity, not to provide a comprehensive, detailed account.

Selection has taken place using one main criterion. I have chosen those programmes which have lasted in time, constituting threads which run for at least ten years or so of the Foundation's history, and so can be seen as forming part of our mainstream. Other initiatives have usually been excluded (for example, two pieces of research on

management of the sea, and of river water, or two studies of Italian television, plus a number of studies of the economics of culture). I am nonetheless aware that these are important, and that they have played a part in the life of the Foundation, and, more importantly, in the sphere of studies to which they belong.

A still more serious limit of the present book is that it is difficult to give an idea of the richness of a programme or a piece of research in the space of a few pages. This has meant that several themes which have been of considerable importance in the intellectual baggage which the Foundation has transmitted to the outside world have not been dealt with, or only very summarily. This is true, for example, of the idea of "the resource of knowledge" - that is to say that resource constituted by young people with higher education, and their role in the economy. True also for the theme of "older people" and the third age, an issue to which the Foundation has devoted much attention. Any selection involves sacrifices; we may be able to remedy matters by giving more detailed accounts of individual programmes or themes at a later date. Another theme which is certainly badly under-represented in the present book is that of education. Between 1976 and 1980 our interest in education focused on issues of general organization. During the 1980s we organized a training course for teachers on industrial culture, and undertook a number of studies as part of our Technocity programme on university education. In the 1990s we carried out several studies on the relationship between the labour market and university education. One of the results of this activity is a guide to choosing a university course (entitled *Filo d'Arianna*), which is distributed to students of secondary schools. We also organized a conference on university autonomy in the 1990s[24]. Our concern for the world of education has therefore been constant, but in many cases, this concern has been evident within the context of wider programmes. It is in this wider context, therefore, that individual initiatives have been given space.

The Foundation, civil society more generally, the political system and the state

Another key to the Foundation's work and approach is that of relationships with the political system and the state. The Foundation has always been very aware of its role as a body of civil society. One of our strongest motivations to operate effectively has, indeed, been that of giving an example of what being a body of civil society means in Italy. This has meant carrying out the numerous activities described in this book, being very aware of our membership of civil society and of the role this implies.

Civil society defines itself as autonomous from politics (even though ideally, it should be recognised in a nation's Constitution). Nonetheless, it needs also to recognise that the political system and public administration have the right to space of their own. Nor should autonomy be any bar to forms of cooperation and joint action. This is already important today, but it is to be hoped that forms of cooperation will become more common in the future. For one of the effects of globalization should be to mobilize all society and all its institutions, whether political, social or cultural, in the attempt to provide adequate, effective responses.

Two of the Foundation's programmes are fine examples of the typical forms taken by our relationship with politics and the state. The first of these is our programme on reform of the state. The Foundation carried out a set of studies, and these have given

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[24] See below, Part Five, "Civil society and self-governing organizations".

rise to a number of precise proposals for reform. It launched a debate on the findings of its research and on its policy proposals. And precisely because we are a cultural institution - hence not obliged to take binding decisions, nor obliged to seek support among the electorate - this debate could be particularly free, open and courageous.

The Italian political system showed that it was interested. It took part in our activities, invited us to a parliamentary hearing, and consistently showed that it was attentive to what we were doing. This kind of relationship (which, it is not anodyne to recall, is the most general and normal) presupposes two sides to it. On one side civil society has to produce ideas and discussion, on the other the political system has to listen and participate in a debate taking place "outside" its own territory.

The second type of relationship with politics and the state is that which is most fully achieved in our programme promoting the image of Italy and renewing links with American citizens of Italian origin. In these programmes, the Foundation (so civil society) was acting in place of public bodies, in that it was carrying out functions which, in other countries, are the responsibility of ministries of foreign affairs, or bodies connected to the ministries.

These two functions - providing a cultural input to the political system, or acting on behalf of the latter - represent the two extremes of a continuum. Along this line lie many intermediate points. One model which is currently emerging, and which should definitely be encouraged, introduces an element of conscious cooperation between government (whether at the level of state, region or city) and civil society. This kind of arrangement meets the need to mobilize all resources that I mentioned previously. It would be a mistake, however, to think that setting up this kind of arrangement is an easy task. It is necessary to preserve, and indeed reinforce, the distinctiveness and autonomy of civil society, and avoid falling into the trap of becoming a modern quasi-state organization. This is ultimately a question of cultural maturity and growth, which has implications for wide sectors of Italian society.

In the era of globalization we encounter new problems, which are, nonetheless, traditional. In this context it may not be fruitless to reflect on the Foundation's experience.

How the book is organized

The book is organized chronologically. 1976-80 is now a distant past. In terms of time, it is only two decades away, but in cultural terms, the distance is much greater. And this cultural distance is still greater if we think of certain specific questions, such as the relationship between the national state and the international economy, or the importance of non-European cultures as actors in world affairs. The cultural distance comes to seem positively enormous, to the extent that we might talk of "ancient history".

The 1980s are more problematic. For it is in those years that the great transformations began to show themselves; and the last year of the decade, 1989, is the emblematic year of a change of epoch. The 1980s are therefore the recent past. The Foundation's activities in this second phase are traced via a description of our main programmes, organized around two main axes. The first of these consists of studies and practice of international cultural relations. The second axis is made up of programmes on the future of Italian society, on technology and the culture of technology, on the

relativity of technology and the grand theme of the relationship between science and transcendency.

The third phase started in 1989 and is still continuing. This is the age of globalization - the present. The book describes the Foundation's work, once again on the lines of two main axes. The first of these concerns the impact globalization has had on cultures, and the consequences which follow for Italy and Europe. These include the need to organize peaceable living arrangements with immigrants within European countries, and dialogue with other cultures in terms of external affairs. This axis also contains a programme on cultural identity and on the future of Europe, and a programme on the geo-economy. The second axis is made up of the three programmes which constitute a response to globalization - on the reform of the state, on social pluralism, and on the role which may be played by cities in Italy. Those interested only in the Foundation's present and recent past may thus wish to read only Part Four and Part Five.

The book's final chapter covers the Foundation's activities in Turin.

Part One
1976-1980. The Distant Past

The Foundation in a "divided" Italy

The beginning

The Foundation was set up in 1966. In the early 1970s it went through a serious crisis, in its work and its identity, and it was only in 1976 that it started on its long history of uninterrupted productive activity. This long stretch of time needs, however, to be divided into two periods - a first period lasting from 1976 to 1980, and a second covering the later years (although the Foundation also underwent partial reorganization after 1989).

The changes put into practice in 1980 did not affect the Foundation's basic cultural stance, but they had important effects on organizational processes and on the decisions regarding which specific programmes to undertake. The main factor which pushed us to introduce changes was the external environment. Whether by choice or by necessity, the Foundation has always demonstrated an effective capacity to react to major external events. Not to single events, of course, but to changes in the overall framework. And since the last twenty years has been marked by extraordinary changes, it is natural that the Foundation, like all cultural institutes, has been profoundly influenced by these.

In the late 1970s national politics, whether at a party or a government level, was formed in the framework of a static, bipolar world order - so one which was extremely simplified. It was possible in many ways to consider the economic policy of a country as a variable in many ways independent of the world economy. Today the world is multi-polar and above all extremely dynamic because, for better or worse, it is being reorganized on bases which are completely different - bases which no-one would have envisaged just a few years ago. The international economy is a variable which is independent from politics, and in particular from the economic policies of individual countries. This is the reverse of the situation in the 1970s. The Giovanni Agnelli Foundation, as an institute of social research, has tried to react to these new features in the environment by grasping their implications as early as possible, selecting a number of themes, among the many we could have studied, on the basis of their feasibility as objects of study.

The first period (1976-80) lies in the distant past, as well as being brief. Nonetheless, it is worth analysing in broad essentials in our attempt to outline a number of characteristics of the Foundation. 1976-80 - years which virtually coincided with the "national solidarity" governments in power from 1976-79 - were important ones with specific implications for the Foundation.

In the elections held in Italy on 20 June 1976, the Italian Communist Party (PCI) made major gains. Although it did not overtake the Christian Democrats (DC), by taking 34.4% of the total vote, it showed that it had gained support in significant sections of the bourgeoisie. Enrico Berlinguer had stated that it was a priority to get out of the crisis situation, and he had suggested that the Communist Party could enter the government without placing Italy's commitment to international alliances (viz. NATO) in question. In other words, just three years after the idea of the "historical compromise" had been launched (in the wake of the Chilean crisis in 1973), the historical compromise seemed on the breach of being put into practice.

At the same time the PCI's compromise was not unqualified. Thus the party was careful to distinguish itself from mere social democracy, and insisted that it wished to undertake a major reform of the state. To the present writer, reform of the state appears as the strategic idea underlying and justifying cooperation with the governing coalition in these years when PCI policy was that of "national solidarity". Eurocommunism was seen as an overall political response to the problems placed on the agenda by modern society - freedom, democracy, peace and world cooperation, and yhe need to place relationships between the industrialized countries and those of the under-developed world on a new basis.

In January 1978 the American State Department reaffirmed its opposition to any entry of the Communist Party into a governing coalition. The social and political climate was exceedingly tense at the

time in Italy. Terrorism had become part of everyday life for all citizens as they read of terrorist acts virtually every day in the newspapers (there were over 2000 attacks in 1977 alone). And for certain categories of citizens (such as managers of large firms, judges, and members of the security forces), terrorism was not just something you read about in the papers but a real risk of being personally involved. The extremist movement "Autonomia operaia", and the 1977 student movement, set the general tone within Italy as a whole.

This climate was well described in a piece of research we carried out in September-October 1977[25]. We asked the classic question about how much esteem respondents had for representatives of the ruling class, and found that the police, *carabinieri* and judges occupied the top places in the ranking, showing the extent to which public order was seen by public opinion as a priority. It was in fact placed by respondents as the first political objective, with control of inflation and of unemployment being placed second and third. The importance given to these latter issues may explain the high esteem rating which trade unionists were given, especially by young respondents. In contrast, suspicion of politicians was widespread, a fact which was indicated also in the finding that, when respondents were asked to choose from among a series of types of government, the most popular formula was "a government of non-political experts".

This research on Italians' political and economic culture also showed that Italian society was far removed from the image presented by the far left. To begin with, 37.6% of Italians declared they took the United States and Germany as their model of a society, 21.5% Britain and Sweden. Only 12.6% of Italians took the eastern bloc countries of real socialism as their model (the detail was interesting: 5.7% chose the Soviet Union, 2.8% China, 1.9% Cuba, 2.2% Yugoslavia). Still more interesting were the countries chosen by those respondents who said they were communist: 7% chose China, 5.5% Great Britain, 12.7% Sweden, 5.5% Yugoslavia, 19.7% the Soviet Union, and 4.4% Cuba. Even among communists, however, the Western model was beginning to exert a pull, for 12.9% chose Germany, and 7.6% the United States. So although more people among the communist electorate continued to take the Soviet Union as their model, by 1977 even this electorate had been already contaminated by the temptations of obviously alternative models, such as Germany or the United States.

I mention these research findings because it is important to recall the cultural climate of the time. The "dominant" culture - i.e., the culture of the left - was precisely that, a dominant culture, which from a certain point of view, objectively discriminated. This was all the more true because it was very sure of itself, sure it was on the side of right, and of progress and the future. When we were setting up a cultural platform for the Foundation, we could not fail to take account of this context: we were, indeed, deeply affected by it. We were especially influenced by the Italian Communist Party's declaration that it wished to undertake a thorough-going reform of the state. This reform remained vague, yet it led one to suspect scenarios which were by no means favourable for a liberal society and a free-market economy.

The climate of the times explain the comments on the Giovanni Agnelli Foundation made by a leading left-wing politician, Lucio Libertini, at the time when a book was published describing the activities of the Foundation in the preceding years. "The failure of the Agnelli Foundation," Libertini stated, "should lead us to reflect in more general terms on the underlying reasons for it. We are living through the highest stage of capitalism, and, at the same time, its crisis and decline. When it was rising, the industrial bourgeoisie was capable of producing important threads of thought. Today it is sterile (...) The detailed description of the Foundation's work (...) makes clear, in the form of one specific example of a cultural initiative, why the "new society" of the industrial bourgeoisie has no future"[26].

It is interesting to read Libertini's assessment today, for it is a good example of ideological, preconceived hostility towards any culture which did not fit in with that of the left, and in particular towards an institute like the Giovanni Agnelli Foundation, which was, as the left was only too aware, set up by a large firm. At the time, we were working in a cultural and political context where positions like that of Libertini were normal. It was common not just be sceptical about the success of this or that specific initiative, but regarding the very possibility of a cultural institute such as the Agnelli Foundation ever producing useful, productive work. Of course, there were exceptions among intellectuals - and in fact our conferences were usually attended by left-wingers too - but the predominant attitude was that expressed by Libertini.

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[25] See Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli (ed.), *Note informative sulla ricerca "Dinamiche culturali e crisi del paese",* Part Three, "La stima per la classe dirigente", Turin, Giovanni Agnelli Foundation, 1979.

[26] Lucio Libertini, preface to Luciano Fioravanti, *La fondazione Agnelli. Cultura e potere nella strategia neo-capitalistica italiana*, Rimini-Florence, Guaraldi 1976, p. viii-ix.

In this cultural climate, we at the Foundation realized that the only the only way we could avoid being crushed by our Italian environment was to widen our frame of reference internationally. For in other countries we could widen and enrich our horizons, and overcome the psychological and cultural perception of being a minority. Our orientation to the international scene, and the importance given to international themes in our work emerged precisely at this time, as a defence mechanism in a situation where the Foundation felt (and was perceived by others as) "different".

This sensation of "diversity" did not, however, prevent us from making political assessments which took account of what was new in Eurocommunism, objectively and in terms of potential, and the difference it could make to the Italian political framework. When I presented a planning report to the Foundation's Board in February 1976, I tried to describe the crucial nature of the political moment, and the increased role of culture in this context. In particular, I argued that, in the short and medium term, the country would experience fierce controversy between political and social forces over the issue of the quality and contents of the modernization process. "The outcome of this clash will determine the contents of a change which is coming in any case: it may bring with it a high proportion of socialism and state control, or it may lead to new arrangements with a high content of pluralist democracy." "In this context," I continued, "culture and cultural institutions take on fundamental importance. Social and political ontroversy need culture, indeed, they demands it as an essential precondition. Otherwise, controversy is bound to degenerate into head-on confrontation, or flat compromise for the sake of sharing out the spoils". I added that "A society is pluralist when different cultures are able to live alongside on an equal footing, each culture bringing its own hierarchy of values. In Italian society, a number of values central to the "liberal-Enlightenment" tradition cannot be surrendered. For example, freedom of information and of expression, economic freedom, fiscal morality, the recognition of merit, efficiency and a responsible use of resources, and so on. It is by ensuring that these values are safeguarded, rather than by membership of international bodies (a membership which might end up having little real significance) that the Western-ness of our country will eventually be decided. The problem of protecting these values is therefore a real and important one for our country"[27].

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[27] Marcello Pacini, "Relazione programmatica al consiglio d'amministrazione della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli", 10 February 1976, unpublished typescript.

The decision not to be neutral

The Foundation thus decided not to be neutral, but to take up a stance which was consistent with our being a private foundation, in the camp of the West, representative democracy, and pluralism. However, our West was not a dogmatic, sectarian affair. It was, on the contrary, a West whose characteristics were specified and qualified with precision, a West consisting of values explicitly stated which were intended to guide the Foundation in its work, helping it to choose what themes to select for study. This made our collocation clear, and this became immediately clear in terms of consonance or dissonance with concrete policies which were being debated in Italy.

The Foundation undertook research and cultural activities which placed us in a stance which was sharply critical of the political forces governing the country. This was only natural for an institute which took as its objective the understanding of problems and the fostering of change. In particular, it was clear to us that we could not assume that "the parties defeated on 15 June 1975 [the DC and its allies] are the proprietors of the pro-West position, while the winners [the PCI] are the proponents of a programme of bureaucratization. There is no doubt that forces favourable to genuine modernization can be found among the latter, while residues of pre-industrial culture may be found even among those who appeal to Western models and values". So we took a critical attitude of autonomy and independence, clearly distinguishing between cultural collocation and mere political alignment.

Alongside our certainties, there were, naturally, areas of doubt and uncertainty. The main one concerned the idea that Italy might become a kind of experimental workshop of the West. This notion had been thrown into the international arena by Guido Carli at a meeting of the International Monetary Fund in Washington in 1975, and subsequently became part of the Italian debate. Carli had described Italy as a fruitful field of studies, a large-scale "economics workshop" for researchers all over the world - confident as he was that Italy's problems were those of the West as a whole, yet especially accentuated, and thus more easily visible than elsewhere.

We at the Foundation were tempted by this idea - which was, in fact, mentioned in our programmatic statement. We argued that "this combination of national problems and problems affecting the whole of the West makes the collocation of a cultural institute easier, especially in the case of a less powerful country like Italy, for it is the first time that the hypothesis has been put forward suggesting that Italy may be taken as a workshop to analyze socio-economic development in the West as a whole"[4]. This was a hypothesis which took the debate over Eurocommunism and the modernizing of the role of the left in Italy and Europe as a central element of change in the political framework.

We soon realized, however (partly through our direct contacts with other countries, and especially the United States) that this idea was highly abstract. And a document written soon afterwards, in fact, reverted to the traditional idea of Italy as being in a perennial state of backwardness. The Foundation was said to be able to "find an opening in the need which the political parties and other political forces have of keeping up with cultural and political development in the other European countries, in order to give some definite content to the declarations everyone makes of their determination to keep up with Europe. The Foundation can spread knowledge and awareness of solutions provided by other European nations to national problems. Realization that there is a lack of information of this kind seems to be growing"[28]. As time went by, this kind of approach became more common in our work, and eventually became one of our standard ways of working.

In the framework I have outlined, the ways of working have not been described. Yet these operative procedures needed to be consistent with the nature of a cultural institution wishing to remain completely detached from party politics. This insistence that our work and proposals must be quite separate from party politics has remained a constant at the Foundation. Gradually, this was placed in a theoretical context by stating that the Agnelli Foundation, like all foundations, belonged to civil society, and thus needed to intervene on policy issues without confusing its role with that of the political parties.

It was possible to espouse this kind of relationship because we had a conception of the social sciences which saw them as serving to stimulate general cultural orientations, rather than aiming at contributions which could be used directly in attempts at social engineering. So our priority publics were not this or that political party, but rather particular social groups.

The consistency in our overall cultural orientations over time was shown when, at the beginning of the 1990s, the Foundation had to identify possible Italian responses to the new challenges posed by

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[4] Ibid.

[28] Marcello Pacini, "Primo scema di obiettivi orientativi", September 1976, unpublished typescript.

globalization. For the Foundation had the advantage that it was able to draw on its own culture and tradition.

During the years 1976-80 a number of themes, re-discovered in the 1990s in our search for responses to globalization, had already been the object of research and cultural activity. This brought the notable advantage that we were able to remain consistent with a number of value assumptions which characterize the Foundation, and which have played an important role in the choice of general lines of research and study. Of course, we did not simply turn back to themes we had covered before. We re-visited old fields, with eyes attentive to the revolutionary novelty wrought by globalization. Our basic orientation was the same, for the external environment and political and cultural circumstances demanded this. Above all, we returned to an orientation which stressed the importance of de-centralization and the self-government of cities and local and regional geographical areas. We went back to the principle of subsidiarity, and to the value of solidarity and that of personal responsibility. All these values had been very much present in the Foundation's life, influencing the themes we had chosen to study, and in the policy proposals we had put forward, from the later 1970s onwards. Those values and general orientations had been present in nearly all the Foundation's programmes (even in those which dealt with issues which were, at first sight very different, such as the studies on the future, or the population predictions undertaken in the early 1980s).

So when the new world situation raised (or rather, imposed) the question of the role played by cities, and by civil society, and the urgency of a reform of the state in a federal direction, the Foundation was well equipped to tackle these new demands correctly and with care.

The roots of the Foundation's "comparative advantage" lie between 1976 and 1979 - years which were crucial in deciding our cultural stance. It was in those years, in fact, that the Foundation succeeded in establishing cultural activity in a context dominated by Marxist culture, and succeeded in working out frameworks of interpretation which were very distant from ideas of class struggle or cultural hegemony. The Foundation placed an idea of pluralist society at the basis of its activity, and adopted a rival set of values to those dominant at the time, and its own criteria of how culture could intervene in society.

We believed that pluralist society had to be characterized by legal guarantees fostering and protecting democracy; by the separation of functions and roles in society and government; by the encouragement of participation, self-government and de-centralization (while still respecting mechanisms and procedures of representative democracy); by the values of responsibility and individual and group professionalism; and by a combination of efficiency and solidarity[29].

These were the liberal values which, in those years we preferred to call liberal-democratic, in order to discourage any association with the Italian Liberal Party, but also because we wished to refer to a set of values which combined the liberal, free market tradition with Christian values. In the background there was unchanged faith in reason as a key tool in any search for innovative, reforming action. However, we did not have in mind any supposedly omnipotent "Reason" with a capital R, which would do everything on its own in some kind of deterministic way, but rather a bounded reason which was obliged to seek out appropriate forms of intervention working through social actors existing in society as it really was. Reason on its own was not enough, as was clear from the many "exposés" issued by a number of (often prestigious) research institutes, which nonetheless regularly fell upon deaf ears.

Our conception of the relationship between the social and human sciences and innovation

Alongside the reference to the value system of liberal democracy, and our consequent decision to take up a non-neutral cultural stance, our conception of the social sciences was crucial in determining the way the Foundation was organized, and in deciding what programmes were undertaken. Particularly important was our conception of the relationship between social research, its uses, and innovation and change in society.

In 1976 we argued that the tendency to merely expose social evils or inefficiencies was a symptom of an Enlightenment perspective which placed excessive faith in Reason as being able to achieve things by its own force, imagining that sermons, exhortations and exposés could produce political innovation. We saw the Italian Enlightenment tradition as having being characterized by an excessive emphasis on pedagogic exhortation, and by a tendency to concentrate too exclusively on action at the government level.

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[29] Marcello Pacini, *Notiziario Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli*, 1, October 1976; idem, "Relazione programmatica al consiglio d'amministrazione della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli", op.cit.

We believed, on the contrary, that rather than simply proposing "the right", "rational" solution, it was more fruitful to analyze the developmental trends which existed in society, and imagine how these trends could be encouraged or corrected. This implied a type of research which took greater account of the social groups existing in society - the real bearers of interests, and the relationships between such groups. "If we are to go beyond this tradition of Enlightenment political practice", I wrote at the time, "the system of values which Enlightenment culture continues to provide us with needs to be re-positioned as a partial, but essential reference point for cultural activity"[30]. This was the working space which the Foundation had identified: we intended to work alongside other cultural bodies contributing to modernization of Italy, bringing our own vision and our own contribution consistent with our cultural stance. As I concluded in my programmatic report, "This contribution can be achieved first of all via encouragement of a kind of social research which goes beyond the mere exposé, and becomes constructive proposal. This means that research needs to be in permanent contact with the historical reality of the country and its trends of development. It also means that no lesser attention needs to be paid to changes in the social and economic structure, and to obstacles (in ideology, in the political culture, in the political framework) which impede the acceptance of innovative proposals"[31].

One way to avoid pure exhortation was to identify the social actors which might carry out a particular type of reform. In those years, a number of social actors were indeed identified (the middle strata, managers and middle managers in industry, teachers, volunteers in charities), not to mention cities (although these came on the scene in our work only in the mid-1980s).

So the pluralist society has been our objective, the values underlying pluralistic society have been our reference points, and we have envisaged specific social groups, or complex, socially-rooted entities like cities (but also industrial districts) as being the actors bringing innovation and reform. This was already the framework which marked out the Foundation's activities in the later 1970s, and in various forms it has continued to characterize our work in later programmes.

In this context of discussion of our work in the 1976-80 period, we cannot fail to mention our initiatives on the voluntary sector, our studies of regions, of local authorities, and of governance of industrial districts, our activities and studies concerning the culture of work, and our research on the middle strata (managers, industrial middle managers, and the self-employed).

The discovery of the voluntary sector

Voluntary work is a fundamental, strategic sector and cultural dimension in a pluralist society. It became part of the Foundation's work as far back as 1977. In fact it entered forcefully, for parliament was debating the role which the private sector might play in the social field, and was expressing the intention to increase levels of control and bureaucracy in social interventions. We wished to put forward a different vision of things, and this led us to a complex set of research activities in Italy and abroad[32].

The theme proved to be extraordinarily interesting, since it had strong links with the theme of values, and posed the issue of how social services could be re-personalized at a time of triumphant bureaucratization. And it also touched on issues which were crucial for the Foundation such as regional and local decentralization. Finally, it represented a path towards Europe.

The first research on the voluntary sector was undertaken in 1977. This was the start of a programme which had a crucial role in the life of the Foundation, although it is a theme which has sometimes been

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[30] M. Pacini, *Relazione programmatica al consiglio d'amministrazione della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli*, op. cit.

[31] Ibid.

[32] See Corrado Paracone, Giuseppe Nicoletti and Stefania Maurino (eds.), *Servizi sociali: autonomie locali e volontariato. un'ipotesi di lavoro*, Turin, Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1978, Quaderno 20/1978. For the work the Foundation carried out on the voluntary sector in those years, see: Giovanni Agnelli Foundation, *1976-1986: dieci anni di attività*, Turin, Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1986, pp. 142-45; for more recent work, see Maria Pia Bertolucci and Ivo Colozzi (eds.), *Il volontariato per i beni culturali in Italia*, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1992; Maria Pia Bertolucci (ed.), *Solidali con l'arte. Secondo rapporto sul volontariato per i beni culturali e artistici in Italia*, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1997.

submerged, only to re-surface later on - rather like a karstic river disappearing and re-emerging in a limestone landscape. A number of studies were carried out in Italy, analyzing the experience of different geographical areas and different voluntary associations, and comparing this experience with that of groups in West Germany, the United Kingdom, France and Belgium. In 1978 we were able to draw up an initial report, and publish the first findings of our research - which confirmed the importance of the theme and its fecundity as research, and above all as a policy proposal.

In 1978 the debate on the welfare state was reaching Italy, but our research showed clearly that in the European democracies the debate had been in course for some time. Whereas Italy was still discussing how to organize the welfare state, our neighbours were discussing how to change it.

The research on the voluntary sector, and on how to encourage its growth and capacity to organize itself, were connected to our wish to introduce the Italian political and cultural world to a new policy of social services. More in general, we wished to contribute to a new philosophy of public intervention in the economy and society. I wrote in 1978: "It is indisputable that the trend which leads the state, the regions and local authorities to take on increasing burdens of financial support, and increasing direct supply of social services can only end in bankruptcy, inefficient bureaucratization, and de-responsabilization. We need to find a different approach (first of all in terms of a different culture, then in terms of specific policy proposals); in this new approach, the growing role of public bodies should be concerned primarily to guarantee rather than directly manage an ever-growing range of services for the collectivity"[33].

This assessment looks very realistic nowadays. It was this assessment which made us think that scope for expansion existed for the voluntary sector in Italy - provided that it was willing to undertake a qualitative leap beyond the kind of framework which was prevalent at the time. For charities needed to combine their spontaneous activity with more organization, and perhaps needed to link up with public bodies.

Our research on voluntary work also had close links with our attempts to encourage regional and local de-centralization. The Foundation's idea was that although responsibilities over economic and social functions needed to be given back to regional and local government, this should not be a question of taking away from central government tasks which would be difficult to manage on a smaller scale: it should rather be a question of using resources differently and more autonomously. Simplifying matters somewhat, this meant moving from a purely passive role of giving out funds and services to a new way of providing services which would be different from the traditional ones, and not cast in the bureaucratic, state mould. We envisaged these new services giving greater responsibility to the user, and meeting real needs more closely.

In 1978 the political spectrum was made up of a left, which was still in the grip of a prejudice in favour of state-run, centralized services (as we wrote at the time, it was "opposed to anything which was not public and run by official organizations", and the rest of the political panorama which was quite devoid of alternative ideas (with the exception of a small group of DC members of parliament).

Our programme on the voluntary sector was thus a useful opportunity to provide an input correcting this situation. Studies were carried out, and seminars and a conference held. At the end of this first phase of work, voluntary work had a new image. Two phenomena were noticeable - there emerged a broad political alliance in favour of giving the voluntary sector a wider role; and research and discussion multiplied. A crucial moment in this process was the conference we organized at Viareggio (28 February - 1 March 1980) to give voluntary workers themselves a chance to discuss the issues the research had thrown up, and to provide a meeting point between representatives of the voluntary sector and those from elsewhere, in particular politicians[34].

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[33] Marcello Pacini, «Presentazione» in Corrado Paracone, Giuseppe Nicoletti and Stefania Maurino (eds.), *Servizi sociali: autonomie locali e volontariato*, op. cit., p. v.

[34] See Luciano Tavazza, Marcello Pacini, Corrado Paracone, Nicolò Lipari, Gaetano Piepoli, Gianni Ottolini and Associazione Cultura Assistenza Popolare Roma, *Volontariato, società e pubblici poteri*, Bologna, Edizioni Dehoniane, 1980, which contains some of the speeches from the conference organized by the Foundation on «Volontariato e pubblici poteri» (Viareggio, 28 febbraio-l marzo 1980). Apart from the editors of the volume, the conference included interventions by: Aurelio Peccei, Vincenzo Cesareo, Achille Ardigò, Filippo Barbano, Giuseppe Bicocchi, Elvina Degiarde, don Aldo Ellena, Nuccio Fava, don Alfio Filippi, Livio Labor, Maria Eletta Martini, Alfredo Merlini, monsignor Giovanni Nervo, Gian Piero Orsello, don Giuseppe Pasini, Patrizio Petrucci, Domenico Rosati, Giovanna Rossi Sciumé, Michela Santerini e Alberto Valentini, as well as Virginio Rognoni and Vito Scalia, who at the time were Minister of Home Affairs and Minister for Research.

Naturally enough, we found some interlocutors who were especially important - in particular, a group of politicians. Indispensable, of course, was the world of the voluntary sector, which took part actively and in great numbers, both at a grass roots level, and at the level of more complex organizations, such as Caritas. Thirdly, there were researchers - sociologists, legal experts, economists, experts in communication, and others - who helped us to discuss the problems that might be involved in changed legislation, and in linking up the voluntary sector with other sectors of society.

The conference was an important operation which succeeded in establishing dialogue between people who would normally never have imagined meeting - such as Alfredo Merlini, chairman of the charity "Misericordie", and Aurelio Peccei, chairman of the Club of Rome. It also contained some abrasive exchanges. Left-wing, secular representatives of public welfare services felt they had to show political and ideological loyalty to the political coalitions governing the Regions in central Italy; these Regions were in fact engaged in introducing social and legislative measures which conceded very little to the voluntary sector and its demands for more space. Members of the voluntary sector had the (fully justified) suspicion that they were often considered as merely a residual part of the system, one which, at best, might be used to fill in the gaps the public services did not manage to cover.

Themes discussed at the conference included: a new normative framework for the voluntary sector at the national and regional level; what should be the relationship with the labour market; the varied experience of the voluntary sector in social services; relations of charities with the mass media, with schools, and with public opinion.

Rarely had a cultural initiative had so much success: all our objectives had in fact been met. First of all, charities were given a new image, as something belonging to the modern world, bearers of social innovation who were recognized as such in other European countries. Ancient institutions such as "Misericordie" were helped to see where the future could lie. The new image was rapidly transmitted to public opinion, for the press devoted considerable space to the event. Finally, relationships were consolidated with representatives of the political establishment, and this culminated in the subsequent introduction of legislation for which the voluntary sector had been pressing.

The Foundation's research and conference thus allowed us to clarify the crucial distinction between responsibilities best carried out by the state and those best carried out by civil society. In a country still under the dead hand of bureaucratic ideology this was no mean achievement. Our consciousness of the fundamental importance of this distinction had gradually accumulated in the 1960s and '70s as more and more areas of Italian society were taken over by the parties. As I wrote in 1980 in my introduction to the proceedings of the Viareggio conference, "this clear demarcation between what is the responsibility of the state and what is the responsibility of civil society is one of a small number of fundamental features which characterize a democratic, representative democracy"[35].

In 1980 we were very aware that the significance of the voluntary sector could not be reduced to the field of social policy. Whether or not individual voluntary workers themselves were aware of the fact, the voluntary sector was, and is, a watershed between different types of society. It was for this reason, that, in my introduction to the Viareggio conference proceedings, I referred to Tocqueville, and to the importance he gave to voluntary associations in the United States.

As I have said, the voluntary sector has been a programme like a karstic river: it is a theme which has never disappeared from our work, even though it has sometimes been submerged. Today it is an essential part of our research area on social and institutional pluralism in Italy[36].

Reform of the state, of the regions and local authorities (1976-80)

Even before our current involvement in the debate over federalism, the Foundation took part in discussion over reform of arrangements for government. In 1976-79 the Italian Communist Party moved towards external support of the governing coalition, and it seemed possible that it might actually enter the government; it was significant in this context that it had raised the problem of a reform of the state. There was a flurry of interest in, and research on, the Regions, and the Foundation took an active part in this.

[35] See M. Pacini, «Introduzione» in Luciano Tavazza, Corrado Paracone, Nicolò Lipari et al., *Volontariato, società e pubblici poteri*, op. cit., p.15.

[36] See Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, *1976-1990: quinze ans d'activité,* Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1990, pp.170-73. See also Idem., *Catalogo generale delle attività*, *1976-1998*, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, in press.

Italy's general situation suggested that major reform of the framework of government might be advisable, especially as there were signs of the economic system getting out of hand due to excessive levels of industrial and social conflict. The search for new levels of political decision-making and mediation of interests needs to be seen in the context of a more general climate open to new forms of political participation and direct democracy.

All these issues were important as part of the general question: how to organize democracy in Italy in the future? Two positions opposed each other. On the one side there were those who wanted to encourage participation, self-government and de-centralization, while still keeping to the mechanisms and procedures of representative democracy. This was, of course, the position the Foundation shared. On the other side there were those on the left who saw democracy as a new and different organization of the masses. The two perspectives implied differing concepts of state functions. Those championing the first position wanted a state which was distinct from the social body, and from trade unions and political parties, a state which acted as guarantor of the rules of the democratic game. Those adhering to the second position, on the other hand, seemed to envisage social forces as undertaking a kind of state function; so it seemed as though the unions in particular would become part of the state.

Given the crucial nature of these issues, the Foundation launched a broad programme of activities which, although tackling a number of different specific themes, were brought together by a shared orientation. The idea of all these activities was to increase participation among citizens, decentralize powers, and create a basis of financial autonomy for local government. Parliament had passed legislation setting up the Regions, and great hopes were placed in what appeared to be a reform with profound consequences, one which would solve many problems. The Foundation thus mobilized a considerable number of scholars and experts who, on various occasions, and using different methodologies, analyzed and discussed the new roles of the Regions, the role of local authorities in the economic system, financial autonomy of local authorities, and the reform of local administration and finance[37].

Via the conferences and studies we organized[38], a series of themes were raised, which have never been satisfactorily resolved. For example, that of the "wide gap which has grown up between authorities which have the power to make decisions over spending, and authorities which have the power to make decisions to raise income"[39].

The programmes started in 1976 tried to define what we believed should be the responsibilities of the Regions as against those of the central state, and the local authorities. This implied new kinds of arrangements which had no precedent in Italy. In 1977 I wrote, "the responsibilities of the Regions need to be defined and distinguished from those of the central state on the one hand, and from those of the local authorities on the other. New kinds of state arrangements which do not have many precedents need to be worked out - for a kind of "regional state", a kind of "third way" between a "centralized" state and a "federal" state needs to be invented. And it needs to be ensured that there is not overlapping between the new arrangements and the old ones, leaving the latter largely intact. This danger is obviously acute in a country where overlaps between competing institutions are so common, and where bodies survive long after the functions which they were originally intended to perform no longer exist. Finally, it needs to be ensured that the Regions - which are intended to encourage more participation from citizens, and be more flexible and agile than the central state in responding to local needs - do not simply reproduce all the mistakes of centralism in their new ways of working, their ways of formulating legislation, and their culture. It is to be hoped that they will also avoid the vices of particularism, and the limited, parochial,

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[37] See Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, *1976-1986: dieci anni di attività*, op. cit., pp. 129-33 and 136-9. See also Franco Levi, Sergio Bartole, Sabino Cassese, Fabio Merusi, Giuseppe Pericu, Alberto Azzena, Massimo Carli, Antonio Carullo, Giuseppe Contini and Enrico Dalfino, *Le Regioni tra Costituzione e realtà politica*, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Agnelli, 1977; Mario Nigro, Gustavo Zagrebelsky, Giorgio Berti, Fabio Roversi-Monaco, Giorgio Pastori, Francesco Trimarchi, Franco Bassanini, Franco Pizzetti and Dino Piero Giarda, *La riforma della amministrazione locale*, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Agnelli, 1978.

[38] See Marcello Pacini, «Presentazione» in Giuseppe Gatti, *Autonomia finanziaria del Governo locale. La finanza locale tra economia e istituzioni,* Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Agnelli, 1978, Quaderno 29/1978, pag. 4.

[39] For Franco Levi's contribution, see in particular, «Regioni e pluralismo» in F. Levi, S. Bartole, S. Cassese *et al.*, *Le Regioni tra Costituzione e realtà politica,* op.cit.

and backward-looking perspectives which often accompany that great vivacity which characterizes much of Italian life in the periphery"[40].

In my introductory remarks to the conference on "The Regions in the Constitution and in Political Reality", I explained why we saw the Regions as so important. "Our particular attention for the Region is due to the fact that we believe it has a strategic significance, for it is situated at the junction of numerous problems and numerous demands. Think of the problem of the balance between conflict and consensus which is so crucial for the quality of industrial relations, and for the launching of concrete processes of industrial reconversion and economic planning. Or of the search for a balance between the new forms of participation in social life, which inevitably segment the self into separate packages, and the need for the political individual to find some more unitary expression. These are just two reasons why the regional level should be considered strategic in plans to reform the state. In our view, even more than an organizational reality, the Region is a cultural reality - a cultural reality whose meaning should be recovered and recognized in the history of Italy. For regional identity does not undermine but contributes to a deeper and more rational sense of national solidarity"[41].

This conference was part of a wider programme, entirely focused on ways of reinforcing local authorities. We wished to identify both the new functions local government might have, and the ways it could be given financial autonomy. This was something which was common all over Western Europe at the time. For it had come to be widely recognized that new dimensions were necessary, and that the times of "bigger is better", in fashion in the late 1970s, were over[42].

We realized that in its work a foundation needs to identify new social trends - in this case, the search for government institutions of new dimensions - while at the same time taking account of the historical specificity of each individual case. The Foundation tried to apply this principle to a number of specific cases, trying to see how the various social and political forces and the various cultural threads present in a particular case linked up with each other. We came increasingly to value the local level and de-centralized organization, and came to hold that there should be a great transfer of functions, autonomy, power and responsibilities. We believed that even the central state would benefit from this process of decentralization in the end, since it would emerge as more efficient and more legitimate. "The idea that we may overcome the current crisis and find a new prosperous future (both in terms of economic prosperity and above all in terms of civic vitality) via the return to dimensions which give a priority to personal responsibility has been put forward by many. The need for institutions of smaller dimensions is certainly particularly acute in Italy"[43]. "Is this wishful thinking? There seems to be solid evidence that decentralization has solid and ramified structural foundations. For precisely the vitality of civic life in the towns and regions seems to be one of Italy's greatest strengths. Indeed, we might even say that, in the absence of a full-blown tradition of deep-rooted social and political consensus, it is precisely this complex, sometimes confused, bundle of energies in the periphery which have "kept the country on its feet" both economically and politically. And even though it might seem paradoxical, we might even say that the same bundle of local energies has also kept the country together - i.e., maintained national unity - after years of crisis and virtual power vacuum (or at least a lack of any nationally unifying capacity on the part of the central state). The Foundation has tried to describe these aspects in the fields it has investigated - at the level of institutional change, in the culture of social groups, and in governance of the economy"[44].

Governance of systems of firms

Our interest in "governance of the economy" was closely tied to our concern for reform of the state - if for no other reason that it shared the same underlying orientations.

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[40] See the «Presentazione» in Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli (ed.), *Regioni verso la seconda fase. Sintesi di un dibattito*, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione, Quaderno 13/1977, 1977, pp. 4-5.

[41] Marcello Pacini, opening remarks to the conference «Le regioni tra Costituzione e realtà politica», Turin, Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 29-30 April 1977, unpublished, p. 2. See also Marcello Pacini, «Cosa valgono i valori?» in *Nuova Società*, 98, V, 18 marzo 1977, pp. 50-53.

[42] See *Notiziario Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli*, 3, December 1977, pp. 1-4.

[43] Ibid., p.1.

[44] Ibid.

We intended to study an aspect of the Italian situation which had traditionally been a weak spot, yet had strategic importance. This was the need to define what was the role of political bodies in the economy, and what was the space which should be left to companies and unions. In detailed terms what we did was to study the capacity of local systems of firms to govern themselves, and the role which local government might play.

The programme on "Decentralized management of development and smaller firms" focused on small and medium-sized companies and on local economic systems. Local systems of small firms were often highly successful economically. We wished to use this context to pose the issues of self-governance and self-identity - the principles which underlay our research on local authorities and the regions. The research brought out a number of problematic aspects of the Italian economic system - in particular its fragmentation, and the high levels of specialization in particular forms of production which characterize many local areas, as well as the lack of coordination between different levels of administration and organization. All this called for forms of economic management which were specific to Italy and different from those existing in other industrialized countries.

The workshop argued in favour of forms of management which supported the decentralized initiatives of entrepreneurs and of their local and industrial associations. The seminars we held to assess and discuss the research were attended mainly by managers, entrepreneurs, and officials of chambers of commerce and of industrial associations. Although they had the problem of extracting practical uses from our research, they brought to the seminars a precise knowledge of real situations at the local level[45].

The programme as a whole had the ultimate objective of defining a system of governance for Italian local economies. Each of these local economies was different from the others; they were all small-scale; and all were seeking to find a balance between competition and moments of cooperation between firms within the local area. They desired state intervention to resolve the lack of services and to create infrastructure, but at the same time they were fearful of excessive state interference. Each local economy was a microcosm oriented to the world, each with its own patterns and characteristics. In the workshops this richly "Italian" diversity emerged more strongly than it did in the research. To govern this kind of situation, what seemed most suitable was self-governance, flexible forms of cooperation not tied down in too institutionalized a form, cooperation based on shared culture and shared interests rather than on legal, institutionalized government forms.

So we argued that systems of small and medium-sized firms were systems and cultures which were suited to governance based on autonomy of local areas, rather than on centralized coordination. It was preferable to obtain local support than to impose orders from above, the commands of a remote central power. These were the underlying principles of the programme which continued up until 1980, tackling themes and problems which were central for the Italian economy, and reinforcing the image of small and medium-sized firms as a central element in the Italian economy (something which was not yet fully recognized at the time).

A positive conception of work

In the Foundation's culture there was immediate interest in work as a founding value of our society. At the time, work was being challenged and often described in terms of social pathology, a product of capitalism which society could and should rid itself of. At the end of 1976, therefore, a first decision was taken, which was to have great significance in the Foundation's life, for it led to the development of research on the middle strata, the initiatives on education, and later influenced our American programmes on the image of Italy and on Italian Americans. This decision was to undertake an initiative on the culture

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[45] See Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, *1976-1986: dieci anni d'attività,* op. cit., pp. 132-3. See also Arnaldo Bagnasco, Piera Cucchi and Ermanno Jalla, *Gestione decentrata dello sviluppo e le imprese minori. Organizzazione territoriale dell'industria manifatturiera in Italia*, Turin, Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1977, Quaderno 16/1977; Berardo Cori and Gisella Cortesi, *Gestione decentrata dello sviluppo e le imprese minori. Prato: frammentazione e integrazione di un bacino tessile*, Turin, Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1977, Quaderno 17/1977; Roberto Artioli, Rosella Barberis and Flavio Iano, *Gestione decentrata dello sviluppo e le imprese minori. L'economia delle piccole e medie industrie in Italia*, Turin, Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1978, Quaderno 30/1978; Berardo Cori, *Gestione decentrata dello sviluppo e le imprese minori. Le piccole e medie industrie in Italia: aspetti territoriali e settoriali*, Turin, Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1978, Quaderno 34/1978.

of work and on the re-valuing of work. Only someone who remembers the intellectual climate which prevailed at the time can grasp how innovative it was to talk about "re-valuing work, and in particular manual work". The general social climate was "against work", and above all was opposed to considering work an ethical value. One of the leading aspects of the critique of the state and of social institutions was the critique of a positive culture of work.

Ideological prejudice thus provided a critical orientation which rejected and condemned Western society in its actually existing manifestations, and thus rejected its historical heritage as well. The importance of the work ethic in the construction of the industrialized West was both well known and roundly criticized. Anti-work culture was widespread in many sections of society and many institutions. It seemed almost taken-for-granted that one should be against work, which was seen as invariably alienating. And it was almost intellectually obligatory to be in favour of a society where the expressive, play element was to the fore - a society where one would spend most of one's time playing music, reading and so on.

This was what gave us the idea of reflecting on work as a value, and analyzing the economic and legal status of manual work compared to non-manual work[46]. We also adopted other methodological approaches, including sociological field studies, and international comparisons. This was one of our first attempts to understand an Italian problem by going to another country (in this case, France). The result was highly positive, for it made us realize the parochialism of Italian perspectives; in France there was already an Under-Secretary for Manual Work whose tasks included re-valuing the image and culture of manual work.

Our programme continued with research on images of "work" in secondary school textbooks, and with a study of Italians' economic culture. The two pieces of research made key contributions to the overall picture, for they revealed the existence of two Italies.

The textbooks (which were, of course, written by authors, and published by publishers) contained an idea of work which oscillated between an Arcadian myth and a glowering inferno. There was no realistic conception of work and there was certainly no attempt to provide pupils with "an image of work which was not just problematic and critical, but also a sound, positive image of what is the most characteristic activity of adulthood"[47].

The information we gleaned from the sociological research I have cited was of extraordinary interest[48]. While the authors of the textbooks might be considered representatives of "educated", intellectual Italy, the survey revealed a grass-roots, non-intellectual Italy, the Italy of those who actually practiced the numerous trades of a complex economy. This Italy had a positive image of work. It was familiar with work from direct experience, and did not make it into a myth - neither a positive, Arcadian myth, nor a negative, hell-like one. Above all, this Italy sought out work, and wanted to have it, for it was seen as the key to taking the historical opportunity to attain prosperity and financial security.

This difference in the perception of work - seen through the eyes of Italians as a whole, and through the eyes of intellectuals - was the central interest of the programme. This led us to undertake an initiative which had a slightly campaigning tone to it - an initiative which later led to wider commitment to promoting industrial culture in schools in 1981.

This initiative was the decision to make a "multi-vision" production (an audio-visual product, of a type we were to use many times in the future). The idea was that this could stimulate public debates which we would organize in various parts of Italy. The title of this film was "School, work and social change: pictures for a debate". The standard pattern was to start with a public debate and then follow this

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[46] Among the various activities the Foundation organized around this theme we may mention the conference "Lavoro manuale e lavoro intellettuale» (Turin, Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 3-4 maggio 1977) with speeches by Luigi Firpo, Ermanno Gorrieri and Filippo Barbano; on the same theme, see Ermanno Gorrieri, *Il trattamento del lavoro manuale e le sue conseguenze*, Torino, Edizioni della Fondazione, 1977, Quaderno 14/1977; Luigi Firpo, *Il concetto del lavoro ieri, oggi, domani*, Torino, Edizioni della Fondazione, 1978, Quaderno 18/1978; Luisa Ribolzi, *I mestieri inventati. Lavoro manuale e lavoro intellettuale nei libri di testo della scuola dell'obbligo*, Torino, Edizioni della Fondazione, 1978.

[47] See Marcello Pacini, «Presentazione» in L. Ribolzi, *I mestieri inventati*, op. cit., p. 7.

[48] The findings of the research entitled «Dinamiche culturali e crisi del Paese» (1977-1979)", directed by M. Pacini and A. Bruschi, with a survey carried out by Doxa, were published in part in 1979 by the Foundation itself in eight numbers of our series «Ricerche». See Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, *1976-1986: dieci anni di attività*, Torino, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1986, pag. 146.

up with a showing of the film for schools. The whole event lasted about four days on average. We organized the first debate at Modena, and fourteen other cities followed. Among the cities we visited was Padova which, as readers may remember, was going through a particularly "fiery" period at the time[49].

"Work" as a value has always remained a hallmark of our activity. It was no accident that our American programme was entitled "Promoting the image of Italy and of Italian work". And it was no accident that, in that programme, we gave such emphasis to Italian migrants to America - i.e., to people whose only wealth lay in their capacity for work. We saw work as an expression of responsibility and of human dignity, and as one of the principal channels to individual and collective growth and progress. In what now seem the far-distant 1970s, all this was seen as backward-looking and reactionary. Yet it was a correct way to look towards the future. We certainly did not evade new themes, still less the demands imposed by changing conditions. So we had an extremely realistic idea of work.

In 1978 we published a book on the image of work in school textbooks. It is worth re-printing the first two paragraphs of the introduction to that work, for even twenty years later the problems are the same, and little has been done to solve them. "The serious problem of youth unemployment has forcefully and urgently raised the question of the need to improve, or indeed found on new bases, the relationship between school and work. After years of disinterest in the question, or even of systematic attempts to insulate school from working life, it is now being realized that this split is arbitrary, abstract and dangerous. In the past it used to be asserted that school prepared its pupils for life, and thus for work. Now there is a tendency to ask how schools can incorporate activities into education which are already "work"; or to ask whether it is possible to alternate years of schooling with years of work. We are thus moving beyond the idea that all citizens should be given a life divided into three successive periods - school, work, and retirement on a pension. We are realizing that this is no longer necessarily the highest result obtainable by industrial society and the welfare state. At times our discussion of work has a taste of visions of the future (as in the case of alternation between school and work). More often, it has tried to respond to immediate needs, such as the need to find a better balance between general education and occupational skills, so as to facilitate the relationship between young people and work, and thus ease their entry into work in a real and concrete way"[50].

The idea of an alternation between school and work was taken up by the Foundation again on a number of subsequent occasions. In particular, it became a key idea in our concept of "the flexible society", which we offered to the Italian debate in the 1980s as a solution to the challenges of the future[51].

The programme on the middle strata

The programme on the middle strata was carried out between 1978 and 1982, in an Italy which was still unaware of the direction in which the world was travelling. At the beginning of the programme, it seemed natural for us to stress the role of industrial managers and middle managers, even though the *March of the Forty Thousand* (employees and management) which took place on 14 October 1980 was quite unthinkable. Our focus on the self-employed (*artigiani* or self-employed manual workers and craftsmen, shopkeepers, and farmers) was more unexpected.

We therefore carried out research and organized a conference. This received a very hostile reception from the press, which interpreted it as a political attempt to undermine the alliance which was currently at the centre of media attention - the alliance between the left and a section of the bourgeoisie, or between "all producers of profit" against rentiers (to use the language of the times). In reality, our initiative had quite different motivations, as I tried to make clear when introducing the work.

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[49] At Modena (13-15 novembre 1978) the multi-vision product was presented in cooperation with the Municipality, the Province, the Chamber of Commerce and the Associazione Industriali; at Padova (20-22 marzo 1980), together with the Regione Veneto, the Municipality, the Associazioni Industriali and Gruppo Giovani Imprenditori. This was one of the last times the exhibition was put on; it took place at a time when the political climate was very tense. See Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, *1976-1986: dieci anni di attività* op.cit., pp. 153-54.

[50] M. Pacini, «Presentazione» in L. Ribolzi, *I mestieri inventati* op.cit., p. 5.

[51] See below, Part Three, ch.1, «Futurama, new means of communication, and the problem of deciding what public to aim at».

My introduction mentioned the fact that Italian culture had little familiarity with sociological analysis applied to the reality of the nation's society. Up until the 1950s the only critical models in Italian culture were those provided by philosophy or history. And even after that time, the social sciences had provided inadequate models of what social analysis could be. In general, culture remained sceptical about the cognitive and policy value of the social sciences. In particular it was notable that Crocean hostility to the social sciences was matched by the hostility of Marxism. "Secondly", I noted in my introductory remarks, "if we except the 1960s, when some attempt was made to investigate Italian society in connection with planning, a tendency rapidly became dominant within sociology which assumed that the aim of the discipline was to unmask society as a whole, rather than to further understanding of a part of society". "Yet it has never been so important to know more about Italian society, so that we can find the most appropriate means for carrying out the reforms which are needed. It is in this belief that the Foundation has started a programme of research on the middle strata"[52]. Since the 1960s the international literature had been telling us that the middle classes were expanding, and that this was a feature of industrial society. If we wished to avoid vague general statements and useless polemics, this implied that there was an urgent need to know more about what was the real situation in Italy.

In December 1977 the annual report of the research institute CENSIS had created controversy by reporting growth in the middle strata. Disagreement had focused on the question of whether the growth meant embourgeoisement of the working class, or whether it represented extension of the proletariat. This kind of polemic had no positive outcome in terms of an increase in knowledge: it simply showed the sterility which resulted from paying too much attention to the political identity of researchers and the label attached to those commissioning research.

In our case we did not wish to theorize on the middle strata in general, but to distinguish them according to the type of relationship they had with society. So in the conference we presented findings of our research on the self-employed, while studies on industrial managers and middle managers were still in course. In my introductory remarks, I noted "important theorists of industrial society, from Dahrendorf to Crozier to Bell, see expansion of the middle classes as the most characteristic features of the advanced societies. So characteristic, indeed, that it almost constitutes a parameter to measure the level of social and material development reached by the various national societies"[53]. Italy was no exception, and an extensive middle class had formed in the years of post-war development.

Once this important phenomenon in modern society had been identified, analysis was immediately distracted by a pseudo-question regarding the economic role of these middle strata. This was normally posed in the following terms: there exist productive strata - entrepreneurs and workers - and parasitic strata. The middle strata, or at least the great majority of them, are parasitic strata. Hence growth of the middle strata is not a sign of economic advance, but an indirect and negative effect weighing down the physiological development of society led by the productive strata.

In my introduction, I mentioned some early findings from our research, which confirmed that there did not exist strata which were parasitic by definition, but rather parasitic situations within each and every class, with no exceptions. And I argued that the self-employed and small businesses made an important contribution to Italy's economic development; in particular, they made an essential contribution to employment. The idea was decidedly ahead of its time, and it was received with great suspicion. The idea of an alliance between producers, against the so-called parasitic strata, still formed part of generally accepted cultural baggage, as well as part of the dominant culture, and a more modern, complex vision of Italian society was firmly rejected. This was the result of lack of faith in social analysis and of concomitant ideological prejudice.

Reinforcing ties with the United States

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[52] Marcello Pacini, introduction to the conference «I ceti medi indipendenti in Italia: 1971-1976», Torino, Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 18 April 1978, unpublished, p. 1; this conference, coordinated by Corrado Barberis, was followed by other studies on industrial managers and middle managers, which produced several conferences and publications between 1977 and 1983; see Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, *1976-1986: dieci anni di attività* op.cit., pp. 54-5, 70-2 e 150-1.

[53] M. Pacini, introductory remarks to the conference «I ceti medi indipendenti in Italia: 1971-1976» cit.

Right from the start, in 1976, our programme of cultural relations with American society was a "strong" one. The programme began with political motivations: the idea was to reinforce cultural relations with the United States at a time when there was a risk that Italy be considered strategically necessary, but anomalous and marginal in the Western world. We started by establishing a formal tie with Harvard University, where we signed a cooperation agreement (29 October 1976) with the Center for European Studies, headed by Stanley Hoffmann, to organize a Permanent Seminar of studies on Italy.

The aims of the agreement were to strengthen cultural exchanges between the United States and Italy, and to set up a permanent study centre on Italy in a strategic point of American culture. The agreement included prevision for an Advisory Committee, on which scholars from all the East Coast universities would sit. And indeed, members of the Committee included, alongside Hoffmann, Sidney Tarrow (Cornell University), Suzanne Berger (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), Norman Kogan (University of Connecticut), Robert Putnam (University of Michigan) and Peter Gourevitch (University of Toronto).

The seminar started work in spring 1977, with a session on industrial de-centralization in Italy, led by Suzanne Berger, followed by an autumn session, introduced by Robert Putnam, on political de-centralization. The seminar became a most important forum for thinking and discussion on Italy, for numerous American scholars with interests in Italy took part, as did Italians resident in the United States, such as Franco Modigliani, Robert Leonardi and Raffaella Nanetti-Leonardi, along with many others.

The first concern of our programme was to inform American scholars of the permanent complexity of Italy. This was important because at the time, interest was visibly concentrated around the one theme of Eurocommunism - or rather, "Italian communism". Although interest in this theme was amply justified in consideration of its intrinsic interest, and because any victory of Italian communism would have constituted a major change in the international scene with immediate effects on American foreign policy, such exclusive concentration on one issue was arbitrary and dangerous for it meant having a one-sided, distorted view of Italy. This concern to provide American culture with a more complex and intelligently critical view of Italy was what was behind the setting up of the Permanent Seminar on Italy.

We believed the Harvard Seminar should be part of a wider framework of cultural relations. This wider project took formal shape in a first, major conference held at Florence in May 1978 on cultural relations between the United States and Italy[54]. The main question underlying the conference could be summarized in the following terms: given that "in political terms, it is indisputable that relations between a super-power and a small-to-medium power are unequal", is it possible to correct this imbalance via cultural relations? The reply we at the Foundation gave at the time was in the affirmative, for we believed there existed "a shared objective of limiting the negative consequences" of the imbalance in political weight. However, we argued that, this could be done "only if the United States has the most complete and thorough knowledge possible of the Italian situation"[55].

The first objective of cultural relations with the United States was thus to limit the damaging effects of excessive imbalance in weightiness and power. Confident as we were in the rationality and values of American society and American political forces, we believed the most obvious way to reduce the imbalance was to provide information. Our confidence in rationality as a tool of political action was bolstered by the illusions prevalent in the 1970s regarding the idea that Italy might be seen as a "workshop" or (if one preferred) the weak point where crises general to the whole of the West emerged in particularly visible form. This idea seemed to suggest that Italy, and Italian culture and politics, had the opportunity to work out ideas and plans which would be interesting for all the countries of the West.

In reality the idea of creating a new, more egalitarian framework of cultural relations soon proved to be unfounded and mistaken, for a number of reasons. Firstly, Italian society, and even more so Italian politics, did not produce anything important in those years which could be of interest to American culture. (Absurdly, the only thing which could have been of interest, if it had been institutionalized, was the feared Eurocommunism.) Secondly, the vigour of American society and culture was so great that it was almost impossible to establish the kind of egalitarian relationship we had hoped for. Thirdly, in the years

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[54] The speakers at the conference were Renzo De Felice, Paolo Farneti, Nicola Matteucci, Roland Sarti, Stanley Hoffmann and Samuel Barnes. See Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, *1976-1986: dieci anni di attività* op.cit., pp. 25 and 105.

[55] See Marcello Pacini, «I rapporti culturali fra Italia e Stati Uniti: interessi reciproci e ipotesi per un'azione comune» in Samuel Barnes, Paolo Farneti, Roland Sarti, Nicola Matteucci, Stanley Hoffmann and Renzo De Felice, *Italia e USA: giudizi incrociati. Italy and USA: mutual judgements,* Torino, Edizioni della Fondazione, 1979, p. 13.

which came immediately afterwards, the processes of globalization began to make themselves felt, undermining any scope for national "solutions".

We had, therefore, to follow a different path. What we did was to place at the centre of our activity and our objectives improvement of Italy's image in the United States. We aimed to give a more complex, more accurate picture of our country, less based on stereotypes. Rather than being just one path among others, we realized that this was the only way to achieve our aims of attracting greater attention for Italy's problems in the United States and giving Italy more weight in American debates. We therefore started a complex set of activities, organized in several programmes, lasting up until 1992. There is great consistency underlying these various activities. They developed primarily in the 1980s, and it is more satisfactory to describe them all together[56].

Simplifying our organizational structure

In the years 1976-80 the Foundation took on a new, original organizational shape. In the Introduction[57], I referred briefly to the reduction in the number of hierarchical levels, and to the introduction of a flexible pattern which allowed us to expand or contract in size.

The problem of the cultural committee was complex and politically more delicate. The first directors of the Foundation, Vittorino Chiusano (Secretary General) and Ubaldo Scassellati (Director) were familiar with the Italian university world of the 1960s, and rightly feared it. They had been afraid of the destructive influence of university "barons" engaging in power struggles to place their various pupils, with a clientelistic logic towards the use of resources. These were concerns which were amply justified and which I shared. We thus had the brilliant idea of nominating a cultural committee which was composed mainly of prominent foreigners, with just five Italian members. In this way we managed to escape the dangerous embrace of the Italian academic establishment, which was nonetheless forced to recognize the legitimacy of the Foundation's desire to give itself a cultural committee made up of world famous scholars[58]. This committee eventually proved to be useless and unwieldy to manage. It involved too much translation of preparatory documents and excessive difficulties in communication. Above all, there was too great a gap between the cultural interests of the members and the Italian reality which the Foundation needed to link up to. The members of the Committee themselves were embarrassed and confused because they did not see what they should express an opinion on. Their attitude was very different when they were asked something about their own research or thinking, or about the state of their discipline or the state of their countries. They were very interesting on these subjects, and anyone who had the chance to listen to them came away enriched. However, this kind of knowledge could be gained by going to visit them in their own countries, through direct contacts and interviews. The Committee in contrast had definite tasks and duties fixed by the charter, and its meetings could not be seminars of high culture nor brain storming sessions.

In addition, a committee of this kind was an obstacle to good relations with a part of the Italian university establishment because it accentuated the Foundation's distance from the Italian university world. Luigi Firpo confided to me once that it functioned as a deterrent to cooperation because it was assumed that the Cultural Committee would have to approve individual relationships of cooperation or express their judgment on the results. And Italian academics, however authoritative, had no wish to have to face even the hypothetical possibility of "judgment" at the hands of foreign colleagues.

However, if an international cultural committee did not work, it certainly could not be replaced with Italian academics. The fears of the past remained, and to these there was another consideration, which was decisive. We believed that although the Foundation would draw on researchers with a university background, it needed to explore new fields of research and approaches less tied to established frameworks. We also thought we should make use of younger scholars, with fewer worries about university careers. Above all, we thought that a serious attempt ought to be made at interdisciplinary

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[56] See Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, *1976-1990: quinze ans d'activité* cit., pp. 111-43.

[57] See above, in the Introduction, the paragraph headed "Our organizational model".

[58] Giorgio Bassani, Karl Dietrich Bracher, Francesco Cosentino, Michel Crozier, Stephen R. Graubard, Max Kohnstamm, Harold D. Lasswell, Gilberto A. Marselli, Giuseppe Parenti, John Pinder, Sergio Ricossa and Paul N. Ylvisaker, and later Clifford Geertz, Guy Serge Métraux and Umberto Colombo.

research, and believed we could not give up our plan to put adequate resources into private research, outside the university.

These ideas did not fit in with the idea of having a cultural committee made up of Italian academics, for the latter would inevitably have asked for disciplinary boundaries to be respected, and would have looked askance at independent, non-university researchers. We therefore convinced ourselves that the best thing to do was to abolish the Cultural Committee as part of the changes we made when simplifying the organization overall[59].

As I have already mentioned, further simplification was obtained by unifying the two management figures, the Secretary General and the Director. The functions of these two posts were brought together under the new post of Director. This latter term was preferred because it had a more managerial sound to it ("secretary general" rather made one think of a political post). At the time we did not realize it, but we were going in the right direction, towards a slimmer structure, with the number of hierarchical levels reduced to a minimum (what is today called a "flat" organization), and with definitions of tasks and work roles which tend to be flexible and polyvalent.

With these changes to the Foundation's charter, we set up an organizational structure which has lasted all these years. It has allowed the Foundation to be flexible and entrepreneurially active, it has regulated our relationships with the outside, and in particular with the university, in a satisfactory fashion, and it has allowed great flexibility in the outlining of programmes - something which has been indispensable given the great changes which have occurred in the last twenty years in Italy and the world.

1980. End of a period and renewal of our programmes

As is well known, in the years 1979-80 the political and cultural climate in Italy changed radically. The Italian Communist Party went back into opposition (1979), and trade union and social conflict became more acute (1980). These were the most visible features of a situation in which it became ever clearer that the Italian left of the time no longer had a coherent political project. In addition, the failure of Eurocommunism as a credible possibility occurred against the background of the rise of free market liberalism. This accentuated the crisis of traditional social democratic-type policies, and also made relations with the Soviet Union increasingly antagonistic. The cultural ideas of the Foundation (embodied not just in declarations of intent, but also in the concrete form of the work we had conducted over the preceding four years) were now surrounded by an international debate which had greatly changed.

The underlying principles of the Foundation were thus situated in a very changed overall context, one which would have seemed inconceivable just a few years earlier. We might think, for example, of the balance we were proposing between freedom and solidarity - something which was not just a matter of verbal statements, but also of concrete commitment concretely via our initiatives on the voluntary sector. It soon became clear that the Foundation no longer had to measure itself against the ideas and projects of the Italian and international left, but rather with those which were coming from the liberal tradition and liberal culture. Cultural debate and discussion of political projects had shifted to being within the vision of Western society. However, this does not mean that the task was any the less complex. In our work we expressed a vision of a society where freedom existed side by side with solidarity, the protection of rights, and the exercise of responsibility. This was a vision of society which raised criticism and opposition in Western countries and culture. By this time it had become difficult to use the categories of liberal and conservative for the problems were more complex, and the traditional distinctions no longer held. Thatcher, for example, was nominally a conservative but her political projects were deeply innovative, even revolutionary.

The path we needed to follow to make our position clear was a descriptive one. We needed to make our vision of affairs explicit via intellectual and practical statements, and at the Foundation, through our programmes and our policy proposals. A new situation was emerging both in Italy and internationally. In

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[59] In the years which followed, the Foundation continued to work with certain members of the Committee, in particular Michel Crozier (who took part in our research on European political parties), Stephen R. Graubard (who we met a number of times in the United States, especially as director of the review *Dædalus. Journal of the America Academy of Arts and Sciences*), Paul Ylvisaker (who coordinated the study the Department of Education at Harvard carried out for us in 1979-80 on the image of Italy and Italian Americans); our contacts also continued with John Pinder and with Max Konstamm, although these did not take the form of particular, tangible products.

Italy a new hard line was prevailing in social relations and dialogue between the political parties was becoming much less common. Internationally, confrontation with the Soviet Union had returned, and there was a victory of hard-line free-market policies. This led to drastic change in the Foundation's programmes (although certainly not to any change in our underlying cultural orientations).

The new situation demanded further innovation, however. After reflecting on the new cultural and political climate, we came to the conclusion that the usefulness and authority of the Foundation would be best safeguarded if we were the almost exclusive proprietors of some "rare" knowledge. In other words, we needed to operate in innovative fields, not tilled by others. This led the Foundation to focus much of its work on two main directions. The first of these was made up of the programmes of cultural relations with the two Americas which had the aim of promoting the image of Italy and "discovering" Italians in the world. The second was formed of the programmes on the future of Italian society. The cultural relations programmes might be seen as representing continuity, for the roots of these programmes go back to the years 1976-80; the second represented a new departure, for they originated in the years 1980-81[60].

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[60] These programmes were not the only activities we carried out in the 1980s; we also did work on education, and on industrial culture in schools. See Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, *1976-1986: dieci anni di attività* op.cit., pp. 155-64.

Part Two
From 1981 to 1989. The Recent Past

I. International cultural relations and cultural universes in the 1980s

Chapter One
Criteria and contents of international cultural relations in the 1980s.
The encounter with cultural universes

The Foundation's commitment to renewing international cultural relations

Today there are a number of particularly important new elements on the scene, compared with the 1980s, that is to say, compared with the era "before globalization". Among these elements, one of the most significant, yet least explored, is the importance which cultures are playing in world affairs. This raises a series of issues, particularly with regard to the consequences of the encounter non-Western cultures are having with modernity.

A second new element - one which is less visible, more uncertain, and still largely to be built - is the role that civil society is taking up in international relations. Today we can say that the monopoly which states used to have over international relations has been broken. This means that civil society no longer restricts itself - as used to be the case - to influencing specialists in state bureaucracies which are linked more or less directly to the state; members of civil society are acting directly abroad, and hence are undertaking international activity.

This is one of a series of phenomena which show how, in the contemporary epoch, the rationality of state bureaucracies is not up to the complexity of problems and situations. Within state bureaucracies themselves, there is an incipient recognition (I say "incipient" because it is still contradictory and uncertain) of this fact that civil society may have a new role to play. The matter was clearly discussed at the 1995 Barcelona Conference between the members of the European Union and the states on the southern shores of the Mediterranean. The Barcelona Conference gave civil society a fundamental role in the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue, for it proposed that this dialogue should be organized on three levels: a) a political and strategic level, reserved exclusively for states; b) an economic level, for which firms are responsible; and c) a cultural, civil society level, where all organized bodies of the civil society are involved.

This represents recognition of the complexity of international relations in the age of globalization, as well as being a consistent application of the subsidiarity principle which is one of the fundamental principles underlying the building of Europe. The principle of subsidiarity fits in with the cultural climate of a number of European countries, including Italy, and hence has come to influence the field of international relations - encouraging what is called de-centralized cooperation, involving local authorities, universities, associations and foundations. This new role for civil society has only just begun, and will certainly meet numerous difficulties, as usually happens with all innovations.

The difficulties can be better managed if there is clear awareness of the framework in which we are working, and of the tools which we can, and should, use. In other words, it is useful to have a conceptual framework in which single actions can be located. Since we at the Foundation have been pioneers as an organization of civil society active in International Cultural Relations (ICR), our experience may be useful to others from a number of points of view.

The first reason for this is that in the 1980s we organized an intense and complex set of activities of ICR in the main areas of the world (North and South America, Australia, the Far East, South East Asia). Secondly, these relations almost always were with organizations of the local civil society; thirdly, precisely in order to give a sense to the complexity of the relations, we have been forced to define the contents and objectives of ICR, and work out an overall conceptual framework which indicates the subjects, the sites, and the typical forms taken by ICR.

The framework which we have taken as a reference point for our work can be summarized as follows: international cultural relations are autonomous from political and economic relations. They have their own subjects, ends, roles, time-scale, and means - none of which should be confused with those of

political or economic relations. The active subjects of cultural relations are cultural universes, and foundations or institutes of culture are merely tools. Cultural universes (Euro-American, Chinese, Islamic, etc.) are not internally homogeneous but differentiated and pluralist, and they are the most adequate way to represent the cultural complexity of today's world.

Successive events have confirmed the validity of this intuition, and over the years the Foundation has thus continued to work on this conceptual framework, which it first worked out in the 1980s, enriching it in the light of the pervasive effects of globalization, which appeared at the beginning of the 1990s. It is a logical framework which it seems more appropriate to define nowadays as a "paradigm" - an explicatory criterion of a certain phenomenon, in our case relations between cultures, or (as we prefer to say in the Foundation) cultural universes, and for the activities which have the aim of organizing such relations - viz., international cultural relations[61]. Today an essential aspect of international politics is dialogue between cultures. The dialogue is mainly with Islam, but it is not difficult to see signs of an extension of this approach also in other directions, for example towards China. Dialogue and international cultural relations are two ways of defining the same activity.

In the 1980s therefore the Foundation started up work which can now be seen as pioneering, and as one of the most valuable aspects of our activity. This work has a number of strong points to it - a precise idea of what cultural relations and cultural universes consist of - and has been organized in several programmes, each with specific objectives.

The first programmes focused on the Euro-American universe, whereas subsequently the Foundation widened its interest to other areas. These initial American programmes, which aimed at re-establishing contact with Italian Americans, and at promoting the image of Italy in the world, came to a halt for the time being in 1992. The programmes dedicated to other cultural universes were started at the beginning of the 1980s and have grown progressively in importance in the course of time, eventually becoming central in the Foundation's work in the most recent years.

Systematizing our experience

At the beginning of our American programmes, in the late 1970s, the problem of international cultural relations manifested itself mainly in the form of the need to clarify Italy's image, bringing out the great complexity of the country, stressing that Italy could not be reduced to what was happening in the news, pointing out that it was necessary to understand Italy in a long-term, historical perspective.

The encounter with the world of Italian Americans certainly enriched our perspective - both culturally and politically. This experience had two great advantages. First of all, it brought out the real importance and complexity of the theme of cultural relations between the United States and Italy. We were even led to hope that political advantages might come out of the relationships we established with Italian Americans, who made up an important electorate, eagerly sought out, of course, by any American politician, whatever their ethnicity. At the same time these relations forced us to avoid reducing our activity to giving information about the Italian present, for they demanded a wider cultural frame of reference - strong ideas which were capable of lasting in time and surviving political changes. This led me to focus our activity around two key ideas - an "idea of Italy" and an "idea of America"[62].

The second advantage of these American contacts was that they stimulated us to think about international cultural relations (ICR) in the contemporary world more in general - a great, neglected theme which went well beyond the problem of relations with the United States. This happened in the 1980s, when I undertook an effort to clarify the concept of ICR, which led me to define what were the subjects and the dimensions (including the spatial dimensions) at issue. This was a question of making explicit intuitive knowledge and working principles which had been guiding our actual practice for some time - not just in our American programmes, but also in Australia, Japan and China. It seemed necessary, however, and indeed urgent, to formulate these principles more precisely. A fundamental outcome of this effort was the elaboration of the concept of the cultural universe[63].

For the Foundation the early 1980s were a genuinely crucial time, with decisive consequences, for from then on ICR became a central plank of our activity. With the passage of time, individual activities

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[61] See below, Part Four, "A new mental map of the world".

[62] See below, the chapter on "Promoting the image of Italy and relations with Italian Americans".

[63] See below, in chapter one of Part Four, the section entitled "Cultural universes and modernity".

have changed, but the Foundation has always continued its commitment to cultural dialogue at the international level. The roots of that activity go back, therefore, to those years when we worked out the concept of cultural universes - a concept which has if anything become still more central in our work. As I wrote in the mid 1980s, "Given the greater complexity of the international system, and the increase in the number of states, two aims have become increasingly important. It has become necessary to create tools to ensure governability, and necessary to prepare the cultural, social and economic terrain which will allow these tools to work properly. The greater complexity of the international system, and the increase in the number of actors (the number of states and of international organizations is constantly on the increase) mean that it is necessary to set up adequate means to ensure that political frontiers do not become cultural frontiers, preventing the flow of ideas and restricting cooperation and mutual understanding. In other words, we need to devote more attention to International Cultural Relations and to insist that these be fully autonomous"[64].

What international cultural relations consist of. Their objective and their autonomy

In the 1980s it was already evident that great transformations had taken place in ICR, making them completely different from the past. In Europe we were used to thinking of ICR as activities undertaken exclusively by official bodies, set up by governments - bodies such as the institutes of Italian culture, the Goethe Institutes, or the centres of the Alliance Française. It was not properly grasped that international cultural dialogue was becoming more and more a question of relations between societies (a situation which had, however, prevailed in previous historical periods), and that, at least in the richer, more complex societies, the tools and the actors of dialogue ought to become more numerous, to include foundations, publishing houses, associations, and even some industrial or financial companies. In the United States, for example, since the 1970s, the major foundations (in particular the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations) had played an important role in encouraging international cultural dialogue, and this had proved very effective, especially in spreading familiarity with the social sciences.

Since we realized that it was necessary to make explicit our distance from a model of ICR which saw them as the province of purely official bodies (the image which was dominant in the 1980s) I believed that it was useful to discuss the nature and objectives of ICR. Although it involved theoretical elaboration, this had eminently practical aims. I intended to explain what the Foundation was doing in America and other countries, and at the same time put forward our work as an example of a new way of conceiving of international cultural relations, a new approach which took bodies in civil society as the vehicle of dialogue between societies and cultures.

What we needed, therefore, in the first place was a new definition of ICR, and at the same time an unequivocal declaration that these relations were autonomous. This was fundamental, because autonomy of the cultural dimension was a necessary condition if civil society was to be involved. Otherwise ICR would inevitably be flattened by other considerations - political, economic or political-strategic - which were legitimate in their own right, but quite separate. Experience had shown that, as traditionally conceived, ICR were almost totally subordinated to political or economic considerations. We believed, in contrast, that political, economic, and strategic or military considerations might condition cultural relations in the operative phase, deciding where and when particular initiatives might be put into practice, but should never have a deciding influence in defining the conceptual framework. Otherwise, ICR would inevitably be reduced to activities of promotion (almost marketing) for a given political line or for economic or trading interests. This idea of ICR as autonomous has since gained some ground, but it still has not been completely accepted.

I certainly did not hide from myself the obstacles which existed between the idea and putting it into practice. "The essence of ICR (I wrote in the "Introduction" to *Euroamericani*) is to increase different cultures' knowledge of each other, especially when this mutual acquaintance is hindered by geographical distance, by administrative barriers, by language, or by a lack of common traditions. Alongside these objective obstacles, we find others of a more psychological nature; in many cases, mutual

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[64] See Marcello Pacini, "Introduction to *Euroamericani*, vol.I, Francis A.Janni, Rudolph J.Vecoli, Salvatore LaGumina et al., *La popolazione di origine italiana negli Stati Uniti;* vol.II, Francis Korn, Isidoro Ruiz Moreno, Ezequiel Gallo et al., *La popolazione di origine italiana in Argentina*; vol III, Rovílio Costa and Luís De Boni, Lucy Maffei Hutter et al., *La popolazione di origine italiana in Brasile*, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1987, p.8.

misunderstanding or ignorance give rise to stereotypes, prejudices and suspicion, which make it difficult to understand the persons or the ideas we are confronted with"[65].

These considerations implied that ICR can never be completely delegated to the play of the free market in culture: they need to be organized, coordinated, directed and promoted. At the same time, governments were not always able to preserve the autonomy of ICR from political interference. It is these limitations of the ministerial bodies on the one hand, and the culture industry on the other, which means that, however necessary both are, there is an important gap - which needs to be filled by civil society.

We summarized the objectives and contents of ICR under a number of essential points. First of all, we argued that it was necessary to "study the major processes of cultural transformation in the main regions of the world - for familiarity with change in these areas is essential not just to understand what influence such change is likely to have on Italian society, but also to understand, and if possible, predict how the international framework is liable to alter.

The second aim is to survey and study individual societies and countries, going beyond any government propaganda which may exist, and beyond ideological interpretations and, of course, stereotypes. This second objective is in reality a more detailed aspect of the first"[66].

Thirdly, there is "the objective of spreading the findings of studies of major transformations occurring in the world's regions and single countries among Italian scholars and public opinion. For research is only useful when it is turned into generalized, widespread knowledge". Indeed, the usefulness of research is greater to the extent that not just "restricted categories, such as business people, politicians or intellectuals" are affected, "but also the general public - which in recent decades has more and more frequently had to cope with the effects of international phenomena. European history is full of myths regarding distant cultures and peoples, many of whom have profoundly influenced European political and cultural life"[67]. The way that China's image has changed in European society is a useful and interesting example: "we went from the 18th century myth of the Chinese sage to that of the yellow peril in the late 19th and early 20th century". In few other instances has "the same culture had such profoundly different images of the same object. This difference was partly a product of change in the cultural conditions of Europe itself - which saw what it wished to see; in part, it was a result of change in objective conditions. The two images had in common the fact that they drew amply on myths and prejudice, and gave little space to objective knowledge about Chinese society"[68]. It seems reasonable to think that similar situations may occur in the future (not necessarily with regard to China of course). And although both kinds of stereotypes are negative, there is no doubt that the second is much more pernicious: "for a climate of a besieged fortress, with all the implications in terms of autarchy and xenophobia, is not such a remote possibility for European society (...) The results which we can obtain, via suitable cultural relations, to make the features of these still distant cultures clearer, constitute the best antidote to the rise of irrational, emotive attitudes - which are always damaging and often dangerous.

A fourth objective is that of promoting Italian culture abroad. This is the traditional objective of ICR. The way this aim is put into practice depends on the cultural area or the country in which a particular activity is organized.

Cultural relations include a series of activities which can have the object of influencing the overall image of a country or a society, or specific aspects of their culture, science, politics, economy or social structure. To achieve these aims, a wide variety of means may be adopted - from scholarships to exchanges of experts, seminars and conferences, research and studies, the publication of books and reviews, the circulation of films, documentaries and audio-visual products, or art exhibitions. In the industrialized countries, most of these means can be called into play using a series of circuits which could be, but rarely are, coordinated: I am thinking here of the public, governmental circuit, the private circuit of foundations, and that of the culture industry (publishing houses, or cinema and television, for example). The important thing is that the exchange should take place in two directions. Otherwise, the result is just propaganda. Totalitarian countries usually place obstacles in the way of cultural relations and simply spread propaganda. (...) Cultural relations need to be adapted to the individual countries which are involved. The culture, history, international political collocation and level of economic and technological development in a particular country all influence the contents of cultural relations. The first reason why

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[65] Ibid., p.10.

[66] Ibid.

[67] Ibid., pp. 10-11.

[68] Ibid., p.11.

this is so is that the decision to take an initiative in cultural relations should spring from a need or curiosity. Our interlocutors seek dialogue, or accept it, because they too are motivated by the same kind of need or curiosity"[69].

Cultural exchanges normally occur in parallel with other kinds of relationships (political, economic, trading, etc.); but they must not be taken over by the latter.

Another aspect of the autonomy of cultural relations is the fact that they need to proceed at their own pace - a pace which is certainly slower than that of other kind of relations. This implies specific tools and ways of working - often tools which are more abstract and less visible than is the case with political or economic relations.

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[69] Ibid., pp.11-12.

The time scale of international cultural relations

As I stated in the previous section, a crucial aspect of the autonomy of ICR is the lengthening of the time scale . A programme of cultural relations will normally need much more time than is usual in political and economic relations. It is necessary to sow a long time before harvesting, and in many cases the results are intangible. The results can almost never be quantified, for we are talking of outcomes such as an increase in appreciation of the culture of another culture or country, or an increase in appreciation of a particular policy or an international collocation, the elimination of stereotypes and prejudices, a simple increase in knowledge regarding how a society has coped with the political, economic, social and cultural problems which the various epochs have posed, or how it is coping with them today.

The need for an ordering principle underlying international cultural relations

Another outcome of our work on ICR in the 1980s was the realization that if cultural relations were to be really autonomous it was necessary to make explicit methodological principles which could lead to an adequate definition of a *modus operandi* and effective activity.

The movement of the entire world system in the direction of greater complexity occurred, as I wrote at the time, "not just because the number of states has become very large, nor even simply because a tendency towards fragmentation seems to be prevailing rather than any trend towards re-grouping and re-unification. The problem is that since even the most recently founded states are organizing themselves, growing culturally, becoming conscious of their history, they are becoming ever more active protagonists of international life. This quantitative growth in the number of interlocutors of ICR is occurring in an era which is characterized by a number of processes which directly influence the cultural dimension. Although these are well known, it is still worth calling them to mind: there has been a further revolution in the means of communication, with the spread of direct reception of television broadcasts via satellites, the economy is becoming increasingly dominated by demand and supply of information, there is a growing spread of cultural needs.

These great trends of cultural (as well as economic and social) transformation help to make the international system still more complex, because they increase the number of variables which need to be taken into consideration, and also because they are taking effect at different paces, and in different ways, in the various countries and geographical areas. It is well known that the pace of change differs greatly, as does its direction, and also well known that things can often vary unexpectedly. So it is not easy to predict how things will develop. Given this, the need for a conceptual framework is clear; we need some criterion which simplifies the complexity of the international system, to enable us to carry out cultural relations in practice - a criterion which enables us to define possible objectives and choose the appropriate means for particular situations.

This means a framework, or ordering principle, which makes it possible to distinguish rationally between what is useful and what is not, and what is possible to do in, for example, the United States, in China, or in Japan - all countries with which the Agnelli Foundation has had, and continues to have, relations"[70].

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[70] Ibid., pp. 13-14.

International cultural relations and Italy

We were well aware that anyone practicing ICR is inevitably deeply influenced by their cultural citizenship. We therefore asked ourselves what Italy was, or could be, in terms of ICR. We found our answer in one of the Foundation's fundamental ideals: belonging to Europe. "There is no doubt that Italy is a specific part of Europe. Cultural relations regard cultural universes, and our culture is one of the forms taken by European culture.

We can certainly continue to talk of Italian ICR, but only if we remember that these are a part of European ICR. They thus have their own characteristics, their originality, their specific value, but nonetheless within the unitary framework constituted by western Europe.

This certainly does not mean that there is not a precise place for ICR in Italy (...); however, ICR only have a full sense if they are considered as an aspect of European ICR. Each European country needs to play its part, playing its own cards, as happened in the past. Nonetheless, it is important to be clearly aware of what one's collocation is - and there is no doubt that Italy is collocated at the heart of the European cultural universe"[71].

It was by no means superfluous to remind readers that Italy - a small-to-medium-sized power on the geo-political stage, and a medium-to-large power in terms of economic and technological capacities - had an extraordinarily rich historical, artistic and literary tradition. "From a historical and cultural point of view, it is therefore a great power, if I may be permitted to use this term, which explains the great attraction it has always exercised"[72].

The need for an observation point rather than a "centre"

Once we had realized that it was crucial for Italian ICR to reflect Italy's European identity, the next step was to critically assess the meaning of modern European ICR (as well as any limits which might exist to this role). The conclusion I came to was that Europe should not be a "centre" of observation, but rather a perspective from which things were viewed. "A realistic analysis" - I explained - "must first of all consider the background of anyone who is trying to adopt a perspective of cultural relations. Being Italian, or rather European, is different from being Indian or Japanese. The history is different, as are the ghosts from the past which need to be exorcised, and the credits which can be cashed in. For a European, for example, the first problem is that of identifying an approach which is not Eurocentric but does not penalize Europe in the name of some (perhaps Third World-ist) ideology"[73].

The Eurocentric perspective gained strength as industrialization achieved ever greater success and colonial expansion spread out and covered almost the whole world. Witin a few years after 1945, the whole picture had changed: it became clear that a reduction in the political importance of Europe (and of its military and strategic weight) was irreversible. The emergence of numerous African and Asian states onto the international stage threw light on Europe's new, more limited international role: it became clear that Europe could no longer be the centre of the world.

As is well known, the decrease in European influence was matched by a flowering of African and Asian nationalisms. What is less well known is that many intellectuals attempted to apply nationalist perspectives to the cultural visions via which they looked upon the world (almost as though they wished to replace the old Eurocentrism with its opposite - Asiacentrism, etc.).

Fortunately, there was a reaction to this tendency from more aware intellectuals who, like Satissh Chandra, affirmed that 'little is to be gained by replacing a European colonialist myth with an Indian or Indonesian nationalist myth (...) What we need to abandon is the idea of a centre and a periphery, no matter whether the centre is placed in Europe or in the Middle Empire' "[74].

"We need, therefore, to put together two necessities. In the first place it is necessary to adopt a perspective which does not privilege Europe, but sets out to discover and give value to the best of "the others", one which is capable of placing itself in the shoes of the interlocutor. At the same time, it is

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[71] Ibid., p.14.

[72] Ibid., p.15.

[73] Ibid., p.16.

[74] Chandra's words are reprinted in Geoffrey Barraclough, *An Introduction to Contemporary History*, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1967.

necessary to have a clear awareness of what Europe has been in the world, and for the world. It would not be in anyone's interests, and still less in the interests of ICR, to ignore the importance that European culture has had in the world (...) Europe is not the centre of the world, and we should certainly adopt a critical perspective, but from a cultural point of view, it certainly has importance. The scientific revolution, and then the technological and industrial revolution, which allowed Europe, from the 18th century on, to compensate for its small geographical size and small population[75], were not just accidents, nor did they take place in vain. They represent a heritage which continues to count, for good or ill, and continues to have effective and important consequences.

This needs underlining not because we wish to hold out our paths of development as models for other countries (this is hardly ever feasible), but because we wish to give further content to a non-Eurocentric perspective. Europe is not the centre of the world, but it is certainly a strategic point, which has given much to the world in the past, continues to do so now, and can do in the coming years"[76].

Cultural universes as a dimension of international cultural relations

An Italian ICR policy should therefore place itself in a consciously, but critically European perspective, without being Eurocentric. But what should ICR focus on? Since we had affirmed the autonomy of ICR from relations of a political, economic, military, or other kind, we needed now to give ICR some content of their own, and to identify possible objectives, the most appropriate interlocutors, the most suitable techniques and initiatives.

In order to obtain a response which was not simply ad hoc, but was reasonably well-founded, we needed an ordering principle for world space which was specifically linked to culture rather than to politics or other dimensions of human activity. If we allowed ourselves to be guided purely and simply by the geo-political criterion of national state boundaries, we would have had to deal with 159 countries (today, the number would be over 200), most of them quarrelsome, all of them in fierce competition with each other in the attempt to obtain a larger share of world trade, and all to a lesser or greater extent, aligned with one of the major nuclear powers[77].

So a strategy of ICR which took the political atlas as its basis would not have gone very far; and above all it would have implied giving up the dimension of autonomy and specificity for Cultural Relations.

But if political frontiers were not a sufficient guide, or at least could only be adopted in the operative phase of concrete activity, some other criterion was needed to identify the individual subjects with which we needed to conduct dialogue (cultural relations consist of dialogue) or the fields of intervention (the relations held with a certain area). Our thinking on this question was influenced by the way Fernand Braudel suggested space was organized. Braudel argued that space was organized on several dimensions - economic, political, and cultural. Each of these dimensions, in Braudel's view, gave rise to a specific organization of space, autonomous from that of the other dimensions.

The economic dimension was read by Braudel in terms of his "economic worlds", which were defined as "an economically autonomous strip of the planet, capable of self-sufficiency in all essentials, where internal exchanges and ties provide a certain organic unity"[78]. The political dimension is made up of states and links between states. The cultural dimension, finally, is determined by civilizations. The geographical areas which constitute the visible results of each specific dimension may sometimes coincide, but in many other cases they overlap only partially. The various dimensions develop at different rates and therefore have different existences: the political regimes are most prone to decay, societies evolve much more slowly, cultures (or civilizations) greatly outlast the economic worlds in their longevity.

The civilization, Braudel maintains, "is the most ancient personage in human history: one economy follows on the heels of another, political institutions fall apart, societies replace one another, but the

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[75] On this issue, see Fernand Braudel, *Civilization and Capitalism, 15th to 18th Century*, Harper and Row, New York, vol. III, 1981-4.

[76] Marcello Pacini, «Introduzione» in *Euroamericani* op.cit., vol. I, pp. 17-18.

[77] Ibid., p.18.

[78] Fernand Braudel, *Civilization and Capitalism, 15th to 18th Century*, Harper and Row, New York, 1967, 1979, 1981-4, vol. III. The quotation is from p. 4 of the Italian edition.

civilization continues on its path". Economic space and cultural space may differ, but there is no doubt that when the two coincide both influence each other beneficially, for "cultural unity encourages economic exchange and vice versa"[79].

The actors in international cultural relations

The conceptual framework sketched by Braudel was essential for identifying the real protagonists of ICR - helping us to abandon once and for all the old, narrow idea that the actors in international cultural relations were institutes of culture. I wrote in 1987: "Who else are the subjects of cultural relations if not cultures? Foundations, institutes of culture, all the other bodies involved, are simply the instruments or interpreters of a dialogue between cultures. The success of dialogue thus depends only partly on the efficiency of these organizers-interpreters, since in large part it depends on the contents of the cultures themselves. From the point of view of a single organizer-interpreter, however, the cultural areas are not subjects but fields of intervention for international cultural relations"[80].

The category of "cultural universes" and its usefulness

In line with this fundamental step, we at the Foundation put forward a conceptual contribution (but one which had major implications for practice) in the drawing of what we called an "International Cultural Atlas". What we set out to do was to study and act with the aim of providing a representation of the cultural dimension of the world. For it was clear that only in certain cases did the cultural dimension coincide with states or with homogeneous economic groupings - in other words with the political and economic dimensions - and there was no necessity that this coincidence should exist. As I remarked, "Cultural partitions will often be less well-defined and will sometimes be interlaced with multicultural areas, yet in many other cases their frontiers are as well-defined and geographically clear as are political and military frontiers"[81].

It was on this occasion that the term "cultural universe" appeared in the Foundation's vocabulary for the first time. We meant to refer to a specific partition of the world - not necessarily contiguous geographically - where the various national societies share to a large extent value systems and historical, cultural and religious traditions. We could have used more common terms such as "cultures" or "civilizations", but the concept of cultural universe indicated our attention to an important feature of these units. "Civilizations" seemed to us to imply relatively static, monolithic units. "Cultural universes", in contrast, emphasized their continually changing character, their complexity, the pluralism which exists within each universe. This internal complexity was particularly evident in the case which constituted our principal focus of study at the time - ICR within the Euro-American cultural universe (Europe and North and South America)[82].

The differences between these various areas, their differing political, economic and cultural histories - and above all the differentiation existing within each area - are nonetheless all products of a shared cultural-historical matrix, which is decisive in determining their international collocation, and their relationship with other cultures. As we are all well aware, European and American societies are so pluralist and different from each other that it is easy to lose sight of this wider shared identity. Only comparison with cultural universes which are more or less radically "other" - for example the Islamic or the Chinese cultural universes - reminds us of the internal homogeneity of the Euro-American universe.

As I wrote in 1987, "Our cultures have in common a number of fundamental conceptions - the concept of the person and of the value of the person, the concept of a transcendent God (independently of whether

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[79] Ibid., p.46.

[80] M. Pacini, «Introduzione» in *Euroamericani*, vol. I op.cit., p. 21.

[81] Ibid., p.21.

[82] See below, the chapter on "Promoting Italy's image and relations with Italian Americans"; for an account of the Foundation's activities in the Euro-American cultural universe, see Giovanni Agnelli Foundation, *1986-1986: dieci anni di attività*, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1986, pp. 98-113 and, for more recent initiatives, Giovanni Agnelli Foundation, *1990-1993: quattro anni di attività*, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1993, pp. 39-44.

one is or is not a believer), an idea of nature, a cultural framework which defines the meaning of freedom, democracy, authoritarianism, etc., and which we use to communicate between ourselves.

With Japan [in the preceding pages of my article I had referred to the traditionally excellent cultural relations Italy had had with Japan], we may share a range of consumption behaviour and technological horizons. It is more difficult to know whether we give the same meaning to terms which are, nonetheless, commonly used, such as person, democracy, or liberty (...) It is no accident that the easiest and most spontaneous channel of communication continues to be art, which relies on emotions rather than on reason, and where it is, in the last analysis, the personal sensitivity of the beholder and of the cultural climate in which he lives (as well as the artist's work, of course) which produces pleasure in the eye. In the same way, we may admire an African mask, and be moved by it, without thinking of the aesthetic criteria adopted by the artist, who wished to honour a god we know nothing about, a god who has no credibility for us. At that moment what is most important for us are themes within European culture - such as a reaction against figurative or classical art, or more generally, the need for new forms of artistic expression. ICR need to take account of these differences - internalizing them. This means that within any one cultural universe one may use conceptual tools, adopt lines of conduct, which it would be impossible or inappropriate to use with other cultural universes. With the United States it is possible to behave differently - indeed one should behave differently - from the way one behaves with the Japanese, Indians, Chinese, etc."[83], for example in terms of relations between civil society.

From the mid 1980s onwards, the concept of cultural universe influenced the Foundation's activities to a very considerable extent. We used it as a theoretical framework which had great heuristic value, and we used it still more as the basis for our work, making it into a real tool for managing our activities. First of all, we used it to rationalize our international programmes in the 1980s; secondly, we used it to launch a complex series of connected activities aiming to dig deeper into the crucial, strategic theme of the encounter with modernity which some of the great societies of the contemporary world were undergoing[84].

With respect to the first point - rationalizing our international work - it was possible to come to wind up our work with America and the Asian cultures with some initial conclusions. As I have said, it had been possible to define the Euro-American cultural universe as, precisely that - a cultural universe - and this made it possible to interpret correctly our (i.e., Italian and European) relations with the various American nations[85]. It was also possible to interpret our relations with the varied Asian cultures more correctly[86].

Nonetheless the descriptive and heuristic value of the paradigm of the cultural universes was not fully developed in the 1980s. Further studies and experiences on our part contributed to the further development of the framework, but above all, what was needed was the full emergence of a number of epoch-making processes, which surfaced after 1989, and which led to what we now call "globalization", and to a full, general impact with modernity for most of that part of humanity which had hitherto been excluded.

The heuristic and practical value of the paradigm of cultural universe was tested at the end of the 1980s, when it allowed us to rapidly grasp the significance of the new migratory flows, including those towards Italy. The distinction between flows of migration taking place within the same cultural universe - such as the old Italian migration to the United States - and flows between different cultural universes - such as those coming from North Africa or Asia - was very useful for interpreting the new scenario.

These migratory flows were themselves just one aspect of the globalization process, and of the fact that significant parts of mankind were being confronted with modernity - changes which, in turn, were due to geo-political and geo-economic change. Thus it is only in the first half of the 1990s that the full descriptive and interpretative power of the paradigm of cultural universes as a framework for understanding the great international changes became clear. The concept makes it possible to grasp the complex and internally diversified character of each civilization and culture - a complexity and diversity

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[83] M. Pacini, «Introduzione» in *Euroamericani*, vol. I, op.cit., p. 107.

[84] See Giovanni Agnelli Foundation, *1990-1993: quattro anni di attività,* op.cit., pp. 45-48.

[85] See below, «Promoting Italy's image and relations with Italian Americans».

[86] See below,«Beyond the West. Cultural relations in the 1980s».

which the encounter with modernity and with other cultural universes has accentuated (and in some cases actually brought about)[87].

Closing this chapter, it is worth observing that today globalization and the encounter with modernity have raised the problem of the "pace" or "tempo" of change. Culture certainly changes more slowly than politics or economics, but how much more slowly? Is Braudel's *longue durée* being shortened? What are the effects of the encounter with modernity in traditional cultures? It is clear that these are themes and problems which are crucial for defining cultural relations and for understanding the cultural background to political relations. The concept of cultural universes continues to be the most adequate tool to investigate these problems and help achieve rational management of their political consequences[88].

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[87] See below, Part Four, section entitled «Cultural universes and modernity» in chapter one.

[88] See below, Part Four, chapters on «A new mental map of the world» and «The cultural problems of globalization».

Chapter Two
Promoting Italy's image and relationships with Italian Americans

The relevance of the subject today

We are currently undertaking a great re-discovery: that of "Italians abroad". This is a late re-discovery, but one which is certainly interesting - so long as it is founded on careful, sound intellectual bases, which seek to describe Italians abroad as they really are, rather than applying some fantasy originating in Italy, or within some little group of expatriates. The re-discovery of Italians abroad first came up in the context of the issue of whether or not it was right to give the vote to Italian citizens living abroad. If the law on this topic is approved in the near future, a new chapter will be opened up in relations between Italians abroad and the mother country.

The second reason for being interested in this topic is a more general desire (in some cases we might even talk of political culture) that Italy should count more in the world. We thought that "Italians in the world" could be a useful means of promoting the country's interests.

The wish to "count more" will probably increase in intensity in the next few years for a series of reasons. As we gradually give up part of our sovereignty to Europe we will seek compensation in terms of image and substance in other ambiences and international forums. The considerable gap which exists between Italy's arena of geo-political action, which is *regional* (the Mediterranean area, now enlarged to include Eastern Europe) and its arena of geo-economic interest, which is *world-wide*, will lead to attempts to fill this gap in some way. The new importance of cities and regions in the new rules of international economic life will also encourage experimentation with new policies and new ways of being present on the international stage.

To all this one further consideration may be added: Italian elites, and educated public opinion more in general, are becoming aware of the complexity of the new international framework and, above all, are acquiring the sensibilities necessary to carry out "international policy". During the cold war epoch, the question of Italy's international alignment was seen in ideological terms, whereas now it is becoming a subject in which many bodies, whether political or economic, are taking a more pragmatic interest.

All the above have led people to think that a new type of relationship should be formed between Italy and Italians abroad - often with the perfectly open idea that these "Italians" might constitute a useful ally in the furthering of Italy's economic and political interests.

Given these broad intentions, it is clear that we need an analytic and historical framework enabling us to move from generic intentions to a rational and historically feasible project. The first thing to be done is to define our interlocutors: who are "Italians" abroad, where do they live, how many of them are there, how much do they count? We also need to know what we - Italians of Italy - mean for them. It is essential to be clear on these points if we are to move from mere intentions to a real project, and if we are to avoid falling into hopeless contradictions, such as taking Italians abroad as votes for the Italian parliament, yet at the same time, hoping Italian Americans will exercise pressure within the American Congress on those who define themselves as Italian Americans in that their parents or grandparents came from Italy.

It is possible to move from intentions to a definite project to re-form constructive and mutually beneficial links with Italians in Italy and Italians abroad if we break down the complex world of expatriate Italians into groups, taking into account the national history of the country of which they are citizens, and the history of their integration into the society where they live. It is to these objectives that the Foundation has devoted its large-scale programme of research and cultural activities - which has been operative (albeit with varying intensity) since as far back as 1978.

Of course, the quantitative data are uncertain. About twelve million Italians emigrated between 1876 and 1985. How many descendents of these people are alive today is even more uncertain - perhaps fifty or sixty million. Of these, only a small proportion (five million?) have maintained Italian citizenship, having migrated only recently; the others are citizens of the countries where they live.

People of Italian origin are present mainly in the Americas, but there are also large numbers in Australia and in the European countries. Naturally, it is impossible to draw up a unitary profile, since we are talking about a "world" which is characterized by diversity. First of all, there are differences between the generations. We need to distinguish the first generation (the migrants themselves) from the second, third or even more from the fourth generation. In addition, we need to take account of the different trajectory of integration into the new country - something which is dependent in large part on the policy and general culture of the latter. Canada and Australia practice a multi-cultural policy, while Argentina and the United States have had integrationist and assimilationist policies. This has inevitably led to very different outcomes for the citizen of Italian origin. Apart from this, historical experience of migrants to Argentina or the United States has been radically different, and this is a further reason why cultural outcomes, and conceptions of national identity, have differed greatly.

To all this may be added considerations regarding the fact that a choice of identity is precisely that - a choice. People are not "Italians abroad" for reasons of blood but because they voluntarily choose to see themselves as such, for personal reasons of a cultural or political nature. Italian-ness is a choice - a complex construction of identity which often does not involve any direct link with Italy and its culture. This great diversity raises the problem of the diversity of policies which we need to have towards Italians abroad - for we are dealing with a plurality of requirements and expectations. The Foundation's experience may be useful in clarifying what this diversity consists of, and therefore what are the most appropriate policies towards various categories of Italians abroad.

Our work is probably the most extensive and complex activity of relations with the world of Italians outside Italy which has ever been organized. As such it deserves to be better known, for it is in our experience that crucial themes may be found if we wish really to move from intentions to a real plan for new relations between Italy and Italians in the world.

Our programme started in 1978 in the United States, but it was almost immediately (1979) extended to South America, and a few years later to Australia. The whole programme has always been closely tied to the programmes for promoting Italy's image and spreading Italian culture.

A twofold strategy: intellectuals and Italian Americans

Right from the beginning of our activity in the United States, it was decided[89] that improving Italy's image should be the strategic aim, the North Star guiding our work in the United States. Having taken this decision, we tackled the problem of what means, and what alliances, were most suitable to the purpose.

First of all, we asked ourselves whether we could apply the approach which we were adopting in our work in Italy - that is find a social group which could be the privileged public for our programmes. It immediately became clear that a "strong" hypothesis was possible: we could form a new relationship with Italian Americans. Italian Americans then constituted a world which was less familiar than it is now, but it was immediately clear that they made up a numerous public, spread throughout the country, and politically, socially and economically important. The idea of taking them as our privileged public was completely legitimate and soon proved to be not just well-founded but also necessary. The activities of the Foundation in America thus went down two tracks, and took on a character they were to maintain afterwards:

a) a relationship with well-known, prestigious scholars and intellectuals. An example here was our convention with the Center for European Studies at Harvard[90]. These relationships were also used to obtain scholars to work directly on our research programmes - as when we commissioned the Graduate School of Education to undertake a study of the image of Italy, Italians and Italian Americans in elementary school and secondary school textbooks, in newspapers and magazines, and on television;

b) a special relationship with Italian Americans - and in particular with Italian American political, economic and social elites. This ambiance obviously differed greatly from the academic world.

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[89] See above, Part One, the section "Strengthening ties with the United States".

[90] See Giovanni Agnelli Foundation, *1976-1986: dieci anni di attività,* Turin, Giovanni Agnelli Foundation, 1986, p. 98.

It was possible to establish relations and forms of synergy between these two tracks, for our "Italian American" activities could certainly benefit from a fruitful relationship with the world of universities and intellectuals. Nonetheless, the two remained essentially separate.

The differences between the two worlds were marked even in their relations with Italy. One example will make this evident: at our Permanent Seminar at Harvard there was great curiosity about Eurocommunism and the role that it might have in Italian parliamentary life; participants in the seminar looked at the future dispassionately and without any alarmism. In contrast, some Italian American groups were still pervaded by radical anti-communism, which in some cases even led to support for organizations which wanted to organize crusades against communism. For people like this, obviously, the very idea of an Italian government coalition including Communists was real heresy.

Our privileged interlocutor became the National Italian American Foundation (NIAF) in Washington. NIAF brought together under one umbrella a hundred or so smaller organizations, and it was thus certainly representative of associations in all the states. Its headquarters were in Washington and its main objective was to promote the image of Italian Americans and to lobby on their behalf. NIAF was well aware that Italian Americans needed a relationship with Italy, for the image of Italy and the reality of Italy were pillars of their mechanisms of self-identity and place in American life. So we quickly realized that this meant that our organizations had a remarkable convergence of interests. This was confirmed a few months later by the research on images of Italy and of Italian Americans, which showed that the two images were difficult to separate in American society.

We therefore started fruitful cooperation, and planned a conference on the role and the future of Italian Americans in the 1980s. The objectives of the conference were to focus attention forcefully on the presence of Italian Americans in the United States and on their ties with Italy. This was a start to providing a more complex, more informed vision of Italian Americans, and thus one which was simply closer too the truth. NIAF was naturally a bipartisan organization. Its President was John A. Volpe, former ambassador to Italy and the man who had made the famous statement of opposition to the Italian Communist Party entering a government coalition. Volpe ensured Republican support for NIAF, while Jeno Paulucci, the chairman and real driving motor of NIAF, was linked to the Democrats and in particular to vice-President Walter Mondale. Cooperation with NIAF could have come up against a number of obstacles, but we soon managed to resolve all of these.

During the first convention at Washington, for example, one of our main concerns was to keep control over the theme of "Communism in Italy", which naturally was placed in a session on the Italian political situation. The sensitivity of the issue was increased by the fact that, a few days after the conference (3 June 1979), political elections were due to take place in Italy. So the Italian press would certainly have picked up, and amplified, any gut anti-Communist declarations which were made.

This was an operation which turned out to be easier than we expected - for it was sufficient to explain the problem to speakers, who thus gave a problematic, detached tone to their statements - a tone which was after all appropriate to a subject which was objectively sensitive and difficult. The flexibility of speakers was a sign of the trust they had in the Foundation, which they had come to consider as their Italian interlocutor and their partner in their cultural activities in the United States as well as Italy.

It was possible for us to work so smoothly with NIAF because we recognized that the identity of our partners was that of American citizens - American citizens who had the very important characteristic of being of Italian origins, but still exclusively American citizens.

This meant that the interests of NIAF members were purely of a cultural nature: they had no desire for Italian citizenship, or for the rights which went with it, such as the right to vote. Two examples of Italian Americans - Mario Cuomo and Rudolph Giuliani - perhaps make this clear, when we remember that the former just missed becoming a candidate for President of the United States, and the latter might become a candidate in the near future. Awareness of this situation underlay our work, and distinguished it from initiatives undertaken by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, worked out in agreement with the parties and trade unions (or perhaps commissioned by them) - initiatives which focused on the social problems of Italians living abroad. These Ministry programmes were thus very much directed to Italian citizens, people who had an Italian passport and all the rights attached.

The Italian political world in fact has never grasped the enormous difference which exists between Americans of Italian origin on the one hand, and Italians resident abroad on the other. This has led to recurrent misinformation, huge errors of assessment and thus the failure of any proper policy towards either category.

The first conference with the National Italian American Foundation: giving a public image to Italian Americans and their relationship with Italy

The conference organized in Washington (D.C.) in cooperation with the NIAF (11 and 12 May 1979), on the theme "The role of Italian Americans in the 1980s", was the first opportunity that Italian Americans had at a national level to put themselves forward publicly as a specific group, and to think about who they were and how they should be represented. NIAF was just beginning its work and the problem of setting up an Italian American lobby had not been solved.

The difficulties and misunderstandings which we had encountered in the preliminary discussions we had held to decide whether or not to undertake our programme were felt by Italian Americans themselves (who had no experience of working together). The various associations had a local, city base, and circumstances in the various cities and states were very different. NIAF and the Foundation were thus for the first time proposing debate - and hence a working agenda - at a national level.

The conference tried to tackle the principal cultural, economic and social problems facing the Italian communities in the United States, and especially the question of what future lay ahead for the communities. Particular emphasis was given to political commitment, and to the possibility-necessity of working out a special relationship with Italy.

The conference was an undoubted success: there was large-scale participation from politicians, academics, diplomats, leaders of industry, journalists and officials of public agencies - who made up a representative cross-section of American society as a whole. A good example was John J.Sirica - the judge who, a few years previously, had been in the headlines in action against Richard Nixon.

The conference ended with a number of concluding recommendations - including restatement of the intention to take the Jewish community as a model of the right and effective way to represent community interests to the government; the need to boost contacts with Italy (on an economic as well as a cultural level); and the urgency of ensuring that more accurate information about Italy was available in America[91].

Relations with Italian American members of Congress and the Senate, with academics, and with the associations

Our relations with Americans of Italian origin in those years were not limited to those we met through NIAF. We immediately formed a good relationship with a number of Italian American members of Congress and the Senate. In 1979 there were 30 Italian American members of the lower house and 4 senators. Some of these, but not all, had occasional meetings together. However, our initial impression - which was subsequently confirmed - was that there was little feeling of common identity or unity. The strategy of following the example of the American Jewish community was flawed by the fact that - fortunately - there existed no dramatic issue comparable to that of the survival of the state of Israel.

Most American Italian members of Congress or the Senate could be split into one of two groups, with very different interests. Some (such as Frank Annunzio in Chicago) had been elected prevalently on an ethnic vote - that is to say in constituencies inhabited by "Italians". Others had an electorate which was mixed or even contained no Italian element (as was the case for Dennis W. De Concini and Pete V. Domenici, who were elected respectively in Arizona and New Mexico, states where the numbers of Italian American voters is minimal). Some Congressman (such as Robert Giaimo, elected in Connecticut) were uninterested in, or even suspicious of, the Italian American organizations.

Naturally we established relationships of collaboration with numerous cultural centres, universities and individuals. Apart from our ties with the major universities (Harvard and Michigan in particular), we set up links with a number of centres which had experience of ethnic cultural studies. Particularly fruitful and firm relations were built with the Center for Migration Studies in New York. The Center was (and is) part of a network of such centres set up by the Scalabrinian?? confraternity in various parts of the world. For when the Scalabrinian fathers decided to undertake study of emigration alongside their pastoral and charitable work, they set up a major initiative. The New York centre is probably that which is best known, but there are also others in Argentina, Australia and the Philippines, as well as in Rome and other

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[91] Ibid., pp. 28-29 and 106-108 for a list of the various activities; Giovanni Agnelli Foundation, *1990-1993: quattro anni di attività,* Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1993, pp.39-44.

European cities. The Foundation has worked with these centres at various times when we have had interests and objectives have overlapped.

The first time we worked together it was with the New York centre in 1978, when the director was Silvano Tomasi. Our relations continued under the new director Lydio Tomasi. We worked together to compile two directories - one listing cultural centres, newspapers, archives, and social and cultural organizations of American Italians in the various parts of the United States, the other giving charitable associations for Italians in the New York metropolitan area.

Our contacts with Italian American associations were naturally numerous, but were always selective and established with clear ends in view. Apart from our main relationship with NIAF, we gave priority to relations with associations of a cultural nature. In particular, we established relations with the American Italian Historical Association in 1979.

Our relations with the associations proved particularly useful when we were managing our exhibition *Italy, a country shaped by man*[92].

Results of the research on Italy's image

During the conference preliminary findings were presented of the Harvard Graduate School of Education research we commissioned on the image of Italy and Italian Americans in textbooks, television programmes and newspapers. What emerged was a stereotyped, superficial image which showed very little knowledge of contemporary Italy.

However, this was no great surprise. What was less predictable was the extraordinarily close tie which was uncovered between the image of Italian Americans and the image of Italy. Italian Americans crucially influenced Italy's image in two ways: they had a direct effect on the image, even if they had been in the United States for three generations, for they provided other Americans with their most immediate images of Italians; and they were also the Americans who were most interested in Italy, its culture and way of life. Their interest was not instrumental - not merely a matter of strategic objectives, for example.

The research undertaken by Harvard Graduate School of Education was thus crucial in confirming that we needed to proceed along two tracks - maintain ties with Italian Americans and ties with American scholars interested in "matters Italian".

Promoting Italy's image

The first findings of the Graduate School of Education's research were clear and unambiguous, and it seemed unlikely that further research would overturn the conclusion: information about Italy was limited, out of date, and often stereotyped.

The average American citizen in the 1970s had read descriptions of Italy in history and geography school textbooks as a poor, over-populated country, where agriculture was a prime source of employment in an economy which was only slightly industrialized. Predictably, the most interesting historical periods were seen as ancient Rome and the Renaissance[93]. The situation was only slightly different among Italian

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[92] See below, section entitled "The exhibition *Italy, a country shaped by man*"; see also Giovanni Agnelli Foundation, *1976-1986: dieci anni di attività* op.cit., pp. 30-37 and 99-104.

[93] See the research coordinated by Paul N. Ylvisaker, *Italians and Italian-Americans as Portrayed in American Textbooks*, Cambridge (Ma), School of Education, Harvard University, 1980, unpublished. See also Giovanni Agnelli Foundation, *1976-1986: dieci anni di attività* op.cit., p. 98.

Americans, whose knowledge was often linked to family memories which were too out of date and confined to one particular area to provide an adequately representative image of Italy. The picture we uncovered was therefore that of a shortage of information and a prevalence of stereotypes. At the same time, however, there was substantial interest in Italy - an interest which in fact had always existed. This ensured that Italy tended to have a "prominent", strongly marked image, whether positive or negative.

The complexity of Italy's image in America was confirmed by a survey commissioned by Chicago's Council on Foreign Relations in 1978 (the year when the Italian Communist Party seemed on the verge of entering the governing coalition). This survey took a sample of the general public and a sample of the country's leaders to probe their attitudes towards the main countries of the non-Communist world. It found that 80% of the leaders recognized that Italy was an area of vital interest for the United States, whereas only 36% of the general public were of this opinion. With regard to no other country (out of the twenty-four examined) was the gap between the opinion of the leaders and that of the general public as high as 44%.

Italy's ranking improved markedly when the survey asked how countries were rated on a "scale of fellow-feeling". Here leaders and general public differed little, and placed Italy in sixth position, behind Canada, Great Britain, France, Israel and Germany.

As I wrote in 1981, "It is not unreasonable to assume that these varying replies show that Italy is more loved than respected by American public opinion - the subject of emotive evocation rather than of rational knowledge. If we were able to break down the results by ethnic group, we would probably have found that the Italian ethnic group had a major influence on these findings. Many stereotypes of Italy and Italians apply also to Italian Americans. There is little doubt that a number of stereotypes of Italian Americans have their roots in a stereotype of Italy. The idea that Italian Americans are likely to be playing accordions or strumming mandolins, or fighting each other in vendettas are typical examples of stereotypes deriving from a particular "idea of Italy"[94].

An old piece of research undertaken among students at Princeton found that Italians were imagined as artistic, impulsive, passionate, musical, imaginative, highly religious, and talkative (in that order). "It is just as true that the image of Italians and of Italy has been, and continues to be, influenced by the image Italian Americans have had. In other words, there is a situation of interdependence: the American general public's image of Italy are markedly influenced by perception of the cultural features of Italian Americans, and change along with changes in the social status of the latter. So Italian Americans have often acted as a lens - sometimes a distorting lens - through which American public opinion sees Italy." [95]

The Council on Foreign Relations survey I have cited shows that a feature of Italy's image in the United States is the wide gap between the evaluation made by elites and by the general public. This indicated that the information deficit regarding Italy was so wide that more refined, sophisticated measures were pointless; what was needed was rather urgent action to begin to reduce the deficit and alter Italy's image.

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[94]   Marcello Pacini, «Perché "L'Italia. Un paese modellato dall'uomo"?» in Giovanni Agnelli Foundation, *L'Italia. Un paese modellato dall'uomo*, Turin, Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1981, p. 2.
[95] Ibid., p. 3.

The problem of Italy's overall image even dwarfed that of excessive interest in "Italian communism", however important this latter question was[96]. This, however, could only be tackled in specialist educated environments such as the permanent seminar at Harvard. What was needed for wider publics - for business, social, political, or administrative elites, or for Italian Americans - was something which tackled the problem of Italy's image at its roots, confronting the stereotypes effectively, simply and accessibly. The most appropriate means seemed an exhibition, perhaps a travelling exhibition which could be taken to the principal American cities. The idea was to bring cultural initiatives which would attract the attention not just of the ethnic, Italian American press, but also that of the major American newspapers.

But what kind of exhibition should it be? What kind of things could we show that would represent an Italy which was more true to life and less stereotyped? What aspects of Italy were worth exhibiting? What language, what concepts could be employed which would be easily understood by Americans, and in particular by Italian Americans, who did have some idea of Italy, however inaccurate and incomplete? Given our objectives, it was essential to communicate messages which were comprehensible and not open to equivocation. Finally, what conception did we Italians have of our interlocutors - that is to say, Americans, and Italian Americans in particular?

These problems were resolved and the exhibition *Italy, a country shaped by man* was planned and arranged, and was presented in Chicago on 11 June 1981, in New Haven on 5 September, in Washington on 20 October. In San Francisco it was opened by President Pertini on 28 March 1982. Afterwards the exhibition went to South America and Canada. Everywhere it was very well received by the public and in the press.

We adopted a well-defined procedure. We chose a site which was suitably prestigious and accessible, and committee was set up consisting of local people within and outside the Italian American community and its organizations. In almost all cases, other cultural events, such as concerts, seminars or talks on Italy were organized to accompany the exhibition.

The local political authorities were also involved. In Chicago the mayor Jane M. Byrne declared the day the exhibition opened as "Agnelli Foundation Day in Chicago", and in Washington Geraldine Ferraro mentioned the exhibition in a session in Congress.

Proclamation "Agnelli Foundation Day" in Chicago

Office of the Mayor
City of Chicago

Jane M. Byrne
Mayor

Proclamation

Whereas,

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[96] See above, Part One, section on "Reinforcing ties with the United States".

the Agnelli Foundation of Turin, Italy works to promote activities fostering closer ties and better understanding between the United States and Italy; and

one of the chief goals of the Foundation is to give American citizens a clearer understanding of Italy today, focusing on its role as an industrial nation and its impact on world events; and

an exhibition entitled "Italy: A Country Shaped By Man" will begin June 11 at the Museum of Science and Industry and continue through August 16, sponsored by the Agnelli Foundation; and

the exhibit explores the contributions of Italians to world culture and learning from the Renaissance up and through today; and

all citizens, especially the large community of Italians-Americans in Chicago, should seek to learn more about the great heritage of Italy as a gesture of friendship and understanding:

now, therefore, I, Jane M. Byrne, Mayor of the City of Chicago, do hereby proclaim June 11, 1981 to be AGNELLI FOUNDATION DAY IN CHICAGO in appreciation of the efforts of the Agnelli Foundation to promote closer ties and greater understanding between the United States and Italy.

Dated this 10th day of June, 1981.

Signature of Jane M. Byrne
Mayor

New Haven was our second stopping point. The city was chosen partly because it was at the centre of a region where large numbers of Italian Americans lived, but above all because it is the city of Yale University, where a "historical" event had recently occurred: for the first time in a leading university someone of Italian origin - the professor of Italian Bartlett Giamatti - had become president. The fact was noteworthy and we thought we would emphasize its noteworthiness by holding our exhibition in the city. Success was guaranteed, for the town is populated mainly by people coming from Amalfi. Even the mayor of the time, Biagio Di Lieto, came from an Amalfi family. The welcome the exhibition received, however, went well beyond anything we had expected. The city and the university competed in presenting accompanying activities - art exhibitions, concerts, conferences and seminars - not to mention the inevitable Italian food delicacies week.

San Francisco was a particularly important occasion, with the opening by President Pertini. Mention of President Pertini obliges me, however, to stress that our initiative was an entirely private one. Our line was: few contacts with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Rome, but good relations with local Ministry representatives in the embassy or consulates (here the degree of involvement depended on the attitude of individual officials).

We adopted the same policy, naturally, towards politicians. We made an important exception for Pertini, however, and we kept him informed in detail of the thinking behind our American programmes as well as of the initiatives being organized. When we informed him of a new project - a little publication distributed abroad called *News*

from Italy??? , and which continued to appear up until the early 1990s, he immediately gave his support, and made this public by sending us the following letter.

Rome, 15 January 1981

Dear Director,
The decision of the Agnelli Foundation to publish a bi-monthly review, *News from Italy*, to be sent to associations of emigrants, cultural institutions and Italian papers abroad, and in particular to Italian American communities and to cultural institutes in the world, deserves praise and encouragement.

Italian communities exist all over the world: they are numerous, active, and full of creativity, and they represent Italy honourably. In a great country such as the United States, the large Italian community has achieved influence and prestige and is continuing to rise. Italian Americans feel that total commitment to their American homeland is not in contradiction with strong attachment to the traditions, values and culture of the homeland of their forefathers. They feel that attachment to each sustains the other, in common tribute to our democratic civilization.

I consider *News from Italy* a praiseworthy initiative for our country, for peace, and for mutual understanding between peoples, and I hope it will achieve its aim of spreading an informed and up to date image of our country, and spread knowledge of the efforts being made to revitalize Italy in a difficult moment, and of the whole Italian people's desire for peace and cooperation.

Yours sincerely,
Sandro Pertini

The exhibition became the cutting edge of our activities in North and South America for several years. However, the part it played, and the extent of its effectiveness can only be properly gauged if we place it in the context of our programme as a whole. For even in 1980 our American programme contained several parts, and general initiatives such as the exhibition or *News from Italy*, alongside those restricted to a single country (the United States, Brazil, Argentina, and so on).

The key ideas

At this point I need to clarify a number of fundamental points in our working framework - the underlying ideas which explain why we made certain decisions, why particular initiatives were successful, why a particular way of working was adopted. For in the United States, and the countries of South America, it was possible to adopt approaches which would have been meaningless in Europe or (for quite different reasons) in Africa or Asia.

There were three fundamental aspects to our approach - our idea of what Italy was, our idea of America (the way we situated it in our framework of cultural universes), and our conception of the role played by Italian immigrants (and European immigrants more generally) in America.

It should be recalled what the political situation was like in Italy in the years 1979-81, and what image was most prevalent of America - "Amerika" as it was often derogatorily styled - in cultural ambiences in Italy. It is only if this is recalled that the originality of our stance can be appreciated.

Let us begin, therefore, with our idea of Italy. We were forced to make explicit our idea of what Italy was in planning documents, and above all in the exhibition.

An idea of Italy in 1981

Today the debate over the nature of Italy's identity is central in the cultural life of the country[97]. In the Italy of 1981, in contrast, it was a theme which hardly anyone was interested in[98]. So when we were forced to make explicit an idea of Italy in order to be able to present it to Americans, we found ourselves on partially unexplored terrain.

The idea of Italy which we tried to work out corresponded to the key ideas which underlay our work in the preceding years, i.e., between 1976 and 1980[99]: insistence on the need to take a long historical perspective, the distinction between civil society and the state, emphasis on the part which non-central areas - the periphery, Italy's many cities, or the industrial districts, for example - had to play, and the belief they should be given greater powers.

When we were planning *Italy, a country shaped by man*, we assumed that the objective was to give the averagely educated American citizen a key to interpret contemporary Italy - a set of basic information which would be useful in reading news from Italy in the newspapers. "Although this exhibition contains numerous artifacts and references to the past [I wrote in the book which accompanied the exhibition in 1981], the intention is not to undertake an advance in scientific or historical understanding; rather, we wish to use audio-visual media to transmit information which usefully provides an overall image of Italy (without necessarily going into detail in all aspects). We have made ample use of images from the past because we believe it is an essential characteristic of Italy that it can only be understood if something is known of those elements of the past which continue to live on in the present, and continue to influence the everyday news coming out of the country. Present-day Italy cannot be understood unless one realizes the depth of cultural sedimentation which divides, but also unites, Italy's cities (and often even different quarters of the same city). Without reflecting on the past it is not possible to understand how a totalitarian ideology like fascism produced a weak state and one which, in its way, could be tolerant when it wanted to be. Nor is it possible to grasp why after thirty-five years in which the same party has been in power, a party which has managed a low-profile state with little authority, Italian society is flourishing, culturally lively and with an advanced industrial system.

Prior to, during, and after Fascism, state organization lost its battle to bridle the vitality of Italian society. This fact cannot be understood unless we look at the special path taken in the construction of the Italian nation, unless we realize the depth of local cultures, realize for how many centuries cities have played a major role, grasp the attitudes of Italians towards politics and towards the state - a detachment which is not disinterest (90% of the electorate votes) but realism. All these phenomena are not the

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[97] See among others Ruggiero Romano, *Paese Italia. Venti secoli di identità*, Roma, Donzelli, 1994, especially the essay «Perché non possiamo non dirci italiani», and the conference paper «Nazione italiana e riforma dello stato: il nodo del federalismo» (Turin, Giovanni Agnelli Foundation, 15 December 1993); Ernesto Galli Della Loggia, *L'identità italiana*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1998; Ezio Raimondi, *Letteratura e identità nazionale*, Milano, Bruno Mondadori, 1998; Aldo Schiavone, *La storia spezzata. Roma antica e Occidente moderno*, Bari, Laterza, 1996. See also Gian Piero Brunetta (ed.), *Identità italiana e identità europea nel cinema italiano dal 1945 al miracolo economico*, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1996.

[98] Among the few scholars who directly or indirectly raised the theme of Italian identity, we should mention Giuseppe Galasso, «L'Italia come problema storiografico» in Idem. (ed.), *Storia d'Italia*, vol. I, *Introduzione,* Turin, Utet, 1979, and Giuliano Procacci, *Storia degli italiani*, Bari, Laterza, 1968.

[99] See above, Part One.

past but the present. The presentational device of exhibiting them strung alongside each other in an exhibition serves to emphasize how deeply-rooted they are in Italian society. These are not traits which are old, but ones which are deeply-rooted"[100].

The great obstacle which we found in our path when trying to convey an adequate and accurate conception of Italy was the abundance of stereotypes and misconceptions among our American interlocutors. Here there was a wide range to choose from. Obviously, we could not combat or discuss all stereotypes and prejudices, so we selected a few which seemed most important - either because they possessed great cultural legitimacy (we wished, after all, to tackle opponents which were worth tackling) or because they went back a long way in time, and thus might be assumed to be more deeply rooted and more damaging to Italy's image.

In our efforts to combat stereotypes, the criterion we chose was that already mentioned of "concentrating attention on structures rather than events, on the *longue durée* rather than on the passing and accidental. In other words, we focused attention on the principal forms taken by cultural, social and economic life in Italy. Everywhere in the world, there is a certain familiarity with the masterpieces of the Italian Renaissance, yet people often know little about the social and cultural structures which fostered this flowering of art. And it is these material structures and underlying ideas - at least as much as the masterpieces they produced - which constitute the thread of continuity linking sixteenth or eighteenth century Italy to the Italy of today."[101]

The first, most widespread, and most serious stereotype the exhibition had to tackle sprang up in the United States after the Civil War, when new elites were emerging. Two sharply contrasting images of Italy emerged at this time. On the one hand there was Italy the country of art and high civilization, where cultivated Americans went on a kind of pilgrimage to complete their education as "gentlemen". On the other hand, there was the Italy of immigrants (who were starting to be numerous, especially on the Atlantic coast) - the Italy of invading foreigners. It was therefore possible for a prosperous Boston family to pay for Berenson's 1887 voyage to Italy, while in the same period another branch of the same family was organizing the Immigration Restriction League.

These two images of Italy "without the slightest connection between them" long persisted side by side - thus giving rise to the prejudice which assumed without question that there was a rupture between past and present, between the Italy cradle of history and art, and the Italy of migrants (seen as Italy of the present) - the former to be absorbed into one's cultural roots, the second to be scarcely tolerated.

It may be noted that it was often intellectuals who most loved Italy - Italian art and Italian culture - who gave credence to the idea that there was a terrible gap between past and present. Being so enamoured of the achievements of the past, they refused to accept the real or imagined defects or mediocrity of the present. This love-hate relationship with Italy consolidated in the eighteenth century in the culture of the Grand Tour, where admiration for the past mingled with disappointment with regard to the modest present. This is, indeed, an old attitude, for even in the second half of the sixteenth century we find the French poet Joachim Du Bellay expressing similar sentiments.

A second stereotype was that of an Italy which was fertile and favoured by nature. This is Virgil's *magna parens frugum*, the country of easy pickings, whose happy, lazy

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[100] Marcello Pacini, «Perché "L'Italia. Un paese modellato dall'uomo"» in *L'Italia. Un paese modellato dall'uomo*, Turin, Giovanni Agnelli Foundation, 1981, p. 5.
[101] Ibid., pp.7-8.

inhabitants can give free reign to their "artistic, impulsive, passionate, ..." nature (to go back to the beliefs of Princeton students). This is a myth which has fed the work of great artists and writers, such as Goethe and Byron. They did not notice what Montaigne saw when, passing through Lucca in 1581, he observed "it would be impossible to praise too highly the beauty and utility of the way they cultivate the mountains right to the top". Around the same time Guicciardini talked of an Italy which was "no less cultivated in the most mountainous and barren places as in the plains and most fertile regions".

Another area where there was a large gap between the real Italy and the Italy existing in the imagination of Americans was the idea that there was a great gulf between the "great Italians" (in particular those of art and literature) and the ordinary Italian. In our opinion, this was perhaps the most dangerous stereotype, so we decided to organize the section of the exhibition which was devoted to art around the Anonymous Genius. This contained no work which could be attributed with certainty to any artist, only masterpieces which were the product of a genius which was widespread throughout a given region. So not Michelangelo but "Anon.", who was much closer to the reality of Italian American communities. As I wrote at the time, "In our view, the greatest genius who could represent Italian art is not Michelangelo, nor Leonardo or Giotto, but the Anonymous artist who produced art in all parts of Italy, whether on the coast, in the mountains, in the hills or on the plains, and who was always highly attentive to the landscape (both urban and rural)"[102].

Another stereotype seemed to us that Italy was a nation of individualists, incapable of collective action.

This idea was in fact the corollary of the previous one. It seemed equally widespread in the English-speaking world, for it seems to have been common to personalize Italy by referring to Italian "geniuses" – whether Dante or Machiavelli, Michelangelo, Verdi or Marconi. However, we did not just need to stress the importance of "Anon.", but also to make it clear that Italians were perfectly capable of collective action. We thus needed to explain that in Italy the relationship between society and political organization is peculiar, and that this meant that collective action takes on forms which are different from those found in other nations.

In 1981 I tried to explain the Italian peculiarity. "The fact that Italy started the process of industrial modernization late has reinforced a number of stereotypes and commonplaces. In particular, it has brought out the negative aspects of the political fragmentation which was a feature of Italy until unification in 1861. Industrialization and a rational, unitary, state organization with strong powers of decision-making became the parameters by which the modernity of a country was judged, as well as its overall capacity to achieve the political, social and economic goals which the new cultural climate decreed.

Now unification and economic modernization came late in Italy; rationalization of the administrative apparatus still has not been achieved even now; and the political system is incapable of taking rapid, effective decisions.

All this is indisputable. And yet Italy is the world's seventh industrial power, and it has reacted to the most recent crisis of Western civilization – the loss of low-cost energy – with a rapidity and flexibility which are at least the equal of other countries which seem to be more rationally organized. In other words, collective action has taken place.

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[102] Ibid., p.17.

However, it can only be seen if we look at results, rather than at intentions or promises. Moreover, it is a kind of collective action which often does without the political system and goes through initiatives of civil society.

These two characteristics – muddle in the political system and capacity of the civil society to react – are not contradictory. For the present-day Italian "system", with its rigid parliamentarianism and political parties which tend to meddle in every area of the country's life, with its unions which play a significant political role, its regional and local governments which play no less significant a role, is the outcome of the society which had to draw up a constitutional framework *ex novo* in 1946. For in 1946 it was decided to respect and give value to social, cultural, regional and local diversity. This was in line with the national tradition, and, fortunately was also a good response to coming international events – for with the Cold War which started soon afterwards, Italy needed flexible responses, given that it had such an important Communist party.

The consequences of these constitutional arrangements were thus partly positive and partly negative. On the negative side we may mention the fact that Italy's governments are less efficient than those of countries with a presidential system, for example. On the positive side we may notice that it was possible to reach a reasonable compromise between political parties and ideological positions which, at the end of the Second World War, looked set on the road of conflict.

Given these arrangements, Italy has reacted in the way which is most congenial to it: it has not succumbed to the inefficiencies of the political system, and it has taken all the steps necessary to achieve social and economic development. This brings us to the importance which initiatives comig from the "periphery" have in Italy (perhaps more than elsewhere).

The low degree of effectiveness of the central political system is perhaps the feature which most marks out Italy from the other major Western countries, whether they have a presidential system (United States and France), an electoral system based on a first-past-the-post system (Britain), or some other mechanism which ensures stable governments (Germany). However, it would be quite wrong to conclude from this weakness of central government action that present-day Italians are incapable of collective action. In a situation where civil society is highly complex, and the political system is inefficient, collective action tends to grow out of liberal rationality – from innumerable independent decisions rather than from any centralized rationality, or any planned, worked-out scheme of overall action. This is a kind of rationality which emerges out of a broad "market" of proposals, rather than from oligarchic circles.

In other words, Italian society is much more liberal than it seems at first sight. And precisely because it lacks the effective regulation provided in other countries by the political system it is forced to regulate itself and work out its own plans (…)

All this should be borne in mind by those foreign commentators who ask themselves if Italy can possibly hold together. Two terms seem to exemplify the kind of misunderstandings which often arise among those who observe and judge us from outside. The first is "crisis", which is so often used in discussions of the Italian political system – conjuring up an image of a country constantly on the verge of catastrophe. The second is the complement of crisis – "Italian miracle" – often employed when the country has managed to achieve some important goal. If foreign observers gave more attention to the relationships between the political system and civil society in Italy, they would avoid excessive alarm about Italy's difficulties, and would find more rational explanations than miraculous intervention for the country's ability to attain social and

economic objectives - starting with its ability to achieve high levels of industrial development. These achievements are the product of work and action, certainly not gifts from heaven. These "facts of today's Italy" are not understandable if we do not grasp the underlying structures of a country which is so thoroughly integrated into the West, yet also so different from other Western countries that it takes special interpretative keys to unlock the essence and substance"[103].

With arguments of this kind we tried to give foreign readers a key to interpreting Italy in the present and the past. However, we also needed to give American interlocutors answers to their questions about where Italy was going. Our reply was optimistic and, in a way, foreshadowed themes which emerged into the arena of public debate in Italy ten years later in the discussion of federalism and local development. "Italian society is deeply structured around its cities – Turin, Milan, Genoa, Venice, Bologna, Florence, Naples, Rome (to mention the eight potential capitals of Italy listed by a French observer in the mid-19th century) and by the hundred smaller cities which embody Italy's history, and also the country's present and its future.

One might think that all this abundance of local centres contained a threat of a localism which was inadequate for meeting the challenges of the 21st century. However, in Italy's history, just as today, local rootedness has not excluded openness on the world [in the preceding pages I had described the various forms the Italian diaspora had taken over the centuries]. Here we need only remember that the tension which has always existed between the local, the national, and the supra-national continues to exist today. The same years in which Italy actively participated in building European integration were also the years when it set up the Regions (roughly along the lines of the frontiers of the old pre-Unification states), i.e., administrative and political bodies which aim to narrow the gap between the differentiation of local life and the uniformity of the national state (…) Italy therefore seems to be capable of meeting the considerable challenges which the end of the century poses"[104].

Our optimism needed justifying and explaining given the gloomy situation in Italy at the time. I therefore concluded by inviting readers to overcome "the weakness which is common among those who evaluate a country (whether Italy or elsewhere) from outside – the tendency to confuse a single event or situation and basic structure, or worse still, deduce the existence of a basic structure from some striking event of the present.

To take an example, even though Italian terrorists have managed to disrupt Italy's public life over the last few years, they number no more than a few hundred, and their ultimate influence on the direction Italy will take is minimal. Yet for many they have been taken as the symbol of a society which is breaking up. It is a good antidote to simplification of this kind to get into the habit of looking at the present with the perspective, and the conceptual tools, of the historian. This allows us to distinguish what is ephemeral from what is lasting, and discourages us from looking for the basic character of a nation in a few newspaper cuttings, rather than in its long history. We believe Italy has something to say because we see it in its historical continuity (…). The fact that it is a country shaped by man (perhaps more than any other Western nation) still makes it very special, and very important on a world scale (…) [because] the problem of how to move from the natural to the human – a problem which has been

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[103] Ibid., pp.17-19.
[104] Ibid., pp.19-20.

tackled for centuries in Italy, and in ways which are unique, remains a challenge for younger countries. They can learn from Italian experience"[105].

The exhibition "Italy, a Country Shaped by Man"

The exhibition "Italy, a Country Shaped by Man" was planned as an organic whole, organized in modules, so that it could be assembled in different forms, enabling us to make full use of whatever space was available[106]. We preferred to hold the exhibition in scientific museums, partly because they were able to attract a broad public, but also because it was a way of pushing home one of our main messages - that Italy was much more than just great art.

The exhibition started with a number of audio-visual presentations (on restoration and technology; crafts and design; work and technology; and energy and scarcity). Next came the exhibition of art by the Anonymous Genius, prepared by Giuliano Briganti, and two photographic exhibitions - one of photographs from the Alinari Archives, which showed Italy at the time of the Great Migration to the Americas, the other (designed by Giovanni Chiaramonte) showing the work of thirteen photographers portraying present-day Italy. Finally, there was the large multi-vision audio-visual production, portraying Italy's history and characteristics. This began with pictures of the United States and asked the question: What do the language of the music played at the Metropolitan, the Palladian architecture of the East Coast villas, champions like Di Maggio, singers like Sinatra, and millions of Italian Americans all have in common? The answer of course was: Italy. The exhibition opened with an account of how Italy had become a "country shaped by man" over the centuries. This showed how the landscape had been profoundly transformed, so deeply that it had become a second nature. It showed that as they worked the land, generations of Italians had transmitted culture: showed how they occupied and marked out territory with the signs of power and wealth, setting up cities (social worlds enclosed behind walls). And the exhibition also showed that present-day Italy was an advanced industrial country which had not forgotten its past, and showed the way Italian merchants, intellectuals and simple emigrants contributed to changing the world over the centuries. And it demonstrated that the influence of Italian goods, forms and ideas is still very significant today.

This is the list of contents of a very long multi-vision production (lasting about forty minutes). It was a great success, especially among Italian Americans, many of whom wrote to tell us they felt proud to be Italian. The Foundation's message in fact did not only defend the interests of Italians in Italy, but also those of Italian Americans[107].

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[105] Ibid., p.20.

[106] In Chicago the exhibition (11 June-16 August 1981), presented in cooperation with the Italian-American Civic Committee, was held at the Museum of Science and Industry; at New Haven (5-25 September 1981) at Ingall's Rink, Yale University, in cooperation with Yale University and its President Bartlett G. Giamatti, and the City of New Haven (mayor, Biagio di Lieto); in Washington (20 October-22 November 1981) at the Hubert Humphrey Building, in cooperation with the U. S. Department of Health and Social Services; in San Francisco (28 March-6 June 1982) the exhibition, held at the California Academy of Sciences, was opened by the President of the Republic of Italy Sandro Pertini.

[107] See Giovanni Agnelli Foundation, *1976-1986: dieci anni di attività*, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1986, pp. 99-104. In South America the exhibition was held in Argentina, *Italia, Un pais hecho por el hombre*, Teatro Coliseum, Buenos Aires (15 April-15 May 1983) and at the Teatro Universitario, Cordoba (l-l5 June 1983); in Brazil, *Italia. Un pais modelado pelo homem*, Museu

An idea of America

There is no doubt that the fact that we felt so very much at home in the United States in the first years of our American programme reflected the stress and difficulties of life in Italy, and in Turin in particular, during those years[108]. However, at a deeper level this sensation of being at home was due to history – the great history which links Europe and the United States. Once again it was clear how important and useful it is to take a long-term view of civilizations – the only view which allows us to go beyond the superficialities of mere impressions or contingent circumstances, and make real sense of personal experiences.

I thus wrote as follows in the booklet which accompanied the exhibition (*Italy. A country shaped by man*): "The problem of Italy's image needs to be set in the context of the Western world – in other words in the context of a shared cultural tradition. Precisely because there is this common background it is possible to make comparisons and bring out contrasts, and to make evaluations on this basis"[109]. This is a key passage, for it marks the transition we made to the second subject in the dialogue we were organizing (the first being our idea of what Italy is) – our idea of America and of Italian Americans.

This was a crucial idea for the Foundation, for it led us to articulate a criterion for ordering the numerous relationships we already had with other countries. What emerged was the need to have a conceptual framework which enabled us to understand the different quality of relations with America and relations with the Asian countries – even when in the Americas we encountered not democracy and liberalism but the arrogance of dictatorship. This struck home when we were confronted with the great diversity of regimes existing in the Americas at the time; for these were the years when Argentina, Brazil and Chile – to cite just the largest countries in South America – were all dictatorships.

As I have said, we felt thoroughly at home in the United States and could easily identify with its culture and society. Naturally our relationship with the political regimes of South America was very different. Those regimes certainly were not the most suitable cultural framework for organizing the Foundation's activities. Given the complexity of these problems, we urgently needed a wider conceptual and cultural framework which would orient our cultural activities and relations.

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de Arte de São Paulo (MASP), São Paolo (28 September-12 October 1983), Palacio das Artes, Belo Horizonte (25-30 October 1983) and at the Museum Nacional de Belas Artes, Rio de Janeiro (8-15 November 1983); in Venezuela, *Italia. Un pais hecho por el hombre*, Ateneo de Caracas, Caracas (7-21 May 1985); in Canada, *Italy. A country shaped by man. Un pays modelè par l'homme*, al Royal Ontario Museum, Toronto (21 September-18 November 1984) and Musée des Beaux Arts, Montreal (14 December 1984 - 27 January 1985).

[108] Between 1978 and 1982 America seemed to me much friendlier than it does today. This was probably because the days I spent in New York or Washington were a welcome contrast to life in Turin; everything seemed (and was) so pleasantly "normal" after all the precautions against terrorism which it was necessary to take in Italy. In Turin one was obliged to be circumspect and continually on the defensive vis-à-vis the world outside the Foundation. In the United States in contrast, one was continually meeting people who were biased in favour of our work, the Foundation, and the Italy we represented.

[109] M. Pacini, «Perché "L'Italia. Un paese modellato dall'uomo"» in *L'Italia. Un paese modellato dall'uomo* op. cit., p. 17.

The conceptual framework of cultural universes came out of this attempt to think things through[110]. In 1987 we published three volumes under the title *Euroamericani* (European Americans)[111], which brought together in Italian translation the most interesting results of the research programmes we launched in the United States, Brazil and Argentina in 1979. Almost all the pieces had already been published in those countries. The title "European Americans" expressed our idea that our relationship with America could only be properly understood in a European dimension, and also our belief that Italian relations (including those of Italian Americans) needed to be understood as a special case of European American relations.

In the "Introduction" to *Euroamericani* (which readers interested in a fuller treatment of the question are naturally invited to consult) I outlined an idea of America which started out from the metaphor employed by Edmund O'Gorman in *The Invention of America* and later taken up by Braudel – the idea that Europe did not "discover" America but "invented" it. The idea, in other words, that Europe moulded America after its own desires, interests and convictions, considering it another Europe beyond the seas – a province which was far away, but also fully part of its territory[112]. From the beginning the main difference between the New and the Old World – the great abundance of land – struck Europeans as *the* characteristic of America, offering economic, political and cultural opportunities for all, which were not available in Europe. The enormous open spaces provided a powerful physical symbol of these opportunities and allowed the relationship to be maintained as the New World provided a continual flow of opportunities at a time when Europe was changing its culture, its political arrangements, and expectations. Soon the New World became a land where it was possible to plan and put into practice what was unthinkable and impossible in Europe. Not only was America perceived as a land of opportunity by the governments of the various European nations (each with its own cultural plans, legal and political arrangements, and economic and political interests); in addition (and this was revolutionary, and had never happened before) the New World turned out to be a land of opportunity for religious and political minorities.

In this way a huge social laboratory emerged, where European culture in all its manifestations, whether dominant or minority, could dream of fulfilling its plans and putting its convictions into practice. So the building of America was partly the work of the Old Regime, but also partly the work of the reforming, Enlightenment Europe which opposed the Old Regime. Protestant Europe and Catholic Europe, Restoration Europe and liberal, democratic Europe, the Europe of realism and that of the utopias – they all had a hand in America. In 1987 I wrote: "It was never a one-way relationship, with Europe simply influencing America, for right from the beginning the New World had a prominent place in European cultural debate, influencing its central nucleus and offering material for reflection for those who were asking themselves what was the best

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[110] See above, the chapter "Criteria and contents of international cultural relations in the 1980s: the encounter with cultural universes".

[111] *Euroamericani*, vol. I, Betty Boyd Caroli, Piero Gastaldo, Francis A. Janni *et al.*, *La popolazione di origine italiana negli Stati Uniti*; vol. II, Francis Korn, Isidoro Ruiz Moreno, Ezequiel Gallo *et al.*, *La popolazione di origine italiana in Argentina*; vol. III, Rovílio Costa e Luís De Boni, Lucy Maffei Hutter *et al.*, *La popolazione di origine italiana in Brasile*, Torino, Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1987.

[112] See Fernand Braudel, *Civilization and Capitalism, 15th-18th Century*, 3 vols., New York, Harper and Row, 1967, 1979, 1981-4. The reference (to page 408 of the Italian translation of vol. 3, Turin 1982) is to be found in M.Pacini, "Introduction", *Euroamericani*, op.cit., vol.I, p.60.

way to create a more just society (…) All the actors in question brought what they had to America – their own institutions, culture, vision of the world. It is not surprising, therefore, that today, several centuries later, America seems to be so culturally and socially (not to mention economically) diverse; for the Europes which the current American nations happened to be in contact with were very different too. The analogies and similarities which link the various American nations of today – Argentina and the United States, for example – have their roots in Europe, not in America, where it is the differences which have emerged. The threads which link many American countries to each other lead to European roots, and it is in Europe that they need to be discovered"[113].

The last utopia: the American myth of abundance

In the second half of the 18th century, the myth of America as a land of abundance was added to the image of America as a place where it was possible to set up religious or political utopias. This American myth meant that America no longer attracted just religious minorities (who were educated and sophisticated in their way), but also great masses of peasants from all over Europe. The English and Irish came first, followed by Germans, and then waves from southern Europe. In all countries the mirage of the American dream worked in the same way – it was the idea of being able to work land of one's own which was the prime mover of the great exodus.

In Italy emigration only got under way after Unification, when the myth of America began to spread through the countryside of the North, in the Veneto, Lombardy and Piedmont. Prior to this, there had only been political migration, or the migration of Ligurian seamen. The hopes of emigrants were inflated by the informal network to encourage migration which was rapidly set up. As Rovílio Costa and Luís De Boni pointed out in *Euroamericani*, "agents of governments and private entrepreneurs combed Italy recruiting peasants. They tempted them with impossible promises, recounting the marvels of the new land – claiming, for example, that it was possible to earn over 1000 lire a month sheering sheep, or that every grain of maize produced six large cobs"[114].

The reality, of course, was very different. In the United States there was no longer new land to cultivate after 1890 or so – thus before the bulk of Italians arrived. Italians therefore "mostly (80%) remained in the large cities of the East Coast, and participated in building American urban civilization. The American myth continued to have its effects, however, for even if they could not obtain land, Italian emigrants were seeking a job and the chance to build prosperity.

The situation of migrants who went to South America was different, for there colonization of new land continued until much later (indeed, it is still continuing – in Brazil, for example). (…)

Thus throughout the nineteenth century the image of America which could free one from poverty ran through Italy, giving rise to unlikely stories and popular ballads", which gave only a vague idea of what life was like, but did convey the idea that there

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[113] See M. Pacini, «Introduzione» in *Euroamericani* op.cit., p. 62-63.

[114] Rovílio Costa and Luís De Boni, «Gli italiani del Rio Grande do Sul» in *Euroamericani* vol. III op.cit., p. 46.

was work. "When our emigrants arrived, they discovered a very different reality – an America which was paved with gold because they themselves were creating the gold with their own work; however, this did not discourage them, nor discourage others from joining them (…) In every country, in the United States as in Canada, in Argentina or Brazil, in agricultural areas and in the cities, "work", and especially manual work had a central place in Italians' culture, whatever the political or economic context they found themselves in. They had no choice: many were illiterate, and could only hope to get on by means of manual work. This centrality of work remained a constant in the years which followed"[115].

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[115] M. Pacini, «Introduzione» in *Euroamericani* op.cit., vol. I, p. 93-94.

The conclusions which I drew gave shape to the basic idea which had been behind all our day-to-day work in the specific programmes – the feeling that America and Europe belonged to the same cultural universe, the "Euro-American" universe. "Religious utopia, political utopia, utopia of affluence – over five centuries relations between Europe and America developed to the tune of these themes"[116].

Some of these utopias have been successful (the American Constitution, for example), others (such as that of the Jesuit missions) have failed. However, in all ages, Europe has been tempted to try in America what it could not do in Europe itself. The most recent utopia – that of affluence – is a good example. Tens of millions of Europeans emigrated, driven by the dream of being able to apply their skills in work.

The Euro-American relationship would not be complete, however, if there was no Canada (the reconstruction of the British conservative project) or Brazil or Argentina (where authoritarian forms of political behaviour were exported, and where democracy has established itself only very recently).

Over the course of these long centuries, the European-American relationship has been complex and varied. It has, however, had the constant characteristic of being a relationship between people on either side of the Atlantic who shared a common culture; indeed, it was a relationship between people who took across the Atlantic the political passions, controversies and antagonisms of their European homelands. At the same time, it is also true that Europe's encounter with America has changed European history and the role it has played in the world. First of all, it meant that Europe was no longer alone. For centuries, Europe had to bear the brunt of the (peaceful or warlike) impact of other civilizations – Arabs, Turks, Mongols, Tartars. It stood alone, without a rearguard, to use a military metaphor. When America came on the scene (the most important event after the Creation, according to Francisco Lopez di Gomara), the ambit of European civilization became enormously wider, and that civilization was able to tackle a completely new task – shaping, building, "inventing" a New World.

After America came on the scene, Europe no longer stood alone; yet at the same time, it was different. When Europe looked eastwards it saw other civilizations, other cultures, with which it had (and has) a duty to enter into dialogue, to further mutual understanding. In relations with these civilizations and cultures it is fruitful and necessary to recognize that we are different, and that we need to discover each other. When it looks westwards, in contrast, Europe finds a World which is different because it is New, but also the same, because it has grown out of the same roots and forms part of the same civilization.

It is well known that the question of exactly how different United States society is recurs periodically in the country's intellectual and political debate, whenever it is necessary to re-define the nation's position vis-à-vis Europe. When isolationist political culture has the upper hand, theories emphasizing the originality of American society, and downplaying European influence, hold sway. During times of international openness or times of ideological opposition to an external enemy, ideas stressing ties to Europe clearly win the day. Thus in the 1920s Americans stressed the difference of

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[116] See above, the chapter "Criteria and contents of international cultural relations in the 1980s: the encounter with cultural universes". My argument here is the same as that in my Introduction to *Euroamericani*, op.cit., vol.I, p.104-108.

American society, whereas in the 1930s and the 1950s they emphasized similarities with Europe[117].

If we take a world perspective, the differences between Europe and America seem small, alongside other clearer, more fundamental differences in culture, and systems of values, morality and religion which separate Europeans and Americans alike from Chinese, Indians, Indonesians or the many other peoples of Asia or Africa.

This Euro-American cultural universe has emerged out of five centuries of history. At first the contributions to this universe were exclusively European, then gradually it became a bilateral relationship in which the American side has become increasingly important. We need to speak of "American", rather than "United States" side, for the relationship involves all the faces of America, not just the liberal, progressive face, but also the conservative, and even reactionary and militaristic aspect. For conservatism and authoritarianism make up part of the European tradition, and Europe has sung all its tunes in America, not just its best ones. Being within the same cultural universe means having the same roots.

Within the Euro-American cultural universe we naturally need to include countries where utopia has been defeated, countries which have seen the victory of Europe at its most closed and authoritarian. As I wrote in 1987, "Alfonsin's Argentina, or Sarney's Brazil have clean, civilized images, so it is easy enough for common sense to accept the idea of them having a place within the Euro-American framework. But what would happen if authoritarian rule should return to Argentina and Brazil? Should we then say they did not form part of our cultural universe? In this kind of situation, common sense would be no use to us, for it would lead us to isolate and exclude these countries, which are nonetheless an integral part of the Euro-American cultural universe, whatever the nature of their political regimes.

As I have said, these countries reflect an essential part of European history, and of the centuries-long conflict between democracy and authoritarianism. They should not, therefore, be excluded from our shared cultural universe, but helped to reinforce democratic values and institutions. In other words, we should help them so that it is the eighteenth century European utopia which finally wins the day.

In this framework our proposal to organize cultural relations between European and American societies by emphasizing the contribution made by descendants of nineteenth century emigrants becomes understandable. These descendants have become fully part of American society, but they are also the people who have most memory of their countries of origin (even if only a memory passed down by other family members). This is an approach which is relevant for many European countries, and for our country in particular"[118].

Giving Italians in South America a history

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[117] The debate was very different from the present-day debate on multiculturalism, a debate which is often taken to extremes by an ethnic reading of history. These positions do not just dispute the European roots of the United States but even challenge European culture; on the multiculturalism debate see Robert Hughes, *Culture of Complaint: the Fraying of America*, New York (N.Y.), Oxford University Press, 1993; Arthur Meier Schlesinger, jr., *The disuniting of America. Reflections on a multicultural society*, Knoxville (Ten.), Whittle Direct Books, 1991.

[118] M. Pacini, «Introduzione» in *Euroamericani*, vol. I op.cit., p. 108.

As long ago as April 1979 we started to make preparations to extend the Foundation's work to South America. I undertook a recognizance trip in Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela and Peru. I had a particularly interesting meeting in Rio de Janeiro with Raymundo Faoro, a lawyer who had written a book entitled *Os donos do poder* (The Masters of Power)[119], and was involved in incipient opposition to the dictatorship (which at the time was led by lawyers, journalists and the Church). Faoro was pessimistic about the chances of democracy being restored in Brazil in the short term, but he showed great interest in our idea of extending the programme of Italian culture to Brazil. This would have to be sited in São Paolo, the only city where there was strong opposition to the regime, and thus where our initiative could automatically become a link with Europe and democratic countries.

This episode makes it clear how radically different the situation was from that in the United States. As a result of this, our programme took a very different form (even though certain similarities remained). The first, and most basic difference in the South American situation, when compared with the United States, was of course the lack of the rule of law, the tendency for the state and its bureaucracy to take over all aspects of social organization, and the weakness of civil society and liberal democratic culture. In addition, there were differences in the social situation of Italians in South and North America, and differences in the relationship with Italy.

From Italy's point of view, there was also a difference in the strategic interest of forging relations in South and in North America. We were interested in strengthening ties with the United States partly because it was a way of keeping Italy in the West and encouraging the spread of liberal democratic culture. The strategic interest of maintaining ties with countries such as Brazil or Argentina was necessarily more a question of economic and cultural ties. There was a political side to the relationship, but the flow of influence ran in the opposite direction: it was Italy, and Italian culture and society which could help South American countries to find a road towards democracy.

The reasons for committing ourselves in South America were therefore mainly of a geo-economic nature. Italy had traditionally played a major role in the South American economies and thus had a duty to take part in their economic development – and consequently also in the development of civil society. A programme of cultural relations thus had to take these needs of Latin American countries to develop civil society into account. From this point of view, our concerns in South America were very far removed from the concerns which dominated our programmes in the years 1976-80 (the objective of keeping Italy in the western camp). The reasons for undertaking activities in South America were more similar to those which led us to work outside the Euro-American universe in the later 1980s. Consequently, the methods we adopted were also somewhat similar.

One major difference between North and South America was the fact that the ethnic origins of people of European origin did not have a political significance. Nor was there much awareness of the cultural significance of these origins, with the exception of a few places such as Río Grande do Sul in Brazil. The situation we were starting from was well described by Mario Nascimbene: "Italians and their descendants in Argentina make up a human group which has had a crucial influence in setting the making of modern Argentina (...) Yet the great majority of Italian Argentineans know almost nothing of

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[119] Raymundo Faoro, *Os donos do poder. Formaçao do patronato politico brasileiro*, Porto Alegre, Editora Globo, 1975.

the country where they have their roots, and almost nothing of the enormous labours of Italian immigrants in Argentina, whether we are talking of simple workers or professional people, writers, artists or men of religion. It is obvious that (...) this ignorance of their roots is a disadvantage both for those with Italian origins (who abandon a precious heritage), and for Argentina itself, for in certain sectors Argentina's national culture is still being formed (even though it is mature in other sectors)."[120]

At the end of the 1970s, "Italians" in Argentina (and in the other countries of South America) were thus still waiting to be discovered, in spite of the fact that, almost everywhere, citizens of Italian origins had formed part of the leading, ruling class and had been crucial actors in the process of nation building.

To understand the history of Italians in Argentina we need to grasp the fact that they were real colonizers of the land. Whereas in the United States they stayed mostly in the big cities of the East Coast, in Argentina or Brazil the main function of Italians was to cultivate virgin lands. In the area around Santa Fé and Cordoba, it was immigrants from Lombardy and Piedmont who put into effect the "revolution of the pampas". It was they who extended the wheat fields little by little, making Argentina first self-sufficient in wheat, then eventually the world's third largest exporter."[121]

The work ethic and a lively grass-roots micro-capitalism are themes which crop up repeatedly in the culture of Italian emigration all the world over. It is almost as though millions of thoroughly Catholic peasants wished to refute the theories linking the work ethic to Protestantism (even before these theories were formulated). The pattern we find in Argentina can also be found in Brazil, although there we find more fragmentation (so the history of São Paolo was not only profoundly different from that of Río del Grande do Sul, or Espírito Santo, but was even quite separate). The huge distances, plus the difficulties of communication, meant that there were many local and regional histories. In Brazil, unlike in Argentina or the United States, geographical mobility long remained low. So single Brazilian communities remained essentially isolated from each other for a long period.

The programme took off quickly, for by June 1979 we had already established a number of solid ties of cooperation. In Buenos Aires these ties were with researchers connected with the Di Tella Institute, a group coordinated by Francis Korn[122]. It was clear from the start that, if the Foundation did nothing else, it would have to fill the vacuum of knowledge in the field of historical research on Italians in Argentina.

Our relations in Brazil were more complex, since we worked with two groups, one in São Paolo, the other in Porto Alegre. In São Paolo our tie was with MASP, the Museum of São Paolo Art founded and directed by Pietro Maria Bardi. In Porto Alegre we worked with a group of researchers headed by Rovílio Costa, a Capuchin father, for whom maintenance of the cultural roots of the descendants of immigrants from the Veneto area in North-East Italy had become a real ethical and political project. Our

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[120] Mario C. Nascimbene, unpublished introduction to «Storia della collettività italiana in Argentina (1835-1965)» for *Euroamericani*, vol. II op.cit., p. 1.

[121] Mario C. Nascimbene, «Storia della collettività italiana in Argentina (1835-1965)» in *Euroamericani* vol. II op.cit., p. 288.

[122] See Francis Korn (ed.), *Los italianos en la Argentina*, Buenos Aires, Giovanni Agnelli Foundation, 1983. The work, which contains pieces by Rodolfo Arizaga, Francisco J. Bullrich, Roberto Cortés Conde, Renata Donghi Alperín, Ezequiel Gallo, Ada Korn, Marcelo Monserrat, Mario C. Nascimbene, Isidoro Ruiz Moreno and Linda de la Torre, forms the first part of vol. II of *Euroamericani*, op.cit.

most fruitful relationship was definitely with this group of researchers based in Porto Alegre, the capital of the state of Río Grande do Sul. It was here, in the years after 1878, that peasants from the Veneto - brought over by the Brazilian government - started to colonize and cultivate new land. Due above all to the isolation of this area, the language and culture of the original Veneto settlers has been maintained. The Veneto dialect of Italian is the normal idiom, and reference to the culture is not just literary, but very much a living matter of one's identity - indeed, it is *the* symbol of identity.

In September 1979 two concrete initiatives were started with Rovílio Costa's group (which included Luís De Boni, Júlio Posenatto and Arlindo Battistel as prominent members). The first of these was a study and survey of the domestic, religious, industrial and social architecture associated with Italian settlement. The idea was to encourage appreciation of the value and historical importance of this architecture, as a means to ensure that it would not be destroyed. The second project was a study of the culture of Italian farmer settlers, based on interviews, recordings of oral history, and the collection of documentary material. The idea was to cover the whole area of the "colonies" (Caxias do Sul, Garibaldi, Nova Bassano, etc.).

I should emphasize one feature of our relationship with the Río Grande researchers. Their aim was not purely to extend knowledge: they wanted to undertake a form of cultural and social action. They were convinced of the value of an "Italian" identity, and wished to reaffirm Italian culture, starting from the language which their fathers had used, and which they saw as essential for maintaining quality of life and culture in the present, especially for young people. They were also concerned to build a modern culture in the same way as they were concerned to preserve the architectural heritage of the first phase of Italian immigration, and concerned to set up museums of material culture. They were thus researchers who identified with, and were part of, the society they were studying, and their prime loyalties were to that society. The quality and usefulness of their work can be judged by the following comment of Ruggiero Romano's on research by Rovílio Costa, Arlindo Battistel and Júlio Posenatto, entitled *Assim vivem os italianos*[123]. Romano complains of the lack of studies of "ordinary" Italian emigrants - those men and women whose lives were made of the manual work of builders, craftsmen, minor artists, and so on. "The great and glorious exception to this generalization consists of the four volumes of *Assim vivem os italianos*. In those four volumes pain-staking patience, erudition and intelligence combine to demonstrate how Italian material culture (in cooking, music, building, ways of making baskets, and so on and so forth) has been preserved, has changed, and has influenced the surrounding environment"[124].

Apart from their research in the Río Grande colonies, the Porto Alegre group also worked to overcome the geographical isolation which was characteristic of Brazil at the time, building up a network of researchers in the other states of the nation. This work gave rise to conferences on Italian migration, held at São Paolo and at Vitoria, in the

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[123] Arlindo Itacir Battistel and Rovílio Costa, *Assim vivem os italianos,* vol. I, *Vida, historia, cantos, comidas e estorias,* Est/ Educs, Porto Alegre, 1982; vol. II, *Religião, musica, trabalho e lazer,* Est/ Educs, Porto Alegre, 1983; vol. III, *A vida italiana em fotografia*, Est/ Educs, Porto Alegre, 1983; Júlio Posenato, vol. IV, *Arquitetura da imigração italiana no Rio Grande do Sul*, Porto Alegre, Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli-Est/ Educs, 1983.

[124] Ruggiero Romano, «Il lungo cammino dell'emigrazione italiana» in *Altreitalie*, 7, January-June 1992, p. 15.

state of Espírito Santo. These laid the basis for a more unified and "Brazilian" view of Italian Brazilians[125].

Different approaches in the various American societies

As I mentioned in the previous section, it was differences which were most prominent in the early years of our programme - between 1978 and 1980 - especially the differences between the United States and the South American countries. In the United States study of the ethnic origins of the population was well established - not only because there had been a great deal of academic research but also because ethnic origins had always been a major political as well as cultural problem in the States.

In addition, United States culture had always focused attention on the importance and meaning of mass immigration. At the beginning of the century, the social response to the challenges posed by immigration was in terms of Anglo-conformity, the attempt to reduce all other European cultures to an Anglo-American culture. In the 1920s, the theory of the melting pot emerged, the idea that numerous different cultures could merge into one new one. Finally, in more recent years, pluralistic ideas of new ethnicity have emerged. These embody a more complex theory of American culture, where the new is seen as being grafted on to the old, and where common and unified identity is compatible with the persistence of cultural differences deriving from the roots of the mother countries of immigrants and their descendants.

This explains why Americans in the United States place such stress on their ethnic origins, yet do so quite calmly, without any sense of doing anything out of the ordinary. For a third or fourth generation immigrant, stressing the national origins of forefathers in no way contradicts a deep sense of national identity as American. Reference to ethnic identities is everywhere - in the cinema, in politics, in virtually every aspect of social and cultural life, and it is this which explains why there is such an abundance of academic production on all ethnic groups, including Italian Americans.

So in the United States the Foundation did not do what it did in Argentina or Brazil and carry out research of its own on the culture of individual communities. It seemed more useful to play a service role, encouraging better ties between scholars and research centres already involved in the study of Italian culture. Since sociological research and academic and wider cultural interpretation and absorption of the results of research were well advanced, and did not need to be set up or encouraged by any outside body. It was therefore more logical for us to concentrate on breaking down isolation between individual scholars or between communities - persuading Italian Americans that the time was right to meet together more often, and start thinking in more complex terms.

The Conferences we organized with the NIAF in Washington in 1979 and 1980 made it possible to discuss publicly - at a high level of intellectual and political debate - the problems facing Italian Americans in the coming years. These conferences were thus a major example of asserting a political and cultural presence - breaking the ice and dispelling the slight mistrust and diffidence which many Italian Americans themselves

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[125] See Giovanni Agnelli Foundation, *1976-1986: dieci anni di attività,* Torino, Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1986, pp. 110-13; Giovanni Agnelli Foundation, *1976-1990: quinze ans d'activité*, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1990; Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, *1990-1993: quattro anni di attività*, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1993.

felt. To sum up, we might say that "Italians" in the United States had more a problem of image than one of awareness of themselves as a group.

As a result of this awareness - the fact that statistics and cultural interpretations were already to hand - meant that we could draw on existing Italian and American studies to answer three basic questions: who are Italian Americans, how many of them are there and where do they live. In no major South American country was this possible; the lack of objective information reflected the very different level of awareness.

The situation in Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela and Chile was in fact completely different. Sociological and historical research on the topic was far less advanced, and even the most elementary data was difficult to find. Above all, the prominence of ethnic identity and cultural roots was much lower. Citizens with Italian origins had been part of the upper middle class from the beginning, they were never marginal, never suffered at the hands of another ethnic group which thought itself superior. Italians in South America have simply been part of the country, for better and for worse, sharing merits and faults with citizens of other national origins. The ethnic issue has thus tended to be seen as a non-issue; and this tendency has been accentuated by the nationalism which has been prevalent in certain periods. It is this which explains to a considerable degree why research on ethnic origins is just beginning. In addition, development of such studies is inevitably hampered by general lack of basic data (archives, documentary sources, etc.), plus lack of the kind of organization and tradition of sociological research which exists in the United States.

Given this political and cultural situation, we decided to organize a number of pieces of research which would bring out the extent of Italian cultural influence, at all levels of society, and show the part played by Italians in those states where they constituted a sizeable part of the population. In other words, in a context where basic knowledge was lacking, we decided to encourage research which would give Italians in South America a history, avoiding any activity on behalf of any specific community. We wanted to fill a major gap in knowledge by reconstructing the history of Italian settlement and integration. We thus traced Italians' contributions to the countries where they went - their contribution to nation building, the history of how they became Brazilians, Argentinians, Venezuelans or Chileans.

This is a history which unfolded over several generations. It was one which sometimes started in lands which were not, at the time, part of Italy, politically speaking (such as the Veneto, the Trentino, or Venezia Giulia). We wanted to trace this extraordinary process whereby people attained a loyalty to an American state, even while Italian cultural roots persisted. The only case in which we had a relationship with one specific territory was that of our work in Río do Sul.

This general approach implied a number of consequences for the way we worked in South America - for example, the fact that we stressed the importance of ties with South American researchers, and the fact that we often published our own studies in Spanish or Portuguese before publishing them in Italian. The programme took off and continued with great intensity until 1992, when we reduced it to a programme of sporadic activities[126]. 1992 was a time for summing up the results we had achieved, and for

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[126] Among the Foundation's activities in Latin America we might mention the exhibitions *Italia-Brasil. Relações entre os séculos XVI e XX*, Giovanni Agnelli Foundation and Museu de Arte de São Paolo Assis Chateaubriand (MASP, São Paolo, 1980) and *Contribuições dos italianos na arquitetura brasileira*, under the direction of P.M.Bardi, Fiat do Brasil and Giovanni Agnelli Foundation (MASP, São Paolo, 1981); the series of publications edited by Luis Alberto De Boni, *A presença italiana no Brasil*,

drawing comparative conclusions, against the background of the celebrations for the five-hundredth anniversary of the discovery of America. At a conference organized in New York we compared the experience of the various "Italian" immigrations in the two Americas. Another conference held at Washington provided an overview of the role played by "Italian-ness" (in terms of both people and ideas) in the United States[127].

How might we sum up the role played by Italian emigration to the Americas? What overall assessment can we make of the significance that millions of Italian peasants had in the history of the world? Braudel gives us such an overall assessment when he says "in the 19th and 20th centuries we find the important but low-keyed voice of Italian emigration. It is a voice which is difficult to hear under the pompous shouting of Grand History, but it constitutes a huge expenditure of human energies - an expenditure which the peninsula of Italy itself did not much benefit from. From the later 19th century on, Italian emigrants made a valiant contribution to the human development of Portuguese, Spanish and English-speaking America, renewing the substance of all these Americas. In world terms, this was no mean service. Was this just the beginning? The question remains open."[128] These words of Braudel's sum up the essentials of the Foundation's programme. Braudel points out that the "huge expenditure of human energy" did not much benefit Italy itself. We argued that it was possible to draw benefits, of a cultural and political nature.

The issue has great relevance, for the conclusions we have drawn for Italy could be drawn also for all those European countries which have contributed at various times to the building of the American societies. The Foundation's activities have the general objective of encouraging ties with Italy (both present-day Italy and that of the past), while at the same time totally respecting the fully American citizenship of Italian Americans. Our relationship with Italian Americans is therefore an intense one, but is a question of a cultural relationship. We might cooperate to improve the standing or role of "Italians" in the Americas, but we would never attempt to build opportunistic

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Porto Alegre, Giovanni Agnelli Foundation and Escola Superior de Teologia São Lourenço de Brindes, 1987, vol. II, 1990, vol. III, 1996; Rovílio Costa and Italico Marcon, *Imigração Italiana no Rio Grande do Sul. Fontes historicas,* Escola Superior de Teologia São Lourenço de Brindes/Editoria de Universidade de Caxias do Sul, 1988. See also Rovílio Costa and Luis Alberto De Boni (eds.), *La presenza italiana nella storia e nella cultura del Brasile,* Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1991; Vicente Giancotti (ed.), *Bibliografia della letteratura italiana in America Latina,* Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1992; Fernando J. Devoto, Maria M. Camou, Adela Pellegrino, J. A. Oddone *et al., L'emigrazione italiana e la formazione dell'Uruguay moderno,* Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1993; Luigi Favero, Maria R. Stabili, R. Salinas Meza *et al., Il contributo italiano allo sviluppo del Cile,* Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1994; Pedro Cunill Grau, *La presenza italiana in Venezuela,* Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1996; Giovanni Bonfiglio, *Gli italiani in Perù,* Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1998.

[127] The conference «The Columbus people. Five Hundred Years of Immigration to the Americas», was organized by the Giovanni Agnelli Foundation and the Center for Migration Studies, New York, and was held at New York University from 27 to 29 May 1992; the conference «America's Italy: classical, romantic and modern Italian traditions and the building of America» was held at the Corcoran Gallery of Art, Washington (D. C.), 17 - 19 September 1992. See Giovanni Agnelli Foundation, *1990-1993: quattro anni di attività,* Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1993, pp. 41 and 43. On the contribution of Italian political and civic culture to the building of the United States, see Gordon S. Wood, Robert A. Ferguson, Meyer Reinhold *et al., La virtù e la libertà. Ideali e civiltà italiana nella formazione degli Stati Uniti*, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1995.

[128] Fernand Braudel, «L'Italia fuori d'Italia. Due secoli e tre Italie», in *Storia d'Italia*, vol. II, *Dalla caduta dell'Impero Romano al secolo XVIII*, Turin, Einaudi, 1974, p. 2092.

political loyalties towards Italy - something which would be thoroughly out of place and inappropriate to our times.

But if our main aims were to help Americans in the United States to reassess the image of "Italians", and to give Italian South Americans a history, to what extent did we succeed?

It is not too difficult to measure our contribution to writing the history of Italian South Americans, since it is possible to see the research produced. It is more difficult, naturally, to assess our success in influencing images. However, there is no doubt that the image of Italians has improved, and that the Foundation has contributed to this change. It would be futile to try to determine "how much" difference we made. What is important is knowing that we have taken part in the great operation of revaluing the memory and the image of Italian Americans, at the same time, we hope, providing an attractive ideal of Italian society in general.

Our activities at present

Our programme on Italian Americans is still running, albeit just ticking over at a low level. We still publish *Altreitalie*, and the Documentation Centre in the Foundation is still operating, with its data base on migrants landing in New York, Buenos Aires and a number of Brazilian ports in the years of mass Italian migration[129].

Prospects for the immediate and less immediate future

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[129] The periodical *Altreitalie* was intended to encourage communication and debate between scholars and promote further research and debate by spreading the idea that Italian emigration was not just social history – thus part of the history of Italy – but also part of the history of settlement and integration in the country of arrival. Over the years, themes we put forward, such as the idea that Italians might be seen as one segment of a wider Euro-American grouping, were discussed in the review (Richard Alba, «L'ascesa degli euroamericani» in *Alteitalie*, 4, II, novembre 1990), as was the fascinating cultural prospect of building an "Italian Commonwealth" (Robert Viscusi, «Il futuro dell'italianità: il Commonwealth italiano», *Altreitalie*, 10, July-December 1993). Between 1989 and 1997 *Altreitalie* published, among other things, articles by Helen Barolini, Richard Bosworth, Emilio Franzina, Raffaele Cocchi, Adriana Dadà, Fernando Devoto, Donna Gabaccia, Fred L. Gardaphe, Ira A. Glazier, José B. Pereira, Ruggiero Romano, Gianfausto Rosoli, Gay Talese e Rudolph Vecoli. Since 1996 *Altreitalie* has been on the Internet site *Italians in the world* (http://www.italians-world.org).

In 1989 two data banks were set up - on Italian emigration towards the United States and Argentina respectively. The sources used were the disembarkation registers of ships coming from Italy and landing at New York or Buenos Aires in the 19th and 20th centuries. We hope this will encourage more extensive use of an important archival source for the study of flows towards these two major destination areas.

The United States data base was part of a wider project for the study of Italian migration to the United States organized by the Ellis Island Family History Center, and was carried out by the Balch Institute-Center for Immigration Research at Temple University, Philadelphia, directed by Ira Glazier. The work was finished in 1991, and makes accessible information on around two hundred thousand Italians disembarking in New York in the decade 1880-1891. At the same time as the United States project was being carried out, a similar one was started in Argentina, undertaken by the Centro de Estudios Migratorios Latino Americanos (CEMLA), Buenos Aires. This drew on the million or more names of Italians disembarking at Buenos Aires between 1822 and 1920. The most recent project is the data base on Italian migrants disembarking at Vitoria, in the state of Espírito Santo in Brazil, carried out by Mauro Reginato (University of Turin) and Aurélia Castiglioni (University of Espírito Santo).

To end this account of how the Foundation has contributed to renewing ties between Italians in Italy and outside Italy, it is worth asking what the future of these relations is likely to be, and asking whether the enthusiasm which I referred to earlier regarding the potential political uses of such links (enthusiasm which seems to have infected certain political circles in Italy) is justified.

Italians in the world do not have a language in common. Apart from Italian, they speak English, Spanish and Portuguese. This greatly complicates matters, for it means there is a lack of one major tool for the recognition of a shared identity.

We have great art and a great cultural tradition at the heart of the history of the Euro-American universe. Is that enough common soil to place an anomalous, imaginative *koinè* (one which is real, notwithstanding lack of a common language)? Since identity is voluntarily chosen and constructed, we need to consider the profound differences which exist in the way different people have discovered they have an "Italian" identity. For although these differences are partly personal, to a large extent they derive from the cultural context of the various countries in question.

The United States is perhaps the society where renewing links with Italy seems most feasible; for being "Italian" is one way of being a complete American. In the United States, however, Italian Americans have an important alternative (or partial alternative, for the two are not really incompatible): the possibility of building a Euro-American identity, seeing a tie with Europe in general, independently of any specific national origin. A number of factors are leading in this direction. First of all, mixed marriages are creating children with more than one ethnic identity. Secondly, and probably more importantly, the ethnic composition of the United States as a whole is changing, and the proportion of the European component is diminishing, while at the same time the European cultural tradition is being challenged. The flattening of differences between the various European ethnic origins, combined with the fact that they share a social and cultural position vis-à-vis the "others" may encourage growth of a common identity. This would seem more justified, in addition, by the growth of a European identity in Europe itself as the process of political unification in the European Union progresses.

In the Italian cultural debate today, there are strong themes and themes which are weak, but which nevertheless deserve attention. An example of a "strong" theme of debate would be that of our relationships with "other" cultures - Islam, China, and so on. These are strong because the future depends on how they are resolved. "Weak" themes are those which affect only certain aspects of society or only certain interests, rather than the future of all. The building of an Italian commonwealth is a weak theme, above all because today (unlike in the late 1970s), there is no overall objective with political and strategic value. Twenty years ago, when the Foundation's American programme started, there was the urgent need to reinforce cultural ties with the United States at a time when radical change in the political system seemed possible in Italy. Links with the United States were essential, and it was politically important to convey an image of Italy which made it clear that it was much more than just Eurocommunism. So at the time the relationship with Italian Americans had a clear public and political value. Today the same problem of conveying a less simplified image of Italy and of reinforcing ties with Italian Americans exists, but on a private level. There may still be implications for politics, but they will be very indirect ones. This does not mean that renewing relations with Italian Americans, or with people of Italian origin elsewhere in the world, is something which should be put on ice. On the contrary, it remains an interesting, and also important thing to do. However, it is an objective which has to take

its place among others in the scale of priorities, and which should be pursued with realism.

Renewing relations between Italy and American, or reinforcing ties with Australian citizens with Italian origins, thus remains an important objective of cultural policy. We should be aware, however, that the people we have contact with through these initiatives make up only a part of the complex and internally differentiated world of "Italians". It is impossible to say a priori just how large this part is likely to be. As I have said, the decision or not to be an "Italian" is always a voluntary choice, something which is reversible. What people decide will depend to some extent on how Italy changes, and on what its image is like, and this in turn will depend on how Italy's culture, its economy and politics develop in coming years, and on the extent which Italy evokes admiration among Italians around the world. Seen from this point of view, the relationship with Italians outside Italy is extremely useful, for it provides a permanent guide to the level of esteem Italy enjoys abroad.

Chapter Three
Beyond the West. International cultural relations in the 1980s

Up until 1992 our international programmes outside the West were directed at Japan, China and South East Asia, plus (from 1987 onwards) the Soviet Union. The exact form our activities took varied from country to country. Naturally enough, these activities were very different in nature (and much more limited in scope) than those we undertook in America.

In those years the Foundation's programmes placed considerable stress on encouraging the spread of Italian culture via an ad hoc programme termed *Biblioteca Italia*. This programme financed translations, distributed a little periodical publication called *Notizie dall'Italia*, and above all set up little libraries containing "essential basic knowledge about Italy". We also distributed copies of an encyclopedia of Italian civilization on video disc (entitled *de Italia*), which we had planned and produced especially for the purpose within the Foundation[130].

Reaching beyond the confines of the West - geographically, but above all culturally and mentally - was a complex operation, which took several years, involving the careful building up of relationships and the establishing of exchanges and dialogue. This process started in 1982, when the Foundation became convinced that Asia was a crucial concern for us. For there is a great difference between being convinced personally, as a private individual, that a particular theme is important, and launching a cultural initiative as an institution (with the commitment of financial and intellectual resources that implies). For the second needs to identify feasible means of carrying out its objectives - suitable types of research, or appropriate ways to encourage debate, for example. Otherwise, there is a major risk of falling into rather dilettante operations with little real chance of success.

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[130] See Giovanni Agnelli Foundation, *1976-1990: quinze ans d'activité,* Torino, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1990, pp. 49-51 and 118-24.

Japan

In 1981-2 Japan was seen as the country of modernity and technology. Its economic success was indisputable, and was worrying Europe and the United States, who were suffering from Japanese competition (competition which, at the time, had acquired almost mythical overtones). Our interest in Japan was therefore liked to our programmes on the future and on how to respond to it[131].

New technology, cities of science, and new ways of organizing production - these were the main areas where we were interested in the solutions Japan had found. We were also interested of course in the way public bodies provided support to industry, and in industrial relations and the trade unions, but our interest was essentially limited to these themes. In the 1980s Japan had displaced the United States as the model of modernity, and a visit to the country was almost *de rigueur*, in the hope of gaining a few years lead over other European countries in the race to attain understanding of how Japan worked. The United States had played this role in the preceding decades, but in the 1980s it seemed to be going through an opaque period which did not encourage imitation.

Assessment of Japan by Western commentators ran on similar lines to later assessments of other high-growth Asian economies. Already at that time, commentators asked themselves if Japan's economy was really solid. Opinion on the matter divided into three camps:

1) according to one school of thought, Japanese economic power was the product of a different culture, which gave Japan an edge over the West, and protected it from Western "degeneration". This was the semi-official position of the Japanese establishment, which encouraged Japanese to persevere in ways that seemed to be working. This was the rhetoric of the beneficent influence of "Confucianism", and its values, stressing the duties individuals owed towards the group and towards society. In later years, this reference to Confucian values was reformulated in more general form, to cover the whole of South East Asia, becoming a more generic claim about Asian values, so as to include societies which have never been Confucian, or have been so only in part, via ethnic minorities which are Chinese in culture. This has meant that President Mahathir of Malaysia - a Muslim by faith - has been able to become the most prominent advocate of "Asian values".

2) a second set of commentators maintained that Japan with inherent weaknesses, and liable to fall. This position was a reaction to the first, and in my opinion, was not really plausible. It needed to adopt such forced arguments that I even suspect it was a stance taken up in the attempt to fill a lucrative gap in the publishing market.

3) a third position maintained that Japan did not owe its success just to cultural factors, but above all to the way its bureaucracy and management were organized.

This last position made Japan seem less atypical, and made it conceivable that Japanese successes could be emulated by the West, and thus by Italy, if appropriate policies could be found. We at the Foundation naturally worked within this third framework, and tried to make Japanese success seem less mysterious and Messianic

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[131] See below, Part Three, chapter entitled «Future and technology».

than it was often portrayed. In this way we tried to spread knowledge in the Italian business world of what we might have called "the lessons of Japan".

Thinking about what made the Japanese system work, with a view to drawing possible lessons for Italy, and especially for the industrialized parts of Italy[132], was a first aim which the Foundation set itself. Japan did in fact have a number of features – both in its socio-economic organization and in the way its firms were organized – which could be usefully reflected upon. It seemed especially worth concentrating on structures within firms, for knowledge about Japan's macro-economic system was already fairly widespread.

In 1982 we came into contact with the Honda Foundation – which was crucial in deciding to launch a programme on Japan. It was the Honda Foundation which proposed a joint programme on technological development and the effects of technology on society and culture. A programme along these lines was therefore launched, which had both the advantages and the drawbacks of this kind of cooperative project – bound to remain somewhat superficial, yet still useful as a way of opening the way for further cooperation and dialogue between two very different ambiances[133]. Our relations with the Honda Foundation continued up until 1988, with the aim mainly of creating opportunities for us to be present at events in Japan, and for the Honda Foundation to appear in Italy.

We also had relations with a quasi-governmental organization, the National Institute for Research Advancement (NIRA), with whom we organized a conference on Italy, "A Future Rooted in the Past: Politics, Economy and Society towards 2001". This was sponsored by the newspaper, *Nihon Keizai Shinbun*. A second conference in 1991 was sponsored by another paper, *Yomuri Shinbun*.

To sum up our cultural relations with Japan, we might say that we sought to import the culture of technology and industrial organization into Italy, while we used a number of the best aspects of our artistic and cultural heritage as products to exchange.

China

The second major Asian country which entered into the Foundation's programmes was China. In 1985 we set up a relationship of cooperation with the Chinese Academy for Social Sciences' Institute for Western Europe. Obviously the Institute was not a choice we decided on, but one which the Chinese authorities decided was appropriate, given that we were a western European body. In practice the Institute had a monopoly over cultural relations with western Europe[134], and the cooperation we started was very different from that with the Japanese foundations.

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[132] See below, Part Six, section entitled «Turin and responses to the future: the *Tecnocity* project».

[133] Giovanni Agnelli Foundation, *1976-86 dieci anni di attività*, op. cit., pp. 42-43 and 120-23.

[134] In 1985 China was profoundly different from the country it is today, and this makes our earlier experience all the more interesting. Our first contacts were with Su Dashen, who at the time was director of the Institute for Western Europe; he was an elderly gentleman who had just recently come back from exile in Sink Yang, where for twenty years he had been head teacher of an elementary school. Dashen belonged to the old generation of Communists who had taken part with Mao in the Long March; shortly afterwards he fell victim to a purge and was sent into exile. After his very recent rehabilitation he had been recalled to Beijing and nominated Director of the Academy of Social Sciences Institute, as well as

Italy greatly interested our partners for two main reasons. They were interested in Italian nationalized companies, and the fact that the state holding company IRI operated in a market economy; and also in our industrial districts, and more generally in our small and medium-sized enterprises. Both these themes were obviously crucial ones for the transformation of the Chinese economy which had already started.

For our part, we were interested at that time in extending our programme of Italian culture to China. The agreement which was signed thus included prevision for a little review on Italy (in Chinese of course), entitled *Italy Today*, and the publication of books on Italy (some being translations of works of Italian writers, others the work of Chinese commentators), and the setting up of a library on Italy at the Academy of Social Sciences. The convention also set up grants to pay for Chinese researchers to carry out research in Italy on the economic themes mentioned. It was agreed that the results of this research would be published, and seminars organized in Beijing. There were also arrangements to set up a scholarly association for those interested in Italian culture.

This convention was renewed several times, and only came to an end finally in 1997. We ended it because we decided that Chinese society had become mature enough for it to be possible to have more flexible and more varied relations, rather than being confined within the bureaucratic framework of a convention with a state body.

In other words, we assumed that China could be seen as having become a pluralist country, not just economically, but also culturally. So we decided that it was possible to have relationships of cooperation with scholars without necessarily going through the filter of state bodies. This was just a working hypothesis, not something we were certain of. Only time will tell whether this hypothesis was justified or not, and how it can be put into practice. In reality, the research which is being carried out on China at the moment is being done by scholars from Hong Kong and Taiwan[135].

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being made a member of the Committee for Foreign Affairs in the Communist Party. When he came to Turin the thing which interested him most were the farms we showed him in the Cuneo region, which for him were marvels of modernity. The measure of the change which has occurred in China over the last few years can be guaged by the contrast with our last contact at the Institute for Western Europe – a young woman who had become Deputy Director of the Institute after having taken a doctorate at Northwestern University in Boston.

[135] See Giovanni Agnelli Foundation, *1976-1986: dieci anni di attività* op.cit., pp. 43-45 and 122; Idem., *1976-1990: quinze ans d'activité* op.cit., pp. 46-47 and 147. See also Sergio Ticozzi, *Il Tao della Cina oggi. Dinamiche culturali, politiche e istituzionali*, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1998.

South East Asia

The third step we made, and one which was crucial for our understanding of Asian cultures, was towards the countries of South East Asia.

In 1986 and 1987 the Foundation's programmes uncovered new aspects of Asia – cultural areas which were very different from each other, where modernity and tradition had come to coexist in differing ways. It was obvious that economically and culturally dynamic societies were being forged, and that Italian firms would soon be coming into regular and lasting contact with these economies. We therefore decided to encourage the spread of knowledge of these countries in Italy – knowledge not just of their economies but also of their society, politics and culture. We were particularly interested in the way phenomena usually associated with the Euro-American cultural universe – such as the inflow of migrants from abroad – were taking place in South East Asia, and had existed in the past. And we wished to take account of this in the picture we presented of these countries. In other words, our encounter with South East Asia gave us a feel of the way a number of issues were taking on globalized dimensions.

Going beyond the confines of the West in our work and in our thinking had an effect not just on the contents of our work – the fact that we were bringing knowledge of non-Western regions to Italy – but also on our whole approach. For it became increasingly clear that we could not adequately understand a number of phenomena in Italy or Europe without setting them in a global context.

At the same time, we continued our efforts to spread Italian culture – which invariably proved an excellent way of establishing relations with Asian countries. Reminding people that we had a great culture behind us was one way of distinguishing the image of Italy from the more general one of Europe. It also had the advantage of pleasing specialists on Italy in the countries we visited (for there always were specialists, albeit small in number). And above all it was a way of sowing seeds of interest in Italy and Italian which we hoped would bear fruit in later years.

We therefore started work on the huge region of South East Asia in 1987, commencing by introducing Italian readers to a number of themes crucial to the area. Our first initiative was to publish the Annual Report of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS)[136], and to organize a number of seminars and conferences on the region.

As is well known, South East Asia is a particularly complex international area, for it contains a Buddhist, socialist country such as Burma, a Western-leaning Buddhist country like Thailand, a mainly Muslim country like Indonesia (which however has syncretist elites), a post-Communist country like Vietnam, a Catholic nation such as the Philippines, a Chinese-Confucian state like Singapore. These countries are profoundly different from each other culturally, but also economically – for the region contains developed states like Singapore or Malaysia alongside poorer and more backward ones like Laos or Burma.

Italy has traditionally had only rare and sporadic contacts with this huge region. Yet the countries of South East Asia are enormously lively and as a whole they have great strategic importance, for they are frontiers of different cultures. In this region the great

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[136] See Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ed.), *Il Sud-est asiatico nell'anno della Tigre*, Torino, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1988. Working with ISEAS was crucial for the success of our programmes. I would particularly like to mention professor Kernial Singh Sandhu, Director of the Institute up until 1992.

religions of humanity – Christianity, Hinduism, Buddhism and Islam – meet and test out their respective abilities to live alongside each other and engage in dialogue.

For all these reasons we believed it was necessary to increase knowledge of the region and its cultures among Italian elites, encouraging the growth of political and cultural debate on related topics[137].

The Soviet Union

In 1985 we made soundings to establish ties with a number of cultural institutions in the Soviet Union. We wished to avoid the usual channels of the international friendship associations, so we sought alternative openings – although this had little success for two years. We continually came up a blank wall of a bureaucracy which was not interested in an Italian private cultural foundation.

We eventually found the right contact in 1987 – Vladlen Martynov, deputy director of the Institute for the World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), a special institute of the Academy of Sciences, directed by Yevgheny Primakov, who later became Prime Minister.

Times were changing in Moscow too, for (with a celerity which would have been unthinkable just a year previously), Martynov started to give concrete signals that he was interested in cooperation with the Foundation, seen as an institution coming from a technologically advanced, industrialized country with important economic ties with the Soviet Union. Martynov was thus expressing an attitude rather similar to that we found in South America – the hope that the Foundation could be a channel for Italy's modernity – technology and innovation, and the various aspects of economic modernization such as training arrangements, vocational training, and the relationship between general education and specialist technical training. Italian economic successes have tended to make people believe that these issues have been resolved satisfactorily in Italy. It has thus often been embarrassing – and difficult – to explain that Italy's economic development in reality is very incomplete, and that its successes have often been attained in peculiar ways which are impossible to imitate, and difficult to explain to a foreign observer. We tried several times to explain the reasons for the success of Italy's small and medium-sized firms, and to describe how an industrial district worked, but we were never quite sure we had fully succeeded. And to present Italian arrangements for training as a success always posed problems of intellectual honesty which were frankly unavoidable.

Relations with IMEMO were given concrete form with the signing of a convention whereby we agreed to launch a *Forum*, consisting of seminars organized alternately in Turin and Moscow. Cooperation went ahead fruitfully until 1990, but the contents of the meetings changed as we sought to understand what was going on in the Soviet Union.

In any case our contacts with IMEMO were a success, and very similar to those we had with the Japanese – very friendly, and characterized by ready willingness to understand the positions of the other party[138].

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[137] Giovanni Agnelli Foundation, *1976-1990: quinze ans d'activité* op.cit., pp. 47-48 and 148-49.

[138] *Ibid.,* pp. 151-52; Giovanni Agnelli Foundation, *1990-1993: quattro anni di attività,* Torino, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1993, pp. 33-38.

Our programme on "Promoting Italian culture abroad"

Activities which have the aim of encouraging knowledge of present-day Italy and Italian culture have always been prominent in the Foundation's work. As I have said[139], such activities fiirst originated in America, and were then extended to numerous other countries. The way we have presented Italy has also varied over the years as we have gained more experience.

Apart from the initiatives aimed specifically at the various American countries (in particular, the exhibition "Italy, a country shaped by man"), the first project came in 1980, the year in which we started to distribute a little periodical called *Notizie dall'Italia*. We started out with two editions of this – one in English for North America and one in Italian for South America. The publication, written by professional journalists, aimed to give news about current affairs and culture in Italy. We deliberately kept it short (it was never longer than sixteen pages) so that it could be sent by air mail, so that it would not be out of date when it was read. Over the years we have had editions also in other languages: in Japanese between 1987 and 1991, and in Hungarian between 1990 and 1991. The Chinese language periodical *Italy Today* (published by the Chinese Academy of Sciences between 1986 and 1993) was also similar to *Notizie dall'Italia*.

In 1985 we undertook the compilation of the first video encyclopedia on Italy[140]. This was a major project, which we were able to carry through thanks to the enthusiastic work of a number of young multi-media experts, who wrote the texts and selected over twenty thousand pictures bearing on Italy's history – ranging from political, economic or cultural history to the history of the landscape and of all forms of Italian art. The technology we adopted – the video disk – seemed the best available, although of course it became outdated ten years or so later.

This video encyclopedia – *de Italia* as it was called – thus had a brief life. It was nonetheless a glorious one. It can be consulted today in the main American museums, and in the libraries of hundreds of universities and colleges in the United States. It can also be consulted in Canada, Australia, Japan and other Asian countries, in Latin America, and of course in Europe.

Unlike the video encyclopedia, *Biblioteca Italia* - our project setting up collections of works on Italy and by Italian authors - was not particularly innovative in terms of its technology or its aims. Nonetheless, it was definitely useful in bridging gaps in knowledge. This project also financed translations of Italian works and paid for grants to young scholars interested in Italy. Like our other programmes promoting Italian culture abroad, *Biblioteca Italia* was radically revised at the end of 1992[141].

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[139] See above, chapter entitled «Promoting Italy's image and relations with Italian Americans».

[140] Work on the video encyclopedia *de Italia* was organized and carried out by Dario Arrigotti.

[141] Works were translated into English, French, German, Spanish, Japanese and Chinese. The agreement with Princeton University Press to publish the "Agnelli Foundation Series in Italian History" was particularly important. This series included English editions of Norberto Bobbio, *Ideological Profile of Twentieth-Century Italy*; Federico Chabod, *Italian Foreign Policy: the Statecraft of the Founders*; Emilio Sereni, *History of the Italian Agricultural Landscape*. The advisory committee to the series was made up of Gabriele De Rosa, Giuseppe Galasso, Adrian Lyttleton, Charles S. Maier and Massimo Slavadori. See Giovanni Agnelli Foundation, *1977-1987: a ten-year report*, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1987, pp.29 and 114-15; Giovanni Agnelli Foundation, *1990-1993: quattro anni di attività*, op.cit., p.47.

1989: end of an epoch in international cultural relations

The various activities I have described were all typical of the 1980s. They all aimed to increase knowledge of "the other", but they were set up in an intellectual climate which was unproblematic – a feature which was characteristic of cultural relations at that time. This was not necessarily negative, but it did certainly limit what could be done, especially in terms of the priorities which were beginning to emerge. Our working programmes did not succeed in grasping the deep aspects of the cultural change which was occurring in the world. Those economic and cultural processes which came to be termed "globalization" were becoming increasingly visible. The result was that approaches which had seemed innovative just a few years before now began to seem outdated. At the Foundation we started to have doubts about the ability of our programmes to be in tune with the spirit of the times.

In 1988 we therefore stated that we needed to move beyond our traditional ways of working, and in 1989 we affirmed that it was necessary to spread awareness of and interest in the connections between "globalization of the economy and contacts and competition between social systems which are very different culturally" and "the contacts which the great traditional religions (Islam, Hinduism, etc.) are having with modernity (science, technology, industry, the insitutions of a modern state)"[142]. It was at this time that we started to rethink our programmes of international cultural relations, reorienting them in a framework which was consistent with the past but which was also able to take account of the new economic and cultural processes of globalization - which had by this time become fully evident[143]. Naturally, the programmes which we were already committed to were carried on until they came to a natural end, so some continued up until 1992.

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[142] See «Perché XXI Secolo: raccontare le idee», *XXI Secolo*, 1 (1), I, November 1989, p. 2.

[143] This conceptual framework is described below in Part Four, in the chapter entitled «A new mental map of the world».

Places outside Italy where specified Agnelli Foundation initiatives were organized, 1980-92

Main towns receiving donations from
Biblioteca Italia

North America
Canada
Vancouver
Toronto
Montreal
Saint Catharines

United States
Cambridge (Ma)
Waltham (Ma)
Washington (D.C.)
Pittsburgh (Pa)
Brockport (N.Y.)
West Lafayette (In)
Bloomington (In)

Latin America
Mexico City
Caracas (Venezuela)
Recife (Brazil)
Brasilia (Brazil)
Sao Paulo (Brazil)
Rio de Janeiro (Brazil)
Santos (Brazil)
Porto Alegre (Brazil)
São Leopoldo (Brazil)
Buenos Aires (Argentina)
Cordoba (Argentina)
Paraná (Argentina)
Mar del Plata (Argentina)
Santiago (Chile)
Montevideo (Uruguay)

Arab countries and Middle East
Tunis (Tunisia)
Cairo (Egypt)
Beirut (Lebanon)
Amman (Jordan)
Damascus (Syria)
Aleppo (Syria)
Riyadh (Saudi Arabia)
Istanbul (Turkey)

Asia
Islamabad (Pakistan)
Lahore (Pakistan)
Karachi (Pakistan)
New Delhi (India)
Calcutta (India)
Rangoon (Myanmar)
Bangkok (Thailand)
Kuala Lumpur (Malaysia)

Selangor (Malaysia)
Singapore (Singapore)
Bandar Seri Begawan (Brunei)
Jakarta (Indonesia)
Yogyakarta (Indonesia)
Manila (Philippines)
Quezon City (Philippines)
Beijing (China)
Shanghai (China)
Hong Kong (China)
Taipei (Taiwan)
Seoul (South Korea)
Kyongsan (South Korea)
Tokyo (Japan)
Kyoto (Japan)
Osaka (Japan)
Yokohama (Japan)
Kawasaki (Japan)
Fukuoka (Japan)
Kumamoto (Japan)

Australasia
Sidney (Australia)
Perth (Australia)

Europe
Madrid (Spain)
Barcelona (Spain)
Valencia (Spain)
Paris (France)
Lyon (France)
Aix-en-Provence (France)
Strasbourg (France)
Edinburgh (Great Britain)
London (Great Britain)
Brighton (Great Britain)
Canterbury (Great Britain)
Dublin (Ireland)
Brussels (Belgium)
Rotterdam (Holland)
The Hague (Holland)
Copenhagen (Denmark)
Berlin (Germany)
Leipzig (Germany)
Mainz (Germany)
Prague (Czech Rep.)
Brno (Czech Rep.)
Olomouc (Czech Rep.)
Bratislava (Slovakia)
Warsaw (Poland)
Lublin (Poland)
Poznan (Poland)
Breslau (Poland)
Sosnowiec (Poland)
Budapest (Hungary)

Szeged (Hungary)
Zagreb (Croatia)
Zara (Croatia)
Sarajevo (Bosnia-Herzegovina)
Moscow (Russia)
Tartu (Estonia)
Bucarest (Rumania)
Athens (Greece)
Salonika (Greece)

Towns outside Italy receiving the video
disk *de Italia*

North America
Canada
Toronto
Montreal
Halifax
Ottawa
London
Guelph
Saint Catharines
Waterloo
Regina
Calgary
Edmonton
Vancouver
Victoria
Burnaby
Clearbrook

United States
Washington (D. C.)
Boston (Ma)
New York (N. Y.)
Providence (R. I.)
Albany (N. Y.)
New Haven (Ct)
Cambridge (Ma)
Hanover (N. H.)
Waltham (Ma)
Kingston (R. I.)
Hartford (Ct)
Jersey City (N. J.)
Reading (Pa)
Philadelphia (Pa)
Haverford (Pa)
Newark (De)
Bethlehem (Pa)
Carlisle (Pa)
Baltimore (Md)
Hyattsville (Md)
Alexandria (Va)
Richmond (Va)

Charlottesville (Va)
Williamsburg (Va)
Raleigh (N. C.)
Greensboro (N. C.)
Winston-Salem (N. C.)
Atlanta (Ga)
Athens (Ga)
Tallahassee (Fl)
Gainesville (Fl)
Miami (Fl)
Rochester (N. Y.)
Syracuse (N. Y.)
Buffalo (N. Y.)
Pittsburgh (Pa)
Oberlin (Oh)
Toledo (Oh)
Columbus (Oh)
Cincinnati (Oh)
Louisville (Ky)
Nashville (Tn)
Knoxville (Tn)
Tuscaloosa (Al)
Baton Rouge (La)
Bloomington (In)
Notre Dame (In)
Detroit (Mi)
East Lansing (Mi)
Saint Louis (Ms)
Fayetteville (Ar)
Chicago (Il)
Glen Ellyn (Il)
Evanston (Il)
Madison (Wi)
Ames (Ia)
Manhattan (Ks)
Tulsa (Ok)
Lawton (Ok)
Dallas (Tx)
Lubbock (Tx)
Waco (Tx)
Austin (Tx)
Houston (Tx)
San Antonio (Tx)
Honolulu (Hi)
Albuquerque (N. M.)
Pueblo (Co)
Colorado Springs (Co)
Boulder (Co)
Tucson (Az)
Tempe (Az)
Provo (Ut
Seattle (Wa)
Las Vegas (Nv)
Redding (Ca)
Chico (Ca)
Ukiah (Ca)
San Francisco (Ca)
Napa (Ca)

Santa Rosa (Ca)
Berkeley (Ca)
Stockton (Ca)
Fresno (Ca)
San Jose (Ca)
Santa Barbara (Ca)
Malibu (Ca)
Santa Monica (Ca)
San Luis Obispo (Ca)
Los Angeles (Ca)
San Bernardino (Ca)
Riverside (Ca)
Long Beach (Ca)
Torrance (Ca)
San Diego (Ca)
Santa Ana (Ca)

Latin America
Mexico City (Mexico)
Guadalajara (Mexico)
Belo Horizonte (Brazil)
Sao Paulo (Brazil)
Rio de Janeiro (Brazil)
Montevideo (Uruguay)
Buenos Aires (Argentina)
Cordoba (Argentina)
Mar del Plata (Argentina)
Santiago (Chile)

Asia
New Delhi (India)
Victoria (Seychelles)
Bangkok (Tailandia)
Macao
Singapore
Hong Kong (China)
Tokyo (Japan)
Osaka (Japan)
Kyoto (Japan)
Seoul (South Korea)
Taegu (South Korea)
Kwangju (South Korea)

Australasia
Auckland (New Zealand)
Perth (Australia)
Adelaide (Australia)
Melbourne (Australia)
Canberra (Australia)
Sydney (Australia)
Brisbane (Australia)
Newcastle (Australia)
Bendigo (Australia)
Coburg (Australia)
Campbelltown (Australia)
Wollongong (Australia)

Europe
Lisbon (Portugal)
Madrid (Spain)
Bordeaux (France)
Paris (France)
Poitiers (France)
Saint-Étienne (France)
Lyon (France)
Nice (France)
Strasbourg (France)
Châteauroux (France)
Sartène (France, Corsica)
Berne (Svizzera)
Dublin (Ireland)
Galway (Ireland)
Belfast (Northern Ireland)
Edinburgh (Great Britain)
York (Great Britain)
Leeds (Great Britain)
Liverpool (Great Britain)
Kingston-upon-Hull (Great Britain)
Oxford (Great Britain)
Leicester (Great Britain)
London (Great Britain)
Exeter (Great Britain)
Portsmouth (Great Britain)
Aberystwyth (Great Britain)
Amsterdam (Holland)
Maastricht (Holland)
Eindhoven (Holland)
Brussels (Belgium)
Luxembourg (Luxembourg)
Bonn (Germany)
Mainz (Germany)
Stuttgart (Germany)
Augusta (Germany)
Munich (Germany)
Heidelberg (Germany)
Bamberg (Germany)
Giessen (Germany)
Passau (Germany)
Wolfsburg (Germany)
Brunswick (Germany)
Osnabrück (Germany)
Oldenburg (Germany)
Bremen (Germany)
Hamburg (Germany)
Berlin (Germany)
Copenhagen (Denmark)
Stockholm (Sweden)
Göteborg (Sweden)
Malmö (Sweden)
Helsinki (Finland)
Vantaa (Finland)
Oslo (Norway)
Bergen (Norway)
Flekkefjord (Norway)
Vienna (Austria)

Innsbruck (Austria)
Budapest (Hungary)
Warsaw (Poland)
Moscow (Russia)
Athens (Greece)
Salonika (Greece)

The video also went to:
Istanbul (Turkey)
Ankara (Turkey)
Tel Aviv (Israel)
Jerusalem (Israel)
Herzliyya (Israel)

Cities outside Italy where exhibitions organized by the Agnelli Foundation were held:

North America
Canada
Toronto
Montreal

United States
Washington (D. C.)
Chicago (Il)
New Haven (Ct)
San Francisco (Ca)
New York (N. Y.)

Latin America
Caracas (Venezuela)
Belo Horizonte (Brazil)
Sao Paulo (Brazil)
Rio de Janeiro (Brazil)
Porto Alegre (Brazil)
Buenos Aires (Argentina)
Cordoba (Argentina)

Asia
Tokyo (Japan)
Osaka (Japan)

Map 1. *Some of the places outside Italy where Agnelli Foundation initiatives were organized*

- Video disc de Italia
- Distribution of Biblioteca Italia
- Video disc de Italia and Distribution of Biblioteca Italia
- Exhibition Italy, a country shaped by man

- Exhibition Italy, a country shaped by man and Video disc de Italia
- Exhibition Italy, a country shaped by man and Distribution of Biblioteca Italia
- Exhibition Italy, a country shaped by man, Video disc de Italia and Distribution of Biblioteca Italia

Part Three
From 1981 to 1989. The Recent Past

II. Scientific and technical culture and ethical and religious culture

Chapter One
The future and technology

The "future" as a research opening

Today, in political and cultural debate in Italy, it has become increasingly common to find discussion of the falling birth rate - particularly with regard to the consequences it has for the country's pension system. Less prominent is discussion of the problems of justice between generations raised by abuse of public funds to pay for early retirement schemes at the expense of younger people and future generations. And still less prominent is any interest in policies which might remove the causes of demographic decline. So one has difficulty in getting people to understand that underlying the fall in the birth rate are problems with citizens' fundamental rights: for the fact is that citizens are currently denied full opportunity (i.e., free of improper constraints) to choose whether or not to have children.

These are just two examples of gaps in the Italian social debate. As in so many other cases, discussion has tended to focus on short-term problems (especially when these are considered alarming and urgent) rather than on longer-term issues. This is not just an Italian problem, but we do have it perhaps in a more acute form than other European countries. Perhaps the fundamental reason is that we have little sense of the future. This is a cultural failing which can be compensated for, but not eliminated – or at least not in the short-to-medium term.

We at the Foundation have been aware of this failing of Italian culture since the beginning of the 1980s. It was at that time that we organized a major programme on the "culture of the future". Since this programme had much influence on our subsequent thinking, it is worth describing its main outlines.

Research projects on the future were started in 1981. They were based on the assumption that Italy's future would be a western one. There were no alternative models available. The problem, therefore, was to decide which variant of the western model (there were more variants at the time than there are now) was the most suitable one for Italy. This led us to think about what were the future trends in western society. That simplified our relationship with the various political parties and political cultures in Italy, for we realized that all would be forced to grapple with the same problems - so the room for manoeuvre which they possessed was very limited. In other words, the menu of possible reforms feasible in a country like Italy had become greatly restricted.

This new situation had great importance in the decisive choice of who should be our partners in our programme of activities. We felt the need for dialogue not just with traditional interlocuters such as politicians, business leaders, or professional groups such as teachers, but also with the wider public (or at least certain segments of the general public – for example families who were having problems in choosing an education for their children, or older people).

This wish to widen the forum of discussion to include the general public was the main reason why our programme of research and activity on the future needed to contain so many parts and different initiatives. This was particularly true of our first public project, entitled *Futurama*, which was started in 1983.

The thinking behind our research programmes on the future

Research on the future[144] expanded greatly in the 1960s and created great hopes, only to be dashed in the 1970s, partly as a result of the economic difficulties which came in the wake of the oil shock.

However, even though the techniques for predicting the future might be in disarray, the problems and questions which the various studies had raised remained. In particular, there was the problem of the gap between a culture which was rooted in the present and a number of phenomena which were clearly already part of the future. Technology provided good examples of such phenomena, but they were not the only examples.

One could feel that major changes were near – not just scientific, but also social and cultural changes. The very ordering of the life cycle into a set of well-defined stages following one after another – with a period of schooling and training for work preceding work itself and then the rest of retirement for all at more or less the same time – was being challenged. This pattern of clear stages had been adapted to industrial rationality, but now seemed more questionable.

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[144] The following pages are a re-working of the main themes discussed in my Introduction ("Perché Futurama") to Giovanni Agnelli Foundation, *Futurama*, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1983, pp.20-31. See also Giovanni Agnelli Foundation, *1976-1986: dieci anni di attività,* Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1986, pp. 73-80 and 168-75.

This was not a specifically Italian problem, but one which affected all western societies. Indeed, such trends could be observed with greater clarity elsewhere, for in Italy they did not surface in the social or political debate.

In 1980 we therefore decided to take the future as a concrete area for our work. I had a number of basic concerns, here as in all our work. I wished to ensure that we produced social research which would be useful, and wished to be clear about who it was we were trying to influence, and engage in dialogue with. I stated that our predictions were intended to be "particularly suitable for a polycentric, neo-liberal society" and the kind of social action such a society implied.

Models of values, demands for more advanced forms of democratic participation, social groups, cities and local areas: these were the keys to the Foundation's approach here as in other areas of our work. They continued to be themes which underlay our vision of Italian society and of the role a foundation should play. We also had in mind the same concern which motivated us in our American programmes - the worry that in spite of being a thoroughly western country (indeed, the cradle of European and Euro-American society), it was currently an anomalous western society, lagging behind culturally, and backward in terms of its government institutions.

We therefore feared that Italy would have difficulty in coping with the challenges of the future, and would thus be forced out of Europe, and the West. Yet this problem received little or no attention in public debate. The very lack of technological culture made the situation worse, by making it more difficult for people to realize what the real problems of society and culture were, leading them to concentrate exclusively on the immediate problems of the short-term. Problems were becoming more complex, yet Italian society was showing no interest in this new complexity.

In my "Introduction" to the *Futurama* programme, I cited a classic of the Foundation's "ideal library", an essay of Luigi Einaudi's. "All the initiatives of *Futurama* are means of encouraging dialogue among people who intuit the importance of a 'culture of the future' in helping us to manage new technology to improve our lives. However, this dialogue can only become effective if large numbers of people take an active part in it. Luigi Einaudi entitled one of his "futile sermons" "Knowledge for considered decision-making", where he argued that "Our decision-making lacks the first presupposition: knowledge" and wondered whether "it is worth deciding without knowing?"[145] (…) Sixty years ago [nearly eighty years ago now, from when Einaudi wrote his essay], only a small number of people were interested in this problem. Today we are all affected. This means we need to provide everyone – especially ordinary people - with a framework for thinking about the future; for the future will be shaped by the choices of millions of persons, by virtually all of us. *Futurama* was started up with the aim of satisfying this demand for knowledge and information; and we hope that its research, its exhibitions, the multi-vision production, its showings of science fiction films and its scientific and popular-scientific lectures will fulfill just that demand. We hope it will make it clear to all, even the most hurried and least attentive among us, that the world around us has changed – the future is already with us"[146].

However, developing the programme in practice was not so easy. Italy in 1981-2 was particularly restricted to a cultural, social, and political view of the world centred on the present. There were several reasons for this. First of all, after the enthusiasm of the 1960s, the idea of economic planning had fallen out of favour. The failure of attempts at planning had dragged down with it also any orientation to the future; the one document which discussed the future – entitled *Progetto '80* – was sarcastically referred to as the "book of dreams". Secondly, general scepticism in the world as a whole towards futurology reinforced rather than countered Italian scepticism.

In addition, the relatively low levels of technological and scientific knowledge in the general population made the situation worse. Levels of knowledge in this area are still unsatisfactory today, but the lag was far more serious at the time. This made things much worse than they were in other countries, where scientific and technological research – especially space research – helped people to think more closely about the future. In Italy the exploration of space was described and perceived mainly as a romantic adventure rather than as a complex set of operations of science and technology. The general cultural climate of the country was thus exclusively focused on the present. The decisions of governments and parliaments on public spending (running up debts which would have to be paid for in the future) was a vivid confirmation of this present-orientation. The path we set out on was not, therefore, an easy one.

First of all, we needed to justify our decision to work on the future. It was important that the programme should not appear esoteric, or a mere curiosity - harmless enough, but of little real use. We needed in fact to ensure that our work was genuinely useful to as many people as possible - so these potential users needed to be clearly identified. In other words, we needed to make sure that work on the future appeared natural and useful in the present, in 1980. Secondly, we needed to free ourselves from the unfortunate image of futurology. This meant explaining thoroughly that we were undertaking a worthwhile activity, and one which was distinct from futurology in the classic sense. Thirdly, we needed to provide some concrete examples of how our research could be used. So we

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[145] In 1956 Luigi Einaudi re-published a number of essays he had written before the rise of Fascism. The first edition had been entitled *Sermons*; the 1956 edition was published with the title *Futile Sermons*, because as Einaudi explained in the new preface, they had been "dust blown away by the wind". Luigi Einaudi, *Prediche inutili; dispensa prima, Conoscere per deliberare; Scuola e libertà*, Turin, Einaudi, 1956.

[146] M. Pacini, «Perché Futurama» in Giovanni Agnelli Foundation, *Futurama*, op.cit., p. 74.

needed to find a terrain in which our proposals could at least be discussed by political and social forces.

The culture of the future does not come naturally: it needs to be constructed, and not all cultures have succeeded in acquiring it. As I wrote in 1983, "The sense of the future as the site of the new and of change, and the place where human possibilities are revealed, is a recent acquisition. The idea that tomorrow is not one more step away from "the sacred time of our origins", and thus one more stage in a process of decay, but a matter of progress, is closely tied to the realization that human beings have the means to increase knowledge. In other words, rational sense of the future emerges along with modern science, and with systematic explanation of the results of scientific knowledge to technology.

The rational sense of the future has never, however, been natural and normal for the man in the street. People still remain attached to the present, and are concerned with the future only in the important, but extremely restrictive, sense of the future of their own private lives"[147]. Italy and Italians were not (and are not) therefore exceptional in their lack of a culture of the future. At most, it could be said that they represent a pathological exaggeration of what is a normal condition. The injustice which adults are perpetrating on their children and grandchildren today, in 1999, is the most striking and well-known example of this pathological inability to think the future.

The crisis of the welfare state, and especially of its Italian version - where simple hand-outs of aid take up most of the resources - was already visible at the beginning of the 1980s. We therefore used public awareness of this to push home the usefulness of looking at the future. Our *Futurama* programme was intended to encourage reflection on a feature which was characteristic of all Western societies - the lack of any sense of collective future. We wished to raise this lack of a sense of the future as a problem, point out its deleterious consequences, and suggest that a rational culture of the future needed to be encouraged.

Any disinterested observer who sought to classify the time-scales in which decision-makers, and the various social and occupational groups of the country, moved could not fail to be struck by the huge, apparently unbridgeable, gulf between the time scale of the politicians and those of scientists, technologists, and almost all manufacturers. For although Italy's political system was totally present-oriented (much more so in 1980 than today, when the country's need to keep up with European plans for integration have imposed fixed constraints), our observer would have noted a culture in industry and technology where the time-scale tended to be much longer than that of political time or the time of the man in the street.

This gap between the time-scale of those who were planning in terms of projects lasting many years, and those who were getting by "day by day" in the hurried world of politics seemed, indeed, to be getting wider at the time, as the great ideologies and political cultures ran out of breath, and lost their ability to propose long-term visions of society orienting the underlying everyday behaviour of citizens. The collapse of political ideology in fact had the (mostly unforeseen) consequence of taking away a sense of what the future of society should be. These ideological visions were of course vague and irrational, but they were at least visions of the future.

For those working in technology the "present" becomes stretched. Alongside existing technologies which are fully operational and mature there come new technologies waiting to be produced and distributed, and alongside these are still newer technologies which still have to be developed, and so on up to the boundaries where technology becomes basic research and science. Not to mention the habit of reasoning on a time-scale which is necessarily long when large-scale technological projects are at issue.

So do technologists work with a "swollen present" or with a sense of the future? In reality, both phrases indicate the same kind of attitude towards a reality which is fully mastered and managed. We might take the example of space research: in 1980 I referred to those planning the Pioneer probe, nowadays we might think of Pathfinder. Someone working on this kind of project will fix

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[147] Ibid., p.8.

months or years beforehand the time and day which the probe will commence its transmissions, and colleagues will long have been working on how to interpret those signals. These abilities to predict are not just the result of complex, well-planned organization, but also the product of a culture in which the future is not an abstract, hostile, incomprehensible concept, but a normal dimension of everyday life.

There were (and are) many reasons for this gap between technological culture and the culture which prevails in politics and in ordinary, everyday life. One of the objectives of the *Futurama* programme was to try to reduce the gap. We wished to organize public debate, thus hoping to build bridges between the two worlds.

The crisis of futurology

As I have said, we needed to distinguish ourselves from futurology in the classic sense, since this had been discredited. We did this by frankly admitting the major flaws which had marred its work. Futurology had flourished in the 1950s and '60s in a cultural climate where smooth progress without any serious interruptions was imagined. This encouraged predictions which saw the future of the United States and Europe at least as simply the extrapolation of current historical trends - a future without surprises ("surprise-free projections" as Hermann Kahn put it[148]).

The publication of Dennis Gabor's book *Inventing the Future* in 1963 was an important turning-point in futurology[149]. For Gabor linked predictions about the future to specific objectives. The idea that one could "invent the future" implied the admission that it was not possible to postulate a future which would always go in the direction of "progress", but also the worthwhile-ness of making predictions which were organically linked to a future which was desired (so planned).

At the time techniques for prediction of the future were raising high expectations. The futurologist Harvey Brooks wrote that "History is an indifferent guide; we have done better"[150]. Unfortunately, Brooks confused what had actually been achieved with his own high ambitions. It is true that there were also more problematic, critical approaches, like that of Daniel Bell, who suggested that predictions should be seen as "tools or aids for making decisions, rather than as statements about the future"[151]. Unfortunately, this cautious approach was discarded and the scope of prediction-making widened disproportionately (even though all that was done in actual practice was to undertake cost-benefit analysis, in other words try and focus on efficiency). So Erich Jantsch, the author of a 1966 survey of techniques for predicting the future commissioned by the OECD[152] tried to enlarge the field enormously, taking it for granted that predictive techniques could be applied to economic planning and "social technology, where the general interest is increasingly focused", and where "the main activity is inter-disciplinary research in political, social, economic, military and technical fields". It was precisely this unwillingness to stay within a strictly technological field that was the fatal flaw of 1960s-style futurology. Futurology was highly fashionable for a time among the general public and in the specialist press, among decision-makers and political commentators, but then fell badly into disrepute with the change in the international climate accompanying the crisis in international relations.

1968 plus the oil shock of 1973 in fact shattered the self-confident assumptions on which the world of surprise-free predictions was founded. It became clear that human affairs were not just going to continue in the same direction as they had been moving over the previous few years. The

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[148] For "surprise-free projections" see Hermann Khan and Anthony J. Wiener, *The Year 2000. A Framework for Speculation on the Next Thirty-Three Years*, New York, Macmillan, 1967.

[149] Dennis Gabor, *Inventing the future*, London, Secker & Warburg, 1963.

[150] Brooks' comment is in Erich Jantsch, *La prévision technologique*, Paris, OCDE, 1967, p.175.

[151] Daniel Bell in *Dædalus. Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Science*, Summer 1967.

[152] Erich Jantsch, *La prévision technologique,* op.cit.

phrase itself "surprise-free predictions" rapidly fell into oblivion, along with other terms which reflected the same cultural climate, such as concerted economy, and indicative planning - concepts used by Europeans struggling to assert an identity of their own, distinct from that of America. In the end, the most durable heritage of the attempts at prediction made in the 1950s and 1960s was a series of methods for planning scientific and technological research projects. These planning methods did continue to be used by large organizations. The most important of the latter was the space agency NASA, along with the galaxy of companies and technological institutes which were linked to it. Here, planning and prediction proved successful; however, the effect on the world outside - on political and cultural debate - was minimal.

Nonetheless, the underlying need to predict and organize change to direct it along desired channels remained. It is thus not surprising that attempts to predict the future persisted after 1973. However, they were forced to widen their frame of reference enormously - ending up including the destiny of all humankind and the whole planet. The problem was that the 1970s shattered that stable development which had been characteristic of most of the post-war period, and which 1960s attempts at prediction had taken as a given. Since such stability could no longer be taken as given, attempts at prediction became ever-wider, but their efforts were responding to a demand to rapidly increasing anxiety as what the future might hold now that the certainties of the previous twenty years had gone.

The new situation thus gave rise to predictions based on what were called global models. In this approach it was argued that the "world system" was the only possible level at which predictions could realistically be carried out. Attempts at prediction based on national conditions had in fact been shown to fail because they failed to take into account the effects on any one national economy of economic, demographic and political trends in the rest of the world. So in the later 1970s there was the paradoxical combination of increasingly varied attempts at prediction on a world scale and increasingly feeble effects on the political and social debate in the various countries which made up fragments of these global models. Perhaps their main effect was the unintended one that the international environment came to be seen as a turbulent environment in which individual nations were immersed, and which they could not control.

By the 1980s there were ten or so global models - in spite of the fact that such models had only begun to appear at the beginning of the 1970s. The model put forward by the Club of Rome and MIT, and untiringly championed by Aurelio Peccei, was certainly the most famous. This fame was due partly to factors outside the model. For it underlined the danger that resources were running out, and that limits therefore had to be placed on growth; and this was a message which the cultural climate of the time was ready to listen to.

The failure of the "partial" predictions of the 1960s thus gave rise, by reaction, to a series of "global" approaches. Looking back on these latter approaches a few years later, their principal weakness was that they were once again deterministic, underestimating the capacity of social systems to react to the external environment. They were no less naive than their predecessors in their implicit assumption that major surprises would not occur.

In reality, social systems had demonstrated a variety of forms of behaviour, and ways of adapting. And it seemed difficult to include these differing capacities for reaction into a global model of prediction. So although global models were originally conceived as proposing a framework for world political action, they ended up by being simply warnings about the dangers of current social, economic and political trends at the world level in the medium term.

"Our" factor-based prediction

The approach to prediction which we put forward in February 1983 was an alternative to traditional approaches, and wished to be useful to political decision-makers. It made no pretence to "truth and certainty", but simply put forward possible scenarios - ones which could be considered probable because they were based on sound cultural presuppositions. By the time our approach was presented, we had already put it into effect on two occasions.

The best way to provide decision-makers with information which they could use seemed to be to make predictions in particular sectors - splitting the future up into its various factors, as it were. Prediction seemed particularly feasible for two factors - demographic and technological change.

When I presented the *Futurama* programme, I wrote as follows: "The direction in which society as a whole, in all its aspects, will react to changes in constraints seems beyond the grasp of efforts at reliable prediction, at least now in the 1980s. So we believe that it is impossible to know what Italy will be like in 1990, and that any attempt to describe it seems to us an arbitrary, fruitless return to approaches typical of the long-past 1960s"[153]. Reducing the scope of prediction in this way was not, however, a retreat from the whole enterprise of making predictions: it was rather a statement of our intention to adopt the only approach which could genuinely help to decipher what was likely to happen in the coming years.

Any attempt at prediction, we reasoned, necessarily had to start from the population and demographic trends, and from technology and the rate and direction of technological change. These two factors provided the opportunity to concentrate prediction-making on limited fields, which were (at least apparently) "neutral" - so fields where there was a high level of technical and methodological objectivity. Yet at the same time, these were fields which had wide implications in terms of the conditions they would place on the rest of the social and economic system.

Ours was thus an approach to prediction which involved several phases: for we envisaged that various groups in society would be able to reflect on the consequences of predictions regarding demographic or technological change as and when they felt the need. "For predictions which are adequate to the shifting conditions of the 1980s must necessarily be adaptive and reactive - nothing else would be realistic. The results of our predictions in the two specific fields of demography and technology will provide information about possible obstacles and constraints which the economic and social system needs to adapt to, or about new opportunities which it needs to react to (...) Given the variety of paths which government organizations, firms, unions, etc. can take, and the various ways the paths of these very numerous bodies may interact in a system where power is fragmented and widespread, the only kind of thing which predictions can do is to offer reference points"[154]. Concerned as I was to stress that our research on the future was useful, I described our project as predictions for social action. In other words, not predictions for intellectuals or specialists, but for decision-makers.

As I stated in 1983, "Prediction in specific fields, based on the assumption of a multi-centric, free market society, seems particularly well-suited to the conditions of the 1980s. Decision-makers realize that social changes are occurring with greater rapidity than in the past, but the perceptions of the various bodies involved in decision-making has become more differentiated; we can therefore say that perception of change has become more rapid and more fragmented (...) In this context, it is necessary to find shared points of reference to help us to gain our bearings. Demographic and technological change are sufficiently objective to act as such reference points which can help the various decision-makers to work out a shared framework of social action"[155].

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[153] M. Pacini, «Perché Futurama» in *Futurama* op.cit., p. 29.
[154] Ibid., p.31.
[155] Ibid., p.33.

I nurtured great hopes in the usefulness of our efforts at prediction. Some of these hopes were fulfilled, others were dashed. In particular, my expectation that our predictions could be used as a shared conceptual framework by firms and trade unions was disappointed.

"Naturally prediction of specific factors such as technological or demographic change is crucial when firms and trade unions are arguing over what the future of Italy's economic system should be (...) Prediction of certain specific factors would seem to provide a very fruitful framework if applied to the management of local economic systems (...) Prediction of specific factors can act to encourage grass-roots proposals from individual firms or unions in a given local area, thus encouraging them to take responsibility and act responsibly. If companies and unions come together to make predictions regarding the future of specific factors, this may act as a useful tool for a democracy oriented towards the future. The perception of technological or demographic change may vary considerably depending on the viewpoint adopted - depending on whether it is firms, unions, political parties or local government who are looking at the changes envisaged. The approach of prediction of specific factors seems to have all the prerequisites for building a system where different interests can discuss together their needs and objectives. In a society like Italy, where polycentrism has deep historical roots, this could be very valuable and effective"[156].

As can be seen, the programme had high ambitions. Above all, extremely high hopes were placed in the ability of political parties, companies and trade unions to make rational use of the results of research. The Foundation was very aware that it was necessary to avoid merely preaching from the hill top - so we envisaged discussion and management of research results which fully involved the various relevant social interest groups. We even went so far as to suggest that the principle of prediction should be accepted, but that the results of such predictive activity would be the outcome of discussion and debate. We were particularly concerned to emphasize that:

a) we did not have any intention of constructing detailed scenarios. We simply wished to indicate an approach and encourage a culture of orientation to the future, and recognition of the idea that the future could be read via certain "signs in the present";

b) the conditions of post-modernity cried out for this kind of widespread cultural orientation to the future. Yet while those in industry or elsewhere who had contact with technology had begun to acquire such a culture, the world of politics and trade union and social affairs remained untouched. This introduced another major rift in Italian society;

c) the approach to research on the future which the Foundation was proposing was very different from that of futurology. We were in fact well aware of the failures (or at best illusions) of futurology.

Our first study of technological change led us to a number of conclusions which served as the starting-points for new research. First of all, we wished to describe the impact of technology on ordinary people and on the society in general - on new ways of working and the need for new skills in industry, and on the changing context of scientific and technological creativity. In following up our initial research results we adopted a strategy we were to use many times in the future (to the extent that it became a *modus operandi* typical of the Foundation): we launched both further research, and, at the same time, studies and activities encouraging discussion of possible solutions to the problems or the new conditions revealed by our original research. In this first case where we employed our two-pronged approach, we started a programme on new skills in industry, and a programme entitled *Tecnocity*[157].

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[156] Ibid., p.33-5.

[157] Giovanni Agnelli Foundation, *1976-1986: dieci anni di attività* op. cit., pp. 70-72, 80-87 and 171-79. See also the section on "Turin as an answer to the future: *Tecnocity*" in Part Six, below.

Technology, society and personal responsibility

Our first studies of the future led to one conclusion which played an important part in the Foundation's work in the years which followed (for example in our work on the *Futurama Atlas*[158], launched in December 1984, as well as various subsequent activities). This was that our attention was attracted to the different capacity for adaptation to the new ways in which technology was being spread. It was already clear that technology was becoming easier to use and much cheaper, so could become widely diffused throughout society. Yet some cultures were clearly more able than others to cope with this new pattern in which technology was no longer the reserve of an elite but was gradually becoming democratized and popularized, as the Japanese writer Moritani pointed out[159].

We recognized the truth of Moritani's thesis and viewed the impact of technological change on society as the strategic variable in social change. "For technological change does not just affect industry and science, but the society as a whole, and especially the world of work and training for work.

How should we manage this change which spreads its influence well beyond technology itself into society in general? Or rather (to phrase the question better): how can we encourage technological change to fulfill its potential by ensuring that general social change develops in a way which is compatible? We need to avoid technological change clashing with resistance from society. This would have the effect of slowing technological innovation down, and in the worst case, it could even halt it. In any case, such resistance could cause severe shocks to society, and constitute a considerable defeat[160].

As I wrote at the time, "the only resources which can ensure that the process of change is managed rationally are personal responsibility and the learning mechanisms which society puts into action as it reacts to the new. If it is not possible to direct this process in detail, we need to ensure that certain fundamental rules of the game are respected. If we cannot offer norms of behaviour which are clear and seen by all to be just and of certain application, then we need to trust the independent judgement of individuals acting on their personal responsibility. The lack of faith in collective rationality needs to be compensated for by greater faith in individual reason. This demands a U-turn away from the culture which was dominant just a few years ago - the culture which tended to merge the individual into the collective, and to negate private choice and individual autonomy, trying to regulate every possible aspect of social life in exchange for the promise of welfare and life-long security.

With the unfolding of time it has become clear that bartering "loss of independence" for "greater security" was not only a mistake and unequal, but was in any case impossible and was leading down a blind alley. It is a fortunate coincidence that we changed direction at the time we did, for it would have been impossible to tackle the technological change coming in the next few years with a political culture based on welfarist-type beliefs giving highest priority to guaranteeing security. This would have been a lost battle from the outset"[161].

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[158] See below, the section on "The *Futurama Atlas*".

[159] Masanori Moritani, *Japanese Technology. Getting the best for the least,* Tokyo, The Simul Press, 1982.

[160] M. Pacini, «Perché *Futurama*» in Giovanni Agnelli Foundation, *Futurama* op. cit., p. 62.

[161] Ibid., p.64.

The flexible society

This assessment led us to a conclusion regarding what kind of policies were feasible. We reasoned that what was needed were wide-ranging reforms which would help to create more of a flexible, adaptive, learning society. We tried to avoid being vague, so at the same time as we presented our general proposals we gave two concrete examples of reforms which might push society in a more flexible, adaptive direction. "A flexible, adaptive, learning society, thoroughly oriented to change, implies that every individual member of society needs to be actively committed to continually negotiating with others; but it also leaves them free to organize their own time (and thus their life) according to their desires (desires which are liable to change with the passage of time and the accumulation of experience).

The *Futurama* programme has analyzed two aspects of the flexible society which are particularly crucial to the objective of coping successfully with the technological revolution which is coming - the way in which working time and retirement are organized. We have suggested that it should be allowed to work flexibly; so it should be possible to work three hours a day instead of eight, and three days a week instead of five. We have also proposed that people should retire at differing ages, in accordance with their wishes. After all, from the work point of view, age - and hence the desire to rest, is a relative concept which does not necessarily correspond to exact chronological age".

In my conclusion, I stressed that "the flexible society can also be achieved in other sectors of social life. For example, in the broad field covered by the welfare state - from health care to social security or education. If flexible, adaptive, learning mechanisms are not created in all these areas, they will lag chronically behind the rest of society, thus creating dysfunctions of the kind exemplified by elementary schools being built in areas where the numbers of children are falling and the numbers of older people are increasing"[162].

The Futurama Atlas

An important landmark in studies of Italy's future was the publication of the *Futurama Atlas*[163]. Presenting the *Atlas* gave us the chance to stress the kind of use we thought should be made of our predictions, for the book included a number of essays on individual problems on which readers needed to form an opinion. This was a way of showing once again that our studies were not intended to be deterministic predictions of what the future would necessarily be like, and still less prescriptions as to what it should be like: rather, they were intended as aids to decion-making.

The *Atlas* represented a new departure in numerous ways. First of all, it made explicit our fundamental ideas and the interpretative keys we used to read the scenarios on the horizon. The necessary link between "demographic change, technological change and social structures" was naturally the bedrock of our work; and this enabled us to make significant progress over the previous studies of our *Futurama* programme. For example, it led me to dissent, for once, from Braudel, and from traditional interpretations of demographic decline. Braudel argues that falls in population occur when population size outstrips resources. Demographic decline thus has its positive side, for it reduces strain and helps humankind to grow more successfully in later periods of expansion. Braudel gives several examples to support his thesis[164]. The argument I put forward in the *Introduction* to the *Atlas* was very different, for I maintained that the fall in numbers of Italians

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[162] Ibid., p.65. The research "Verso una società flessibile" was carried out in 1981-2. See Vincenzo Cesareo, Umberto Morelli, Maurizio Ambrosini and Eugenio Zucchetti, *Risposte al futuro: una società flessibile*, Turin, Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1982, in the series "Futurama-ricerche".

[163] Giovanni Agnelli Foundation, *Atlante di Futurama,* Turin, Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1984. The volume describes and comments a study of future trends worked out by a research group coordinated by Piero Gastaldo.

[164] Fernand Braudel, *The Structures of Everyday Life*, p. 5 of the Italian translation, Turin, Einaudi, 1982, p. 5.

(for we were talking about an actual fall) would not lead to a reduction of social strain, for the number of citizens *qua* workers would not decrease at all, but increase. In other words, at the same time as the population was falling, the labour market was expanding, as a consquence of women working more, and the lengthening of the working life. Our future did not, therefore, hold a smaller Italy, but a larger one.

This conclusion (which was an innovative one in Italy in 1984) was based on the analysis of demographic data, together with assumptions about cultural change and the effects of technology spreading to everyday life.

So I introduced into our predictions the distinction (which is now well-known) between biological (chronological) age and social (cultural) age. In other words, I argued that age was relative: the way the life course was divided into ages (and therefore the behaviour of people at various ages) depended on individuals' state of health, on the way society was organized, and on culture[165]. What I was doing was to draw out the conclusions from historical research which had portrayed the ages of Man as a social product (Philippe Ariés on childhood and adolescence, Kenneth Keniston on youth, and the more general work of Bernice L. Neugarten and Gunhild O. Hajestad on the ages of life[166]). In other words, I argued that in the course of history, the stages of life (and thus the ages of Man) varied in accordance with the complexity and wealth of society. Childhood - the age between seven and fourteen - was very important in Ancient Rome, but then disappeared in the Middle Ages, to reappear, along with the subsequent phase of adolescence from the 17th century onwards, with the rise of the bourgeoisie, the growth of the private sphere, and the decline of the communitarian, corporate cultures of the Medieval period.

I pointed out that our own times were particularly strong and effective in re-planning the phases of life and the balance of roles between the sexes. I also noted that adolescence had become longer (14-20) and a more universally-experienced stage of life, while youth (20-30) had also become widespread as a socially-recognized stage of life, as the number of years spent on education has increased and entry into work has been pushed back. At the other end of the life cycle, after middle adulthood, the third age (which is no longer the same thing as old age) clearly constituted a genuine revolution in society and the economy. I pointed out that it was above all new technology and new ways of organizing social life which had created this new age of life, as an independent phase, distinct from any other. To these various changes in the organization of the life course, I added the fact that women had entered paid work in massive numbers.

We presented the prospect of a "larger Italy" as an opportunity for the country. "This larger, more prosperous Italy discussed in the *Atlas*, where women and men participate in work and production in greater numbers, can only take place if we manage the technological change which is currently occurring properly. This is what the Foundation has been arguing for some time, in programmes like *Futurama* and *Tecnocity*. Rational management of the wave of new technology can make it possible to achieve a "greater Italy". For this scenario is certainly not beyond our reach, or beyond our technological and economic capacities. But these capacities need to be surrounded by a social context which not only does not penalize them (as has often happened in the past) but which increases their potential"[167]. These closing words of the introductory essay to the *Futurama Atlas* thus explicitly advocated taking the flexible society as an objective which Italian society could fruitfully set itself.

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[165] For a more extended account of this argument, see M. Pacini, «Introduzione» in Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, *Atlante* op. cit., *passim*.

[166] See Philippe Ariès, *Centuries of Childhood. A Social History of Family Life,* New York, Knopf, 1962 (orig., Paris, Plon, 1960); Kenneth Keniston, *Young Radicals. Notes on Committed Youth*, New York (N. Y.), Harcourt, Brace and World, 1968; Bernice L. Neugarten e Gunhild O. Hajestad, «Età e corso della vita» Italian translation in Danilo Giori (ed.), *Vecchiaia e società*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1984.

[167] M. Pacini, «Introduzione» in Giovanni Agnelli Foundation, *Atlante di Futurama* op. cit., pp. 42-43.

Futurama, *the new tools of communication and the problem of what public to address*

Futurama was a project which had many different parts to it. Apart from the research, and the books which resulted, in 1983 we organized a technology exhibition, a multivision production, an exhibition of future cities and houses, a series of science fiction films[168], and a number of lectures on scientific and technological themes by speakers from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Brown University, and Rockefeller University.

The whole *Futurama* project aimed to encourage debate in Italy on the crucial strategic importance of technology in the society which was taking shape. It was for this reason that we organized such a diverse array of events - ranging from the spectacular show (the multivision on the relationship between technology and the West) to the exhibition of advanced technologies (most of which were presented by Turin laboratories - which showed how high the technological level of the area was), or lectures by scientists involved in advanced, world-class research. We also wished to put forward the idea that technology was at the service of the ordinary citizen: it was for this reason we put on the exhibition on the future of cities and houses.

Futurama was the only opportunity the Foundation has had to use an exhibition on technology as a tool of communication. In later years it was not possible because in 1985 Japan organized its great Tsukuba exhibition on the future of technology: competing with this was not something which was feasible for a private foundation (and an Italian one to boot). The level of investment and level of technology required meant that only governments (and only the governments of certain countries) could undertake the enterprise with some hope of success. The Foundation found itself cut out of the market of exhibitions on the future of technology. We shed no tears, for what we had aimed to do in Italy and Turin had already been achieved; so repeating the experience would have been useless as well as unfeasible.

Futurama had the merit of stimulating discussion of future technology and its importance in the society of tomorrow in the newspapers - newspapers being fundamental if one wishes to influence opinion among the general public.

Demographic predictions in the Futurama Atlas
compared with actual population change in Italy, *1996*

The *Futurama Atlas* started from 1981 data and made predictions for the size and age-structure of Italy's population in 1991, 1996 and 2001, on the assumption that trends observable at the time would continue.

Since the time-span covered by the predictions is now virtually history, it is possible to compare prediction and reality, at least up until 1996.

In general, our predictions were very accurate. The difference between the population size predicted and Italy's actual population is less than one hundred thousand, so the error is a negligible 0.17 percent. The major trends we foresaw also took place as we predicted they would: there was a significant increase in the numbers of people in the third age (61-72), and in the numbers of elderly (over 72), while the numbers of the young (under 19) fell.

At first sight, therefore, the demographic framework we outlined seems to reflect reality quite well. If we get down to a finer level of analysis, however, a number of differences between projection and reality are noticeable - differences which are due to factors which were not foreseen

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[168] The exhibition "Il futuro della città e della casa" was designed by Claudio D'Amato and Paolo Portoghesi. The films in the review "A scuola di profezia" were selected by Riccardo Valla and Baldo Vallero. See Giovanni Agnelli Foundation, *Futurama*, op. cit.

in the early 1980s, and therefore did not enter our model. Three new factors have slightly modified, without radically altering, the structure of Italy's population:

1) the larger-than-forecast fall in the birth rate (in 1996 there were almost a million fewer children between the ages of 0 and 14 than we forecast);
2) immigration from outside the European Union. The proportion of immigrants in the population as a whole is still quite small (under 2%). However the fact that these immigrants are concentrated in the young adult age groups (15-40) has meant that these age groups are now larger than we forecast;
3) faster-than-predicted increase in life expectancy. This meant that the oldest age group (over 72) contains more than three hundred thousand people than we forecast.

Italy's population, by age-groups, 1996 (in millions)

It was an important part of our programme on the future, which continued without a break for several years. The use of a new means of communication was no accident: it reflected the fact that we were re-considering our strategy of directing our research towards specific, special interlocutors, and began turning towards all elites and the educated general public as a whole.

It was the dimension of the future which called out for a relationship with the general public. We certainly did not forget that prediction of the future via factors could be useful in the management of social and economic problems in specific local areas and particular social and governmental fields. However, the themes we needed to investigate, the scenarios we were describing, had such broad implications that they required (and still require today) a dialogue with society as a whole. We stepped back from the immediate political dialogue, and we affirmed that our first aim was to stimulate debate and encourage orientation towards the future not just among decision-makers, but also among families. For we saw families as crucial actors in strategic issues such as increasing educational levels, increasing society's stock of knowledge, and halting demographic decline. The *Futurama Atlas* (containing our scenarios of what Italy's future would be like) was presented, right from the opening words of the Introduction, as "a tool for discussion" rather than as any sort of prescriptive framework. Our scenarios were accompanied by a series of brief pieces - constituting a kind of mini-encyclopedia - on the main issues. These helped "more curious and attentive readers" to form their own, personal thinking on the issues.

Looking back on *Futurama* today, I might add one more comment. *Futurama* was important for the Foundation for a number of reasons. First of all, the future was not just the centre of a single

programme in our work: it became part of our DNA, so all our programmes and activities have been permeated with concern about future trends.

Since this orientation towards planning for the future is now part of the Foundation's routine approach, we might say that the Foundation has never left the future dimension, even though work which focuses specifically on future trends is one of those aspects of our work which comes and goes, surfacing occasionally, but most of the time remaining hidden. *Futurama* was crucial in helping us to make the transition from analysis of immediate problems (and thus the search for immediate solutions), to reflection on the kind of culture and ideas which could encourage Italian society itself to seek innovative solutions. We wanted, in other words, to shift from a focus on problems which were on the agenda, and already being debated, to an approach which invited Italian culture and society to acquire new horizons and new perspectives, to discuss and develop the thinking which was emerging in Europe or America – the kind of thinking which was often only present in embryo, but which we saw as being consistent with the cultural horizons we had always tried to be faithful to. So for example, even though it is almost impossible, even today, to give an exhaustive definition of what the flexible society is, we sought, way back in 1983-4, to put forward the general idea of the flexible society, championing the idea of a more flexible life-course, with varying ages for retirement, and more possibilities to return to school, and alternating periods of study with periods of work.

These two problems of retirement and alternating periods of school and work are still unresolved – which shows how difficult it is to introduce social innovation. Especially in Italy, where the decision-making system is arthritic, and hampered by established groups trying to hold on to their privileges, and where the vortex of the national debt swallows up all political attention and all the country's resources. However, other European countries too, which do not have Italy's specific problems, need to develop a culture whereby social innovation becomes normal and attracts broad political support: for in no country do politicians, or entrenched social interests like to see their influence or power decline.

Our decision to "make culture" on broad issues, and to introduce innovative perspectives into Italian social and political debate, paid off well.

Since those times, the Foundation has stepped up its role as an "importer" of ideas and themes for social debate from other countries. Much of our work has therefore consisted in furnishing Italian social debate with ideas, proposals and perspectives which, even when they have been worked out within the Foundation itself, have always been enriched by our international experience and by the international orientation of our work. I have found this international experience has constituted a major comparative advantage.

Innovation in managing our work: linking research programmes to programmes seeking solutions to Italy's problems

Attention to innovation occurring in the world's most advanced countries had to be accompanied by thinking which was more oriented to Italian society. From 1984 onwards, the Foundation introduced a series of activities we called "Italian answers". The idea was to divide our work into two broad categories – programmes which sought to interpret "facts and processes" in the world of the future, and programmes seeking responses – that is to say, suggesting the kind of policies which would be suitable to help Italy cope with the facts and processes at issue.

From an organizational and management point of view, the distinction was very useful because it made the general objective of the individual activities clear. And above all, it was useful conceptually in that it reaffirmed our belief that it was useful to see Italy as a dependent variable, influenced by international conditions.

Our "answer" programmes (which we more modestly termed "searching for answers") were, and are, initiatives putting forward specific proposals for the solution of some problem in Italy.

Following on from our programmes on the future, we started up a number of "answer" programmes connected to the two principal themes of technological modernization (how it should be managed, how it should be encouraged in Italy) and demographic decline (the exceptional seriousness of this problem became evident from 1984 onwards).

Responses to technological modernization

There was no conceivable Italian, or even European, answer to the issue of the future of technology. One answer might have come from Japan. At the beginning of the 1980s in fact, not even the United States seemed to offer adequate responses, so only Japan seemed a reference point which it was necessary to understand in order to grasp the major changes of technological change, and the new technical culture which was coming to Italy, and which was so extraordinarily different from traditional forms.

Japan was thus the place in the world in the 1980s where a number of fundamental aspects of the technological dimension were visible – such as, for example, the popularization of technology. The Foundation worked to bring elements of these new forms of modernity to Italy, for it was essential that they should be known and managed[169]. As we were acting as a kind of "bridge" with other cultures, there was a major risk that we might be putting forward proposals and ideas which were so tied to the cultural context where they originated that they could never be applied in Italy. It was necessary, therefore, to distinguish between technological innovation and social innovation. In the former domain Japan was an essential reference point, whereas in the latter the safer and more certain reference was Europe and the United States. Obviously, even when we were looking at Europe or the United States, it was essential to maintain critical distance.

To give a couple of examples of how our approach took form in practice we might mention that our work on Turin included a proposal for a "technological district", based on a culture of widespread entrepreneurship and numerous small firms. This idea drew on the experience of Silicon Valley and Route 128. These were considered preferable models to the Japanese science cities, and France's Sofia Antipolis[170].

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[169] See above, Part Two, chapter entitled "Beyond the West. International cultural relations in the 1980s", especially the section on Japan.

[170] On this aspect of our work, see below Part Six, section entitled "Turin as an answer to the future: *Tecnocity*".

Chapter Two
The culture of Italians. Technology and the relationship between science and transcendence

Technology as strategic but not all-important

The *Futurama* programme took technology as its central, strategic focus – technology seen not just as a factor of economic and demographic, but also cultural, change. The new relationships between biological age and social age, and the corresponding emergence of new ages of life, were the most striking demonstration of the revolutionary role which technology could have in contemporary society. But however revolutionary this role was, it was not without its limits. First of all, we recognized that technology was a factor which brought revolutionary change, but which required appropriate social forms and institutions, which fitted in with the history and value systems of the particular societies which had to manage such change. So we did not see technology at all as an independent variable, but as a factor which was highly dependent on the social and cultural context. Secondly, we believed that science (and thus *a fortiori* technology) necessarily had to measure itself against higher questions regarding ethics and the sense of life and creation.

The cultural fabric of technological innovation

We believed that the social and institutional actors to manage technological innovation, and the social forms they used to do so, should be sought in Italy's history. "The actors in this great technological transformation are territorial areas which have their own clear identity – in the main, metropolitan areas. Cities are in fact collective actors within whose bounds a variety of institutions play their part – firms, universities, research companies, managers, entrepreneurs, technologists, trade organizations and trade unions, political parties, and so on. The protagonists of technological progress are therefore collective entities - complex urban societies. Successes and failures in technological progress are the successes and failures of actors within cities. In the last analysis, the actors of technological progress are cities"[171].

We pointed to Silicon Valley in California and Route 128 in the Boston area as proof that technological creativity really takes off in contexts where the exchange of information, the presence of laboratories, and an abundance of technological personnel come together to produce a particularly creative mixture. "To some extent it is inappropriate to compare different national situations – Italy versus the USA, France versus Japan, etc. The national level of analysis is too aggregate, excessively general. If we wish to identify the best tools to encourage technological creativity we need to get back to the city level, as was the case in other historical epochs"[172]. We might add, that we also need to get down to a still more disaggregate level and talk of the internal diversity of cities. It was no accident, therefore, that we took the American areas as our model rather than Japan's science cities, which were a centralized and over-planned model.

The years between 1984 and 1992 saw the Foundation working on a broad programme of research and activities encouraging debate. This had the objectives of studying a) what conditions made technological innovation possible in Italy, and thus also the relationships between scientific research and the cultural forms of Italian society; b) the centrality of real actors (individuals, professional communities, social groups, social contexts, including cities and other economically strong local areas; c) the culture of the "users" of technology, and thus of specific social contexts in Italy.

The activities of the *Tecnocity* programme, and our first studies of cities[173] both focused on the first two of these themes, while our study of "Technology and science in the culture of Italians" (1987-90) undertook a broader and more complete examination of Italians' attitude to technology and technological innovations. The main aim of the research was to shed light on the cultural dimension of technological and scientific change, and find out whether the general culture of Italians was a resource or an obstacle in the great challenges posed by modernization[174].

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[171] Marcello Pacini, «Prospettive tecnologiche di Torino: opportunità e bisogni», unpublished paper given at the conference «Lingotto: un'occasione per Torino», Turin, Unione Industriale, 22 June 1984, p. 5.

[172] Ibid., pp.4-5.

[173] See Giovanni Agnelli Foundation, *1976-1990: quinze ans d'activité,* Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1990, pp. 190-200.

[174] The research was carried out by a team of sociologists – Maurizio Ambrosini, Clemente Lanzetti, Marco Lombardi and Maria Luisa Bianco – coordinated by Vincenzo Cesareo; see Vincenzo Cesareo (ed.), *L'icona*

This research led to a number of significant findings, among them the comforting conclusion that positive attitudes to technological and scientific change prevailed in Italian culture overall. It was also shown that Italians were aware of the importance of the "resource of science and technology" as a strategic factor in the country's progress.

The relationship between science and transcendence in the culture of Italian scientists and in the international debate

After having studied the link between technological innovation and the economic system (especially with regard to the emergence of new firms and new professions and with regard to the role played by the urban context and by the general culture of ordinary people), the Foundation decided to complete its work on science and technology by introducing a particularly innovative theme and examine the relationship between science and transcendence. For although science and technology were a fundamental part of the Foundation's vision of the world – and thus a fundamental part of its vision of Man – they were certainly not the only elements in this vision. So it was not just necessary to study the cultural environment of scientific and technological ambiences; we also needed to introduce themes crucial for understanding the human condition in a modern and post-modern world: we needed to ask what the culture of scientists was, how they saw the world, what values and ethics they adhered to, and what their religious opinions were.

This research was coordinated by Achille Ardigò and Franco Garelli and took the form of a wide-ranging field survey involving 350 Italian scientists working in frontier fields of physics, bio-genetics and artificial intelligence. The findings were extremely interesting and showed how pluralistic and varied the social and cultural situation was – a situation where tolerance and mutual respect usually prevailed. In this situation, the progress which was theoretically possible in science raised moral issues which ended by invoking the themes of transcendence[175]. Showing that the theme of the relationship between science and transcendence was a relevant one today was a highly interesting result for a study of a sociological nature – a result which vindicated Ardigò's pioneering initiative.

It was a natural subsequent step to widen the horizon and move from the culture of Italian scientists to the international debate. The findings of our research were thus presented at an international conference entitled "Scientific mentality, secularization and transcendence", organized in June 1988. Leading scientists with differing cultural orientations, and a number of theologians, discussed the research findings, the ethics of science as a profession, the relationship between science and faith, and the encounter between scientific culture and philosophical and political cultures. We were particularly pleased to have Abdus Salam, winner of the Nobel Prize for Physics, and a practising Muslim. Salam spoke in the session devoted to "the boundaries between science and transcendence", giving a paper with the admirably simple and direct title "An Islamic point of view". Our invitation of Abdus Salam was one of the Foundation's first attempts to go beyond the boundaries of the West and compare perspectives and values outside the Christian tradition[176].

The discussion covered many topical themes, such as the ethical problems raised by research in genetics and artificial intelligence, and delved into the themes of transcendence and faith – especially with regard to the most advanced levels of research, notably in physics. At the end of the conference, the philosopher Gianni Vattimo (who had given a paper on "Science, ontology and ethics"[177]) wrote that "something is shifting in the attitudes of scientists

towards religious and ethical issues. What is most evident is that religious sensitivity» is the more pronounced in those areas where the new moral problems raised by science are most pressing"[178]. In November 1989 the sociologist Luciano Gallino (who gave a paper at the conference on "Models of interaction between natural science and the human and social sciences"[179]) recalled our conference, and stressed that the positivist prediction that religious thought would disappear in the face of science had been disconfirmed. For the vitality of science had in no way shaken the strength of religious thought, which was as "alive as it has ever been among the great mass of individuals". Gallino admitted that the findings of Ardigò and Garelli's research were "certainly contradictory, specially for those who like explanations in black and white, or those who still believe in the positivist prediction (…) that when science comes on the scene religion disappears – including in people's minds." In reality, however, Gallino continued, "the majority of the Italian scientists studied seem to see the relationship between science and religion in terms of a possible complementarity rather than in terms of contradiction"[180].

The research on Italian scientists and the conference on "Values, science and transcendence" were just two events in a much wider debate taking place all over the world – a debate which is never likely to end, at least not in a humanly conceivable time-scale. They had a strategic importance for the Foundation, for they gave balance to the range of our interests in the 1980s: without them, it might have seemed that we were giving excessive weight to technology – which was not at all our intention, nor our culture.

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[178] G. Vattimo, «Dio è più vicino», *La Stampa*, 29 June 1988.

[179] Luciano Gallino, «Modelli di interazione tra le scienze naturali e le scienze umane e sociali» in E. Agazzi, Sebastiano Maffettone, Gerard Radnitzky *et al.*, *Valori, scienza e trascendenza*, vol. II, op. cit.

[180] L. Gallino, «Scienza e fede, crolla il muro. Prospettive diverse, ricerca comune», *La Stampa*, 29 November 1989.

Chapter Three
The Senator Giovanni Agnelli International Prize for the Ethical Dimension in Advanced Societies

A rather special initiative, which was however linked to the programmes described in the previous chapter, originated in the early summer of 1985, when FIAT asked us to plan and manage a prize in memory of Senator Giovanni Agnelli, to commemorate the fortieth anniversary of his death[181].

As is our custom, we went about the task very systematically. First of all, we undertook a survey of existing prizes. We discovered a world we did not know, and which we had not foreseen. According to *Awards, Honors and Prizes*[182], there were 8,600 prizes in the United States and Canada in 1984, plus another 5,100 in the rest of the world, including Europe. These prizes were given by over 2,200 organizing bodies, and the number of prize-awarding bodies had grown significantly over the previous few years.

It was not surprising that there was growth, for this just reflected the general increase in importance of the voluntary sector. Prizes are in fact an important and integral feature of the complex set of mechanisms of social regulation set up in Western society over the centuries. Alongside state coercion and market incentives, and accompanying the exhortations of cultural and spiritual authorities, there has always been a space where societies have set up symbols of excellence and standards to aspire to. The basic idea behind prizes today remains the same as it always has been – that of giving recognition and encouragement to human activities which are considered worthy, and which are not adequately rewarded by the normal functioning of society or the market.

The Foundation reasoned that a prize should be original if it was to be useful. And a prize which is not useful has no justification. But was it possible to be original, given that over thirteen thouand prizes existed already?[183]

Our analysis showed that the most prestigious prizes are those which cover particular sectors of activity (e.g. Nobel Prizes for literature, for chemistry, economics or other fields of science or culture), even though there is no shortage of prizes awarded on a territorial basis (e.g., "Turinese of the year"). Some prizes combine the sectorial and territorial criteria: for example, the Premio Saint Vincent goes to Italian economists, and the Oscars are divided into American and non-American categories.

Naturally, prizes establish precise criteria specifying what the exact aims are, and outlining minimum standards and criteria for giving the award. Apart from the obvious desire for self-promotion which may motivate bodies giving awards, the principal reasons for setting up prizes may be summarized as follows:

- to finance activities by persons or organizations who would not otherwise receive sufficient financing via market mechanisms. This was an objective made explicit when the Nobel Prize was set up.

- to channel the activities of promising persons or organizations towards a specific field of activity. The "specialized" prizes encouraging particular sub-fields of research are awards of this type: for example, the prizes which encourage specialization in molecular chemistry or Italian history within the general fields of chemistry or history. These also aim to direct young scholars towards the fields in question. Awards of this kind are prizes (or study grants) which act as "incentives", often encouraging activities in which industry or the organizing body of the prize is interested.

- to heighten the profile of the activities rewarded. As already mentioned, bodies organizing a prize may wish to promote their own image. But any kind of prize will do this. There may also be a desire to give publicity to a whole series of attitudes; the case of the Nobel Peace Prize is a good example. In that case, the objective is clearly to spread a culture of peace.

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[181] In its first years, the Senator Giovanni Agnelli Prize for the Ethical Dimension in Advanced Societies was financed by FIAT. From 1995 on, it was financed entirely by the Foundation.

[182] Gita Siegman (ed.), *Awards, Honors & Prizes. Sixth edition*, vol. I, *United States and Canada*; vol. II, *International and Foreign*, Detroit (Mi.), Gale Research Company, 1985.

[183] 315 of these were for architecture, 38 for the graphic arts, 89 for archaeology, 149 for language, linguistics and philology, 170 for engineering, 278 for journalism, 245 for the theatre, 100 for pharmacology, 581 for poetry, 33 for travel writing, 27 for science fiction, 95 for management, 95 for surgery, 222 for medical research, 351 for music, 216 for television, 27 for African culture, 141 for photography, 81 for political science, 81 for criminology, 62 for women's issues and 173 for acts of heroism.

- to promote a specific product. This is a fairly common type of objective, which can be seen as an extension of the objective above. Here, what is important is not so much the sum of money which may go with the prize but rather the promotional value. Numerous industrial prizes, such as the "Car of the Year" award, fall into this category, as do the Oscars and many literary prizes.

Among the minimum criteria which we wished our prize to meet, was the fact that it should be capable of creating an image in the public eye. This was not just a question of good public relations, nor of the size of the "grant" which a prize might award. One of the facts we had to bear in mind was that in the field of prizes as in other fields, there are "barriers to entry" posed by the existence of already-established successful prizes. The size of any new prize, its originality, and its visibility are all crucial in determining its chances of success. Originality is crucial in the sense that it is not feasible to enter "territory" which is already well covered by well-known, rich and prestigious prizes; nor is it advisable to give prizes in areas which are obsolete or which have been overtaken by other fields. The criterion of visibility means that it is not a good idea to choose a "territory" which is too restricted if the prize is intended to be an opportunity for enhancing "image".

These criteria might make it seem that it would be difficult to find a suitable territory for a prize. In reality, it was easy: we just had to turn our eyes inwards to our own interests and (albeit relatively short) tradition. In the human and social sciences, it was clear that economics was already well-covered by extremely well-known prizes such as the Nobel; other disciplines like history also had prestigious awards. The area of ethics in advanced societies, on the other hand, seemed an open field. It met our wish to establish an award in an innovative area, but it also linked up well with tradition – and especially with the Foundation's tradition – for the Foundation had often concerned itself with values, the ethics of responsibility, and civil society.

We therefore proposed a prize of a type which would help to heighten the image of the activity rewarded (the third type listed above) – a prize which also thoroughly met the required criteria of size of award, originality, and visibility. This was a prize for *the ethical dimension in advanced societies*. The reasoning behind the prize was summed up as follows: "The aims and problems of our societies cannot be reduced to the logic and results of scientific progress and technological change. This has never been the case in any historical epoch. The problems of justice and equity, freedom and civic order, the relationship between the private citizen and the *res publica* – in other words, the problems of a civil society founded on a social compact which regulates life together in an orderly and morally legitimated fashion, have always been fundamental in our societies. This has been especially true of modern history. Modern society emerged with the reforming process which began in the eighteenth century and continued without a break up until the 1950s, by which date all Western societies had had the chance to adopt democratic constitutions as the basis of their existence – constitutions which aimed to safeguard the fundamental principles of the social order.

Is this still the case? Is there still interest in the problems of how to make social organization hang together, and the problems of how to act in day-to-day practice in conformity with the ethical principles incorporated in our societies? Or has a situation unwittingly been created whereby social organization – driven by scientific progress and economic dynamics – lost its ties with that ethical dimension which is an essential component in the history of the advanced Western societies? It is not possible to answer this question with certainty. What we can do, however, and what needs to be done, is to attract attention to the urgent need for theoretical reflection on the whether the kind of society we are constructing is consistent with the principles of public life which underlie contemporary industrially advanced societies"[184].

Having decided the nature of the prize, we went about giving it regulations which would formally and precisely define the tasks to be performed by the various bodies set up, and the main procedures they should follow[185].

The organizational apparatus of the prize consisted of two main bodies – a committee of experts, and a jury – and gave the Foundation an active role. The experts had to be representatives from the main geographical areas in question – Europe, America and Japan. The task of these experts was to nominate a number of candidates within their own geographical area. The jury was to be chosen from the worlds of business, politics and social affairs, and had to be made up of people of indisputable international renown, with no particular regard to geographical origin. President of the jury was to be Giovanni Agnelli.

The Foundation was given the task of handling the general organization of the prize. This included identifying experts and members of the jury, and making a shortlist of three or four candidates from the names suggested by the experts, to submit to the jury. There was some turnover among the experts, but the prize rapidly succeeded in achieving internal consistency, and demonstrating a clear cultural line via its choice of prize-winners. I can vouch for the fact that the three-sided relationship between experts, jury and Foundation worked effectively and in a balanced manner.

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[184] Giovanni Agnelli Foundation, «Finalità e identità del premio Senatore Giovanni Agnelli», Turin, Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1987, *mimeo*, pp. 2-3.

[185] See Giovanni Agnelli Foundation, *1976-1990: quinze ans d'activité*, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1990, pp. 100-101; Idem., *1990-1993: quattro anni di attività*, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1993, pp. 31-32.

The prize-winners were Isaiah Berlin, Amartya Kumar Sen, Ralf Dahrendorf, and Norberto Bobbio. The cultural consonance between these four winners (which was the outcome of a precise policy in the selection process) emerges clearly in the four introductory discourses prepared for the respective award ceremonies.

First of all, in the work of all four winners, prominence is given to the individual, and to individuals' rights and freedoms in face of the claims of society. Together with their recognition of the importance of the rule of law and of democracy as tools for safeguarding the freedom of the individual, this places all four writers in what we might call the liberal tradition, understood in a broad sense. In different ways, and to differing degrees, all see "positive freedoms" (*freedom to*) as valuable, but see "negative freedoms" (*freedom from*) as the truly fundamental element of freedom. While violation of negative freedom necessarily implies a violation of positive freedom, the opposite is not necessarily the case. All our prize-winners also are interested, to differing degrees, in the theme of equality and inequality. In general, they treat this theme in connection with that of freedoms, and equality is seen as a means for obtaining freedoms.

All the winners of the prize have an open-minded, un-ideological and rational approach. This is evident in their (at least implicit) belief that intellectuals and culture can make a positive contribution to the improvement of society. And they all share the recognition that it is necessary to set social and economic research in a well-defined framework of ethical and normative thinking.

The consistency of our choices of these four men as prize-winners was confirmed by the fact that all give importance to the part played by civil society in reinforcing democratic systems, and all concurred that it was necessary to act to strengthen and extend civil society.

The Prize for Ethics in Advanced Societies became – via the prize-winners – a prize encouraging the strengthening of civil society. It was, therefore a success. However, it was limited – geographically, sociologically, and culturally - by the fact that its frame of reference was that of the advanced societies. It was, in other words, a prize reserved for western Europe and North America, with a somewhat artificial extension to Japan. It was, therefore, essentially a western prize.

From the early 1990s on, as I have already described, the Agnelli Foundation found itself constantly dealing with problems which had a global dimension to them. Some of these themes became the subject of the Foundation's work, as in the case of our programmes on cultural universes and the way they were coping with modernity. This fact that we were so continually in contact with world themes made the Western nature of the prize particularly evident, and made it seem a limitation. Of course, this did not in any way detract from the nobility of the prize. Yet at the same time we felt that it reflected a cultural framework which had had its day. Other urgent problems were emerging – in particular, the problem of whether human rights could really be considered universal (something which was starting to be disputed by a number of countries), and the more general issue of dialogue and exchange between the great cultures of the world.

At the ceremony conferring the prize on Norberto Bobbio, we therefore publicly announced our intention to change the objectives of the prize and to channel it towards these new, emerging problems. In 1996 we undertook rigorous inquiry, at the end of which we decided to turn the Senator Giovanni Agnelli Prize into an award for dialogue between the cultural universes [186].

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[186] See below, Part Four, "The Senator Giovanni Agnelli Prize for Dialogue between Cultural Universes" in the chapter on "The cultural problems of globalization".

Chapter Four
Italy's demographic decline: a policy response programme

In 1986 that part of our research on the future which focused on demographic trends in Italy became an independent programme. This enabled the Foundation to take a highly active part in social discussion of the topic and to take a leading part in making proposals. The seriousness of the demographic decline was not immediately apparent. We ourselves did not realize the seriousness and complexity of the problem for, when we produced the *Futurama Atlas* in 1984, even though we recognized that there was demographic decline, we still talked in terms of a "larger Italy".

The research we undertook in the years 1981-5 was essentially descriptive in nature. In the *Futurama Atlas* we attempted a provisional cultural interpretation of what the consequences would be of Italy's demographic transition, and painted the scenarios which seemed likely in tones which were not dramatic. We argued that even though there would be fewer Italians in the future, the fact that they would live longer and that more women would join the labour force made it possible to talk of a "larger Italy".

The extent of demographic decline emerged, however, in the years which followed publication of our *Atlas*, and as is well known, the situation continued to deteriorate. As a result of this worsening, the Foundation started a new study in 1986, which was completed in 1988. The subject of this study was the demographic transition in the main regions of the world. This research served as the basis for two different and successive lines of thinking and policy-proposal in the Foundation – the first with regard to policies aiming to halt or slow demographic decline, the second with respect to the management of immigration coming from outside the European Union[187].

The seriousness of the demographic decline was clear when we realized that very soon Italy would have to cope with the depressive effects caused by profound alteration of the structure of the population, with all the effects this change was likely to have on the health system and the pension system, on education, work and the economy. In the long term, it was even true that some regional populations with particularly low birth rates, were likely to decline to the point where their very existence was in danger. For although Italy in general was experiencing a crisis in the birth rate, this was especially true of Liguria, Emilia Romagna, Tuscany and Piedmont. The various regions of Italy were travelling at different rates towards desertification.

How could we raise the problem of Italy's demographic future in the country's cultural debate? Two cultural obstacles made raising the issue particularly important. The first of these was constitute by the image of the world which was popularized by the Club of Rome – the idea that the world's population was already too high and ecological equilibrium at breaking-point, with resources running out. This was a catastrophic-type vision which described an abstract, unreal world, and which failed to distinguish between the situation in the various cultures, and allowed no room for the action of individuals. It was a totalizing and totalitarian vision (nowadays we might say a fundamentalist vision) and it is extraordinary that it managed to gain so much support even in democratic and liberal circles.

We tried to bring the debate on Italy's demographic future back to the concrete terms of the Italian case, and the case of a European country – with all the needs and specificities which that implied. We achieved this result with our research on the demographic future of the main areas of the world, published in a work entitled *Abitare il pianeta*[188]. This was a necessary operation because the prevalent culture was very close to that contained in the Club of Rome's vision, which saw the human race as having a different destiny from that of other animal species (exotic species in particular). So, as the saying goes, everyone was very willing to worry about the extinction of some race of parrots, promptly declare a protected species, or about some remote Amazonian tribe, yet few seemed worried about the same risk being run by Piedmontese or Tuscans. The ideology which was associated with the Club of Rome constituted what was, in its effects, anti-birth propaganda. And this propaganda was received essentially acritically. It had frightened more or less all cultures – inexplicably, even culture close to the Catholic Church.

Abitare il pianeta stressed that any serious demographic policy could not be applied in an undifferentiated manner at a world level, but needed to be calibrated case by case, in accordance with the stage which individual populations had reached in the demographic transition. By "demographic transition" is meant that process which will eventually, in

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[187] See below, Part Four, chapter 2, section on "Immigration and cultural pluralism in Italy and Europe"

[188] Marcello Pacini, Aristide Zolberg, Antonio Golini et al., *Abitare il pianeta*, vol. I, *Il Mondo Arabo, l'Italia e l'Europa*; Thomas J. Espenshade, S. Philip Morgan, Guido Ortona *et al.*, *Abitare il pianeta,* vol. II, *USA, URSS e aree asiatica e australe*, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1989. See also Giovanni Agnelli Foundation, *1976-1990: quinze ans d'activité*, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1990, pp. 192-93.

successive periods, affect all populations on the planet, taking them from a pre-transition equilibrium, involving high levels of fertility and of mortality, to a post-transition equilibrium, in which births and deaths are rarer. In the central stages of this transition, when death rates have already fallen but birth rates remain high, there is rapid growth of the population.

Demographic transition started in the nineteenth century and will be complete by the mid twenty-first century, at which point the world population will stabilize. The present writer has always liked the idea that the Italians, in all their regional varieties, will be there to see this event. It would be nice to avoid Italian regions becoming rather like Cappadocia in Asia Minor (now part of Turkey) - i.e., areas where there is no link whatsoever between the population actually living there at present and the population of the past which built the buildings, shaped the works of art, and so on, which tourists and locals view as archaeology. If this kind of "Cappadocia model" actually does take place, the marks left by the past will be enigmatic: the majority will not understand their significance, and for the minority who do know how to interpret them, they signs of erudition – almost certainly not signs with which they identify.

The second difficulty we encountered in our attempts to awaken concern over Italy's demographic future was the fact that the theme had been discredited by the interest taken in it by the Fascist government. We had already encountered a similar problem with our programme encouraging ties with Italian Americans (for Fascism had wanted to mobilize Italians abroad as a source of nationalist support for the regime). In that case too, the fact that the (now distant) Fascist government had taken an interest in the question created an important obstacle to establishing cultural relations between Italians and Italian Americans.

In the case of demographic policy, attitudes were similar. Parochialism led Italians to mistakenly believe that worrying about the country's demographic future was right-wing, and thus unseemly. In Italian culture at the time it was the opinion of the vast majority (one even had an impression of unanimity) that the state should remain absolutely neutral on the question of the country's birth-rate. And neutrality was intended in terms of "refraining from intervention", and disinterest in the question. It was assumed (an assumption we later showed to be mistaken) that existing, spontaneous living conditions in Italy provided couples with the real possibility to choose between having and not having children. The concept of equal opportunity had long been applied to the condition of women, but nobody had yet applied the concept of equal opportunity as a criterion for population policy.

At the conference in which we presented our research[189], I argued that policies encouraging population growth were politically neutral, for they had had both right- and left-wingers among their supporters, and argued that it was necessary to make Italy's demographic future a theme of political debate, in the same way as the quality of life, condition of women, or the reform of the Constitution, in order to encourage collective realization of the serious consequences of demographic decline. The Foundation wished to issue an invitation to debate pro-birth policy which would slow the rapid decline in the Italian population. It was, in fact, already obvious that increasing the number of Italians was not a feasible objective, even given the most optimistic hypotheses of upturn in fertility. But it was desirable that the process of aging of the population, which was now inevitable, should proceed as slowly as possible – partly to give the social and economic system the time to adapt.

By 1991 we could say that the first objective we had set ourselves – making Italy's demographic future a theme of public debate – had been achieved. By that year, in fact, even though there was still insufficient awareness of the problem, the issue had become part of political and cultural debate. This was objectively positive, and represented progress over the situation of just a few years previously, when misinformation and disinterest prevailed. The second step was to define with clarity what population policy meant, in what sort of ambit it should intervene, and what kind of measures it should employ.

As we clarified our concepts we came to the conclusion that population policy was not the same as simply policy encouraging births, nor did it necessarily even imply the latter[190]. The difference is a precise and clear one: birth policy involves specific initiatives to encourage an increase in the birth-rate, whereas population policy is a series of measures designed to ensure that a couple who have chosen to have children is not penalized with respect to a couple who have chosen to not have children. In other words, population policy has the form of an "equal opportunity" policy – a commitment to eliminating obstacles, and all forms of discrimination, facing those who wish to exercise their right to procreate.

If, therefore, pro-birth policy may in some cases be part of a wider population policy, it is equally true that it is possible for population policy to exist which contains no birth policy in the strict sense. As I put it in 1990 at the conference on "Populations, society and demographic policy in Europe", "In our view it is legitimate and necessary for Italy to have a coherent, well-organized population policy"[191]. I argued, furthermore, that particularly urgent situations

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[189] "Transizione demografica, migrazioni internazionali e dinamiche culturali", Turin, Giovanni Agnelli Foundation, 17-18 October 1988. See Marcello Pacini, Aristide Zolberg, Antonio Golini et al., *Abitare il pianeta*, vol. I and vol. II, op. cit.

[190] See Marcello Pacini, "Le politiche per la popolazione: idee per un dibattito italiano" in Antonio Golini, Alain Monnier, Olivia Ekert-Jaffé et al., *Famiglia, figli e società in Europa. Crisi della natalità e politiche per la popolazione*, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1991, p. xvii.

[191] Ibid., pp.xv-xvi.

could justify pro-birth policies – which meant, as will become clear, a policy of equal opportunities at the national level, and policy of more direct incentives for births left to the discretion of individual regions.

I stated that numerous factors "penalize not just a general, abstract social function – reproduction - but also a very great number of Italian citizens discriminated against by sex and age". This led to the conclusion "that our country, too, should adopt a population policy. Or rather, Italy should adopt a general orientation in favour of a population policy, because alongside measures aiming to directly encourage procreation, there should be a general orientation to avoiding penalization present in the country's framework of laws and administrative provisions as a whole. Work, housing, taxation, social insurance and social security are all areas where the law intervenes and where measures which penalize women and families can be easily identified. It is in these areas that we should act, to make sure that we have a population policy which really provides conditions whereby the choice to have a child or not is a free one. A general orientation towards eliminating measures which penalize procreative activity should be an important thread of long-term policy – a sophisticated response by government to a new social and cultural situation.

A policy for population does not, therefore, have as its main objective to favour couples who wish to have children, but to avoid making them disadvantaged. The question of whether or not specifically pro-birth measures – for example, encouraging couples to have a third child – are desirable is a distinct one (even though closely connected to other aspects of population policy)"[192]. With regard to pro-birth policies of this type, cultural resistance is still strong. "However [I argued at the time], the idea that we might intervene actively to raise birth rates cannot be rejected out of hand, especially in regions such as Tuscany, Emilia, Piedmont and Liguria, which have populations in such rapid decline that the very survival of these populations, with their socio-cultural identies, is at risk". I went on to say that "an increase in the number of Italians is not the aim of a modern population policy such as that we believe is necessary for our country. The real objective is to attain - in a context of relative numerical stability - a balanced structure of the population, where there is a harmonious relationship between young people, adults and the elderly (…) We are convinced that a neo-industrial society like ours has all the cultural and economic means to make it possible to choose consciously a demographic regime where there is balance in the long period between the generations. However, cultural and economic resources are not enough on their own: legislative tools are also required. The lack of such tools is what justifies the existence of a population policy. I might repeat that having such a policy would bring us closer to our partners in Europe"[193].


The fall in Italy's birth-rate, 1971-2007

The research which the Foundation has carried out on future trends has (we might say) accompanied the development of the population in Italy over the last two decades. Looking back at the predictions we made, and comparing them against actually occurring trends, we can say that in general our predictions hold up well and can be seen to have been precise.

One trend which was much more accentuated than we predicted, however, is the fall in the birth rate. As the graph shows, the predictions we made in the *Futurama Atlas* (1983), and the lower predictions made in *Il futuro degli italiani* (1990) (compiled by Piero Gastaldo, Stefano Molina, Sandro Monteverdi, Carla Marchese and Daniela del Boca) – estimates which themselves led to serious worry about the consequences of the decline in the birth rate – were in reality shown to be too optimistic. They were overtaken by real trends, which yielded far fewer births than predicted.

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[192] Ibid., p.xxi-xxii.
[193] Ibid., p.xxvi.

Births in Italy, 1971-2007 (thousands)

Legend:
- Actual trend
- Predictions made in Futurama Atlas
- Predictions made in Il futuro degli italiani

Our long involvement in demographic issues, which started in 1981, did not stop in 1991, and certainly has not run its course today. Between 1991 and today, Italy's demographic situation has changed for the worse. By March 1999 the total fertility rate, that is to say the number of children per woman of childbearing age was 1.17 – just over half the replacement rate (2.05 children per woman), which is the rate which ensures that the numbers of births will just keep the population at the level it is, maintaining the size of the population stable in the long term. It seems that the Italian people has definitely opted for suicide. However, the increased seriousness of the question does not change the key points of our position, which can be summarized as follows:

-the criteria and objectives underlying demographic policy vary in time and space; each country should have its own demographic policy, which will change in accordance with its position in the processes of demographic transition, and its culture. It is to be hoped that all policies will respect the life and freedoms of persons;

-the demographic future should be made into a major theme of political debate, a theme as important as the national debt or pensions. One of the ways in which a society shows its cultural adequacy is by the way it reacts to the problems regarding its future;

-the framework of legislation which exists today penalizes couples who want children: this is a real attack on rights and it is surprising that, in a democratic country, this situation is not only accepted, but is not even discussed or questioned by the political parties. The only explanation for this state of affairs which comes to mind (but it is perhaps too optimistic a conclusion) is that Italy has gone through a particularly turbulent period over the last few years, and one where the conditions of the country's public finances have limited what was possible;

-finally, since demographic indexes are one of the many indicators of regional differences, those regions where the population crisis is most acute ought to have the legal and financial capacity to activate genuine pro-birth policies. The problem of the future existence of Piedmontese, Tuscans, Emilians or Romagnolians is first of all an issue for the citizens and tax-payers of these regions. It is to be hoped that the federalist reform of the state we hope will take place will facilitate solution of the population crisis.

Unfortunately, it has been impossible to propose a debate along these lines. The priorities of politicians do not just depend on the seriousness of a problem, but also on its urgency. An issue like demographic decline, which has a very long time-scale, is seen as being less pressing than the emergencies of the country's immediate economic or financial situation, meeting the criteria demanded by the Maastricht agreement, or struggling to reduce unemployment. The greater predictability of the problems connected to the structural decline of the Italian population has evidently not been sufficient to bring about prompt preventive action or the adoption of corrective measures.

But since the problem has only been put off to another day, it will inevitably re-present itself in a form which will be all the more serious the longer we wait. I therefore believe that equal opportunity population policy, and incentives for births at the regional level, are two issues which will be present in the cultural debate in the next few years. When Italy has restored balance to its budget and reformed its framework of government and administration, and when the effects of the change in the age-structure of the population begin to make themselves felt, it will be possible to propose a policy strategy: a) to enlarge the area of equal opportunities for citizens; b) to introduce more rational and far-sighted management of the consequences of Italy's demographic transition; c) to counter and correct the effects of demographic decline.

These are the policy conclusions of an ambitious programme which started in 1981 and gradually became a permanent focus of interest, which the Foundation will need to cultivate in the years to come.

Part Four

The Present: from 1989 to 1999

Facing up to a "New World"

Chapter One

A New Mental Map of the World

The need for new conceptual tools

In the years between 1989 and 1999 it became noticeable that a number of profound changes which were transforming our society were about to make a major and irreversible leap forward. In the Foundation we therefore started to undertake a process of review, with the aim of constructing a new frame of reference for our activity which was in tune with the times. Since we were trying to understand the nature of the innovations taking place in the world - the wider meaning behind the news stories and individual events - it was clear that we needed a conceptual framework which would allow us to reassess the usefulness and adequacy of our programmes in an international context which was so rapidly changing. In November 1989 – a date which happened to coincide with the fall of the Berlin wall (9 November 1989) – the editorial of the first number of our journal *XXI Secolo* (*Twenty-First Century*) expressed our awareness of a change of epoch, and of our desire to set our programmes in the framework of understanding of our times[194].

In this editorial presenting the journal *XXI Secolo*, I wrote: "we are at the watershed between two centuries. At other times in Europe's history the transition from one century to another has had exceptional significance. The years spanning the shift from the fifteenth to the sixteenth century, for example - with the discovery of America and the arrival of Europeans in the Far East, the expansion of the boundaries of European Man and the tiumph of Humanist learning – were exceptional. There is considerable evidence that the years we are living through, spanning the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, will also go down in history as exceptional. Let us consider some examples of major transformations which are already under way, or are just taking hold:

- the beginning of a new demographic transition;
- globalization of the economy and the meeting of/competition between social systems which are very different culturally;
- the problems posed by developing countries and by international migration;
- technological revolution and the building of an information society;
- construction of Western Europe as a political unit;
- radical transformation of the societies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union;
- reconciliation between Christianity and modernity, with the establishment of dialogue between religious culture and rationalist thought in its political and scientific manifestations, and new, incipient interest in the scientific world for the subject of transcendence. The encounter between the great traditional religions (Islam, Hinduism, etc.) and modernity (in the shape of science, technology, industry, and institutions of a modern state). The re-emergence of the ethical dimension as a central theme in our culture.

These are all major transformations which (alongside others) will develop in the next few decades, coming to full development in the twenty-first century. The Agnelli Foundation is oriented primarily (though not exclusively) to these themes precisely because we consider them to lie at the core of the changes which are affecting Europe and Italy in the near future. A foundation like ours fulfils its role to the extent that it identifies change just before it becomes the object of political debate, or a source of social tension and economic problems"[195].

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[194] For an outline of the Foundation's research orientation in the early 1990s, see Giovanni Agnelli Foundation, *1990-1993: quattro anni di attività*, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, pp.9-12.

[195] "Perchè XXI Secolo: raccontare le idee", *XXI Secolo*, 1 (1), I, November 1989, p.2.

Of course, this reflection on the new world framework was not distinct from the everyday activity of the Foundation; so the new mental map of the world we produced was both the outcome of and the stimulus for our research and discussion programmes.

Right from the beginning of the 1990s, it was evident that globalization was a truly revolutionary, all-pervasive trend, which was influencing ideas and everyday behaviour, the policies of major nations, and the decisions of the man in the street (not just as a consumer but also as an investor and a worker). This change seemed so profound that it required an overall review of the way Italian society needed to view the world if it was to find new guidelines and formulate adequate policies in a whole series of fields in social, economic and political life. It was clear that such a vision of the world needed to be not just a description, but a framework which incorporated paradigms and interpretative keys to the major processes of change which were occurring. For these processes are determining the destiny of Italy and they nearly all demand responses which are deeply innovative. As I have said, the first element of novelty is the pervasiveness of change; so what are needed are responses not just from technical specialists, but from each and every citizen.

As an example of this pervasiveness, we may reflect on the way economics – considered as a variable separate from politics – has produced a genuine revolution within European societies and states. I am thinking, for instance, of the cutting back of the welfare state and the redistribution of responsibility for local economic development away from the central government to regions and local authorities. Alternatively, I might cite the way "cultural diversity" has entered the everyday life of ordinary Italians as Asian and African immigrants have now come to Italy.

All this raises a problem of how to spread awareness of the nature of these changes: for they need to be understood by all, since they profoundly influence the future of all. This is why we need a new "mental map of the world" which is capable of making sense of the new reality (a world reality which is also a personal reality) and capable of spreading awareness of it throughout society. In other words, we need an up-dated mental map which is capable of interpreting the hopes and interests of individual citizens in society.

Mental maps

Mental maps are part of any epoch. Each age has its own vision of the world, though which peoples – or rather cultures – have expressed their own way of understanding their relationships with others, their own place in the world, their cultural universe.

In classical times, the *limes* identified the edge of the world with the boundaries of the Roman Empire. All those who were beyond the bounds – the Germanic peoples and the Parthians – were the enemy; for knowledge of distant India was too vague and mysterious to take the form of anything more solid than a myth. We should remember that the definition of the world has never been purely geographic: Herodotus made a distinction between Greece (and Europe) and Persia (and Asia) – the former being the land of liberty, the latter that of tyranny.

In the Middle Ages geographical representations changed little: the world retained a circular shape, with a "T" in the middle of it – the upright being constituted by the Mediterranean and the crossbar being formed by the Black Sea, the Aegean and the Nile. At the point where the two pieces met was Jerusalem, the centre of the world, the site of the foundations of Christian civilization. This was no mere geographical map, therefore, but a representation which was oriented and shaped by the sacred, and by religious belief.

This way of organizing space is not specific to Europeans. Classical Islam also always had a mental map of the world in which the Islamic lands were at the centre and the lands of infidels in conflict with it (a conflict which might be dormant but which was always present).

It is perhaps less well known that China, too, had its mental map of the world, one which derived from Confucian culture, and embodying the value of hierarchy which is so fundamental to that culture. In this mental map it was possible to represent the world as a series of squares, each one inserted in the other. These rectangles contained territory (and thus the various countries) in accordance with their geographic distance, but also in accordance with the importance and frequency of trading contacts.

The world was therefore an enormous *mandala*, where China – the Middle Empire, the roof of the world – formed the centre. All other known countries, from Japan to the Philippines to the Persian Gulf, were located around this centre. All these lands were – had to be – in some sense tribute countries of the Empire. So as one went further away from the centre of the Empire, one came to lands which were progressively less civilized, where social and moral customs became steadily more degenerate.

Of course, this moral degeneracy could always be corrected via operations of unification and homogenization, directed by the centre and its wise men. In this way, the essential nature of Man could blossom (an essential nature which could, of course, only develop in stratified society). In its spatial expression, therefore, the centre tried to extend its positive influence and its moral order to the periphery.

This mental map of the world thus justified the sending into neighbouring countries, seen as subordinate, of imperial missions which had the aim of collecting symbolic tribute. Such tribute was the expression of a relationship which was seen as useful for the tribute-bearing country – which was given the chance to improve itself and make progress towards a more civilized state.

From the sixteenth century on, Europe had a vision which was similar in some respects to that of classical China. In this vision, Europe was at the centre of the world. Within Europe, it is true, there were many states, often at war with each other, but relations between these states were based upon two fundamentals: they all considered each other legitimate potential owners of newly-discovered lands outside Europe (so long as they had the military and technological means to take possession); and they regulated their relations with each other via the drawing of zones of influence, and via international treaties. So they considered each other juridically equal (it thus became possible for the beginnings of international law to emerge at this time), and different from – indeed, superior to – the forms of political and social organization which they found outside Europe. For centuries this Eurocentric vision was accepted and uncontroversial. Underpining it was military and economic power, and cultural, scientific and technological strength.

Mental maps do not just have a descriptive function. They contain an implicit conception of how the world, societies and states are organized, a conception of the principles underlying relationships between elements of the whole, and they provide an interpretative key to understanding many events as not simply random. Mental maps are not simple descriptions but are visions of the world which embody explanations of events – so also paradigms offering solutions to problems and keys to interpreting current affairs.

Let us now shift our focus to recent years. After 1945 our map of the world – and basic model or interpretative paradigm – was that of the Cold War. In accordance with that framework, the countries of the world were divided into three categories, which helped us to understand and order events. There were the Countries of the Free World, Countries of the Communist Bloc, and Third World Countries. Non-aligned countries were a variant on the category of the Third World. During the Cold War, American leadership of the Free World was so strong and undoubted that it produced highly complex consequences. To take just one example, in Italy, it eliminated collective consciousness of the need for national defence. The fact of belonging to the Free World and to its military organization NATO, erased from Italians' consciousness any memory of the need to interest themselves in national security.

Now Italians are beginning to reflect on the question once again. However, the effect of 40 years of a mental map in which all military responsibility was delegated elsewhere has had an enormous effect in inhibiting reflection. The end of the cold war, and above all the fall of communism, have meant that we need to search for a new conceptual framework which makes sense of international relations, and a new mental map which can orient us, and provide us with bearings (however simplified and schematic these may be) providing an overall sense to individual events, and satisfying our desire to know where we stand in the world, who we stand beside, and why we are in a certain place. We need a framework which allows us to understand how the world is organized after the collapse of the great ideologies and the end of the great conflict between communism and the West.

A new mental map and a new vision of the world needs to take account of the interaction of a large number of factors. However, these can be reduced to two basic processes. Firstly, there is gradual but accelerating construction of a single world economy: local economic systems are increasingly interdependent (while national states become gradually weaker), and they are regulated by one fundamental law – permanent competition between cities and other territorial units (as well as competition between firms). Secondly, there is a new influence of the cultural dimension in the political sphere and in international relations – hence the increased importance of cultural universes and their relationships with each other, and the importance of the dilemma "dialogue or conflict".

The Foundation began to work around these themes at the end of the 1980s. In the years which have followed, two programmes have been developed – on the new world geo-economics, and on cultural universes' encounter with modernity. The new mental map of the world is at one and the same time the outcome and the source of these two programmes.

The new geo-economics, its fundamental law, and the deficit of governance

If we are to outline a new mental map of the world, which is capable of answering the questions, and expressing the interests, of individual citizens and states, we need to start off by noting the major changes which have occurred in the

world economy – first of all those associated with globalization. Globalization has taken place above all via growing liberalization, and it takes permanent competition between territories, as well as firms, as its fundamental law[196].

Globalization means that for the first time in the history of humanity, local economies are coming together in one large world economy. Previously there were a number of distinct world economies – in the future there will be just one. This is so not just because the collapse of the Soviet Union brought with it the collapse of Comecon, but also because in numerous Asian and Latin American countries there has been a dismantling of state control over the economy. Even China is in the process of inventing its own model of market economy which will have a place on the international scene.

The single world economy has not yet been achieved (essentially because China's participation is only partial), but we may expect that within a few years the process will be completed. At present there is no credible variant of this process, still less an alternative. Above all, there is no strong political opposition, because (and this is the really new feature) states are not capable of offering resistance. It would be in the interests of states to oppose this process, but they do not seem to possess the power to do so. National states have in fact seen their ability to regulate economic, and especially financial, processes greatly reduced.

National states have lost their ability to guide economic processes because a gap has appeared between the logic and organization of the international economy and the logic and organization of states, and the former is prevailing. State budgets are in crisis and traditional industrial policy has become unfeasible[197]. Some commentators envisage that in the future the state will be an empty shell – devoid of powers and of effective capacity to act, and bereft of the necessary skills[198].

One of the characteristics of the age of globalization (perhaps the most important) consists of the changed relationship between international economy and state sovereignty. To make the idea clear, it is useful to remind ourselves that older people living today have known at least three types of relationship between the two. In the 1920s and '30s – the era of protectionism – the sovereignty of states imposed itself on the international economy. From the end of the second world war up until the 1980s, there was a more balanced situation, which allowed a generally free market system of transactions, but still left states strong powers of control. The social democratic state flourished in this period.

In the 1970s, however, this model collapsed and history forced another pattern into place – that which we are currently living in. The new pattern which has emerged in the world market can be correctly interpreted if we apply the paradigm of permanent competition between territories. Not only do firms compete between each other, but so do territorial units. This means not just states, but also individual local economies – whether cities, regions or industrial districts. Permanent competition between territorial units is the key concept in our new mental map of the world, because it is only if we are aware of this principle that we can grasp the nature of the change which living in the changed conditions of a single world economy demands of all – not just states, but also individual citizens. It is precisely for this reason that we need a new mental map of the world – in order to be able to spread awareness of these new conditions of existence beyond the ranks of small elites to the public as a whole.

Globalization produces effects everywhere, but assessment of it is more relative – depending on the point of view of the observer. If we try to take an overall view, we cannot fail to recognize one extraordinarily positive effect: the problems of world poverty are slowly disappearing. It remains true that eight hundred million people (nearly all in Africa) continue to be malnourished, but numerous countries in South East Asia, China, and most of South America are now on the road towards economic modernization. It is true that – especially in the new geo-economic context – no achievements can be considered irreversible, but realizing this does not take away any of the value of this spread of well-being.

Another major novelty of the last ten years (one which is correlated with the spread of relative prosperity) has been the significant, even remarkable, spread of democracy. Today throughout the entire Euro-American world there is just

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[196] The Foundation's reflection on the new geo-economics started with the conference "Globalization and Systems of Welfare" (Turin, Agnelli Foundation, 20-21 September 1990). Maurizio Ferrera, Robert Gilpin, Alfred Pfaller, Robert Jessop, Harold Wilensky, Richard Rose, Stein Kuhnle, Nathan Glazer, Susan Strange, John Myles and Rei Shiratori gave papers at this conference – now in M.Ferrera (ed.), *Stato sociale e mercato mondiale. Il welfare state europeo sopravviverà alla globalizzazione dell'economia?*, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli 1993. See also M.Pacini, "Introduzione" in Alberto Bramanti, Lanfranco Senn, Sergio Alessandrini, Centro Studi sui Sistemi di Trasporto, *La Padania, una regione italiana in Europa*, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli 1992.

[197] See Giovanni Agnelli Foundation, *La nuova geoeconomia mondiale. Alla ricerca di una risposta italiana*, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli 1996.

[198] Robert Jessop, "La transizione al postfordismo e il welfare state postkeynesiano", in Maurizio Ferrera (ed.), *Stato sociale e mercato mondiale*, op.cit., pp.83-84.

one authoritarian state – Cuba. This is a very different situation from that of the 1970s and '80s, when dictatorial regimes were numerous in Europe (Greece, Spain, Portugal) and in South America (Chile, Argentina and Brazil, just to cite the largest states). This spread of democracy has not just entailed the spread of representative institutions but also a new demand for autonomy and power coming from civil society, and from local government authorities. This has in part been a direct result of the new geo-economic rules of the game, and the drastically reduced powers of politics over the economy.

The outcome of this transformation is that today we have more democratic states (and also states which are more democratic), even though these states have less influence over economic conditions. If we look at this situation from a European point of view we may remark that this shift – in particular the existence of the international competition provided by recently industrialized countries – poses a new problem. There are social and human costs to the process of continual adaptation of economic patterns in the old industrialized countries; the high unemployment rates of Europe and the fall in wages in the United States are well known, emblematic examples of these costs. Globalization thus produces highly disruptive effects and demands great capacities for the planning and management of new policies. It is legitimate to fear that the future of the West does contain risks; for although it is probable that globalization will bring an overall increase in the world's wealth, there is no certainty as to which regions will benefit. It may even be that Europe will not benefit.

It is therefore indispensable that we ask how individual territories and states can keep shares of the wealth produced in the world as a whole tied down within their own pieces of territory. What can be done to face the challenge of globalization as a positive force? We need to make use of our map, and ask ourselves from an Italian and European point of view, what the "collective actions" are which make it possible to keep prosperity and democracy in Italy and Europe. It is clear that the stakes are enormous: either the rich, industrialized countries of the Old World manage to find a place for themselves in the new international context, maintaining at least a part of their affluence, or a long-term phase of decline will get under way, probably taking with it not just prosperity but also the conditions for democracy.

The great strategic problem which the new world geo-economy poses national states is therefore that of facilitating the creation of competitive advantages which are capable of beating international competition. After this, there is the much more difficult problem of how they can regain at least partial control over the economy. In Europe the main competitive advantages have traditionally been human capital and higher education, environmental quality and high quality infrastructure, and high quality of urban life[199]. However, the new geo-economics demands more ambitious responses, which cannot be simply technical. If states and local administrations are to have some chance of regaining the initiative in the economic field, if they wish to maintain or create competitive advantage rationally and in a self-aware manner, they need to give themselves institutional forms which are up to the task.

In the new geo-economy, the form taken by the state, and the way it relates to its citizens, are not issues which are separate from economics; they are crucial to a country's capacity to face up to the challenge. This is the reason why the Foundation launched its programmes on cities, on reform of the state in a federalist direction, on civil society and on social pluralism[200].

Since I wish to describe here the conceptual framework which underpins the Foundation's programmes, I need to say something about the "external" response which has been given to globalization – that is to say, the increasingly frequent construction of areas of economic cooperation in the various regions of the world. As is well known, these regional economic organizations take their place alongside bodies which aim to cover the whole world, such as the World trade Organization (WTO) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

The area of the Pacific is particularly complex from this point of view. So a country like Singapore is a member of AFTA-ASEAN, alongside other South-East Asian countries, but is also a founder member of the Pacific Caucus, and is part of APEC, which also includes Australia, the United States and other American countries[201].

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[199] For the Italian geo-economy, see Giovanni Agnelli Foundation, *La nuova geoeconomia mondiale*, op.cit., p.20 ff.

[200] See Part Five of *Una cronaca culturale. Le attività della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli dal 1976 al 1999*, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli 1999.

[201] The Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) was founded in Bangkok in 1967, with five founding members: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. These were joined by Brunei in 1984, by Vietnam in 1995 and by Laos and Myanmar (Burma) in 1997 (Cambodia's application for admission was rejected). An Asian free trade area (AFTA) is being set up within the confines of ASEAN and will be completed progressively (by 2003 for the first six members, by 2006 for Vietnam, and 2008 for Laos and Myanmar).

Asia-Pacific Economic cooperation (APEC) is an association founded in 1989 in response to increasing economic interdependence between the economies of the Pacific rim. Founder members were the first six members of ASEAN, China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan, together with the three NAFTA countries (The United States,

In America NAFTA and MERCOSUR[202] are expressions of this same logic of enlarging the boundaries of economies to increase efficiency and to make them more capable of coping with globalization.

The creation of economic blocs of this kind is a process which should be viewed with full awareness of its advantages and its limits. Experience shows that they are indispensable organizations, but ones which are limited in the objectives which can be entrusted to them. The history of these organizations over the last ten or fifteen years brings out a number of failures – for example, that of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)[203]. Even APEC had little success in coping with the autumn 1998 crisis.

Europe was the pioneer of these attempts to go beyond national boundaries, for here economic integration started in the 1950s. However, even Europe has experienced major difficulties in the transition from the simple lifting trade barriers, or the construction of a common market, to the much more complex matter of overall economic integration, involving implementation of common policies – perhaps even decided without the agreement of all member states.

It is well known, in fact, that the form taken by these regional economic areas is very varied, some taking traditional, others much more innovative forms. These range from a minimum level of cooperation – the simple creation of a free trade area – to a more complex, but still solely economic form – the common market – to a highly innovative, not to say revolutionary, form with wide political implications, such as the European Union. So in general, and with the exception of the European Union, there is a serious "deficit of politics" in regional economic areas. They are organizations which, when faced with a crisis like that which came to a head in Asia in autumn 1998, prove to be weak. They are effective in abolishing constraints – such as constraints on the free circulation of capital, of goods, workers, and resources – but unable to lay down new rules.

One further remark seems appropriate. The difficulties which have been found in giving these organizations of regional cooperation political content are indirect proof of the crucial importance of "culture". It is in fact no accident that it has been in Europe that progress has steadily been made towards economic and political integration. For belonging to a common culture has been a crucial deciding factor – indeed, an essential pre-condition[204].

If these are the limits of the regional organizations, those of the the traditional bodies such as the WTO or the IMF are even greater: the 1998 Asian crisis made it evident how inadequate they were in the new geo-economic context. The consequence of this inadequacy of our international frameworks is that globalization is pushing the world economy from a regime full of constraints to a situation where there is an absence of rules. The 1998 crisis is partly a result of that lack of regulation. The lesson which should be learned from 1998 is therefore that there is a serious lack of *governance* in the global economy.

Alongside the incipient attempts to construct new supra-national institutional frameworks, there is a parallel process whereby various powers and responsibilities are being transferred towards local and regional bodies; so states are loosing their centralized character and re-organizing themselves on a regional and federal basis[205].

The new world map created by the new geo-economy is a complex construction, peopled by new actors who would have been unthinkable just a few years previously. National states are less important in the new map, whereas local economies and cities are more prominent. The WTO and other supra-national organizations seek to regulate the game

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Canada and Mexico), Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea and Chile. Since 1998 Russia, Peru and Vietnam have also been members.

The Pacific Caucus is a consultative group for Asian members of APEC.

In Oceania, Australia and New Zealand set up ANZCER (Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations) in 1983, reinforcing the preferential trading agreements which already existed between the two countries.

[202] The North America Free trade Agreement (NAFTA) was signed in late 1992 and came into practice on the first of January 1994; it lays the basis for the creation of a free trade area in the USA, Canada and Mexico. The Mercato Comùn del Sur (MERCOSUR) was set up in March 1991 by the Asunciòn Treaty between Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay, who were joined in 1996 by Bolivia and Chile.

[203] The members of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) are Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldive Islands, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.

On the boundaries between Europe and Asia lies the ECO (Economic Cooperation Organization), an organization set up in 1985 by Iran, Pakistan and Turkey, and enlarged in 1992 to include Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan, Tajikstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

In the Persian Gulf the GCC (Gulf Council of Cooperation) was set up in 1981, bringing together Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

[204] On the importance of the cultural factor, see also the section on "Cultural universes and modernity" below and the chapter on the Foundation and Europe.

[205] See Part Five of *Una cronaca culturale. Le attività della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli dal 1976 al 1999*, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli 1999.

so that the fundamental law of permanent competition can play itself out without undue restrictions. Political governance of this new world economy is lacking. Only one supra-national organization, the European Union, is seeking to take an active part in the geo-economy, asserting its right to take active initiatives – for example helping local areas to develop their competitive advantages and thus reinforce their local economies.

However, geo-economics explains only part of the new mental map of the world: we need to add the cultural dimension.

The main areas of economic cooperation in the world

The new mental map needs to take account of another crucial new factor which has emerged with dramatic clarity in recent years – the new prominence of old cultures and religions.

While the new world geo-economics raises problems of maintenance of prosperity and of democracy, the new strategic role played by cultures raises problems of peace and war. Terms such as Islamic fundamentalism, Hindu fundamentalism, Islamic atomic bomb, "religious nuclear war" have entered journalistic language. Understanding what is occurring within cultures – or rather cultural universes – is therefore fundamental and essential, if only to be able to have a point of view from which we can criticize other interpretations[206].

At the same time as the world economy is re-grouping in large regional blocs – each of which are tending to become more homogeneous within their boundaries – the cultural dimension has given new meaning to the world economy's division into cultural universes. It is worth reflecting on the concept of cultural universes if we wish to assess – from another point of view – the import of the major, essential differences which have emerged in the world over the last twenty years. The concept of cultural universes is in fact useful as a tool for measuring the speed of change that we have all lived through (often without being fully aware of it).

When we in the Foundation started to utilize the concept of cultural universes, at the beginning of the 1980s, we did so in large part because we wished to affirm the autonomy of cultural relations: cultural relations had in fact traditionally been considered as a field which was subordinate to political and economic relations (normally thought to be more important because they expressed interests which were more immediately visible and measurable). Nowadays the autonomy of international cultural relations that we identified is evident in all its dynamic force, and there is widespread awareness of the implications – including the pathological implications – of cultural relations. Cultural relations these days are in fact extraordinarily different from what they once were. Nowadays, the existence of dialogue or of conflict between two cultures can certainly affect the solidity of political and economic ties between the areas in question, and in some cases, it may be a crucial feature deciding whether there is peace or war.

Two "big" facts have marked the history of the last fifteen years – and are likely to have important effects throughout our epoch: the definitive defeat of that alternative ideology which was rooted in Marxism (hence in Europe); and the appearance on the world scene of religions and the major cultures. Cultural universes have become political subjects – protagonists of history. In 1989 we pointed out this new state of affairs, and we talked of "encounter/competition between social systems which are very different from each other culturally", and of "encounter between major religious traditions (Islam, Hinduism, etc.) and modernity (science, technology, industry, institutions of the modern state"[207]. Realization of this new state of affairs led us to set up a number of initiatives, which were subsequently incorporated in a full programme specifically on the theme of cultural universes and their encounter with modernity, and the consequences which this encounter might bring for Italy and Europe.

Naturally, if we wish to describe this second aspect of the new world map, we need to keep in mind all the economic processes I mentioned earlier. For all the profound economic changes which are transforming the world's economic geography have their consequences on the cultural dimension of the map.

In economic terms, globalization and increasing interdependence are leading to the spread of new technology, applied to the most various fields of life, and to economic development which is, in turn, spreading industrialization and urban life, so forcing a transition from traditional to modern, technologically advanced economies. These phenomena have repercussions on all aspects of life in society – from social processes to the dynamics of internal politics, from international relations to population movements. The modernization process proceeds at differing rhythms and takes differing forms, but it involves all details of both collective and individual life. We may think of this movement as having two aspects. On the one hand there is the spread of new technology and new industrialization; on the other there is the emergence of comparable problems in various areas of the world due to these processes.

However, even though the problems are in many ways similar, in so far as they spring from the same world processes, this does not mean that they will be tackled and managed in the same fashion. In spite of the fact that economic and technological modernization per se tends to have a homogenizing effect, modernization has certainly not led to the disappearance or the weakening of the cultures present in the various areas of the world. Indeed, it is precisely the encounter with the problems brought out by modernization which has led traditional cultures to become prominent as bearers of possible social and political solutions to the problems created. The rhythm of economic and social change may be rapid (i.e., short or medium term), but the time scale of cultural change is much longer: Yet cultures are deeply rooted in societies, providing them with interpretative codes for the present, and guidelines for the future.

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[206] One of the most well known among existing interpretations is that expressed by Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, New York, Simon and Shuster 1996.

[207] "Perché *XXI Secolo*: raccontare le idee", *XXI Secolo*, 1 (1), I, November 1989.

What little historical evidence we have provides no support whatever for the idea that convergence in the economic and technological field brings a tendency towards cultural convergence (often understood as the spread of a universal culture which is the expression of Western modernity). In numerous areas of the world, cultural movements – often accompanied by political movements – propose tackling the problems posed by modernity via recourse to cultural values which are different from those of the West. In other words, universality is accepted at the level of economic and technological development, but the criteria with which such development, and the problems raised by it, should be managed - the models of what society is in the modern age - are rather drawn from local, non-Western cultural traditions. The process of change inherent in modernity is global, but there is much variety in the tools used for understanding and managing present and future change (that is to say, the cultural values).

In order to obtain a sophisticated understanding of the complex social dynamics of today's world, the concept of cultural universes proved useful and effective; as such, the idea was utilized by the Foundation from the 1980s[208]. The concept has a significance which is both geographic and historical-cultural. We may distinguish various areas of the world - each containing a number of countries - on the basis of a shared cultural tradition which provides a "system of sense". Such a system furnishes people with a basic system of ethics, and a specific conception of Man's place in the world, it shapes fundamental attitudes and values underlying relationships with other people, with the environment, with government institutions, and it outlines the role which government should have.

The term "cultural universe" is a highly complex one, for it contains the great richness and complexity of the term "culture". Thus there are at least two major dimensions to the category of cultural universe: a larger, *longue durée* dimension covering the system of fundamental values of a culture; and a second dimension, more restricted in time and space, which focuses on the specific dynamics of particular societies within a larger cultural area. In other words, the concept of cultural universes covers both the great cultural systems associated with the major religions or religious-philosophical systems – i.e., the basic cultural substratum of a given civilization – and the complex pattern of dynamics and challenges which the various societies in a civilization have had to face in the course of their history – a pattern which therefore depends on historical circumstances, political developments, and contacts with cultural and ideological influences from outside. Cultural universe is thus a category which is not static but dynamic. It recognizes that there are deep cultural structures which define various areas of the world, marking them out from others; but it also recognizes cultural processes and dynamics, and the multiplicity of patterns which exist within each area.

Since cultures change slowly – so slowly that centuries constitute the scale of measurement - they are not able to adjust to the inevitably faster rhythms of economic and social change simply by keeping up the pace; they therefore try to guide, manage and direct such change. A reciprocal process is established, whereby change towards globalization affects culture, but culture reacts, guiding change down different channels.

If, therefore our epoch seems characterized by a tendency towards globalization at the economic level, and towards unitary organizations capable of managing international political relations on the basis primarily of dialogue, we have no shared system of values, no common "universal" culture. Indeed, local cultures are re-emerging in the face of such evident change, putting themselves forward as bearers of a basic "system of sense" which can manage the ethical, social, political and economic problems linked to modernization.

But precisely because cultures are different from each other, and possess a long duration (which is their great strength), the outcomes they produce in the management of essentially similar problems are different in each cultural universe. Sometimes different cultures will come together; at other points, their value systems will contradict each other, and situations of conflict will arrive. We should bear in mind (and devote research resources to investigating) the fact that the encounter with modernity constitutes a radically new historical experience for non-European cultures. Indeed, this is such a new experience that we are forced to ask a question (one which cannot at present be answered in the light of current experience and knowledge): how rapidly do cultural universes encountering modernity for the first time change? Can the encounter with modernity - a "unique" event in the history of a culture - produce a fracture in the *longue duree*? Or rather: if it is the long time scale which continues to regulate the rhythms of culture, can there be accelerations in the process of change?

Today, varying answers to this question seem to suggest themselves, reflecting differences not only between cultures but also within them. The answer which comes to mind if we think of China

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[208] See the chapter entitled "Criteri e contenuti delle relazioni culturali internazionali negli anni ottanta: l'incontro con gli universi culturali" in Part Two of *Una cronaca culturale. Le attività della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli dal 1976 al 1999*, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli 1999.

is certainly different (in terms of awareness and rapidity of change) from that which comes to mind if we think of the Islamic countries. Within the Islamic cultural universe, the response of Malaysia is certainly different from that of Iran. Even within a single country - Egypt for example - several different responses exist side by side (and alongside the response implicit in government policy).

The cultural universes which form much of the basis for the units of the new world map are those areas (which, as I have said, we already indicated in the early 1980s) which saw the emergence of the major civilizations. At the core of each of these civilizations is a religious or philosophical-religious system, which also finds expression in styles of life, art, literature and ideology. Let us consider the major cultural areas of the world - all the while bearing in mind that, within these areas, specific local cultural, political and social dynamics may have led (indeed, generally have led) to somewhat differing cultural outcomes.

First of all, there is obviously the "Western", Euro-American cultural universe (which is itself internally differentiated[209]), and also the European Orthodox Christian cultural universe (which needs investigating *ab initio*, after the fall of Soviet domination[210]. Apart from these we may outline the following areas:

- the Islamic cultural universe, which contains numerous sub-systems: the Arab world, divided into the Maghreb, the Mashreq and the Gulf nations; an area formed of a number of countries of sub-Saharan Africa: the Turkic area, including Turkey and the Muslim republics of the Confederation of Independent States (CIS); the Western Asian area including Pakistan, Afghanistan and Bangladesh; and the South-East Asian area containing Malaysia and Indonesia. Finally, there is Shi'ite, radical Iran, which is difficult to fit in with any of the above experiences.
- the Hindu cultural universe, made up of India, with extensions in Sri Lanka.
- the Buddhist cultural universe, centred on Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Burma and Sri Lanka.
- the Chinese cultural universe taking in China, including Taiwan, Singapore, the Chinese minorities living overseas, Vietnam and Korea.
- the Japanese cultural universe - the sole case in which a cultural universe corresponds with a single country, and above all, the only case outside the Euro-American cultural universe of transition to post-modernity.

Chinese and Japanese cultures might also be brought together in one single unit of Confucianism - and indeed, it would not be a mistake to talk of a coherent Confucian cultural universe.

This allocation of countries into cultural areas has a heuristic purpose. There is a historical basis to the dividing lines I have drawn, but this does not in any way imply that there are not areas where different cultural traditions overlap and mingle. Patterns of this kind may exist where groups belonging to differing cultural and religious traditions live side by side, as, for example, in certain countries in South East Asia. In other cases, different cultural traditions may have fused in a cultural order which is complex and highly integrated - as is the case in Japan, where Confucianism mingles with Buddhism and Shintoism - or in China, where Confucianism is interwoven with Taoism or Buddhism, and above all with folk culture and religion. In addition, recent political and cultural dynamics may add newer influences to the fundamental substratum - as with Marxist ideology in China and Vietnam, or Christianity in Korea. We should ask ourselves, however, what is the nature of these transplants: for the underlying cultural structure inevitably influences the result. This means that we may, for some purposes, view China, Japan and Korea as part of the same cultural area - without claiming any arbitrary homogeneity. Each of these countries has cultural characteristics of

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[209] See the chapters entitled "Criteri e contenuti delle relazioni culturali internazionali negli anni ottanta: l'incontro con gli universi culturali", and "La promozione dell'immagine dell'Italia e i rapporti con gli americani di origine italiana" in Part Two of *Una cronaca culturale. Le attività della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli dal 1976 al 1999*, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli 1999.
[210] See below in Chapter three, the sections entitled "Searching for an idea of Europe" and "The European Union and Greater Europe".

its own - consequences of its recent and not so recent history - which distinguish it from the others. Nonetheless, the presence of Confucianism constitutes a major element of shared culture, which has implications for people's vision of the world, and for the way political, social and economic relations are organized and managed.

Any single cultural universe is thus complex and differentiated - by no means monolithic. Different traditions coexist side by side. Above all, it is the encounter with the processes of modernization which give rise to major diversity - sometimes radical diversity. One example may serve to illustrate the point - that of fundamentalism, which is a source of legitimation for political radicalism not only in Islamic countries but also in India.

Faced with all this multiplex diversity and all these strong cultural identities - all of which are involved in managing the impact of modernity, and thus have important effects on political systems and their equilibria - we need to raise the problem of relations between cultural universes. It is these relations across cultural boundaries which constitute the substance of international cultural relations as I have defined them[211]. Cultural international relations are autonomous from political relations. Whereas the latter are the monopoly of states, the former are today managed by a variety of bodies. In European countries it is mainly organizations of civil society which undertake these relations, and at the Barcelona Conference in 1995 the states of the European Union expressed interest in encouraging this state of affairs.

The encounter between cultural universes takes place in the practice of everyday life. The risk that relations between differing cultural universes may degenerate into conflict is not just a theoretical one, since in some cases it already exists. The alternative to conflict can only be dialogue - which should be adopted both as a means and as a value in itself. Adopting the conceptual framework of cultural universes - and the accompanying method of dialogue in the relations between them - explains the role of cultures in the mental map of the world.

Dialogue between cultural universes

We need, therefore, to organize a framework of cultural relations - alongside the traditional international relations of economics and politics - as we have been arguing since the 1980s. The essence of these cultural relations needs to be dialogue between cultures. It is worth adding a few remarks on this score.

International cultural relations have a minimum objective - encouraging reciprocal knowledge of other cultures - and more ambitious aims, such as the management of cultural tensions in order to avoid conflict, or the search for shared cultural positions which make it possible to undertake common projects. Without claiming any kind of completeness, our experience over the years allows us to suggest a number of basic principles and working guidelines which are useful when trying to launch constructive dialogue between different cultures:

a) first of all, it should be remembered that the parties to dialogue are "cultures". Foundations and other institutions are simply the instruments of, and witnesses to, the process. This may seem obvious, and awareness of this is habitual in the Agnelli Foundation's programmes. Nonetheless, it is indispensable to bear the point in mind if possible results of dialogue are to be assessed correctly.

b) dialogue demands "conviction". It takes great determination and sincerity to listen to the positions of the Other, and at the same time, great consistency and faith in one's own values. It is necessary to conduct dialogue in full awareness of difference, avoiding relativism. Keeping to this

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[211] See the chapter entitled "Criteri e contenuti delle relazioni culturali internazionali negli anni ottanta: l'incontro con gli universi culturali" in Part Two of *Una cronaca culturale. Le attività della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli dal 1976 al 1999*, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli 1999.

straight and narrow path will take considerable cultural commitment over the coming decades. Those who wish to engage in fruitful dialogue need to be aware of their own identity and sure of their own values. At they same time, they need to be able to listen, and to be receptive towards the Other, and need to be able to accept justified criticism. One example of criticism of the West which is sometimes justified is the point made by many in Islamic and Asian societies - that in Western societies too much emphasis is placed on an ethics of rights and not enough on duties - for example, an ethic of responsibility. This criticism is often made even from within Western societies - and although neglect of duties and responsibility is indeed widespread in the Western cultural and political tradition, it is not the only thread in Western society. The importance of notions of duty and responsibility is shown by the large number of charities and the frrequency of voluntary action in all Western countries.

c) the partners in dialogue cannot be specialists of the culture with whom one is conducting dialogue (e.g., orientalists). Dialogue needs to involve cultures as a whole - their religious and philosophical thought, their social and political doctrines, their art and their material culture - so must involve people working in all these realms. The complexity and wealth of culture needs to be seen as a positive asset and a resource. This means, however, that distinctions must be made, since not all "dialogues" are equal. The themes of dialogue can be arranged on a scale of negotiability. It is part of the culture of dialogue to be aware that there is a scale of negotiability, some issues being more fundamental than others. Maximum negotiability applies to material culture, while minimum negotiability exists over rights. For religious belief, negotiability may often even be zero. We need to be aware of this variability in negotiability if we are to have dialogue which is effective, and which sets itself realistic objectives.

d) cultural relations, and thence dialogue too, have their own autonomy, their own time scale, and their techniques. For this reason, they should be considered independent from economic and political relations. Nonetheless, autonomous does not mean unconnected, for fruitful cultural relations can be one of the main bases for stable economic and political relations.

e) dialogue needs to be organized and managed via effective organizational forms. Networks and circles of dialogue need to be built up, and preferably placed on a permanent basis. Dialogue networks can be bilateral or multilateral, depending on the themes discussed and the partners taking part. Dialogue having a territorial basis may be distinguished from that with a thematic basis. The former is limited in terms of geographical area but may cover a large number of themes; the latter may be less focused in geographical terms but is more closely focused in terms of the theme of discussion. In terms of groups with a geographical focus, the Foundation has given priority to the Mediterranean, while with regard to groups with a thematic focus, we have concentrated on human rights.

f) dialogue between cultures has concrete objectives. First of all, it wishes to counter stereotypes and prejudices - knowledge which is false. It needs, therefore, to take account of the complexity and rich variety of cultures. For example, there are a number of stereotypes which have been damaging the West and Europe for centuries: the West is often seen as exclusively a matter of technology and industry, completely lacking in spirituality. This is a stereotype which has pursued us since the times of Matteo Ricci's contact with China in the seventeenth century. It is in Europe's strategic interest to modify this negative stereotype, demonstrating that its society and culture are much more complex: after all, Europe has a very great tradition of spirituality which is still very much alive.

To sum up, cultural relations via dialogue should mediate between cultures, rationalizing and circumscribing cultural diversity, and should seek areas of agreement, and encourage convergence.

The world's cultural universes

140

Euro-American cultural universe | Islamic cultural universe | Hindu cultural universe | Buddhist cultural universe | Sino-Confucian cultural universe | Other areas

Elements underlying the new mental map of the world

Geo-economic and geo-cultural dynamics in the mental map of the world

Geo-economic factors

Permanent competition between territories and between firms

Weakening of political regulation

Processes shifting political and administrative powers away from nation-states

Towards the local and the periphery: decentralization and federalism — Towards supra national bodies

Geo-cultural factors

The great traditional cultures encounter modernity and become major actors on the international scene

Accentuation or emergence of internal differentiation in traditional cultures

Dialogue between cultural universes or conflict between cultural universes

Arenas of cultural dialogue

Material culture (max. negotiability) — Human rights (min. negotiability)

Differentiation within cultural universes: the example of the Islamic cultural universe

Islamic universe

Geographic and Linguistic Differentiation	Religious Differentiation	Schools of Law	Differing reactions to Modernity	
Maghreb	Sunnis	Malechite	*Types of political reaction*	*Cultural differentiation*
Mashreq	Shiites	Hanafite	Innovative reformist (e.g. Tunisia)	Conservative tendencies
sub-Saharan Africa	Ishmaelites	Hanbalite	Fundamentalist-Islamic (e.g. Iran)	Reformist tendencies
Iranian area	Kargites	Shafite	Pragmatic traditionalist (e.g. Saudi Arabia)	Fundamentalist-Islamic tendencies
Turkic area	Halevis	Shiite traditions of law		
Indian sub-continent				
South-East Asia				

Economic regionalism and cultural universes

I have outlined the mental map of the world in the age of globalization, the map which has guided our programmes at the Agnelli Foundation. It is a map which differs profoundly from others which have been suggested recently[212]. I hope that readers may find it a useful basis for reflection. It may be thought of as a combination of the spatial areas mapped out by the regional economic areas and those defined by cultural areas. The two often coincide but by no means always. The whole map is rendered dynamic by a number of permanent tensions and processes. On the political and economic side these processes include a weakening of the power of states in international economic affairs, competition between numerous actors in the ambit of the geo-economy, the political move towards new international institutions which have the double aim of encouraging and regulating international economic relations. On the cultural side, there is a wide range of reactions towards the encounter with modernity, and a variety of relationships to the latter which might be summed up in terms of the two extremes "dialogue/conflict".

It should be stressed that these two extreme poles are sometimes embedded in the complexity of relationships between cultures. The case of Islamic countries' relationship with the West is emblematic here. In reality, there are great differences within Islam, since the political position of the various Muslim states towards Europe and the United States differs greatly; and even within a

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[212] S.Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations*, op.cit.

single state, the position of the Muslim Brothers is liable to be very different from that of the Ba'ath Party.

The two levels of our mental map - geo-economic and cultural - are not totally separate from each other, for belonging to the same cultural universe facilitates the creation of supra-national organizations aiming at cooperation (or integration, as in the case of Europe). Certainly when the objectives go beyond simply creating a common market, cultural conditions seem to exercise considerable influence. This explains why the European Union's policies have been so different towards the Muslim countries of the Mediterranean and towards the countries of central and Eastern Europe, or Cyprus.

Renewal of the Foundation's programmes for the 1990s

On the basis of the conceptual framework I have outlined, the Foundation took a number of decisions between 1989 and 1992 which thoroughly renewed our programmes - albeit maintaining consistency and continuity with our tradition. The strategic decision was to encourage the spread of a culture of "globalization" within Italian society. We considered it an urgent priority to spread knowledge and awareness of globalization and its effects.

The Foundation's efforts in this direction have been far from negligible: we believe we have tackled some crucial elements of the "encounter with globalization". Obviously we have had to neglect some issues as we have had to concentrate on a limited number of questions to avoid being dispersive: but we believe we have dealt with those issues which are of most strategic importance. The programmes of the Foundation (which have taken up nearly all our energies during the last ten years) can be grouped in three areas:

1) Cultural universes and their encounter with modernity. In this area there are programmes on a) immigration and cultural pluralism in Italy and Europe; b) the encounter with modernity in a number of major cultures, in particular Islam; c) active participation in the discussion around the Senator Giovanni Agnelli International Prize for Dialogue between Cultural Universes.

2) The geo-economy and geo-economic culture in Italy. This area contains two programmes: a) geo-economic studies of countries and regions[213]; b) research on factors enhancing competitiveness, and on the culture of local societies. These latter studies aimed to study how adequately local elites and local culture are facing up to the challenges of globalization (in a context where the role of local economies is crucial)[214].

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[213] The programme of geo-economic studies contains a large number of studies. Apart from the works already mentioned, see Franco Zallio, *Rapporto Vicino Oriente. Riforme economiche e cooperazione regionale*, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1998; Franco Zallio, *Rapporto Maghreb. Riforme economiche e competitività*, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1996; Corrado Molteni and Claudio Zucca, *Rapporto Giappone: Quale ruolo nei nuovi equilibri dell'area Asia-Pacifico?*, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1996; Carlo Boffitto, *Rapporto Europa centro-orientale. Competitività e cooperazione economica: l'Unione Europea e i paesi dell'Europa orientale*, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1996; Carlo Filippini, , *Rapporto Indonesia. Un gigante in marcia*, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1996; Maria Weber (ed.), , *Rapporto Cina. Il successo del "socialismo di mercato" e il futuro di Hong Kong*, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1995; Giovanni Campanelli, *Rapporto Vietnam. Quali forze emergenti?*, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1995; Luigi Marcuccio, *Rapporto India. Le riforme economiche e il difficile rapporto tra centro e periferia*, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1995; Roberta Rabellotti, *Rapporto Corea del Sud. Un modello di industrializzazione tardiva*, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1995.

[214] For details of these studies, see the Foundation's catalogue, Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, *Catalogo delle attività 1993-1999*.

3) Encouragement of new organizational structures for Italian society and the Italian state. Three programmes were included here: a) on cities and their role in Italy[215]; b) on civil society and institutions capable of self-government[216]; c) on reform of the state in a federalist direction[217] [218].

[215] See the chapter entitled "Il ruolo della città" in Part Five of *Una cronaca culturale. Le attività della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli dal 1976 al 1999,* Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli 1999.

[216] See the chapter entitled "La società civile e le istituzioni con autogoverno" in Part Five of *Una cronaca culturale. Le attività della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli dal 1976 al 1999*, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli 1999.

[217] See the chapter on "La riforma dello stato e il federalismo" in Part Five of *Una cronaca culturale. Le attività della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli dal 1976 al 1999*, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli 1999.

[218] In this context it is also worth mentioning the Foundation's sponsoring of revived debate in Italy on the tradition of civic humanism and classical republicanism. In 1995 and 1996 a number of seminars and conferences were held, including among their participants Giuseppe Angelini, Giorgio Rumi, Gianni Vattimo and Michael Walzer.

Special mention should be made of the conference on "Political Liberty and Civic Consciousness. Liberalism, Comunitarianism and Republican Tradition", Turin, Agnelli Foundation, 21-22 November 1996. The conference was coordinated by Maurizio Viroli, and included contributions by Keith Baker,Benjamin Barber, Eugenio Biagini, Elena Guarini Fasano, Mirella Larizza, John Pocock, Massimo Salvadori, Jean-Fabien Spitz, Rosario Villari and Blair Worden. See also Gordon S.Wood, Robert A.Ferguson, Meyer Reinhold et al., *La virtù e la libertà. Ideali e civiltà italiana nella formazione degli Stati Uniti*, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1995.

Chapter Two
Cultural Problems of Globalization

Immigration and cultural pluralism in Italy and Europe

This is the oldest programme among those devoted to cultural universes and modernity for the Foundation started to take an interest in contemporary patterns of international migration in 1988. I will give this programme the space it deserves in consideration of its important place in the Foundation's tradition.

In the second half of the 1980s Italy and Italians encountered a phenomenon which was quite new to them and quite unexpected – a flow of immigration from outside Europe, primarily from Asia and Africa. This was unexpected and extraordinary because up until the 1960s Italy had been a country of emigrants, whereas now it became, against its will, a society receiving flows of immigrants. Italians had hitherto considered themselves a nation of emigrants, so to discover that the roles had suddenly been inverted undoubtedly constituted a major surprise. Worse still, this discovery revealed that there was a lack of cultural preparation and a lack of planning, and although this could not be seen as anyone's fault, it soon proved to be extremely serious. Italy had no conception of the nature of the phenomenon, and therefore no idea of what policies to adopt.

The decision to interest ourselves in immigration thus seemed a natural and almost an inevitable one. Italy was facing a real emergency and the need for initiatives to increase understanding of the phenomenon was evident, as was the need to suggest a cultural and political approach on the part of Italian society (whether at the level of government or of ordinary citizens).

At this point we realized the enormous fruitfulness of two conceptual frameworks in use at the Foundation. Firstly, the paradigm of "cultural universes" gave us a key to understanding the complexity and novelty of the phenomenon – above all the great difference between the new migration and previous migratory waves within Europe, and between Europe and the United States. Secondly, the paradigm of demographic transition gave us an indication of the extent of the problem and suggested a principle to which we remained faithful in the years which followed – the principle that a clear distinction should be maintained between problems of immigration and Italy's demographic problems (even though a hasty reading of matters might suggest that the two should be linked, with immigration seen as a solution to the low Italian birth rate). It was in fact clear to us from the beginning that the two problems demanded two separate sets of policies, precisely because their objectives were different. Migration policy - involving complex management of flows of immigration, arrangements for housing immigrants and integrating them into Italian society - is oriented towards meeting the demands of the labour market and those of international solidarity. Demographic policy on the other hand - involving the no less complex problems of equal opportunities policies and policies encouraging more births - aims at safeguarding citizens' rights and equal opportunities, as well as safeguarding national identity and social equilibrium.

Already in those years (1987-88), it was clear how much pressure there was on Italy's frontiers, and how inadequate were traditional responses (whether Marxist or liberal) to the problems of integrating populations coming from another cultural universe, outside Europe.

In my introduction to the conference on "Demographic Transition, International Migration and Cultural Dynamics" in October 1988, I stressed the need to distinguish between migration within one single cultural universe (e.g., Italian immigration towards the United States) and the migration of people between cultural universes (e.g., Africans coming to Europe, but also Chinese moving to Islamic countries, or to South-East Asia). Already at that time, ethnic and cultural conflicts were numerous. So were examples of separate identities persisting over long periods even in the most unlikely places; I cited the German population invited by Empress Catherine to migrate to Russia to the Volga plains in the eighteenth century, and that of the Chinese Baba, who have emigrated to Malaysia over the last few centuries.

145

Russians of German origin still kept their original language, and in 1988 had started to emigrate back to federal Germany. The Baba Chinese, forming a specific part of the complex Chinese *koinè* in South-East Asia, had started to re-learn Chinese. Rather like Americans of Italian origin, who have often identified with the most noble parts of Italian history, whatever region they have happened to come from, the Baba Chinese started to learn Mandarin Chinese, which they had never talked in the past, rather than Cantonese (as would have been more natural). They chose the official language of the new China. This choice was a clear demonstration of the permanence of their cultural roots, but also of the political uses of those roots. As noted, therefore, "the complexity of the processes which lead to national integration are greater than has been foreseen either by scholars belonging to the liberal cultural tradition (who thought the modernization process would necessarily have unifying effects) or by Marx, who thought that class conflict would take over from all other forms of political and cultural conflict. In the same way, the idea that ethnic conflict is an anachronism in modern society has been shown to be rash. The mistake committed by these Western scholars was that they placed too much faith in processes of industrialization, urbanization, and above all education. In many cases, ethnic conflict arises precisely in reaction to contact with these processes. Precisely because these processes are liable to bring about major change, they raise problems and create a need for protection, security and defence of identity[219].

There was therefore a problem: traditional intellectual paradigms were not capable of explaining or interpreting the new facts of the world (which, in reality, were by no means new, given that people have always emigrated). The newness was more marked for us Europeans than it was for some others (Asians, for example). And it came as a surprise especially to those Europeans who had never thought about the matter (for example, the Italians) or those (like the Germans) who had believed they could control flows of migration with cool precision, by calling foreign workers in the precise numbers necessary, and for just that period of time which industry needed (a vision which was so widespread that the normal phrase for immigrant workers was "guest workers").

In 1988 it started to be clear that migration towards Europe did not depend on the needs of the receiving society but solely and exclusively on pressure within the emigrant countries. Immigration had become a phenomenon which was independent from the social and economic conditions of the receiving countries.

Of all European countries, Italy was the most ill-prepared – culturally, politically, economically, legally and socially – to cope with the new emergency. The Foundation sought to encourage awareness of the new phenomenon among Italian intellectuals, policy-makers and the wider public by sponsoring research, conferences and publications, and via contributions to the newspapers and the mass media in general[220].

Right from our first conference on the subject in October 1988 we were concerned to dispel a number of possible misunderstandings which risked obfuscating understanding of the situation; and we wished to dispute misleading interpretations which had surfaced in Italy. First of all, we challenged soothing interpretations which claimed that the coming together of different cultures and ethnic groups in one society would necessarily have beneficial effects, smoothly producing a uniform society. Nowadays in Italy there is more awareness of the difficulties of managing the new phenomenon. However, even now, one aspect of the matter is still often insufficiently grasped. This is: "the strength of ethnic and cultural identity (and culture in this case often means religion), which is, indeed, one of the strongest identities of our times. In the same way, the conflicts which spring from this continue to be neglected, due to a lack of adequate institutional and social frameworks. Yet such conflicts are among the most durable and the least negotiable of all conflicts"[221].

The second misunderstanding regarded the effects which migration could have on development in the South of the world. "Money sent home by migrants does have a positive impact on certain macro-economic variables. Nonetheless, money sent home does not necessarily have a direct impact on development of the area of emigration. We may think of the Italian South, where money sent back home for many years did ensure the survival of a number of communities, but certainly did not alter their economic destiny. Above all, it should be remembered that the number of immigrants likely to be accepted in the whole of Western Europe in the next few years, even according to the most generous estimates … will have decidedly limited effects on the large growth of the labour force which is occurring even just on the southern

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[219] See Marcello Pacini, "Transizione demografica, migrazioni internazionali e dinamiche culturali" in Marcello Pacini, Aristide R.Zollberg, Antonio Golini et al. *Abitare il pianeta. Futuro demografico, migrazioni e tensioni etniche*, vol.I, *Il Mondo Arabo, l'Italia e l'Europa*, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1993, p. 35.

[220] See Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, *1990-93: quattro anni di attività*, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1993, p.21-24.

[221] See Marcello Pacini, "Transizione demografica, migrazioni internazionali e dinamiche culturali" in Marcello Pacini, Aristide R.Zollberg, Antonio Golini et al. *Abitare il pianeta.*op.cit., vol.I, p. 37.

shores of the Mediterranean"[222]. For this reason it was clear that the struggle for development could only be won by acting directly within the emigrant countries themselves[223].

In the years following our 1988 conference, as is well known, the numerous problems connected with mass immigration of people coming from outside the European Union exploded. The question thus became the subject of fierce, and often revealing, political debate. Knowledge of the phenomena at issue has greatly increased – as has awareness of their qualitative complexity and of the extent of immigration. Some aspects of the issue now simply require technical and organizational measures. These demand decisions of policy (including decisions about values), but not the preliminary activity of research and analysis (or only to a lesser degree). As an example of such technical and political issues, measures are needed to control the flow of immigrants into Italy and to increase control at the borders. However, there are other aspects of the question which are more linked to how immigrants can be integrated into Italian society, and these still demand research and increased knowledge. Greater understanding is needed of the cultures of recent immigrants – cultures which are much more complex than widely-held Italian and European stereotypes suggest. For example, it is insufficiently recognized that Islam takes numerous forms; there is a multiplicity of traditions which goes back many centuries, and diversity has been accentuated by differing reactions to modernity. This implies that we need histories, analyses and general interpretative frameworks. Only on this basis can we work out policies which facilitate immigrants' integration into Italian society – policies which avoid conflict, and respect both our traditions and our law and Constitution.

The Foundation gave priority to understanding the European dimension of immigration. So in 1991 and 1992 we devoted considerable attention to immigrants in Europe. We concentrated on Muslim immigrants, not only because of the large numbers of the latter but also because we considered integration of Muslim migrants to raise the most delicate and complex cultural problems. We therefore collected information on housing, labour, education and social policies for immigrants in the main European states, and legal arrangements adopted, and we organized seminars and discussions around these issues, as well as on the organizations set up by Muslims themselves.

The Foundation was able to draw on its experience in Europe to set up a network of ties with other research institutes (especially the University of Lovain) to organize joint discussion or research, drawing on the services of the leading experts and scholars in Europe. I personally believe this has been one of the most successful examples of importing European experience into Italy - an Italy which was totally unequipped to deal with the new situation, yet at the same time hungry for understanding what was happening, and eager to know more about the people who, at the time, were still given the derogatory term *vù cumprà*.

The Foundation also went ahead with its research on the situation in Italy, widening the field to migrants from China. And we moved on to tackling a number of key issues such as: the Muslim family in Europe; young people in school; possible models of integration[224].

As we proceded in our enterprise we realized that it was indispensable to widen the scope of our programmes. In particular we felt the need to further our knowledge of the societies and cultures from which the immigrants came. In addition, it was clear that the presence of immigrants within Europe raised issues of dialogue between cultures which were not different conceptually from dialogue at the national or supra-national level between European societies and the societies of Africa or Asia. What is different is the concrete ways in which this dialogue takes place, the depth of the

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[222] *Ibid.*

[223] *Ibid.* Parliament also discussed the problem at this time, and the Foundation was invited by the Commission for Constitutional Affairs, chaired by Silvano Labriola, to present its conclusions to the Commission's inquiry into the condition of foreigners in Italy. The hearing took place on 21 November 1989. This provided direct evidence of the need to introduce awareness of the issue into Italy's public consciousness, and in particular into the consciousness of the country's ruling elites (especially given the fact that the nature of migratory processes had changed radically even when compared with the recent past). In fact Chairman Labriola stressed that our contribution was "the only hearing of representatives of a foundation or cultural institution". In reality, we were almost alone in Italy at the time in tackling these themes, and it was some time before other institutes turned their attention to these new problems.

[224] On Chinese immigration, see Giovanna Campani, Francesco Carchedi and Alberto Tassinari (eds.), *L'immigrazione silenziosa. Le comunità cinesi in Italia*, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1994. On immigration from Muslim countries, see Albert Bastenier, Felice Dassetto, John Rex, Catherine Wihtol de Wenden et al., *Italia, Europa e nuove immigrazioni*, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1990. The Foundation organized two conferences on Islam in Europe: "L'islam europeo: società e stati" (Turin, Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 4-5 May 1992) and "Famiglie musulmane immigrate fra pratiche e diritto" (Turin, Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 5-6 October 1992). See Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, *1990-1993: quattro anni di attività*, op.cit, p.23-4. See also Felice Dassetto, *L'islam in Europa*, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1994; Jacques Waardenburg, Sami A.Aldeeb Abu-Salieh, Mohammed Sahli et al., *I musulmani nella società europea*, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli 1994.

problems, the delicate and fundamental relationship with the crucial features of European culture. The effects for non-European immigrants of living in a democratic regime may be very different. Above all, the results of dialogue are different because they have direct effects on the way of life of European society. Nonetheless, at least in the early phases, dialogue with European Islam (so dialogue within our own society) has much in common with cultural dialogue between societies and between countries.

We might add considerations which spring from the fact that migration is, we believe, irreversible; non-European migrants will settle permanently in Italy and consequently take Italian citizenship. This outcome of the migration process – extraordinary enough to affect Italian identity – obliges us to be particularly attentive in our search for understanding. All these considerations led us to launch two programmes – "The Contemporary Arab World" and "Islam and Modernity".

As has already been mentioned, although our interests in immigration from outside Europe are wide, we have focused especially closely on Muslim immigrants. Muslims not only constitute the most numerous contingent but also provide (or may provide in the future) the most complex and sensitive problems vis-à-vis their permanent integration into European society.

The main objective we set ourselves (an objective which continues to be high on our list of priorities) is to encourage elites in Italy to become more aware of the issues, and more capable of managing the problems which arise. As part of this we have been concerned to encourage both a general culture, and plans regarding how Italian society and Italian laws should be changed to meet the challenge. These objectives made it necessary to launch two programmes focusing on the contemporary Arab world, and the relationship of Islam to modernity. We believed that focusing in this way was essential to the success of the wider objective.

Our overall objective was to show how complex the contemporary Islamic world was – how many different threads it contains, how many contradictions it contains within itself. Islam is in fact by no means a monolith, it can sometimes be remarkably dynamic and is often shaped by change which springs from the encounter with modernity. As is well known, the change in question is not always positive for Europe and the West. However, the various currents in Islam deserve to be known not just for the sake of international relations policy, but above all (as in the case of Italy) when juridical relationships are at issue. We might imagine a Concordat which regulated the relations between Italian Muslims (who will become numerous as immigrants acquire citizen rights) and the state - something similar to the Lateran Pacts. The contents of an agreement of this kind obviously have consequences for other Italian citizens. The different currents in the Muslim world need therefore to be correctly weighed up if we are to come up with appropriate decisions[225].

We wished, therefore, to produce knowledge of the Islamic world which would be "useful" to politicians, administrators and intellectuals, and to Italian society. This criterion of usefulness was used to select from a large number of subjects which could have been chosen. When the programme on the contemporary Arab world was started in 1991 it was decided to focus on four essential aspects of culture and politics in Arab countries – state-building processes; the social, economic and cultural state of the cities; the cultural conditions and legal status of minorities in Arab countries; conceptions of public order and legality in Arab societies[226].

Among the specific subjects we wished to investigate I may mention the issue of the image which Muslim societies have of Italy, Europe and the West. It is important to know what this image is for a number of reasons. Firstly, it helps us to tackle our relations with Muslim societies, and therefore with immigrants, more clearly. Secondly, it allows us to counteract stereotypes and prejudices.

The programme on the "Contemporary Arab World" did not aim solely at knowledge of other societies and cultures but also at launching dialogue between the civil societies of the various countries, especially in the Middle East. This

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[225] Among the Foundation's other publications, see Andrea Pacini, 'Abd al-Qadir 'Uda, Sayyid Qutb et al., *Dibattito sull'applicazione della* Shari'a, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, "Dossier Mondo Islamico" series, 1, 1995; Roberta Aluffi Beck-Peccoz (ed.), *Le leggi del diritto di famiglia negli stati arabi del Nord-Africa*, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, "Dossier Mondo Islamico" series, 4, 1997.

[226] See, among other works, Mahmoud Abdel-Fadil, Nazih Ayubi, Fathallah Oualalou and Abdelbaki Hermassi, *Stato ed economia nel mondo arabo*, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1993; Joseph Schacht, *An Introduction to Islamic Law*, Oxford, Clarendon Press 1966 (Ital. trans. Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1995); Andrea Pacini, Hasan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb et al. *I Fratelli Musulmani e il dibattito sull'Islam politico,* Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, "Dossier Mondo Islamico" series, 2, 1996; Bichara Khader, Galila El Kadi, Philippe Fargues et al., *Città e società nel mondo arabo contemporaneo. Dinamiche urbane e cambiamento sociale*, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli 1997. Among the more prominent events on the theme in recent years at the Foundation, we should also mention the conferences "Le comunità cristiane nel Medio Oriente arabo: identità, dinamiche e prospettive future" (Turin, Agnelli Foundation, 21-23 October 1996); "Le visioni dell'Occidente nel mondo arabo: flussi culturali e stereotipi" (Turin, Agnelli Foundation, 21-23 October 1996); and "Per una riflessione islamo-cristiana sulla situazione attuale e sull'avvenire dei cristiani in Medio Oriente nelle società arabe" (Turin, Agnelli Foundation, 6-7 May 1997). Our programme has recently been extended to Iran and Shiite culture with the conference on "Religione, società e e stato in Iran e in Italia. Seminario di dialogo islamo-cristiano" (Turin, Agnelli Foundation, 1-2 December 1998), organized together with the Organization for Islamic Culture and Communications, Tehran.

objective of dialogue has been achieved via an innovative, original approach – studies and seminars on the condition of Christian communities in the Middle East[227].

The main reason for starting our strikingly original activity around Christian Arabs was to analyze the relationship between "Islam and social and cultural plurality" in the context of the concrete historical experience of countries where Muslims are the majority. This is a direct, and correct, way to understand what concepts like pluralism, dialogue, living alongside each other, citizenship mean in practice, beyond theoretical ideas. In other words, concrete analysis of the Arab-Christian population is a good starting point to understand how Muslim state and society is developing in the Middle East. It also allows us to achieve a second aim – that of conducting concrete dialogue between European, Christian Arab and Muslim Arab scholars and intellectuals.

For the Foundation, this programme meant taking up a tradition in a radically new cultural context. Using focus on a well-defined cultural minority as our starting point, we aimed to give it wider social and political objectives. These included renewing the relations between different civil societies (in our case, between Arab Christians and European societies). In the past, it is true, such relations flourished – but always as an arm of European foreign policy – something which is no longer acceptable. Our programme of research and discussion had the aim of seeing whether it was feasible to rebuild such relations starting from cultural institutions and civil society rather than from states. The problems which we discussed were certainly central in Arab society:- how to construct a modern state; how to encourage growth of civil society; what the concept of citizenship means in a state which has a Muslim culture; what place minorities have.

The programme held its first public meeting in Turin in May 1995. The Barcelona conference came six months afterwards in November, and at that conference the important proposal was made of a partnership between the civil societies of all the Mediterranean countries. From a number of points of view, our programme can be seen as anticipating the themes of Barcelona, showing that the proposals made were indeed feasible, and indicating the kind of way in which initiatives could be organized.

I have already said that it is characteristic of the Foundation's approach to tackle themes from several points of view – fostering cultural, social, economic and demographic analyses. This was true for our study of the Mediterranean[228], where we undertook a number of pieces of research to understand where the area was going. These studies made it clear that there was a wide variety of strategies being followed as a response to economic globalization, and also revealed some surprising modernity in demographic behaviour and family relations.

This research was highly interesting in that it presented a fresh image of the southern shore of the Mediterranean. The extent of differences between the various countries was stressed, suggesting that policies and relations should be country-specific, rather than directed to the region as a whole. These differences are already very significant, but they are certain to become still more so in the future – at least from a demographic point of view.

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[227] Andrea Pacini (ed.), *Comunità cristiane nell'islam arabo. La sfida del futuro*, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1996.

[228] See Youssef Courbage, *Scenari demografici mediterranei. La fine dell'esplosione*, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1998. A conference on the prospects for the Mediterranean entitled "Il Mediterraneo al plurale. Nuovi scenari per l'area mediterranea" (Turin, Agnelli Foundation) was held in March 1998. Research on the demographic future of the Mediterrnean led to an Internet database "Banca dati sulle popolazioni del Mediterraneo" (http://www.fga.it/).

From a policy-making and policy-planning point of view, our programmes on Arab and Arab-Islamic themes are useful in two areas. Firstly they help us to understand how the permanent settlement of immigrants should be managed, and peaceful and fruitful coexistence in the European Union ensured. Secondly they indicate how friendly, mutually trustful relationships can be established between European and Muslim states, and how partnership between civil societies in the Mediterranean can be made a reality. With regard to the first topic, a general remark is in order. Integration of immigrants is a wide-ranging problem which has implications for a great many aspects of European society. School curricula and programmes need to take account of a school population which is multi-ethnic and multi-religious; the law has to think of consequences for matrimonial legislation and inheritance; the health system may even have to plan for health assistance for ritual practices. What is at issue here is the problem of accepting within Italian and European legislation cultural and legal principles which derive from other societies. Whether to accept such principles totally or partially, or whether to reject them will be one of the most sensitive and strategic problems which will need to be solved in the next few years.

Given this challenge, which contains all the complexity and gravity of the problem, we need to undertake empirical investigation of the various subjects at issue. What is needed above all, however, is a strategy for the possible emergence of a European Islam – that is to say an Islam which is reconciled with the bases of European civilization, and which fully and unreservedly accepts the fundamental human rights and citizenship rights - freedom of conscience, for example, and equality between men and women. The problem of the relationship between Europe and Islam (whether within Europe or in the relationships between societies and national states) will inevitably be played out around these themes. The hard core of the whole problem will be decided by the political, institutional, legal and social outcome of Islam's encounter with modernity.

This problem (which is crucial for the whole world) is usually summed up in terms of the question: is modernity being Islamized or is Islam being modernized? In reality both processes are probably under way – for although they are contradictory, both have historical roots in the rich complexity of Islamic culture. The challenge for Europe lies here. We naturally hope that it is a "modernized Islam" which will win the day. Yet the tools we have at our disposition to encourage this process are few and far between. It would however be a mistake to believe that Europe has no part in this debate going on within Islamic culture. Europe can have a place so long as it takes account of two preconditions.

First of all, it must admit that "modernity" cannot coincide with modernity-as-experienced-by-Europe, or by the West more generally. Other paths to modernity may exist which are consistent with other cultural traditions, and may have results which partially differ from those which emerged in Europe. For example, it can by no means be taken for granted that the secularization which is always associated with modernity should take the form it did in European history. We can well imagine religion playing a more complex and deeper role in societies which are nonetheless "modern". So Europe must learn to look upon diversity – even major diversity – with trust and sympathy. This will be crucial in relations with Muslim states and societies.

At the same time Europe must have confidence in itself, and in the social, political and ethical products of its history; so it must demand that anyone who lives in European territory must accept the basic principles underlying those products. This will help those Muslims who wish to reconcile Islam with history and wish to "modernize Islam" rather than "Islamize modernity" – a task which means thoroughly overhauling the law in Muslim countries with regard to rights of the individual, inheritance rights, relationships between men and women, family life, citizenship, and the relations between the state, civil society and religion.

This task involves a genuine revolution. A number of political and cultural tendencies in Islamic countries as elsewhere are currently working towards a transformation of this kind. However, if Europe loses confidence in itself and gives up the struggle, due to a misplaced (indeed fundamentalist) sense of respect for other cultures, then it will allow into its legislation principles which are contrary to its current spirit. The effect of this would be to collude in undermining the hopes of those Muslims who wish to modernize Islam in their countries (without necessary copying European paths of development).

How to manage the ways in which Muslim immigrants become a permanent part of Europe is an issue which will remain high on the agenda of all European countries for many years to come. Italy is particularly ill-equipped to tackle the problem in a rational and balanced fashion because it has little knowledge of Muslim culture and of Asian and African cultures more in general.

During the concrete experience which the Foundation has had over the last few years, the Muslim intellectuals with whom we have had contact have been unanimous in asking one thing: they have begged that European countries should be, first of all, themselves. So they have wanted Europe to defend respect for rights, and to reject the demands coming from some Muslim quarters to adjust European legislation. This is the testing ground for European civilization: Will it be able to distinguish between the point where respect for others' customs and laws ends, and where sturdy defence of

our own legal principles and system of values and way of life begins. Finding balance on this point is also a precondition if we are to come together to search for basic values safeguarding human dignity shared by all cultures[229].

The European-Mediterranean Partnership and the role of Italian civil society

This search for shared values also needs to be the basis of policies which aim to build relations between European and Muslim states and societies. This, too, is a problem which will be with us throughout the coming decades, and it is far from certain how things will turn out. The only thing we can do is to work towards a future where relations between Christian and Muslim societies are characterized by trust and friendship, and where there is economic and political cooperation between states in the Mediterranean. However, action in this direction needs to make a realistic assessment of the difficulties in the current situation we start from. History and tradition weigh down heavily and profoundly shape current relationships. Stereotypes, prejudice, painful memories of ancient and recent tragic conflicts (from the Crusades to the Gulf War), a sense of impotence vis-à-vis richer societies, mingled with a sense of superiority towards societies which are considered corrupt, immoral and lacking in religious life – all these give rise to a negative image of the West, and to prejudices and stereotypes which we may know are baseless and arbitrary, but which unfortunately are extremely widespread both among elites and the general public.

The Muslim world knows little of the West, and surprisingly (given its historical links) it knows little of Europe. It distinguishes between the United States, Europe and Italy, but one has the impression that this is mainly due to recent demonstrations of military power, and to attitudes taken towards Israel. No doubt an imaginary scale of popularity or *simpatia* would place Italy at the top end, Europe in the middle and America at the bottom. There exists a major, strategic problem of completely renewing the image of Italy, Europe and the West in the Muslim world in general, and in the Arab world in general. This is an objective which is complex and not easy to achieve: it certainly will not be resolved in the short term, but it needs to be tackled urgently.

A tool which is useful for laying new bases for peaceful and fruitful co-existence between Europe and the Arab world (starting with reassessment of images) is the partnership between civil societies in Europe and the Mediterranean. This is one of the most interesting outcomes of the 1995 Barcelona Conference – which extended the idea of "partnership" to civil society. The two traditional pillars of international relations have been political cooperation between states and trade between companies; Barcelona represents an attempt to introduce a third pillar - cooperation between civil societies. At Barcelona, the states of the European Union thus implicitly acknowledged that it was impossible, in the age of globalization, to manage the complexity of relations between societies solely and invariably through the intermediaries of their bureaucracies. For globalization has definitively ended the monopoly of states over the management of international cultural relations, generalizing an approach in which the Foundation was a forerunner in its programmes on America[230].

The road ahead is particularly complex, and we do not know whether it is feasible, given the social situation in the Arab countries in particular. For while all European nations have civil societies which are capable (albeit to a lesser or greater extent) of organizing initiatives for cooperation, this is not true in Arab countries. Here, non-state organizations tend to be weak and government tends to be centralizing and suspicious, and finally there is simply not a tradition of civil society organizations. Being aware of these difficulties obviously does not detract from the worthwhileness of the policy proposed by the European Union.

The Foundation's tradition and experience means that it is particularly sympathetic towards the proposal of a partnership between civil societies, and we have put ourselves forward to organize appropriate forms of cooperation. The first thing to be done, as always, is to discover possible partners, i.e. actors in civil society. In 1998 the Foundation thus started a survey of Italian organizations of civil society operating abroad – charities, universities, religious bodies, NGOs, as well as bodies of provincial and regional government. The aim was to draw up a map of international cooperation fostered by these bodies in the world (even outside the Mediterranean). We will estimate the financial scale of current initiatives, describe the main approaches employed, assess the numbers of organizations working in the various countries and geographical and cultural regions. We will also obviously deal with the problems, difficulties and

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[229] One of the purposes of The Senator Giovanni Agnelli Prize for Dialogue between Cultural Universes is to promote research into the common foundations of all the major cultures.

[230] See the chapters entitled "Criteri e contenuti delle relazioni culturali internazionali negli anni ottanta: l'incontro con gli universi culturali" and "La promozione dell'immagine dell'immagine dell'Italia e i rapporti con gli americani di origine italiana" in Part Two of *Una cronaca culturale. Le attività della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli dal 1976 al 1999*, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli 1999.

cultural needs these organizations and their workers are grappling with. The research will produce a data base which will provide a permanent information service to all those working in the field of partnership.

Since 1996 we have also been gathering information on organizations of civil society in the main Arab countries, with the aim of encouraging concrete cooperation with similar institutions in Italy and Europe.

Focus on Asia

For the reasons stated above, the Foundation took the Mediterranean and Islamic culture as its highest priorities in the 1990s. Nonetheless, we took Asia and its major cultures as an important secondary focus. Asia obviously had a significant place in our programmes on Islamic culture, but the problems the continent is facing, and its various cultures, were a centre of attention in various areas of our work.

First of all, Asian cultures were at the centre of cultural hypotheses and the practice of our prize to encourage dialogue between cultural universes[231]. Secondly, we have undertaken studies of South East Asia (1996) and of two single countries - India (1997) and China (1998)[232].

Obviously, it would be easy to get lost in a continent as immense as Asia. For this reason, the Foundation decided that, rather than organizing entire programmes, it would be more feasible and effective to organize simpler events.

For this reason, we have approached Asia with two approaches. One approach has taken the theme of dialogue between cultural universes, the other has selected particular geographical areas for attention. From an organizational point of view, the two approaches are very different. The Prize for Dialogue between Cultural Universes involves activity which can be complex but is simply a matter of contacts with individual scholars and intellectuals; whereas other activities have often been undertaken in cooperation with institutes in the relevant region or country[233]. Here too, we have tried to practice cultural pluralism. So in the case of our conference on India, for example, we brought together the Centre for Policy Research – headed by Ashis Nandy, who certainly does not belong to the government establishment – and the Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, which is part of the Indian Ministry of Defence.

The Senator Giovanni Agnelli International Prize for Dialogue between Cultural Universes

Our Middle Eastern initiative with Christian Arabs might be taken as a good example of inter-cultural dialogue organized on a geographical basis. As an example of how dialogue may be organized on a thematic basis, in contrast, we might take the way we re-oriented the Senator Giovanni Agnelli Prize, renaming it (from 1997) as a prize for inter-cultural dialogue, and turning it into a prize which encouraged the search for a core of "shared values", present in all cultures. When the Prize for ethics was presented to Norberto Bobbio in 1995 it was announced that the next

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[231] See the section on "The Senator Giovanni Agnelli Prize for Dialogue between Cultural Universes" below.

[232] With regard to South East Asia, the Foundation organized the conference "Le prospettive geoeconomiche e geopolitiche del Sud-est asiatico" (Turin, Agnelli Foundation, 26-27 February 1996). See also: Chia Siow Yue and Marcello Pacini eds., *Asean in the New Asia. Issues and Trends*, Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies and Giovanni Agnelli Foundation, 1997. On India, the Foundation organized the conference "Politica, cultura e dinamiche socio-economiche nell'India contemporanea" (Turin, Agnelli Foundation, 3-5 February 1997), and published the book by Ashis Nandy, Jasjit Singh, Vishvanath A.Pai Panandiker et al., *L'India contemporanea. Dinamiche culturali e politiche, trasformazioni economiche e mutamento sociale,* Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli 1998. On China, we organized the conference "Il mutamento della Cina: dinamiche politiche, sociali, giuridiche e le trasformzioni in corso" (Turin, Agnelli Foundation, 13 May 1998) and published the book by Sergio Cozzi, *Il Tao della Cina oggi. Dinamiche culturali, politiche e istituzionali*, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli 1998.

[233] ISEAS, the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore; the Centre for Policy Research, the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies and the Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, New Delhi.

edition of the prize would be very different, and be directed towards problems deriving from contacts between different cultures. In 1996 we set up arrangements for the awarding of the prize in its new form, enlarging the jury so as to include a variable number of "experts" representing all the major cultures of the world. These experts firstly nominate candidates, and then vote on a final list of names, which have been selected by the Foundation. In 1997 we awarded the prize in its new form to the historian and scholar of the Koran and sources of Islamic thought, Mohamed Talbi. This year, 1999, the prize went to the Algerian-born Jewish intellectual, André Chouraqui, for his cultural and political work encouraging dialogue between Jews, Christians and Muslims.

The Prize focuses on an issue which is central in contemporary cultural debate – the encouraging of "dialogue" as an ethical and political value, and the search for a core of values which are shared by all the major cultures.[234] The need for this emerged at the beginning of the 1990s with the Bangkok Declaration in 1993, where a number of Asian governments disputed the universal validity of the Declaration of Human Rights (which celebrated its 50th anniversary in 1998). The Asian governments in question argued that human rights do not hold in all historical periods and all places, but depend on the level of political and economic development in a particular country and on its cultural traditions. They also maintained that economic development must always precede civil and political rights, for it is only in developed economies that these are truly effective. Finally, they claimed that Asian cultures have a different hierarchy of values to that of Western society, for in Asia the group, authority and duty are fundamental values whereas in the West the value system emphasizes the individual, democracy and rights.

It is worth recalling here that (for quite different reasons from those expounded in the Bangkok Declaration) a number of Muslim countries refused to sign the 1948 Declaration of Human Rights. In that case, the motivation was religious; Saudi Arabia, for example, refused to sign on the grounds that some of the Declaration's principles – especially the articles on freedom of conscience and religious freedom – were contrary to Islam. In the years which followed, debate took place in the Muslim world, and this eventually led to a separate Islamic declaration of human rights, issued in 1981 by the Islamic Council for Europe, with the support of Pakistan, and to the Cairo Declaration on human rights under Islam, approved by the foreign ministers of the Organization of the Islamic Conference in 1990[235].

Controversy over whether human rights are universal is not new, therefore. The West must bear the responsibility for having always ignored the cultural reasons why human rights were not applied in certain states, and for pretending that this was just a temporary, exceptional situation in a context of gradual extension of the United Nations Declaration. The West has also had political motivations (for example its anxiety to maintain its alliance with Saudi Arabia) for keeping quiet on the question. Thus political considerations have triumphed, and the fundamental reasons underlying diversity have been ignored.

Today international power relationships have changed, and realization of the importance of the question, and of its real nature, is being forced on the West. It is now clear that there are actually three separate official positions on an issue which the West once wrongly considered uncontroversial – the existence of a universally valid system of values guaranteeing the dignity of human beings. The New York Declaration has been disputed by governments in Asia and in the Muslim world representing 65 per cent of the world's population. If the world had to vote on the question – these governments seem to be saying – the Western vision of humanity and its fundamental rights would lose the vote! The dangers of a relativism of this kind on the theme of human rights (which constitute key principles of Western society) are enormous. Asian and Muslim

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[234] A more complete account of the thinking lying behind the Prize can be found in Marcello Pacini, "Il dialogo fra gli universi culturali: alla ricerca di un nucleo di valori condivisi" in Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, *Un'urgenza dei tempi moderni: il dialogo fra gli universi culturali,* Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli 1997.
[235] See the volume edited by Andrea Pacini, *L'islam e il dibattito sui diritti dell'uomo*, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli 1998.

governments justify this relativism by appealing to their cultures. However, we know that within these cultures, a number of positions exist, at least in essence.

The issue has to be tackled. But it cannot be states which undertake the task directly for in the circumstances they do not possess the necessary tools. It is mainly, if not entirely, on the shoulders of cultures that responsibility lies, for what is at issue are values, concepts of what human beings are, cultural traditions.

Our concept of cultural universes provide the tools for building a fruitful political and cultural approach – encouraging a dialogue to seek a core of values shared by all cultures. To seek a single culture would be illusory, for such a thing does not exist, but we can seek a core of shared values.

The prize for dialogue between cultural universes has the aim of encouraging this search. The prize does not view human rights as a value system which is alternative to that provided by philosophies, let alone religions. Human rights have no desire to take the place of Christian ideas of charity, Islamic concepts of solidarity, or the Buddhist ethic of compassion. Human rights aim to secure Man's dignity – an idea which has roots and forms of expression in all cultures, philosophies and religions.

Article 1 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are gifted with reason and consience and should act towards each other in a spirit of brotherhood") is, for the West, the outcome of a long historical process. This process has roots in the Old and New Testament, and milestones along the way such as the Magna Carta, the American Constitution, and the 1789 Declaration constitute fundamental points in the forming of our identity. In some other cultures (for example, Chinese culture), it is only recently, as a consequence of the encounter with modernity, that the question of human rights, and of the legal institutions necessary to put them into practice, has emerged. So it should be no surprise that China's reaction to the issue is different from that the West might wish. Nonetheless, it can be argued (and this is the premise on which the Prize rests) that all the great historical cultures and religions contain an implicit or explicit conception of Man which gives a central role to the dignity of the person. What the West can legitimately ask Chinese intellectuals to do is to critically re-read their tradition in the light of modernity, to see how Chinese culture recognizes human dignity today, and how that conception can be linked up to the New York Declaration of Human Rights. In the last few years, a legal system has been set up in China which introduces or reinforces a genuine "rule of law". This shows that real convergence over rights is possible.

Human rights should therefore be considered as minimal principals which do not compete with the more general philosophical frameworks, still less with religions or with the richness of individual cultures. However, precisely because of this minimal nature, any cultural universe can agree with them. It is only if we approach matters in this way that the universality of human rights can be considered not as something which is imposed from outside by Western values but as an independent convergence of all cultures on values which can be shared because they aim at securing the dignity of Man in a context of pluralism. What the Prize aims to do, therefore, is to encourage critical re-readings of cultural traditions from within, so as to encourage convergence and agreement on a core of values. Reinterpreting human rights in the language and value system of the various cultures will make them more understandable, and allow them to be integrated into the various societies from within.

As I have stressed, history has a profound influence on the way any individual culture approaches the question of shared values and of rights. So matters are different in China and in Islam. In Islam the problems spring from the role played by the shari'ah, in China from a long-standing cultural tradition which gives a slight role to law.

The problem of a search for a core of shared values also concerns the Europe and the West. It would be quite wrong for the West to think it was always in the right, and had no need to consider the stances taken by the Other. The criticism of "liberal exclusivism", advanced by certain Asian intellectuals should make us reflect, and lead us to undertake a critical re-reading of all the various cultural traditions which are present in ethical and philosophical debate in the West. Today it is a

duty for Europe and the West to be attentive to criticism coming from Asian and African intellectuals. This is particularly true if these people are of liberal, open-minded inclinations; precisely because they are close to us, they deserve greater attention.

The Prize naturally has preferential criteria for the selection of candidates. The first aim is to give recognition to non-Western thinkers who are committed to finding within their own cultures the conceptual foundations of democracy, rights and fundamental human freedoms. However, the Prize is also concerned to note the work of Western intellectuals who use their knowledge of other cultures to re-read the Western cultural heritage in the new climate of dialogue and comparison with other cultures.

All this is a complex process which is in the process of becoming, and which will produce its fruits mostly in the future; for this reason, the Prize does not aim at identifying thinkers who have achieved any kind of definitive synthesis, but rather those who have made a significant contribution to laying the bases for dialogue and the search for convergence between different cultures around a common core.

Finally, the Prize wishes to give prominence to exemplary intellectuals who have themselves personally engaged in dialogue or who have actively contributed to increasing cultures' mutual understanding of each other.

The Prize has the aim of encouraging not just intellectual activity but also active and concrete dialogue – dialogue which is aware of differences and the specificities of the various cultures, but which is determined to stimulate debate and encourage consensus around a core of strong values, such as freedom of conscience, democracy, and the right of everyone to a life of dignity. It is worth repeating that we at the Foundation are aware that this is a straight and narrow path: for it is necessary to avoid falling into cultural relativism and avoid entrenching oneself in yet another form of acritical Eurocentrism.

Chapter 3
The Foundation and Europe

Which Europe?

Europe is a difficult theme, for it is one which is frequently used in political rhetoric with a vague, evocative sense. In many countries it is used to indicate standards which have to be achieved, changes which have to be made. In Italy, for example, we hear talk of "staying in Europe" or "entering into Europe". Such language forms part of the economic and political rhetoric in most European countries. At times, there is a temptation to take Europe as a geographical given, thus forgetting the more complex reasons, deeply rooted in our history, which give meaning to the term.

The term Europe is no longer a model because the word covers too many things; so evoking it nowadays only produces confusion. Or rather, the senses of the word only become comprehensible if the analytic context in which they are framed is clear.

This has not always been the case. For several decades the term Europe was accompanied by an idea which was certainly symbolic and evocative, but which made it possible to discriminate between countries: the only countries which were considered genuinely European were those of the West. One made a distinction between Western Europe and Eastern Europe, but everyone knew that the only real Europe was the one where freedom and democracy reigned – in other words, the West. The only prominent leader who talked of a Europe stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals was De Gaulle. And it was plain to all that he was using the term instrumentally – inventing a geo-political entity in the attempt to find a political line which was not rigidly pro-Atlantic or pro-American.

In Italy, even more than elsewhere, nearly everyone has been in favour of Europe, and seen the European Community (subsequently the European Union) as the appropriate institutional embodiment of this idea; the issue was not controversial. From the 1980s onwards, this was true for most of the Left just as much as for the Right. The Foundation was part of this general intellectual climate, so it is not surprising that appeals to the concept of Europe formed part of its rhetoric of communication and information.

Today the term has lost all informative meaning, and produces nothing but confusion. We therefore need to do something similar to what we did in the early 1980s for the concepts of Italy and of America – define precisely what we mean by the notion of Europe in our activity as a foundation. Obviously, political parties ought to undertake a similar task of definition, and with equal urgency.

So what has Europe meant for the Foundation? Why have we frequently used the word – for example, in our definition of ourselves as "an Italian and European Foundation" (the definition of ourselves which appears on the heading of our review *Twenty-First Century*).

The need to define exactly which Europe we are referring to became acute after 1989 when, after the collapse of the Soviet empire, peoples and countries which had been part of European history came back into the fold after a gap of several decades. This is not the place to discuss whether or not the history of the Soviet empire was a history which, although "different" and "pathological" nonetheless formed part of European history. The only thing which is necessary for the moment is to remember that the Soviet empire put itself forward as a world empire – an alternative to the West, offering a model which was of interest to the whole world, not just Europe. The Soviet Union

showed notable lack of interest in claiming European identity. It was thus a striking case of a lack of overlap between geography and sense of identity.

This lack of overlap was sufficiently powerful to involve even the Western Communist Parties for several decades. It was therefore necessary to invent the term "Eurocommunism" to indicate a kind of Communism which differed from the Soviet brand.

In reality the problem of how to define Europe, how to pin down the implications of the word in terms of culture and identity, has always been complex and controversial. This has meant that even the geographical boundaries of Europe have been disputed, along with the cultural, religious, social and economic traditions. The prevalent tendency has been to limit Europe's cultural identity to that coming from the Germanic and Latin traditions, that is to say those of the Catholic and Protestant countries[236].

When Braudel was asked to write a history of the civilizations for young readers[237], he talked of Russia as "the other Europe" and he stressed major differences and specificities – starting with the specificity of the Orthodox religious tradition. The Hungarian historian, Jenó Szücs, has argued that three Europes exist (Western, Central and Eastern)[238], and claims that differing economic, social and governmental or institutional histories have unfolded in each. In his view, the relationship between state and society, the degree of pluralism, the role of the urban bourgeoisie, the powers of citizenries, and the development of individual liberties have all been very different in the three areas.

These examples demonstrate how difficult it is to define what Europe consists of as a cultural identity. They also show the seriousness of the problem, which has, moreover, taken on strategic political significance since 1989. There is a precise calendar for extending NATO eastwards and for including various countries of Eastern and Central Europe in the European Union. Extending NATO does not pose particular problems of cultural identity. Military alliances (and NATO is no exception) are usually founded on a convergence of interests, which may well be acompanied by cultural differences, as the case of Turkey shows. The problem of coopting countries and societies within the European Union is very different and much trickier, especially at a time when political union is being launched. Political union will take place only if there is cultural identity – only if, as has been said, there is a soul.

The question of European cultural identity cannot be ignored, therefore. And it is a subject which does not just concern those countries which are candidates for EU membership but most of all the countries of Western Europe - those societies which never experienced the disastrous experience of real socialism. The countries and societies of Europe have a genuine common interest in investigating and debating the theme of Europe's cultural identity or identities. For future arrangements of government, law and administration will have to respect and safeguard that identity. Europe's cultural identities need to become the foundation of legal and political arrangements – a strong anchorage, not a weakness.

Given all these various claims regarding who belongs to Europe, who expects to belong, who would like to belong, etc., simple generic mention of Europe – seen as a the synonym of modernity and progress – is no longer sufficient. We need to make explicit which Europe we are talking about.

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[236] See Ruggiero Romano, *Europa e altri saggi di storia*, Rome, Donzelli 1996; Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, Italian transl. *Storia dell'Europa. Popoli e paesi*, Milan, Bompiani 1990; Remi Brague, *Europe, la voie romaine*, Paris, Criterion 1992; Hans Georg Gadamer et al., *L'identità culturale europea tra tra germanesimo e latinità*, proceedings of the conference held at Bergamo 17-19 April 1988, edited by Alberto Krali, Milan, Jaca Book 1998.

[237] Fernand Braudel, *Grammaire des civilisations*, Paris, Arthaud-Flammarion 1987.

[238] Jenó Szücs, *Les trois Europes*, Paris, L'Harmattan 1985.

The use of the term 'Europe' in the Foundation's history

Over the last twenty years the Foundation has acted with a definite idea of Europe, which is worth making explicit in order to avoid possible misunderstanding, and to explain the reasons behind decisions we have made in the past and those we are making for the future.

We have worked with one single idea of Europe. However, it is useful to distinguish analytically between Europe as a model of best practice embodied in the leading European nations, Europe as a cultural universe, and Europe as a political project (with its values, its mission and its roles).

Europe as a model of best practice

As far back as the 1970s the Foundation realized that it was virtually impossible to conduct research if we isolated Italy and ignored the European dimension of the problems facing us. We also realized that it could be fruitful to compare the solutions which other European countries had already produced to the problems which Italy was currently facing, perhaps for the first time.

A constant concern in our work was to understand whether Italy was an anomaly or whether it was comparable to other European states. In other words we tried to see whether we were going in the same direction as the rest of Europe, or in a different direction, or staying in some backwater. The 1970s and '80s were years in which there was much talk of reform; some of these reforms were carried out, but often in the wrong kind of way. So trying to see where Italy was going had clear practical implications. From 1979 on we undertook research on education which examined and compared the way schooling was organized in Italy, Sweden, Belgium, Holland, France and Great Britain[239]. This showed that there did exist an "average" approach in European culture towards schooling, at least in terms of broad outlines. However, Italy did not fit into this average pattern. It was an anomaly in the European context because the underlying culture which had guided its educational arrangements were different – indeed substantially different – from those of the other countries covered by the research.

It has been frequent for the Foundation to take Europe as a source of inspiration for Italy, and we still remain loyal to this approach. So recent programmes such as that on on the "network capital" and our proposals for federalism have drawn on our long-standing links with the leading countries of Europe. In this sense, the term "Europe" alludes to the experience of the larger countries which are Italy's partners in the European Union.

We have no sense of inferiority, nor any desire to conform to general European patterns at any cost. nonetheless, we do think that it is normally a good idea to stress all the points where Italy deviates from European practice. We have adopted this approach numerous times, so that it has become a normal technique in the way we tackle Italy's problems. The fact that Italy is different is not necessarily a bad thing, but there is a high likelihood that it is; and in any case, the existence of a large number of anomalies in Italy tends to marginalize Italy from the European mainstream.

To make "Europe" equivalent to the countries of the EU would seem arbitrary if it was not the result of a cultural idea – a conception which does not reduce Europe to a mere geographical expression but makes a selection from within the range of options available in the region's history. While we were working out the idea of cultural universes, and outlining the notion of America which lay at the basis of our programmes of cultural relations[240], we became acutely aware of the

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[239] The research "Verso una scuola deburocratizzata: prospettive di sviluppo della scuola italiana nel contesto dei sistemi europei" was undertaken between 1977 and 1981. Lanfranco Senn and Luisa Ribolzi among others were involved in this research.

[240] See the chapters entitled "Criteri e contenuti delle relazioni culturali internazionali negli anni ottanta: l'incontro con gli universi culturali" and "La promozione dell'immagine dell'immagine dell'Italia e i rapporti con gli americani di origine italiana" in Part Two of *Una cronaca culturale. Le attività della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli dal 1976 al 1999*, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli 1999.

complexity and tortuousness of Europe's history, made up as it is of freedom and tyranny, of generous utopias and cynical realism, and aware also of how all this complexity became transferred to the new World and helped to shape it. When things are so complex, it is necessary (and possible, fortunately) to cut some things out and pick out a thread running through the ideas and values European culture has produced.

Europe as a cultural universe

In the mid-1980s we decided to set up a number of pieces of research on the societies of certain European countries. The idea was to analyze "convergences and divergences" in the various nations to seek to understand Europe from within, seeing what the basis was for the political projects to construct Europe. This research was of course comparative, but we did not wish to limit ourselves to mere comparison, for we wished to probe in depth, to grasp the difficulties which political plans for a united Europe would encounter. This approach was similar to that which we had previously adopted in 1978-79 when we undertook studies of the models of society and the political programmes of the political parties in France, Britain, Germany and, of course, Italy[241]. We worked on two levels – that of change in structure, and that of patterns of culture.

With regard to changing structural factors, our greatest efforts were made in the field of demography, which was a major element in our "Futurama" programme of studies predicting future social patterns[242]. The second research focus was Europe's metropolitan systems. Although this was closely linked to our research on Italian cities, it had an independent "European" dimension[243].

Our efforts on cultural themes were more rich and varied. Religious habits, and the role played by organized religious bodies, were investigated in France, Great Britain, Germany, Spain, Hungary, and, of course, Italy[244]. With the same kind of approach we conducted research on television, and cultural attitudes towards television in European countries[245]. We could not miss the chance of investigating Europe's image, so we financed research on the image of Europe in school textbooks

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[241] The research "Forze politiche europee e progetti di società" was carried out between 1978 and 1980 by Michel Crozier, Kurt Sontheimer, Richard Rose, Paolo Farneti and Gabriele De Rosa.

[242] See Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, *1976-1986: dieci anni di attività*, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli 1986, p.168-9. For our demographic predictions, see (for France) Georges Tapinos ed., *La France dans deux générations. Population et société dans le premier tiers du XXIe siècle,* Paris, Fayard 1992; for Greece, see Georges Tapinos and George Contogeorgis eds., *I elleniki kinonía sto télos tou XXI eóna*, Athens, Ekdhò'sis Papazese 1995.

[243] The Agnelli Foundation conducted a specific study of Central European cities, coordinated by Sergio Conti, and organized the conference "Città capitali dell'Europa centrale: politiche e strategie urbane nel nuovo spazio europeo" (Turin, Agnelli Foundation, 14 September 1994). Among others, the following members of the Hungarian, Polish and Czechoslovak Academies of Science took part: Györgyi Barta, Piotr Korcelli and Jiri Musil.

[244] See Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, *1990-1993: quattro anni di attività*, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli 1993, p.27-30. See also Danièle Hervieu-Léger, Franco Garelli, Salvador Giner and Sebastian Sarasa, *La religione degli europei. Fede, cultura religiosa e modernità in Francia, Italia, Spagna, Gran Bretagna, Germania e Ungheria*, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli 1992; Ole Riis, Marek Tarnowski, Alexander Tsipko et al., *La religione degli europei, II. Un dibattito su religione e modernità nell'Europa di fine secolo*, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli 1993.

[245] See Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, *1976-1986: dieci anni di attività*, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli 1986, p.147. See also François Garçon, Carl-Diether Rath, Howard Davis, Gianfranco Bettetini, Aldo Grasso eds., *Le televisioni in Europa*, vol.I, *Storia e prospettive della televisione nella Repubblica federale tedesca, in Gran Bretagna, Francia e Italia,* vol.II, *I programmi di quarant'anni di di televisione nella Repubblica federale tedesca, in Gran Bretagna, Francia e Italia,* Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli 1990.

in Germany, France, Spain, Britain and Italy[246], and shortly afterwards a study of the image of Italy in the cinema[247].

Europe as a political project

The Foundation has always sided unequivocally with those who have consistently pursued the aim of a united Europe. However, we have always been conscious that European unity is not something which exists pre-packaged: it is an objective which needs to be earned, and pursued with rationality and in full awareness of the importance and difficulties of the undertaking. We have also always been aware that it is possible to build many different kinds of Europe. So European unity needs to be evaluated not just in itself, for the sake of unity, but also with regard to its contents.

This means that we think of Europe not in the abstract but from two points of view. Firstly, we are attentive to individual problems – the major problems of our times; secondly, we have tried to define what European identity means, outlining a hypothesis of what can be identified in a thousand and more years of history. The Foundation has also sought to incorporate a European dimension as part of its usual methods and approaches. We have not looked for a European dimension to problems when it would have been artificial to do so; but in our analysis of the problems facing national societies, our demographic analyses, our studies of technology, of religion, of migration, our work on relations with developing countries and with South-East Asia we have introduced such a dimension. We have never invented a European angle when this did not exist, and we have never been merely "pro-European" at all costs. We have maintained firm roots in the Italian situation, while at the same time being aware that it is necessary to have European perspectives and objectives.

The second point which should be noted is that the Foundation has always tried to avoid a purely economic approach. We recognize the justice of the criticism that excessive weight is often given to strictly economic considerations. This does not mean, of course, underestimating economic themes; it simply means giving other themes their due importance and locating economic considerations in their rightful place.

We have always been aware that what Europe lacks (perhaps it would be better to say "lacked", for the process set in motion by the introduction of the Euro seems irreversible: if governments are not to be governed by the currency they will be obliged to place it under control, which implies setting up organizational umbrellas with wider powers and political functions) is an explicit big idea which allows it to overcome the regrettably proverbial national selfishnesses, making it possible to play a truly federative role. It has been well known for some time that a march towards unity which is based solely on questions of economic well-being, levels of consumption and production targets is not enough. Even the fear of the Soviet threat was not enough to persuade Europeans to move on from economic to political cooperation; it is well known that advocates of European unification suffered a severe defeat in their plans to set up a European Defence Community (1952-54).

So we have been conscious that Europe lacked a strong idea which would facilitate progress towards a federation; but we have also always been convinced that in Europe there is a deficit of knowledge and self-awareness of the historical existence of a European identity. The low level of

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[246] Falk Pingel, Rolf Westheider, Wolfgang Sander et al., *L'immagine dell'Europa nei manuali scolastici di Germania, Francia, Spagna, Gran Bretagna e Italia*, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli 1994. This book contains essays by Falk Pingel, Rolf Westheider, Wolfgang Sander, Günter Kirchberg, Michael Jeismann, Evelyne Brandts, Rafael Valls, Stefan Spanik, Eva Kolinsky, Luigi Cajani and Jean-Michel Leclerq.

[247] Gian Piero Brunetta ed., *L'immagine dell'Italia nel cinema italiano ed europeo dal 1945 al miracolo economico*, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli 1995. This contains essays by Gian Piero Brunetta, Barbara Corsi, David W.Ellwood, Pierre Sorlin, Christopher Wagstaff, Maria Adelaide Frabotta, Roberto Campari, Mirco Melanco, Sergio Raffaelli, Valentina Ruffin, Giovanna Grignaffini, Bruno P.F.Wanrooij, Antonio Costa and Leonardo Quaresima.

awareness Europeans have of their common identity is one of the main problems which needs to be tackled in the next few years if we wish to continue to pursue the aim of political unity (albeit as an uphill struggle against increasing difficulties).

This is a problem of extraordinary complexity, which deserves to have a central place in intellectual debate, and ought to become the focus of sustained efforts to educate public opinion in the various European countries. The complexity of the issue also means that major research efforts need to be devoted to understanding the problem further. Nonetheless, a number of assertions can be made, and offered for reflection, even given the present limited state of our knowledge.

Searching for an idea of Europe

The Foundation has already contributed to research on the idea of Europe through the study of images of Europe in school textbooks which I mentioned above. This study brought out the profound difficulty which was experienced in describing Europe's history: "a cultural unease which does not seem to merely a problem of nationalism, or of a desire to claim national "firsts" in this or that aspect of the continent's history, or ownership over this or that element in its cultural heritage. It is above all a problem of the complexity of the entity whose story one has to narrate. No doubt matters are made worse by profound differences in the way writing history is approached in different countries, and by the fact that (here as in other fields, regrettably) people are not used to seeing things in a European perspective.

The complexity of European history, and therefore of European identity, is manifest in space and time. Over the centuries, Europe has meant democracy, but also totalitarianism; it has been social innovation but also conservation, international solidarity but also imperialism. The Renaissance, the Enlightenment and the French Revolution, industrialization – all testify to the great variety of events and cultures which have marked Europe.

Unlike other major geo-political areas and civilizations, Europe has often liked to portray its history in terms of discontinuities. Each of the great transformations has wished not only to be the successor of the previous period, but to put it in the shade, portraying it as a dark age. Thus the Renaissance obscured the Middle Ages – wrongly portrayed for a long time as "The Dark Ages", even though it was precisely in this period that the particular clarity in the relationship between Church and state emerged – a feature which marks Europe off from all other civilizations. The Enlightenment and the French Revolution subsequently cast the so-called "ancien régime" as a similarly benighted period. Yet the term ancien régime lumps together two centuries of highly varied experience – centuries where, as Pierre Chaunu has said, there was a "unity" which was the fruit of solidarities in aesthetics, philosophy and politics. The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were the age of Voltaire's European "republic of letters", and of the "concert of states" which inspired Abbé Saint Pierre's utopian vision of a European confederation. A further complication when we wish to narrate Europe's history comes from the fact that each country has made different contributions. This means that there is often a temptation to give greatest weight to those periods where one's own national culture was most prominent"[248]. "School textbooks in the different countries cover different periods with varying degrees of thoroughness (…) the national perspective and the European perspective overlap above all in those periods when one's own nation made a significant contribution to European culture. The Renaissance belongs to Italy, of course (…) France takes the stage with absolutism, the Enlightenment and the Revolution, Britain with

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[248] Marcello Pacini, "Prefazione" in Falk Pingel, Rolf Westheider, Wolfgang Sander et al., *L'immagine dell'Europa nei manuali scolastici di Germania, Francia, Spagna, Gran Bretagna e Italia*, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli 1994, p.xi-xii.

democracy and the industrial revolution, while Germany appears above all in the context of European power politics"[249].

As I have said, the Foundation has made Europe part of its activity throughout its existence, but it is only in the last few years, with the changed political and cultural climate, that the pressing need to define what one means when one uses the term has emerged so strikingly. The need to think things through has emerged after years of experience, particularly in our work on cultural universes. This work naturally led us to place ourselves in a world perspective – asking ourselves what were the real differences between our own civilization and others. Understanding our own specificity, and above all the differences from Asian civilization, helps also to understand the affinities, the ways different civilizations have influenced each other, the cultural loans which have been made.

Comparing Europe with other civilizations brings out a number of differences which set the tone, and which seem to be genuinely fundamental to European civilization. It is a useful exercise to try to understand also the differences between the different European traditions, in particular the Orthodox, Catholic and Protestant traditions in all their complexity. We are led to realize, for example, that Catholic and Orthodox theology are much closer to each other than either is to Protestant theology. Yet the political and civil histories of the Catholic and Protestant societies are much more closely intertwined – and therefore similar – than to the history of societies with an Orthodox tradition.

Only history in a long perspective can provide us with a reliable guide to how to define an idea of Europe. European culture as we know it and as we feel it almost instinctively, unthinkingly is a tradition in which we are immersed; it gives a meaning to our identity because it is an "anthropology" in the sense of a concept of Man. It gives us a complete vision of the world, and rules to guide us in our everyday life and in our plans. European culture has been built up over at least three thousand years of history, step by step, in a historical process in which certain crucial founding moments, and certain decisive conquests stick out.

We may say that a fundamental characteristic of European culture is precisely its dynamic character, which appreciates newness and innovation and knows how to produce them. The dynamic character of European culture is not natural and should not be taken for granted: other civilizations posses this trait to a much smaller degree. Some in fact do not possess it at all: innovation has come to characterize Chinese civilization, for example, only very recently, and it is still not clear how much space it will be allowed within the Chinese value system and its overall social and political arrangements.

It is no accident that China should come to mind in this context. From numerous points of view Chinese civilization is "radically Other" (the "most Other" of the various "Others") with respect to European civilization. Apart from the large differences in values, beliefs and approaches which exist between the two civilizations, it is also well known that China has always had only sporadic contacts with the West. This makes it even further removed from Europe on the scale of diversity than is Islam (often seen as "the Other" par excellence, the paradigm of "difference").

An "Other" which is so radically different to ourselves may help us to reflect on our lowest common denominator as Europeans, on what it is which allows us to feel European even though we belong to different nations, religions and local cultures.

[249] Falk Pingel, "L'Europa nei manuali scolastici: una visione d'insieme" in Falk Pingel, Rolf Westheider, Wolfgang Sander et al., op cit., p.13.

The common denominator of European identity

It is advisable now to narrow our focus to a number of fundamental stages in the process which has produced European culture, concentrating on a few crucial goals, which have been crucial in shaping the society we live in, and which form the basis for a modern identity adapted to the future of Europe. These stages and achievements in the process whereby Europe was founded may be summed up as follows:

1) the emergence of the individual and of the individual's political liberty;
2) the emergence of personal conscience, and the corollary of separate spheres of state and religion, each leaving the other autonomous;
3) elevation of science, technology and practical activity to a place in the value system which is of equal dignity and prestige to that possessed by humanist literary culture;
4) the gradual emergence of women from the shadow of a patriarchal society and the consequent progress towards equal rights with men in all respects.

These are the main stages which have marked the forming of Europeans' culture, the hard core of their civilization. These are Europe's greatest cultural inventions. They are distinctive traits which Europeans do not share with others, and which today they are obliged to offer to the world, in spite of the difficulties and problems of legitimation which that involves.

The specificity of Europe's history may emerge more clearly if we take a very rapid glance at other civilizations. Let us start with the notions of the individual, liberty and personal rights, and also the related notion of democracy. In an essay published in *Heritage of China*, entitled "Early Civilization in China: Reflections on How It Became Chinese"[250], David Keightley draws a contrast with early Greek society, in the belief that it was classical Greek culture which gave the greatest contribution to our Western conception of the human condition.

Homer's heroes fight, love their wives and children, honour friendship; they have courage and feel fear, they laugh and cry. They are heroes but they are also men, each with his own private life made up above all of feelings, and his own public life, with its duties to fulfill but also its rights, which he must ensure are respected. Achilles has the right to show that he is offended and to withdraw into his tent. Greek heroes contribute to the common victory, but they are free – in fact they have an acute sense of their freedom and their aloneness. Out of this anthropology of heroes was born the democracy of men, the the freedom of the individual, a political life which was conflictual but set in a framework of rules in the *polis*.

None of this was present in early Chinese civilization. Early China did not experience conflict or pluralism. Right from the beginning, it was based on the group not on the individual, and was organized around an ethic of duties towards the group and towards the sovereign rather than an ethic of rights.

The consequences of basic assumptions which are so different have naturally been decisive. Jack Dull, another contributor to *Heritage of China* begins his essay on successive forms of government in China by saying that from time to time we Westerners would do well to remind themselves that "democracy is not the natural political condition of humankind". He points out that "if popular participation is the measure of the desirable government, then Chinese governments are not likely to fare very well"[251].

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[250] David N.Keightley, "Early Civilization in China: Reflections on How It Became Chinese", in Paul S.Ropp ed., *Heritage of China. Contemporary Perspectives on Chinese Civilization*, Berkeley, Ca., University of California Press 1990. The Italian translation *L'eredità della Cina* is published in Turin by Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli 1994.
[251] Jack L.Dull, "The Evolution of Government in China" in Paul S.Ropp, ed., *Heritage of China*, op.cit. Citation from p.69 of the Italian translation.

In a purely European, Eurocentric perspective, Dull's remark would have decidedly negative connotations; but in the context of globalization and dialogue between cultures, it takes on a different sense. This is made explicit by Keightley, when he wonders what would happen if a Chinese historian analyzed the founding, pre-Christian moment of European culture and civilization. He would certainly note certain gaps: "the most notable of these would surely include the emphasis that many early Chinese thinkers placed on altruism, benevolence, social harmony, and a concern with human relations rather than abstract principles"[252].

Still on the subject of freedom and personal rights, it is worth recalling that, especially over the last hundred years, Europe has developed a new conception of the extent and nature of personal rights. Some personal rights have been re-defined in order to keep in tune with social and historical evolution, others have been worked out *ex novo*. To take just one example, child labour has become ethically completely unacceptable to the modern European conscience, and a series of measures have been developed to protect minors in this respect. This may now be considered a development which cannot be turned back. Proof of this lies in the fact that measures against child labour tend now to be seen as part of fundamental human rights, rather than as part of social citizenship (where the boundaries are admitted to be more liable to change in accordance with changing historical and political conditions and the various national situations).

I have chosen the example of child labour because this is currently an important point where Euro-American culture diverges from the "Asian model". In China, India and throughout South-East Asia exploitation of child labour is undeniable. When they have been accused by the West of violating rights of the person, Asian governments have responded by theorizing their right to economic development, even when this contravenes civil and political rights as the latter are understood in the West. For, they have argued, such rights are of little significance unless there is economic prosperity. As can be seen, we are dealing here with a difference which does not derive primarily from the economic system but rather from the value system.

Today's Europeans take it for granted that people have a conscience, and that the freedom of that conscience is safeguarded by law. It is worth noting that although certain major pre-Christian thinkers (such as Socrates or Seneca) were important pre-cursors, it was only with Christianity "that the autonomy of the conscience was asserted loudly and frequently"[253]. So it was in the profoundly new social and cultural context of Christianity that "the founding of freedom of conscience linked up with recognition of the single individual, i.e., the recognition that in Man there is a part which should be immune to human interference – even by the *res publica*"[254].

To this fundamental trait of freedom of conscience was added another achievement which built on it. This was the Copernican revolution of distinguishing between the sphere of civil society and the state on the one hand and the sphere of religion on the other. This distinction had two senses, since it meant both autonomy of state from the Church and independence of the Church from the state. The major historical crossroads at which this separation emerged is located in the third and fourth centuries. In the Roman Empire the path taken by Western Europe diverged from that taken by Eastern Europe, where Byzantium preferred "symphony" between the two powers.

Another major step which came later was the incorporation of technical and scientific knowledge into the European value system. Scholars have argued one of the most important cultural reasons for the collapse of the ancient world was the failure to give cultural dignity to scientific and technical research[255]. This was a characteristic which the classical world of the Greeks and Romans shared with other great civilizations – especially that of China. In China too, the low value given to knowledge applied to nature prevented the growth of science.

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[252] David N.Keightley, "Early Civilization in China", op.cit. (p.68 in the Italian translation).

[253] Paolo Siniscalco, *Il cammino di Cristo nell'Impero romano*, Bari, Laterza 1987, p.71-2.

[254] Ibid., p.72.

[255] Aldo Schiavone, *La storia spezzata. Roma antica e Occidente moderno*, Bari, Laterza 1996.

The scientific and technological revolution – our own times, in other words – is the outcome of hard-won achievements over the centuries, conquests which started in the late Middle Ages. This example is worth citing because it exemplifies the dynamic character of European culture and its capacity to build the new. I might add one more European invention – equality of the sexes. The progress of women's emancipation is a theme which still stirs political and cultural controversy in Europe. The women's movement continues to attack the discrimination against women (at work or in society generally) which still exists in this or that country. This is as it should be. Nonetheless, a detached view – above all, a "global" view – will immediately show that there is an abyss between the condition of women in Europe and the West today, and in a number of other civilizations. This is true not only for backward countries but also for many which have achieved levels of prosperity which are quite comparable to our own. It is clear, in other words, that the situation of women does not depend solely on economic development but also on cultural traditions of particular civilizations stretching back thousands of years. In Europe the emancipation of women has deep historical roots - beginning in the thirteenth century with "courtly" poetry - and it is in this context that we should see the whole complex of laws and provisions protecting women and conferring them with rights.

However brief and incomplete these comments have been, they have brought out clearly enough one basic element of European culture – its dynamic nature. Liberalism and democracy are thus the result of a long historical process. The conquest of liberty of the person is the logical antecedent of that particular legal, governmental and administrative set of arrangements which we call social and political pluralism. Even in Voltaire's times it was clear that there was a major difference between European states – which had imposed upon themselves the rule of public and international law – and the despotic Asian empires. This was a distinction which had even been noted by Heredotus in his account of the Persian wars.

The anthropocentric conception of the world which emerged, or was revived, in Italian and European humanism also contained, however, the idea that powers needed to be limited – the idea that safeguards should be given to the person, the collectivity. Thus emerged the idea of making individual freedom as the foundation of society and the state. This distinction lies at the heart of European identity. The pluralism which Tocqueville observed in nineteenth century America would not have been possible without the primary distinction between state and religion. The highly secular principles of 1789 come out of Jesus' teachings, which Matthew faithfully recorded in chapter 22 of his Gospel ("Give to Caesar what is Caesar's, and to God what is God's"). These teachings lie at the basis of the Constitutions of numerous republics and have attained secular form in the United Nations 1948 Declaration.

The dynamic character of European society and its capacity to innovate

It needs to be stressed, finally, that a characteristic of European civilization, and hence a trait of European identity, is that it has set up a social and economic system which is particularly able to produce social innovation, and capable of constantly adjusting to change and reforming its institutions. Europe has shown itself capable of revolutionary transformation, too, though always in the context of a historical framework which maintains great continuity in the long term.

It is no accident that science, technology and industry emerged in Europe, nor that it is the birthplace of that social system which, for convenience, we call capitalism (though there have been many capitalisms in history). Europe gave birth to capitalism, but when social relations produced by certain kinds of capitalism started to throw society into a barbaric state of war, it showed itself capable of reacting.

Another trait worth mentioning in our list of significant, distinctive aspects of European identity is the capacity to plan institutional arrangements of government, law and administration. Let us summarize briefly: feudalism ended, the early modern state was formed – first as an absolutist monarchy, later in more constitutional forms - finally there was the advent of democracy. In other

words Europeans have been capable of building sets of arrangements suitable for pursuing the political and economic objectives posed by the various historical epochs.

This capacity to construct such different sets of arrangements relating authority to the citizen is not a characteristic which is frequently found in other civilizations. These have produced marvellous forms of artistic expression of great importance, but they have maintained political and legal forms which have been very stable over the centuries. They have, indeed, often maintained "fossilized" forms of state and legal and political arrangements.

We may conclude, therefore, that the core of European identity consists of a value system based on a series of distinctions. The first of these is the fundamental distinction between religion and politics, followed by those relating to economics and science. All this necessarily implies a value system based on tolerance and a social system capable of driving a permanent process of political, social and economic innovation and construction. Since everything was situated in a framework underlain by very complex values, moreover, freedom had to be allowed for, but also justice; success but also service, efficiency but also solidarity.

The various national societies of Europe grew up within this overall, highly general framework. Yet these nations form part of one single civilization. This is true not only in virtue of the traits I have just outlined, but also because these traits have led to numerous artistic, intellectual and economic influences being shared – currents of thought and opinion which can only be defined as European.

There are other Europes in history. I mentioned these when I outlined the way in which Europe invented and built America[256]. These Europes are fossils, or in some cases monsters. They should certainly not be forgotten; they need to be known. However, they do not form part of the living identity of Europe – that identity which can act as the basis for political union.

The European Union and Greater Europe

As relationships between the European Union and the countries of central and Eastern Europe became closer, and as plans were formulated in 1996-7 for the enlargement of Europe, a new problem surfaced. To be more exact, it was an old problem in new form: where should the eastern boundaries of Europe lie?

Today, therefore, we need to organize cultural dialogue with the aim of defining the identity of the European Union in terms which are more complex than they have been up to now; we need to build a more pluralist identity which takes account of certain aspects of different historical traditions. Secondly, it is indispensable to clarify where Europe's boundaries lie – and whether or not we should extend them finally to include Russia.

This new situation means that we urgently need to find new contents and new methods for international cultural relations. More and more frequently, social research is itself necessarily becoming the occasion for fruitful exchanges in international cultural relations. In the 1980s we at the Foundation were able to make a clear distinction between research and cultural relations, for we were dealing with intellectual fields which were well trodden, and almost invariably the people doing the research were quite different from those acting as "cultural ambassadors". Today, in the new relationships we have formed with intellectuals in the countries of Eastern Europe (but also in the Mediterranean countries), the distinction is far less clear-cut. The problem of introducing new contents, and challenging received ideas has become a pressing one. This requires a considerable qualitative leap to meet the new demands placed on cultural bodies and organizations of civil society.

In 1968, in *Europa anno zero?*, I wrote: "It seems increasingly true that Europe does not just mean Rome but also Byzantium, and that Orthodox Christianity, in which Russia has always been

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[256] See the section on "Un'idea di America" in chapter two of Part Two of *Una cronaca culturale. Le attività della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli dal 1976 al 1999*, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli 1999.

immersed, is a fact of European history as much as is the Roman tradition"[257]. This assertion remained in a state of "hibernation" for decades until the conditions arose which obliged me to conduct a more detailed, systematic analysis of the question.

First of all, a paradox should be noted. There is a considerable gap between orthodox historical opinion and the opinions expressed by various intellectuals in past times. Most historians have set eastern limits to Europe, normally drawing the line between the Catholic and Protestant areas on the one hand and the Orthodox areas on the other.

However there is no lack of thinkers in the past who were prepared to include Russia in Europe. The Abbé Saint Pierre's "European Republic" lists nineteen powers which were imagined as taking part, and between the emperor of "the Romans" and the king of France we find – in second place – the emperor of Russia[258]. When Voltaire was describing Europe's republic of letters he included Russia as part of Europe quite naturally: "literature has united Italy with Russia"[259]. In the nineteenth century the words of Victor Hugo are famous: "The day will come when you France, you Italy, you Russia, you England, you Germany, all you nations of the continent (…) will be closely bound together in a higher unity making up the European fraternity, just as Normandy, Brittany, Lorraine, Alsace and all our provinces are fused together into France"[260].

In Russian culture too, there has traditionally been deep controversy over what is the country's relationship with Europe[261]. On the one side there is a Eurasian tradition which sees Russia as outside Europe, and perhaps against it – so looking towards Asia and out towards the world. On the other side there are exponents of a pro-European tradition, affirming that Russia belongs to Europe. Dostoevski exemplifies this tradition. He even claims that Russians have greater loyalty and a more altruistic attachment to Europe than other European peoples: "For a Russian, Europe is as precious as Russia – every stone is sweet and dear to him! Europe has been our homeland just like Russia. Oh, even more so! One cannot love Russia more than I do, but I have never felt guilty because Venice, Rome, Paris, the treasures of their science and their arts, all their history, are dearer to me than Russia"[262].

Dialogue between the cultures of Western and those of Eastern Europe is therefore an essential step on the way towards the new Europe. This is a strategic dialogue which must begin (precisely because it is so important) from reflection on the foundations and the origins of of the first great split in Christianity.

The different relationship between Church and state – a relationship which in the West is based on autonomy and often involves conflict, as against one which is based on agreement and "symphony" in Orthodox societies – has deeply marked the history of European societies.

Now that the long interval of Soviet rule, with its forced secularization, is over, thought and political action are focusing on precisely this question of the role of religion within those European states which lie in the Orthodox tradition. Debate over values and identity, and on the "glue" holding a state and society together, on political cultures and their plans for the future are at the top of the agenda in political debate in Eastern Europe, and above all in Russia.

As is well known, in the few years since Eastern Europe regained its freedom, there have been a number of bloody wars fought in the name of national identity, using the cultural and religious tradition as the principal "glue" and the loudly proclaimed justification. Some commentators

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[257] Marcello Pacini and Ernesto Baroni, *Europa anno zero?*, Bologna, Il Mulino 1968, p.31.

[258] Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "Scritti sull'abate di Saint-Pierre" in Paolo Alatri ed., *Scritti politici*, Turin, Utet 1970, p.430.

[259] Voltaire, *Il secolo di Luigi XIV*, Turin, Einaudi 1951, p.420.

[260] Victor Marie Hugo, "Discorso di apertura al Congresso della Pace", Paris, 21 August 1849, in V.Hugo, *Douze discours*, Paris 1851.

[261] See Giorgio Petacchi, "Eurasia: prospettive di politica internazionale" in Romano Bettini ed., *Istituzioni e società in Russia tra mutamento e conservazione*, Milan, Franco Angeli 1996.

[262] Fe=dor M.Dostoevski, *Podrostok*, Ital.transl., *L'adolescente*, Milan, Mondadori 1987, p.547.

already speak of "Orthodoxism" – a politically extremist force in Eastern Europe which is transforming the religious tradition and identity into a political ideology. These are complex and new phenomena, which deserve to be studied in themselves, and still more so in the context of inter-European dialogue[263].

This dialogue will take place first of all with the societies which are supposed to be joining the European Union within the first decade of the next century. With these countries we need to clarify and overcome "prejudices rooted in history". For belonging to the same political and legal body implies the need that this should be rooted in a common culture, i.e., a common European identity – one which is enriched and rendered more complex by the contributions of these "rediscovered Europeans".

Secondly, there is the question of setting up a completely new relationship with Russia, and with the new European countries which emerged out of the break-up of the Soviet Union, so as to ensure that the European Union's new eastern boundary is not just peaceful but permeable to the exchange of mutual influences. Nor is this all. The problem of whether or not Russia belongs to Europe – a problem which was theoretical and literary up until 1989 – has now become a burning political issue, as well as a strategic one.

As has been mentioned, in today's Russia the traditional debate over whether or not Russia is part of Europe has been revived with great vigour. What is new in this debate is that it has entered into the programmes of the political parties which aspire to rule Russia. Europe cannot remain indifferent to this debate; indeed, it ought to place it at the centre of its strategy – with the aim of encouraging the collocation of Russia within a Greater Europe in the geo-political framework of the next century. Is such a strategy genuinely feasible?

If we think in terms of cultural universes, Russia is part of the Orthodox world. I mentioned earlier the conclusion historians have traditionally come to when they have considered the problem of how to define Europe's identity, and therefore its boundaries. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that the Orthodox world should frequently be considered so different from Western Europe as to constitute a separate civilization[264]. However, we need to ask ourselves whether these "traditional" conclusions are still adequate in a globalized world where there is dialogue between cultures which are much more radically different from each other than those of the Orthodox world and Western Europe. We need to know in any case whether the historical differences between the two areas are so great as to exclude the possibility that the two cultures be considered variants of one single civilization, one cultural universe. This problem concerns Russia above all.

It is well known, of course, that Russia has frequently put itself forward as part of Europe since the time of Peter the Great. Russia is, therefore, one of the very few states which has ever tried to change its cultural collocation via a political project. This political project was certainly upset by the socialist period, yet it was never completely given up. Russia thus belongs to that category of countries which Huntington sees as being "in the balance"[265] – still uncertain as to their identity and as to which cultural camp they will eventually choose. The radically different political cultures existing in present-day Russia differ also with respect to their stance on this fundamental issue. Even if matters are not expressed openly in these terms, this is what the political choices on a variety of themes really amount to.

Huntington outlines some of the conditions which may lead a state "in the balance" to fall finally into one camp or the other (so, in the present case, lead Russia to opt finally for the European

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[263] A start was made in discussing these issues in the conference "Dibattito culturale ed evoluzione socio-politica nella nuova Russia. Le dinamiche in corso, gli attori, il modello di società in costruzione" (Turin, Agnelli Foundation, 11-13 November 1998).

[264] Cf. Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order*, New York, Simon and Schuster 1996. See p.227ff. of the Italian translation, *Lo scontro delle civiltà e il nuovo ordine mondiale,* Milan, Garzanti 1997.

[265] Ibid., p.199ff.

camp). He stresses the importance of policies establishing the general framework of government; and emphasizes the role played by the society which may (or may not) be chosen – whether or not it is welcoming in its attitude. The first condition is an internal Russian problem, the second is up to elites of the European Union. This means that Italy's elites cannot ignore the problem.

There is therefore an opportunity for concrete cultural initiatives to encourage dialogue between the various Europes with the precise aim of reducing differences, eliminating prejudice, increasing awareness on both sides of belonging to a Greater Europe. Even if this single Europe did not exist in the past, it is possible that it could exist in the future. The Agnelli Foundation can commit itself to encouraging this sort of dialogue, contributing the long experience it has accumulated in fostering dialogue between cultures and societies[266].

The aim behind inter-European dialogue is a very innovative and highly complex one. We wish to encourage a culture which sees all Europe (in the not too distant future) as part of one single cultural universe. Today the differences between the various areas seem large. However, it is likely that cultural initiatives aiming at encouraging dialogue will make these differences seem less insuperable and deep-rooted than they appear at present. Instead of seeming an obstacle, or even as threatening, these differences could come to be perceived as fruitful – a rich shared resource.

Naturally, this is a very large-scale objective, which is certainly well beyond the grasp of any single body. However, cultural initiatives can act as yeast, helping the cake of major social change to rise. This is especially true today, when direct contacts between organizations of the civil society in different countries are becoming more and more indispensable and fruitful.

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[266] The Foundation set up a "Forum for Research and International and European Cultural Relations" in 1998. This has the function of sponsoring initiatives and conducting studies on the problems outlined in this chapter and the preceding chapter ("Cultural problems of globalization").

Part Five
From 1989 to 1999. The Present

II. Internal Responses to Globalization

Chapter One

Seeking, planning and encouraging a pluralist Italy, capable of self-government

Around 1990, as the new global economy was becoming manifest in all its innovative force, the need emerged to reflect on the consequences for Italian society (not just the economic consequences). We also needed to think what kind of policies should be adopted if we were not to be overwhelmed by the new rules of international economic life. Political and social forces in Italy, as well as the business world and the world of ideas, started to think of the questions at issue, and to take in the change which had occurred. However, even now, only a few of these actors have successfully digested the transformation. Globalization is in fact such a pervasive process that few aspects of life can be considered out of its reach.

Some features are more obviously visible than others. For example: in the past it was possible to distinguish between different sectors of economic and socio-political life, according to whether or not they were exposed to international competition, and thus forced to keep up constantly in terms of efficiency. It was clear that firms were exposed to international competition, as were those cities and local economies which relied on exports. Other sectors, on the other hand, were protected from international competition: for example, many parts of the administration, many state firms and public bodies, some professional strata, etc. In the era of globalization, this is no longer true: there are no longer protected sectors. In particular, the system as a whole can no longer bear the improper and useless costs of protected areas. It is necessary, therefore, to activate policies to improve efficiency in every area of organized life. However, the search for efficiency is rarely painless: it is normally achieved through social and political conflicts, which may be sharp. This means that it can only take place when social and political actors have realized the need for relatively radical change. In the last few years, all political actors have been going through a contradictory and controversial process whereby they come to grips with the questions at issue.

This new situation, in which everyone is exposed to international competition, is a state of which every citizen should be aware, and in which he or she should actively participate. Encouraging this awareness could be the main function of our new mental map of the world[267]. For if this new mental map was internalized, it would help to encourage the appropriate kind of culture. Over the last few years, acquisition of the awareness of globalization and its consequences has proceeded only slowly among Italians, and much work remains to be done.

The second condition which has emerged from globalization, since the early 1990s, has been the need to provide flexible, adaptive responses to a process of economic adjustment which has become the rule, and an everyday affair. This has presupposed a cultural orientation capable of distinguishing between situations which are different and above all capable of drawing the consequences. This is no mean objective in Italy, where the culture of political and social elites is rooted in a tradition which prefers homogenizing policies, and which (in the name of a misguided conception of solidarity) insists on formal parity e.g., between geographical areas. (So there has been great reluctance, for example, to accept differing rates of pay in different parts of Italy, even though the cost of living often varies greatly.) Although the overall tendency and logic is the same,

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[267] See above, Part Four, «A new mental map of the world».

the effects of globalization have made themselves felt differently in different geographical areas. This is true everywhere, but particularly so in Italy.

The differences between geographical areas does not just imply variation in the effects globalization has, but also implies the need for selective responses. This in turn requires a healthy injection of flexibility. From the point of view of a central authority (for example, a national state), it means above all being able to adapt to the differing conditions existing in the various parts of its territory.

This is especially important for a country like Italy, where major regional differences exist. The logic of economic competition can only be tackled by permanently re-creating the competitive advantages of individual territories (education and training, research, infrastructure, cultural life, security and public order, etc.). This means that the prime concern of the governments of these territories should be how to create and maintain such advantages. The maintenance and creation of competitive advantage are in fact the new arena of economic policy; for economic policy can no longer set the direction in which economic growth is to go, but should rather create the conditions for a healthy economic life.

This is the reason why in 1990 we started research on the economic geography of the new Italy, and why this research led to the conclusion that there were two geo-economies in Italy - one in the Centre and North of the country, another very different one in the South[268].

The need for flexibility from the point of view of a single local or regional area implies the need for great flexibility and capacity to adapt to international pressure which is much more dynamic than it was in the past. This need to respond in a way which is suitable for a specific local area has raised the question of giving local or regional areas forms of administration which are capable of providing such flexibility and rapidity of response - in other words, it has raised the problem of how to raise capacity for self-government and self-management.

This problem applies to all industrialized societies: although different societies have been proposing solutions which are different in form, they are all moving in the same direction. It has become clear by now that, for complex reasons, there is a general tendency towards restructuring of the centralized state. It is not just economic but also cultural forces which are pressing in this direction. On another occasion I called this general tendency to shift levels of decision-making towards lower levels as "the end of the century spirit"[269].

One of the most important consequences of the process of coping with the new conditions of international competition and globalization is the definitive crisis of the traditional welfare state. This crisis is manifest not only in the incapacity to fulfill its traditional functions, but above all in its inability to meet the new social emergencies. The most acute commentators[270] all express their concern over new social pathologies, new forms of social ills which were once considered

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[268] See Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli (ed.), *La nuova geoeconomia mondiale. Alla ricerca di una risposta italiana*, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1996. The research entitled "Un'Italia, due mercati del lavoro" was carried out by two groups working in parallel (the Gruppo Clas in Milan, coordinated by Marco Martini, covered North and Central Italy, while the Monitor team in Naples, coordinated by Mariano D'Antonio, did the research in the South); it described the change which had taken place in the labour market in the North over the five-year period 1990-95, and analyzed the nature of unemployment in the South. This reearch was presented in a conference (Turin, Giovanni Agnelli Foundation, 29 May 1991). Apart from those who had carried out the research, participants included Paola Clarizia, Rodolfo Jannaccone Pazzi and Lida Viganoni. See also Gruppo Clas (ed.), *Un'Italia, due mercati del lavoro. Gli squilibri nei mercati del lavoro nel Centro-Nord*, and Monitor (ed.), *Un'Italia, due mercati del lavoro. Occupazione e disoccupazione nell'economia del Mezzogiorno*, Turin, Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1991, «Contributi di ricerca». See also Giovanni Agnelli Foundation, *1990-1993: quattro anni di attività,* Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1993, pp. 13-18.

[269] Marcello Pacini, «Introduzione», in M. Pacini, *Un federalismo dei valori,* Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1996, pp.2 ff..

[270] Ralf Dahrendorf, «Economic opportunity, civil society, and political liberty», speech given at the UNRISD conference «Rethinking Social Development», Copenhagen, 11-12 March 1995.

something of the past - excessive financial inequalities, and the formation of areas of social marginality[271].

In my essay on "The new geo-economy. Searching for an Italian response", I emphasized that there exist a new collective psychology which is leading to an even greater cultural transformation than that brought about simply by the crisis of the welfare state[272]. The United States, where the "psychology of risk and acceptance of uncertainty" has become very widespread, is a good case. But even in the more advanced areas of Italy we have undergone similar changes, as a partly unanticipated result of globalization, which, even more than technical solutions, demands political and governmental responses. The comments of Dahrendorf and other neo-liberal intellectuals on the formation of a society divided into a third which is "safe", and two thirds subject to the risk of marginality reflect this kind of unexpected situation.

The society of the global economy cannot hide from the problem of solidarity, therefore. On the contrary, it needs to internalize it and make it an inner constraint - not as part of the economy of a firm or an industry, but as part of the political economy of a territory. The stakes are high - we are talking of the survival of prosperity, and hence of democracy, in the European countries.

After the brief experience which we have had so far of living in a globalized world, the following seems indisputable: the search for efficiency is essential in order to survive international competition; the maintenance of mechanisms of solidarity is essential to save democracy and liberal society in Europe in the medium period.

To put the matter in other terms, globalization has raised with dramatic new urgency the much-debated but never-solved problem of the transition from the welfare state to the welfare society. It poses the question of "which society, where and how?", and needs to take responsibility for solidarity in a situation where solidarity cannot be commanded, but only promised and encouraged.

A society which was capable of providing cushioning mechanisms, and reducing the social costs of adjustment in the economic structure, would not be incurring extra costs: it would be building a competitive advantage. This is an objective which needs defining and planning, in the context of an overall critical review of all the ways in which solidarity manifests itself in practical everyday life in Italy. In this overall review, we might start by looking at solidarity between regions and local areas at differing levels of development, and at the forms of solidarity between generations.

In our attempts to identify the new challenge of the global economy, we have naturally had to make choices, for it would be impossible to tackle all aspects of the question. We have tried to select areas which, in our opinion, are of strategic importance, or at least important; and we have tried to select areas which, in our opinion, fit in with our tradition and traditional interests. Our choices did not take place in a vacuum, but were conditioned by the fact that discussion was already taking place in Italy of three major phenomena which the globalized economy did not create but did accelerate. I am referring to the de-politicization of society, the running down of state intervention in the economy, and the de-bureaucratization of the public administration.

The Foundation came to the conclusion that it ought to pursue three lines of research and planning, three lines which not only fitted in with its tradition, but also represented continuity with work we had already started: *a)* the city as a more adequate dimension for cultural, political, economic and social life; *b)* civil society and the third sector in general within the context of a programme of studies on social pluralism in Italy; *c)* reform of the state in a federal direction.

Cities. In this field the Foundation adopted a procedure it had often adopted before: it analyzed the concrete situation of a number of Italian cities, what they had done with regard to one of the most important phenomena of our epoch - innovation. The aim was to encourage re-legitimation of

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[271] See above, Part Four, the section entitled "The new geo-economy, its fundamental law, and the deficit of governance".

[272] Giovanni Agnelli Foundation (ed.), *La nuova geoeconomia mondiale*, op.cit, pp. 8-9.

the city as "the most adequate place" to produce innovations, culture and creativity, notwithstanding the fact that cities have recently traversed a period of doubts and perplexity.

After a number of studies on Italian cities and on the network of European cities, we were able to put forward the idea of a network capital. This proposal has political objectives, for we believe a network capital would have the effect of reconciling Italy's various cities to the idea of nation and a united Italy. But we also believed, and believe, that the project would strengthen Italy's urban network, making it more competitive.

Italy is a country of former capitals and of important cities. Precisely for this reason, the idea of a network capital can be the right one to enable it to beat international competition. Today, some years after our first initiatives in this direction, the strategic role of cities seems clearer than ever: the urban dimension in fact seems to be the only social space in which it is possible for the longed-for welfare society to grow[273].

Civil society and self-governing institutions. The second programme the Foundation launched in its attempt to seek responses to globalization focuses on social pluralism and on self-governing institutions - in particular, organized civil society[274].

These are particularly complex themes for at least two reasons. Firstly, after centuries of mortification, civil society is far from strong in Italy. The voluntary sector of charities is strong, but it has its own logic, and although it has much in common with civil society, it is not the same thing, and it cannot take its place.

Secondly, a process of de-bureaucratization and withdrawal of the state is in process. This means that important institutions are leaving the sphere of state control (which in Italy often means party control). The Foundation has thus dedicated research to strategic institutions which have attained new autonomy, such as the universities and the banking foundations. The collocation of these institutions is unclear: it is not certain whether they should be considered public bodies, and thus still part of the galaxy of the public sector, or whether they should rather be thought of as part of civil society. Only the years to come will tell us. Obviously, the Foundation is not neutral on the question: we hope that institutions of this kind will become fully part of civil society. Finally, it is clear that the theme of civil society overlaps here with the great theme of subsidiarity, considered as a value and a principle for organizing society, the state, and relationships between their respective institutions.

Reform of the political system and government. The third response to globalization at the institutional level is reform of the political system and arrangements for government. On this issue of the reform of the state, the Foundation came down strongly in favour of a federal option[275].

European integration. The above three themes represent the Foundation's attempts to show how Italy can react to the challenges of globalization from within. However, these need to be supplemented, of course, by the discourse on Europe, and the increasing integration which we hope will occur[276].

On all these themes there is apparent, superficial consensus in Italy, at least in broad terms. In reality, however, there is still great confusion, as the recent failure of the Parliamentary Commission on the reform of government arrangements shows. There is still little real awareness of the urgency of matters, and still much vagueness regarding the contents of any possible reform.

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[273] See below, the capter on "The role of cities".

[274] See below, the chapter on "Civil society and institutions of self-government".

[275] See below, the chapter on "Reform of the state and federalism".

[276] See above, Part Four, "The Foundation and Europe".

Through its work, the Foundation thus hopes it will be able to encourage further support for a general orientation towards change in the desired direction, as well as proposing policy solutions on particular matters, and de-mystify the current superficial consensus by giving more precise meaning to concepts.

Among the areas where an apparent, superficial consensus exists, one of the main ones is that of the relationship between the political system and civil society. We believe civil society is its own legitimation, and that it is independent of the political system. In our view, civil society can be a tool criticizing the political system, and it is made up of actors who are capable of organizing themselves and taking initiatives together, some of which may be alternative to, and in competition with, initiatives of the public sector. This kind of conception of what civil society is differs from the conception which is widespread among the parties and political forces: here there prevails an idea of the civil society as being dependent on the public sector via subsidies, conventions, etc.

The second example of superficial, apparent consensus which needs to be clarified regards the relationship between federal reform and civil society. The mere transfer of power to the Regions only partially solves the problem of self-government. For it is quite possible that a distant centralism may simply be replaced by a less geographically distant one. In theory, the latter might be even more prevaricating and bureaucratic than the old centralism of the national state.

Chapter Two

The role of cities

Cities as protagonists of innovation

Cities have always had a highly esteemed place in the Foundation's culture. When in the years 1978-81 we needed to give our American interlocutors an idea of what Italy was like[277], the reality and imagery of a hundred cities, and of many capitals, was essential in conveying a founded, credible conception of the nature of the country. In addition, it is not possible (as was attempted in the late 1970s)[278] to set up a de-centralized system of government, based on the principle of self-government, without having a clear idea of the actors which will receive the power, and which will have to manage themselves. In the 1970s the "political" role of the cities was almost a basic premise for us - an idea founded in our understanding of history, more than in social analysis. It was only in the years which followed that we undertook direct analysis of cities - first with our studies of technology areas[279], then from the mid 1980s, with two studies on urban systems in Italy and in Europe[280]. The first important finding of these studies was empirical confirmation of the idea that cities and urban systems were, indeed, crucial.

The research showed clearly that urban issues and urban policies were being very widely rediscovered. At the end of the 1980s, after a period of doubts and uncertainties, the idea began to return that technological innovation and economic growth, as well as cultural creativity and development, all had their natural terrain in cities. This was a significant turn-around in intellectual trends. The debate on the urban crisis, on the decline of the big cities, and on the de-centralizing tendencies inherent in technological innovation and in the economy were, after all, still very recent. Our research showed, on the other hand, that the urban ambiance was becoming more complex, and was taking on new responsibilities. Cities were adding to their traditional educational and cultural functions new political responsibilities on economic, scientific and technological themes. The city was thus revitalizing its role as *polis*; but it was above all in the economic field that it was reasserting itself, and taking on new forms[281].

The research provided a descriptive map of a new hierarchy in Europe. This was not a uniform panorama, but one which was highly differentiated. Above all, it showed a picture of cities in competition - with some gaining in this competition, and others losing out. Some cities were technologically developing, others less so: some were becoming global centres, world centres of direction, while others were in structural crisis. The arena for this great challenge was (and is) the

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[277] See above, Part Two, the chapter on "Promoting the image of Italy and relations with Italian Americans".

[278] See above, Part One.

[279] See above, Part Six.

[280] See Sergio Conti and Giorgio Spriano (ed.), *Effetto città. Volume primo, sistemi urbani e innovazione: prospettive per l'Europa degli anni Novanta*, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Agnelli, 1990; Erminio Borlenghi (ed.), *Città e industria verso gli anni novanta. Sistemi urbani e impresa a Torino, Genova, Verona, Bologna, Firenze, Napoli, Bari, Catania, Milano e Roma*, Torino, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1990. See also Giovanni Agnelli Foundation, *1976-1990: quinze ans d'activité*, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1990, p.193.

[281] See *XXI Secolo*, 1 (1), I, November 1989, p. 2.

world. "It is impossible to say today who will lose out in the competition between urban areas in a Europe dominated by the single market and globalization. It is, however, possible to advance a few informed guesses on the kind of city which will have better chances of maintaining or gaining higher places in the league of innovation and wealth creation (...) The complete directional city (e.g., London, Paris, Rome) is certainly among these. Cities of this type are capable of controlling technological change, and have a high concentration of command functions over the international financial and industrial system, and also over the industrial manufacturing system. The potential for technological innovation is high here, due to "virtuous" structural conditions, such as concentration in the same local area of management capacity, industry, research and society, or the collocation of these cities at strategic nodes of the creation and circulation of knowledge[282]".

Each city's specific features and specific economic specialization exposes it to particular risks and challenges. "Competition" between technological cities (e.g. Stuttgart, Lyon or Turin) is more intense than between directional cities, for their technological and productive resources can more easily become obsolete. So in order to keep up in the harsh selection process, technological cities are "condemned" to continual innovation. In addition, competition for dominance among global, directional cities is by now limited to a few metropolises, whereas there are a large number of cities which can offer technological resources, and a still higher number of manufacturing cities.

As we were trying to draw policy conclusions from our research, we asked ourselves whether it would be possible to give general indications about how cities should tackle the near future. We concluded that general recipes covering all cases would probably be ineffective, if not counter-productive, for each city is essentially unique, each having its own historical inheritance. However, a number of criteria could be laid down as general guidelines for urban strategies alive to the present and oriented to the future. Three criteria seemed particularly crucial:

"1) Preparation for change, anticipation of the future. Cities must be capable of developing a capacity for investment oriented to the long term;

2) Drawing resources for the future from the city's own past (...) The ability to reinterpret one's traditional culture today seems to be the royal road to urban renewal;

3) Increasing communications and relationships, especially with cities at a higher level. Being linked in to international circuits of communication makes it possible even for peripheral cities to enjoy the benefits of "centrality"[283]."

Among the main results of our research (a finding which anticipated present concerns) was the fact that a city's international image was a strong point (or weak point); for the challenges of the future are played out on a much wider scale than was the case in the past.

"Growing interdependence can be a factor of vulnerability or an opportunity for development. Much depends on whether cities realize the need to play a conscious, active role on the international scene. This requires first of all a capacity to determine the international profile of the city. So it is a task of strategic collective actors (local government, universities, foundations, firms, business interest associations, chambers of commerce, etc.) to decide on one or more consistent, well-founded "directions" capable of orienting the international profile of the city in question (...) We might ask ourselves if profound changes in the international role of cities are not leading towards a new version of the city state, capable of economic, cultural, and perhaps political initiatives to further its interests. It would be premature to give a definitive answer to this question today. What is certain is that we are seeing the emergence of a new generation of international cities, cities which have made being international into a vocation, or which are reinforcing their presence on the international scene. It is these cities which seem better placed than others to tackle the challenges posed by the information society and globalization.

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[282] Ibid., p.7. See also Marcello Pacini, «Effetto città», *Prometeo*, 28, December 1989.
[283] *XXI Secolo*, 1 (1), I, November 1989, p.7.

If these challenges are to be faced successfully, a *sine qua non* must be met. There must be a strong local government, capable of stimulating and guiding changes which require creative capacity and far-sighted programmes"[284].

In the years which followed, these conclusions found significant application to Italian cities - mainly in our programme on Turin[285], and that on the network capital.

The proposal of a network capital

The most important policy proposal of our programme on cities is the proposal of a network capital, which we put forward in 1992 during a conference entitled "Expanding the centre: capital cities, urban system and de-centering functions. Debate and policies in France, Germany and Great Britain". The approach was that which the Foundation had often adopted before - to analyze other European countries and suggest a debate both on the reasons why the situation was different in Italy, and on the feasibility of developing innovative policies moving in the direction of other European policies.

The aim which we announced was twofold. We wished to integrate as large a number of Italian cities into Europe as possible. And we wished to spread throughout Italy the "sense" of exercising national functions - thus combating the disaggregating forces which pervade Italian society. For what sense could it have to fight "the capital Rome" if the capital was also in Turin, Milan, Venice and Naples?

The plan for a "network capital" was to transfer a number of political, economic and administrative functions to a series of Italian cities. The idea was thus to extend the capital effect outwards, making certain cities stronger, and thus strengthening the Italian metropolitan system as a whole. We gave the example of the leading European countries, which had long posed the problem of extending the capital effect. Especially in France, but also in Great Britain, the co-existence in the capital of the principal financial and economic centre, and the political and administrative centre, had long made clear the need for policies to reintroduce balance into the situation. And indeed policies for re-localization had been quickly and energetically put into practice. Italy was at least fifteen years behind France's decisive policies. Federal Germany's arrangements followed in the path of the country's historical urban pluralism, with many cities having important functions (and this remained true after unification). In Italy, in contrast, even in recent decades, there has been a policy of centralized government which has had few equals in Europe, so prestigious functions have been heavily concentrated in Rome, to the detriment of other cities. So this is one more case where Italy is anomalous. The current pattern is an anomaly when set against Italy's historical tradition of urban pluralism - the "hundred cities" for which the country has been famous. And an anomaly compared to the rest of Europe. "The European scene contains numerous examples of dissemination of the functions of the capital among various cities, which constitute a network of national range responsibilities - in other words, a "network" capital"[286].

The European experience made it legitimate, in our opinion, to hope that a network capital could be created in Italy too. "The new rules of the international economy and the introduction of the single market in Europe require widespread competitive capacity, present in all regions and throughout the urban network, not just concentrated in one or two points. In this kind of situation, Italy will be forced to bring ten or fifteen of its cities up to European levels. This ought not to be too

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[284] Ibid, p.8.

[285] See below, Part Six.

[286] Marcello Pacini, «La capitale reticolare: una proposta per l'Italia» in M. Pacini, Klaus Kunzmann, J. Neil Marshall *et al.*, *La capitale reticolare. Il decentramento delle funzioni nazionali: un'esperienza europea e una proposta per l'Italia*, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1993, p.2.

difficult for a nation which has an extremely rich history of urban pluralism. Yet there is considerable evidence that this heritage risks being wasted"[287].

France is clearly taking into Europe not just Paris but also Lyon, Toulouse, Strasbourg, Nice, Bourdeaux, Grenoble, Montpellier, Marseille and Brest. It has launched a thorough policy to give these cities greater value, partly by transferring functions which had traditionally been carried out in Paris.

Historically, Germany has shared out national roles in its economy, but also in its administration, between Bonn, Frankfurt, Munich, Karlsruhe and other cities. This model, although weakened, will not be placed in crisis by transfer of the capital to Berlin. Italy, in contrast, refuses to take into consideration the idea of abandoning the model of centralization of national functions. "To invert the tendency," I wrote in 1992, "we need to re-localize a number of important functions in other cities, as a first, essential step towards the model of "network capital" which seems to be asserting itself at the European level"[288].

Our 1992 proposals suggested a large number of functions - political, administrative and economic - which could be re-located in cities other than Rome.

Building the network capital: criteria and hypotheses for de-localization

In our proposals three particularly important problems were identified. It was necessary to define criteria for identifying which cities would benefit from the transfer of functions; to indicate which functions could be transferred; and to indicate what kind of relationship might exist between our plans for a network capital and our proposals for reforming the state in a federal direction.

With regard to the problem of what cities should be chosen, three hypotheses seemed feasible. First of all, we could take the larger regional "capitals" - Turin, Milan, Venice, Genoa, Bologna, Florence, Naples and Palermo, with the addition of Bari, Cagliari, and a city on the Adriatic, perhaps Ancona.

A second, more restrictive approach would be to take cities which were geographically accessible. This would mean cities linked up by the future high speed rail links (and with good airports, and good road connections). So Turin, Milan, and plausibly Genoa, Venice or the diffuse network of Venetian cities and towns, Bologna, Florence and Naples. (Although the "railway criterion" would tend to penalize the South.)

A third approach would be to focus on threshold effects and effects of scale. This criterion would favour the four or five largest cities, alongside Rome[289].

Our plans naturally avoided making precise recommendations as to which particular functions ought to be transferred. As with the question of what cities should be chose, we laid down criteria (all taken from European countries) indicating the kind of function suitable for transfer, but leaving political decision-makers a broad margin of choice. These criteria seemed to us, in principle, and bearing in mind European experience, effective tools for deciding on de-localization, and they suggested a range of possible combinations. The functions believed to be "transferable" were:

a) publicly controlled economic bodies (for example, the national electricity board ENEL, the state railways, and the headquarters of nationalized companies);
b) a number of administrative bodies with extensive autonomy, or quasi-state bodies (for example, the National Research Council, the Bank of Italy, the boards for southern development, the National Institute of Statistics, the Automobile Club, the energy council ENEA, the sports council CONI, etc.);

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[287] Ibid., p.6.
[288] Ibid., p.3.
[289] *XXI Secolo*, 1 (9), VI, January 1994, pp.13-17.

c) individual services or offices of the central public administration which are part of ministries, or controlled by ministries (e.g., certain general directorates of ministries, the National Institute of Health);

d) some Constitutional bodies, which do not strictly speaking need to be located in Rome (the Constitutional Court, the Council of State, the Upper Council of the Judiciary, etc.);

e) the headquarters of some technical ministries (e.g. Transport, Industry, Agriculture).

We put forward these suggestions making it clear that they needed to be thought out further in the light of debate over federalism and reform of the state which was taking place at the time[290].

Alongside these institutions, all of which belong to the public sphere, we might also mention private institutional bodies, such as business interest associations. Among these, Confindustria, the Italian confederation of employers' associations, might consider de-localization, for it is no longer as necessary as it was in the past to be sited next to the seat of political power.

"As can easily be seen, a solution which affected the first three levels - a) to c) - would be most consonant with the French model; arrangements affecting all five levels would be closer to the German model"[291]. Naturally, hybrid combinations of the French, German and British models would be possible.

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[290] Ibid., pp. 15-6.
[291] Ibid., p.16

Federalism and network capital: possible link-ups

On the third question - that of the relationship between proposals for a network capital and proposals for federalist reform, we had no hesitation in stating that there were positive connections. We saw the proposals for a network capital as subordinate to demands for federalism, but as independent and complementary, especially with respect to the choice of which bodies and functions to de-localize. Some people argued, in fact, that a number of functions would be affected by the de-centralization involved in reform of the state. Introduction of federalist-type arrangements would itself tend to create a "network" organization of functions. This should thus lead us to reconsider the balance between centre and periphery.

We at the Foundation, in contrast, argued that there were a number of good reasons for seeing the two proposals as complementary. In a perspective of federalist reform, the localizing of national-level bodies in cities other than Rome was less urgent than it would have been if the plan was to maintain current centralized state arrangements. However, the idea maintains its validity if one thinks of the great mass of functions suitable for transfer, and also of the way which a network capital could consolidate civic sense and national sense in Italy. In a federal Italy, it would still make sense to spread national functions around the whole country (this would have not merely symbolic value), for it would have the effect of consolidating Italian unity. We might think of analogies with Germany's federal state, where there is a similar distribution of national functions in various cities. This approach would recognize the political sense of the network capital idea, its ability to reinforce the national "pact", and share round symbols of national identity[292].

After 1994 the Foundation stressed the idea of network capital less forcefully. Not because we had any doubts regarding the validity of the project but simply because the Parliamentary Commission on Constitutional Reform started to discuss federalist reform of the state in concrete terms. It thus seemed reasonable to return to discussing the network capital when federalism was in place.

Now that the Parliamentary Commission has interrupted its work the dilemma comes up again. Should we wait for federalism or push immediately for a network capital? The processes of the geo-economy will not wait, so the problem of building an Italian metropolitan system which has the infrastructure, the economic capacity, the quality of life, and the cultural maturity to be competitive on the world stage is still an urgent priority.

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[292] M. Pacini, «La capitale reticolare: una proposta per l'Italia» in M. Pacini, Klaus Kunzmann, J. Neil Marshall *et al.*, *La capitale reticolare* cit., p.113.

Chapter Three

Civil society and self-governing institutions

Is Italian society re-shaping itself?

It has become part of standard political rhetoric nowadays to invoke civil society; yet in many cases invocation is very vague, without reference to any particular institutional reality. More rarely, there is a reference to Tocqueville and his famous description of America in the 1830s, in which he told Europe about the existence, the other side of the Atlantic, of a society which operated on quite different principles of collective action.

Tocqueville's words are still fresh and relevant[293]: «American of all ages, all conditions, all minds constantly unite. Not only do they have commercial and industrial associations in which all take part, but they also have a thousand other kinds: religious, moral, grave, futile, very general and very particular, immense and very small: Americans use associations to give fetes, to found seminaries, to build inns, to raise churches, to distribute books, to send missionaries to the antipodes, in this manner they create hospitals, prisons, schools. Finally, if it is a question of bringing to light a truth or developing a sentiment with the support of a great example, they associate. Everywhere that, at the head of a new undertaking, you see the government in France and a great lord in England, count on it that you will perceive an association in the United States.»

Tocqueville gives an amusing example of the use of associations[294]: «The first time I heard it said in the United States that a hundred thousand men publicly engaged not to make use of strong liquors, the thing appeared to me more amusing than serious, and at first I did not see well why such temperate citizens were not content to drink water within their families. In the end I understood that those hundred thousand Americans, frightened by the progress that drunkennes was making around them, wanted to provide their patronage to sobriety. They had acted precisely like a great lord who would dress himself very plainly in order to inspire the scorn of luxury in simple citizens. It is to be believed that if those hundred thousand men had lived in France, each of them would have addressed himself individually to the government, begging it to oversee the cabarets all over the realm.». Tocqueville concludes[295]: «Among the laws that rule human societies there is one that seems more precise and clearer than all the others. In order that men remain civilized or become so, the art of associating must be developed and perfected among them in the same ratio as equality of conditions increases.»

To cite Tocqueville nowadays is to refer to a classic - with the advantages and limitations that implies. It can give us a general political orientation, but we certainly would not wish to set up American society as a model for Italian society to imitate, nor to suggest that Italy should make associations the key to reforming society and political life. That would be fanciful and abstract.

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[293] Alexis de Tocqueville, *De la démocratie en Amérique*, 1835 and 1840. Reference to p. 602 of the Italian edition, Milan, Rizzoli, 1992.
[294] Ibid., p.606.
[295] Ibid.

Today even in the United States there are those who are wondering whether the model described by Tocqueville still exists, and several have expressed concern. We might cite two recently published reports: *A Nation of Spectators*, edited by the National Commission on Civic Renewal, chaired by Senators Sam Nunn and William J. Bennett, and *Governing America: Our Choices, Our Challenge*, produced by the Kettering Foundation[296]. Both reports discuss the most fruitful and most suitable ways to revitalize the civic spirit, and encourage greater commitment and direct participation by citizens in politics and in society.

For a number of reasons it seems appropriate to approach the theme of civil society in Italy with caution and modesty, without expecting any kind of miraculous renewal[297]. The first reason for caution is that Italy has a centuries-long tradition of state centralization of all resources intended for collective purposes. This tendency has been worsened by the fact that the state has invaded more and more areas, and over the last fifty years, by the fact that the political parties have occupied more and more positions within the state in a kind of spoils system.

It is worth recalling this state of affairs because it makes us realize the great significance of changes which have taken place in recent years in Italian state arrangements (changes which, in other countries, might seem of minor significance). The Foundation's programme set out to assess the real degree of pluralism in Italian society, through analysis of specific situations and their differing, concrete dynamics. It is thus a programme which has primarily analytic aims: unlike our programmes on cities or on reform of the state, it has not produced anything approaching policy recommendations - in spite of being full of ethical and political significance and value orientations.

Analytically, the programme focused on organized bodies in the civil sphere, broadly defined - that part of social action which, simplifying matters, we can identify as being outside the market sphere, and independent from the state. These are bodies which may have widely differing legal statuses, and their aims, organizational patterns, and ways of working may also be very different. Nonetheless, this wide spectrum may tentatively be treated as one, for analytic purposes, if we remember that the bodies in question are independent from control by the state, and from public sector resources, and if we bear in mind the concept of subsidiarity. Although it should be remembered that we are dealing with a very varied set of institutions and organizations - not all of which necessarily fit into the categories provided by the civil code. All these bodies are in some sense self-governing. All tend to regulate their activity and their purposes via some sort of charter or founding articles. Among their number we also find public bodies, which have been founded, or re-founded, as independent organizations as part of a move away from bureaucratization, and either given significant autonomy, or told to seek it. Universities are a typical example of institutions of this kind, as are "opera foundations" (although these operatic theatres have a different legal status).

The main thing to note about this kind of process whereby certain public organizations in Italy have become, or are becoming, independent bodies is that it is a movement from the top down. Organizations of this kind have almost had autonomy thrust upon them, and have often been fearful about the results of the new arrangements, and about their ability to radically reorganize the way they are managed and build new relationships with a world of potential private funders. Public control of these new institutions is currently attenuated and flexible; the organizations are financially autonomous and their governing bodies are appointed by local bodies, so they are very fragmented. An example are the foundations which have their origins in publicly-owned banks.

Alongside organizations of this kind there is the world of voluntary associations, of charities and of social cooperatives - all belonging to that non-profit sector which is usually termed the third sector.

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[296] National Commission on Civic Renewal (ed.), *A nation of spectators*: *how civic disengagement weakens America and what we can do about it*, Proceedings of the conference of the National Press Club, Washington (D.C.), 24 June 1998, *mimeo*; the National Commission is chaired by Senators Sam Nunn and William J. Bennet; Kettering Foundation, *Governing America: Our Choices, Our Challenge*, Dubuque (Ia), Kendall-Hunt, 1996.
[297] See the report by Pierpaolo Donati (ed.), *La società civile in Italia*, Milan, Mondadori, 1997, which may be taken as the most recent and systematic discussion of the subject.

Alongside these, finally, are organizations of the kind we think of when we think of civil society as an ideal type - organizations which are autonomous, including in financial terms, subject to minimal public control (and to no control at all over the contents of their activities). In Italy many organizations of this kind have a status in civil law.

A list of this kind inevitably raises the question whether there is not a break between the different types of organization described. Is it legitimate to talk of one single continuum of organizations, all components of one single transformation which is in the process of redistributing the powers of social, cultural and political initiative, changing relations between centre and periphery, and extending the area of self-government?

We have come to the conclusion (an empirical but historically founded one) that categorizing such organizations together is not just possible but also fruitful. All these processes may in fact be seen as part of a single dynamic transformation because they all occur within the same society, the same legal and political framework, and the same culture. Thus all influence each other. This is not just a question of cultural influences, but a practical, operative affair. We need only think of how university autonomy may be influenced by the contacts universities are liable to establish with the bank foundations. The influence and the possible shared culture are worth considering fully. The bank foundations are different from the foundations with civil law status as simply foundations. Nonetheless, we can see that a number of essential issues are being worked out in a shared conceptual and cultural framework. They are different institutions but they have much in common, and will have still more in common in the future, if social change in Italy goes in the direction of reinforcing civil society and the powers of the periphery, and thus if the autonomy of the foundations is appreciated as it should be.

Considering the different organizations as participating in one single process also poses, however, the problem of what kind of distinctions can be made within their number. In particular, it is necessary to distinguish between the concept of third sector, and that of civil society. The two are not synonymous, but constitute two distinct worlds; in some particular cases they may overlap, but in numerous others they are very different.

I propose the following distinction, in ideal-typical and functional terms, between civil society and the third sector. Whatever their specific aims, and whatever area they belong to, bodies of civil society observe the political system from a cultural and ethical-political point of view, and act as a critical stimulus to the political system. They see the political system as a partner or opponent; relations with the political system are not necessarily those of cooperation, but dialogue is always present. Organizations of civil society do not necessarily emphasize the "social" element, nor that of solidarity. Their fundamental dimension is that of culture. The nature of their "commitment" is cultural and political rather than social. This explains why, in Eastern Europe after the fall of communism, there were so many initiatives encouraging the growth of civil society - civil society being regarded as a necessary ingredient in the development and maintenance of free democratic social arrangements.

Dahrendorf argues that "democracy and the market economy are not enough. Freedom needs a third pillar if it is to be safeguarded: civil society. The essential characteristic of the open society is that our lives are lived out in "associations" (understood in a wide sense) which are outside the reach of the state"[298].

To be outside the state sphere means to assert what is civil society's natural basis. Civil society is regulated by the laws of the state, but it emerges at the same time as the state. We should recognize that in Italy at present this subjective autonomy of civil society unfortunately does not exist, because it would require recognition of its function in the Constitution. Among the reforms to the

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[298] Ralf Dahrendorf, *Moralità, istituzioni e società civile*, Turin, Agnelli Foundation, 1992, p.18; this is the text of Sir Ralf Dahrendorf's speech accepting the third Senator Giovanni Agnelli International Prize for Ethics in Advanced Societies (Turin, Teatro Regio, 30 March 1992).

Constitution recently discussed in the Parliamentary Commission on Constitutional Reform, no such provision was ever foreseen.

Contrasting the third sector, it should be noted that this is primarily oriented towards the social; its general objective tends to be to reinforce solidarity. Its prime guideline in terms of values is effectiveness, rather than efficiency, although it may well be efficient in particular areas where it operates. Its main contribution, therefore, is to ensure solidarity. This is a value which a well-ordered society, aware of the pressures and constraints imposed by the geo-economy, needs to pursue in parallel with that of competitive efficiency. It is obvious that, at a time when the state is bound to progressively reduce its role in the direct management of "services of solidarity and cohesion", the third sector is likely to grow in size as its responsibilities grow.

Naturally, the "third sector" and "civil society" are not non-communicating spheres. There may be organizational overlaps and there will certainly be overlaps in objectives. We need only think of cases where alternatives are constructed to the bureaucratic logic of the public administration, or areas where the public administration does not perform a service properly. Organizations of the third sector and of civil society possess a core of values in common, such as personal responsibility and esteem for freely given service. And they are both motivated by an orientation towards the "common good". Above all, civil society and the third sector share one great value, which gives legitimacy to both of them, which is the principle of subsidiarity.

Finally, civil society like the third sector can be seen as organizational forms which are rational for the purposes of responding to globalization, even though they normally work on different planes. Both constitute an extraordinary resource for any society which is capable of forming them, motivating individuals and groups to take part in them. Since they produce capacity for innovation, sense of responsibility, quality of life, and social cohesion, they constitute an important aspect of competitiveness even in an economic sense.

The Foundation's programme adopts the working scheme I have outlined, and is thus organized in four thematic areas covering: the universities and their move towards autonomy; the banking foundations; charities and the third sector; foundations in the traditional sense[299].

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[299] See Giovanni Agnelli Foundation, *Per conoscere le fondazioni*, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1997; Centro Studi CGM, (ed.), *Imprenditori sociali. Secondo rapporto sulle cooperative sociali in Italia*, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1997; Maria Pia Bertolucci (ed.), *Solidali con l'arte. Secondo rapporto sul volontariato per i beni culturali e artistici in Italia*, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1997.

Foundations in Italy

Further details on the above themes can be obtained in the research in question[300]. With regard to foundations, on the other hand - a theme which is obviously particularly dear to us - it is worth making a few remarks.

Thanks to our research we can now make an assessment of the number of foundations in Italy, suggest some shared objectives, and indicate the outlines of an overall framework, which can be useful not just for those who work in foundations, but also for the whole complex world which gravitates around them. These remarks are based on findings of the Foundation's programme as a whole.

Our research on traditional foundations - i.e., excluding institutions emerging out of the banks - obtained information from "536 foundations (out of the thousand or so which seems a reasonable, cautious estimate of the total number in Italy)"[301].

"The first important finding of the research is that the number of foundations is growing in Italy. More than half of the organizations we surveyed were in fact started in the last ten years. This encouraging finding can be explained partly by the fact that there has been a gradual spread of a cultural awareness favourable to strengthening of civil society and its organized expression. Secondly, over the last few years, there has been the incentive that foundations have been able to obtain legal recognition from the Regions. Foundations are still distributed unequally over the various parts of Italy: they are concentrated mainly in the richer parts of the Centre and North, and mainly in the cities. Nonetheless, they are pervasive throughout Italy, and they cover a very wide spectrum of interests and activities. Most, however, suffer from slender means and resources, especially if we compare them with institutions in other countries.

To sum up, the research shows a world in ferment, with great potential for development in numerous directions. Certainly the sector of Italian foundations cannot be compared - in terms of social pervasiveness, cultural weight, or size of resources - to that in the other advanced democracies, such as the United States, Great Britain or Germany. In these countries, foundations constitute one of the central actors of organized civil society. Indeed, they are often the real backbone of the sector"[302].

This leads to the question whether Italy can ever become like the United States, Britain or Germany. Two alternatives seem possible. In the short term, this objective can only be attained if the foundations which have emerged from the banks take an active part in creating a new situation. If they do not, the objective will shift to the long term, and can only be achieved via thorough-going change in the relationship between the state and society - including, naturally, radical change in tax regimes, and rules regarding the accumulation of resources for objectives which are in the public interest.

We assume that the foundations coming out of the banks wish to lose the specificity which derives from their origin, and become more and more like traditional foundations. The thesis, or rather the hope, is that it will be possible to form one single sector of Italian foundations. Within this sector, obviously, different categories of foundations will exist, but within an overall framework where the overall conception of a foundation's role, overall culture and objectives are in large part shared. On the basis of our experience, five common objectives might be suggested.

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[300] See Pippo Ranci and Gian Paolo Barbetta (ed.), *Le fondazioni bancarie verso l'attività* grant-making. *Le fondazioni* grant-making *in Germania e negli Stati Uniti*, Turin, Giovanni Agnelli Foundation, 1996, «Contributi di ricerca»; Giorgio Brosio e Roberto Zanola, *Il trattamento fiscale delle organizzazioni* non-profit *con finalità filantropiche: un'analisi comparata*, Turin, Giovanni Agnelli Foundation, 1996, «Contributi di ricerca».

[301] Marcello Pacini, «Le fondazioni in Italia» in Giovanni Agnelli Foundation, *Per conoscere le fondazioni* op.cit., pp. 3-4.

[302] Ibid., p.4.

"The first objective is that of accrediting the "foundation" as a useful, modern tool and one of the pillars of a stronger and more independent civil society (...) The Giovanni Agnelli Foundation interprets its role in civil society in as strong sense, for it believes we should see civil society as a resource for encouraging modernity, and in particular de-centralization, de-bureaucratization, and subsidiarity - the opposite of traditional centralizing, state-centred culture. Although this kind of vision is common in Europe, it is worth asserting in Italy, for a strong, independent and responsible civil society seems increasingly to be an indispensable element if the country is to renew itself. And without such a renewal, that reform of the system of government and public administration which is currently on the political agenda can never be achieved.

To accredit and legitimate foundations in public opinion we need a friendlier culture. Building a culture which is friendlier towards foundations means first of all (this is our second objective) giving a clear and positive image of what a "foundation" is, and what real foundations are like. If we start from an up-to-date explanation of the weight and the role of foundations in other countries, such as Germany or the United States, public opinion, voters and taxpayers must be informed with regard to what foundations are, and how they could help to renew the country if they were stronger.

The third objective is that of encouraging a legal framework which is more favourable to and trusting of the foundations. This is not just a question of fiscal arrangements - although the fiscal question is crucial for the whole of the third sector. It is above all a question of recognizing our role (if this occurs, the fiscal issue will flow naturally from it). Foundations are "testimonial" institutions of civil society. Their role is the mirror of the relationship between state and society, and evidence of the scope which is given to the principle of subsidiarity.

The fourth objective is to encourage growth of the network of foundations. Now that foundations are no longer exceptions or marginal phenomena, but are important social actors, they need to become an ambiance, a world, a culture, a labour market, an economic sector. Between the various organizations which make up this world, dialogue and, where possible, cooperation should be become increasingly frequent.

The fifth objective is to define a code of behaviour regarding the whole gamut of foundations and its various actors. As foundations become more important and increase their responsibilities, we need to discuss a code of professional practice. We need to increase transparency on financial and cultural matters and on our working practices, to ensure that there is consistency between aims and use of resources, and to increase efficiency in the way we achieve our objectives"[303]. Let me add that these objectives, although worked out on the basis of research on foundations having a civil law status, are also valid for the foundations created from banks.

We have made a number of public interventions on the question of foundations. In particular we have stressed the need for a culture which is capable of using this institutional tool in the most fruitful way. It should be recognized, in other words, that it is not enough simply to have foundations in a society. The society must also know how to make best use of them. It is for this reason that culture is so important - that is to say, widespread awareness of the characteristics, role, obligations and rights of foundations in a free society. The adjective "widespread" is worth stressing: it is necessary for the role of foundations to be recognized by a plurality of social actors and ambiances. This is true both for the traditional foundations and those set up by reorganization of the banks.

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[303] Ibid., pp. 5-7. See also Marcello Pacini, "Una nuova cultura per le fondazioni", *Il Sole-24 Ore*, 28 May 1998.

The culture we need in foundations

Thinking about the culture of foundations in Italy can be organized around a few fundamental conceptual nuclei. We need a number of shared values, a sufficiently precise idea of responsibilities tied to specific tasks, and we need the professionalism necessary to achieve these aims.

On the level of values, the first and fundamental value is autonomy. This is the principle we find at the heart of the most important European and American foundations. Autonomy should be understood here first of all as a right to self-government, and as independence from any undue external interference; but it is also a question of respect of the autonomy of others, a value which is beholden on organizations which form part of organized civil society.

Another fundamental point is that all those responsible for running foundations should have a clear cultural awareness of their roles and their functions, the sector they operate in and its boundaries - in a word, they should have a clear idea of their rights and their duties. This is an objective which governing boards and other governing bodies need to set themselves. A similar effort needs to be undertaken by those who do not work within foundations, but have precise responsibilities towards them - for example, those who are responsible for nominating members to governing bodies. Such persons need to exercise their choice keeping the proper functions of the foundation clearly in mind; *a fortiori* they need to avoid the ever-present temptation to make improper demands on the governing bodies of foundations - for example, asking them to carry out tasks which ought to be carried out by the state. For their part, managers and staff of the foundations must acquire the professional skills which are necessary for their job - both the general skills (such as the art of "spending wisely") and more specific ones.

Adopting criteria of financial and working openness is crucial. Only if there is transparency can foundations make the public see their usefulness, and create a climate in the country which will allow them to strengthen their activity[304].

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[304] We consider the theme of foundations and of their future in Italy so strategic that in 1998 we set up a Centre for Documentation on Italian Foundations. We wanted to make this independent and to involve other foundations in its management, so - consistent with the principle of subsidiarity - we created it with the legal status of a "foundation".

Chapter Four

Reform of the state and federalism

The geo-economy, federalism, and Italian history

The path which led us to return (after a gap of fifteen years) to the themes of reform of the state[305] was a complex one, and one which to some extent was unplanned. We did not start out from a political assessment of the kind: 'let us look at the theme of reform of the state again because the political situation in Italy has changed'. What happened was exactly the opposite. Our analysis of the world geo-economy and its rules on the one hand, and of the real conditions of local economies on the other hand - the new economic geography of Italy - led us to conclude that the best way to tackle the new challenges was to take the opportunity to reform the state in a federalist direction, to decentralize responsibilities, to give further powers to the new actors of economic development such as cities and local areas[306], and encourage radical strengthening of the role of civil society and the entire system of self-government[307].

The fundamental motivation lay in geo-economics. In our research on Italy's new economic geography[308], it was clear that there were new rules to international economic competition - the same rules which constitute the focus of our programme on the geo-economy.

Our research on regional economies brought out a number of important links with the new world geo-economy. The new conditions of the international economy forced us to pose the question of a new state - or rather of public arrangements which would be adequate to the new international conditions which presupposed transfers of powers downwards towards local economies, and also upwards, towards the European Union. Both transfers went in the same direction - in other words towards the real actors of the new geo-economy. We saw systems of governance in local economies as managing comparative advantage of local areas, while the European institutions we described as building an institutional framework which was adequate for a global economy. We reached these conclusions in 1992, a year in which the Northern League put forward a vague and confused demand for federalism (its well-known demand for a division of Italy into three macro-regions).

Managing the proposal for reform of the state in a federalist direction posed a number of problems. First of all, the whole political world at that time was virulently opposed to any idea of federalism. There was no lack of fiery declarations, and even cultivated politicians like Giovanni Spadolini felt moved to make the equation "federalism = anti-Risorgimento = subversion". In reality, in most cases, invocation of the Risorgimento to deny legitimacy to federalist projects was the result of more concrete worries - in particular the fear that the South would be cut adrift without any form of solidarity. In addition, there was widespread misunderstanding of the needs and expectations of those local economies which were most exposed to international competition. The

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[305] See above, Part One, section on "Reform of the state, the Regions, and local authorities (1976-80)".

[306] See above, the chapter on "The role of cities".

[307] See above, Part Four, the section entitled "Civil society and self-governing institutions".

[308] See above, Part Four, "The new geo-economy, its fundamental law, and the deficit of governance".

arrival of federalism on the political agenda had taken the political parties by surprise, and they were more prone to see the risks than the opportunities.

Another major obstacle was constituted by the very poor image which existing regional government had in Italy. In 1977-78 the Foundation had greatly welcomed the establishment of regional governments, but the results in the intervening years were almost universally judged to be very disappointing. It was quite legitimate, therefore to ask how we could think of increasing the responsibilities of this level of government.

When the Foundation was trying to encourage support for the idea of a federal state in the years 1992-96, it naturally had to take account of problems of this kind. In other words, we had to justify and give roots to the idea of a federal Italy. We tackled this problem by organizing research, seminars and conferences. These certainly did not claim to be exhaustive, but did try to capture the most prominent aspects of the numerous issues involved[309].

Our first concern was to dispel any idea that federalism could in any way be subversive. We did this by showing how the history of the Risorgimento could be reconciled with federalism. We reminded the public that it was not just minority figures, who lost out, such as Cattaneo, who had favoured federalism, but also the great architect of national unity, Camillo Benso di Cavour. Cavour was in fact initially favourable to a de-centralized model of government, and it was only contact with the gravity of problems in the South which led him to opt for a centralized structure. The work of the commission chaired by Luigi Carlo Farini, and then by Marco Minghetti, during the third Cavour government (21 January 1860 - 23 March 1861) bring this out clearly and beyond any dispute. Secondly, it had to be stressed that, however fundamental, the Risorgimento was simply one period among others in a history lasting many centuries.

Already in our American programmes[310], since 1981, we had presented an image of Italy which was more complex and composite than the Risorgimento idea of a single unit. So it was nothing new for us to think of Italy as made up of regional parts - yet nonetheless very much a nation. "At a time when we are talking of creating a neo-regional or federal state, it is essential to reinforce awareness of Italian identity. The idea of the Italian nation cannot be reduced to that of the last hundred and fifty years - it is an idea which has roots in the Middle Ages. It is a mistake to confuse the present centralized state - which is rightly considered by many to be out of date, and in need of re-foundation - with the idea of the Italian nation. Italian identity is made up of shared traits and of pluralism, of unity and diversity. Our century-long history probably fits better into a neo-regional (or federal) state than into a centralized one.

There is, therefore, nothing subversive or anti-Italian in the idea that the centralized state may be just one period in Italian history (albeit a long period, lasting a century and a half) in a much longer history which has generally valued diversity and autonomy. In any case, Italians have always remained more of a nation than a state - in the sense that civil society (making a virtue out of necessity) has often had to fill in where the state did not fulfill its functions. So there is no doubt that transformation of the Italian state in the direction of neo-regionalism or federalism is perfectly consistent with the historical conscience of the Italian nation. It is also worth recalling that during the first great wave of Italian unification, in 1860, the instincts of one of the fathers of the country, Camillo Benso di Cavour, were to establish de-centralization and autonomy in the new national state which was being set up.

At the same time, we need to be completely clear that any disunion is liable to be extremely damaging for all Italians. The present international situation require great cohesion, and a wise use of resources and optimal use of synergy (and this will be even more true in the future). So pluralism and autonomy cannot and must not turn into a break-up of any kind: on the contrary, they need to be

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[309] See Giovanni Agnelli Foundation, *1990-1993: quattro anni di attività*, Torino, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1993, pp. 15 and 18. Also Giovanni Agnelli Foundation, *Catalogo generale delle attività, 1976-1998,* in print.

[310] See above, Part Two, "Promoting the image of Italy and relations with Italian Americans".

the opportunity for fruitful common action. National identity, the consciousness of belonging to a nation which is in many ways special and atypical in form, but which nonetheless has many centuries of rich history and civic virtue behind it, can act as the basis for striking the right balance between autonomous action and common action"[311].

The second thing which we needed to establish was what size of region could make an effective, efficient unit of government. We were determined to decide on this without being influenced by fear of upsetting the status quo or stepping on the toes of the ruling elites of the current Regions (we were aware that it might be necessary to change the dimensions of the regional unit and reduce the number of Regions). As early as 1992 we suggested it was necessary to reduce the number of Regions - on the basis of research on financial flows between the state and the Regions, on the degree of financial self-sufficiency in the various Regions, and on possible ways to increase financial self-sufficiency (we considered financial self-sufficiency the real basis of autonomy and self-government).

These analyses led us to formulate a plan to reduce the number of Regions to twelve. This proposal stimulated debate in many ambiances. When we presented the proposal we made it clear that we believed it was essential to radically innovate the present regional arrangements, so as to make a clear break with the recent history of regional government, which had been severely criticized. For the poor record of the current Regions did, indeed, seem one of the main obstacles to obtaining broad support for the federal idea.

The federal proposal

The proposal to reform the state in a federalist direction was the high-point of the Foundation's intervention in the Italian debate, so it is worth summarizing in its main points. I will take as my basis a text published in September 1994, a time when support for our plans was at its peak.

In the years which followed, debate was intense. As is well-known, the Parliamentary Commission on Constitutional Reform even got to the stage where a plan for a federal state was agreed upon by a broad spectrum of parties. We at the Foundation continued with research on the subject and with activities of cultural promotion up until 1996[312]. If we had to go back to planning federal reform now, we would therefore naturally take account of the results of this work in the Foundation, and above all take account of the changes which have occurred in the country over the last few years.

In the present text, however, it is more appropriate to describe the federal reform project as we formulated it in 1994, because it is around that proposal that public debate centred. I therefore re-state it in its original form because it constituted a fundamental moment in the Foundation's life, not because we would today put it forward in exactly the same form.

Reading it today, in fact, our proposal seems rather "timid". Today we would probably go further, and try to give greater powers to federal institutions. Nonetheless, the general architecture of the plan would not change - either in terms of the underlying principles, or in terms of the main units of government we proposed[313]. The principles which underlay our proposal were those of responsibility, openness or transparency, and subsidiarity.

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[311] Marcello Pacini, «Introduzione» in Alberto Bramanti, Lanfranco Senn, Sergio Alessandrini, Centro Studi sui Sistemi di Trasporto *et al.*, *La Padania, una regione italiana in Europa*, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1992, p. 11.

[312] See Marcello Pacini (ed.), *Un federalismo dei valori. Percorso e conclusioni di un programma della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli (1992-1996)*, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1996.

[313] See Marcello Pacini, «La costruzione dello Stato federale» in M. Pacini (ed.), *Un federalismo dei valori,* op. cit., p.15ff.

"Clearly, the principles of responsibility, transparency and solidarity (solidarity between citizens, and between different regions) are not *per se* federalist principles. They are simply principles of good government. Only the fourth principle, subsidiarity, has a more markedly federalist connotation, and even that not exclusively so"[314].

The principle of responsibility "in its most general formulation requires that anyone who has responsibilities for government at any level should be systematically held to account, in political and personal terms, for the decisions they have made (...) In practical terms, this means that we "need to make sure that the two basic responsibilities in the management of public affairs - power over expenditure decisions, and power over raising the necessary resources, via taxation - are no longer separated (...)

The principle of transparency (...) is both obvious and neglected in practice. It states that political decisions and their implementation at all levels should be based on mechanisms and procedures which are clear enough to be easily accessible and open to inspection by citizens. This is particularly crucial with regard to the equity of the tax burden and to the size and allocation of public resources. The transparency or openness principle means democratic control over the workings of the public administration, and it is a corollary of the responsibility principle (...)

The need for a new state organized according to principles of responsibility and transparency is particularly evident in southern Italy. It has often been claimed, quite rightly, that blame for this situation rests above all on the shoulders of governments which, over the last few decades, have had powers over policy for development in the region. These governments built an economy based on subsidies in the context of a virtual absence of civil society. The result was that values of self-government, autonomy and responsibility were not permitted to emerge; and indeed the idea was even allowed to develop that economic and political dependency was no shame (...) All existing federal states have some mechanisms for solidarity and redistribution between categories of citizens, and between regions. Solidarity policies operate basically at two levels. The first level is that which ensures that no citizen in any region falls below a given minimum threshold of services and entitlements. This kind of solidarity has the aim of guaranteeing social citizenship. The second type of solidarity - no less important than the first - gives support to disadvantaged areas and regions, redistributing resources to encourage equitable balance between various local areas. Any federal system must, therefore, set up arrangements for both these two levels of solidarity. And if a federation is to work well, it is particularly important that there should be effective mechanisms for geographical redistribution. What must distinguish the principle of solidarity in a federal system is that it should be subject to the responsibility principle. In other words, there must be mechanisms which ensure that areas which make efforts to become self-sufficient are rewarded more than those which rest on their laurels (...)

If it is to be genuinely more efficient than the old centralism, a federal system of powers and functions of the state needs to avoid uncontrolled fragmentation and overlapping responsibilities. This implies the need for a well thought-out, non-mechanical application of the subsidiarity principle - the principle which states that powers and responsibilities should be allocated to the level of government which is closest to the specific problems being tackled (...)

It is clear that the subsidiarity principle encourages organization at the grass roots. It is a way of combating centralization and centralism, and thus a way of promoting autonomy and self-government (...) However, the principle should not be interpreted rigidly or to the exclusion of other criteria. So although it is true that in most cases implementation of federal reform and subsidiarity would lead to a shift of powers from the centre to the periphery - with a corresponding gain in efficiency - in some cases it could be beneficial to introduce a shift in the opposite direction, giving more powers to a higher level of government. This is the case when fragmentation of responsibilities among lower level authorities makes it impossible to cope with the complexity of the problems in question, or when it leads to conflicts between various authorities at the lower level.

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[314] Ibid., p.19.

The most obvious example of a situation where applying the subsidiarity principle would lead to a shift of responsibilities from a lower to a higher level is that of metropolitan areas. The level of the commune is too small to deal with the complex geography and socio-economic structures of metropolitan areas.

The crucial importance of subsidiarity as a guiding principle should be self-evident. For the problem of finding the right correspondence between territorial dimensions, local economy, responsibilities and government institutions is a general and widespread problem in Italy. To this extent, it is not a problem which is specific to metropolitan areas: many communes are too small and too fragmented; and many current boundaries between Regions are also unsatisfactory"[315].

The search for the right size for the new units of government was a general aim of our programme. Our proposal to reduce the number of Regions was the most developed and best-described of our suggestions on this issue, but it was not the only one. For we also recommended that communes should be merged and metropolitan areas set up, in an overall framework involving large-scale devolution of responsibilities.

The role of the Region

"A federal system built on the four principles I have outlined implies an important transfer of responsibilities and of legislative powers away from the centre, and therefore towards authorities which are capable of effectively exercising the devolved powers, and of achieving a balance between expenditure and taxation (...) A move to federalism involves re-allocating legislative and decision-making powers which are central to national life, powers which in turn require autonomous management of large-scale financial resources. We are talking about powers and resources which are crucial for the development of large geographical areas, services which are essential for society as a whole, policies of solidarity, socio-economic balances which are fundamental for Italy's future prosperity and for national unity (...) These are responsibilities which require a level of government capable of coping with legislative and administrative measures of great complexity, and capable of managing a large, carefully chosen, civil service. We are also talking about levels of government which are capable of participating fully in debate and cooperation with other similar bodies within the federal system, and able to be seen as legitimate and credible when negotiating with European government institutions.

We arrive at similar conclusions regarding the scale needed if we consider the needs and prospects of the Italian economy. We know that the logic of international competition has given the local economy and management of a territory much greater importance than in the past. The ability of a local area to create the structural conditions, and the infrastructure, to attract economic, financial and human resources is nowadays an essential prerequisite for the health of a local economy and of the firms which operate within it. In other words, it is becoming increasingly necessary to have a government of the territory which is capable of reading the needs of the local economy rapidly and accurately. National government bodies do not seem to be close enough to the ground to do this. On the other hand, this task also requires that local government should initiate programmes which have sufficiently wide scope to be able to cope with competition on a European and international scale. This complex of political, administrative and economic requirements seems to rule out smaller units such as communes, Provinces, or economic districts".

Our conclusion is therefore that "the most suitable unit - one which would be capable of performing all the functions which a federal reform would give it, and would best satisfy the demands currently coming from citizens - is the Region (...) Emphasis on the regional level prevails to all intents and purposes in existing federal systems in Europe and the world as a whole. In the United States, these units may be termed States, and in Germany Länder; but in any case, it is these

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[315] Ibid., pp. 20-23.

intermediate levels of government within a federal system which exercise the main powers of decision-making, administration and tax-raising (...)

The Region is, therefore, the keystone of our proposals. At the same time, however, we are very aware of the claims of lower level local authorities, in particular the communes (...) In any federal state, sub-regional local authorities would certainly have important responsibilities and major resources. This means that the relationship between regional and local government would have to be redefined. New forms will be necessary which give full autonomy to local authorities with regard to the responsibilities they are allocated in accordance with the subsidiarity principle, but at the same time ensure that there is not unnecessary overlapping of functions. Such overlapping would inevitably undermine the fundamental role which the Regions should have in a federal republic. In particular, we need to avoid additional circuits of redistribution of resources, for this would create unnecessarily complex flows of finance, which would make the whole system less accountable, making it less easy to see to what extent results had been achieved"[316].

We naturally also addressed the question of the character a system for the redistribution of resources should have. We considered both "paternal", "vertical" models of re-distribution - where it was the central state which had the task of re-distributing resources - and "fraternal" or "horizontal" models, where the regions made direct exchanges to other regions, without going through the centre (although the federal state might have a modest role as mediator). Although we did not wish to wish to make a definitive choice, after having considered the international experience, we tended to incline towards the view that a "fraternal" model like that practiced in Germany was most suitable in Italy.

Reallocating responsibilities between the Federal Government and the Regions*

The Foundation did not formalize its proposals for modification of constitutional arrangements in the shape of a draft for legislation, but it came near to it, in the precision of the suggestions made.

Our proposal made a clear choice on one fundamental point in the structure of a federal state: we opted for "the specialization of one of the Chambers of Parliament to become a Chamber of the Regions. This means that a number of matters would have to be written into the Constitution; the text would have to specify at least the following issues:- the make-up of the new Chamber and its role as representative of the regional governments or parliaments; a weighting system for the regional delegations; and a voting mechanism (so articles 57 and 58 of the present Constitution would have to be rewritten).

As for the division of responsibilities between central and regional government, article 70 would have to be revised so that it specified the categories of laws which were the responsibility of one House or the other, or of both together. In accordance with the specialization of the two Houses which we have suggested, laws which affect regional powers (framework laws, Constitutional laws, or revisions of the Constitution, laws coming under heading V of part two of the Constitution, coordinating laws of public finance, and subjects regarding the European Union) should come before both Houses. A division of responsibilities which was compatible with the principles we have outlined might give central government law-making powers in the following areas:-

a) foreign policy, foreign trade;
b) relations falling under articles 7 and 8;
c) defence;
d) public security;
e) individual public rights specified by articles 13-22, 29, 30, 31, 39, 40, 49 and 51; Italian citizenship and the status of foreigners;
f) judicial framework;

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* This text was originally published in our journal XXI Secolo, 3 (11), VI, November 1994, and subsequently re-published in Marcello Pacini (ed.), Un federalismo dei valori. Percorso e conclusioni di un programma della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli (1992-1996), Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1996, pp. 69-73.

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g) system of civil and penal law and rules of trial;
h) state accounts; money; supra-regional finance and credit;

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[316] Ibid., pp. 24-6.

i) central government taxation;

k) general economic planning and adjustments; state holdings; competition policy;

l) supra-regional industrial policy; production and distribution of energy on the national scale;

m) national transport and communications; regulation of traffic;

n) major natural disasters and essential conditions for public health; legislation regarding pharmaceutical products;

o) minimum standards of protection of the eco-system, and of cultural and natural treasures - including protection of the cultural heritage against exportation and spoliation; non-regional parks;

p) scientific and technological research of national importance; protection of copyright and artistic and intellectual property;

q) social insurance; private insurance; general regulations for workers' rights and safety at work;

r) general framework of education system;

s) general framework of university system;

t) electoral system, with the exception of provisions of article 122;

u) public works strictly connected with the exercise of central government functions;

v) regulation of the professions and occupations;

w) national statistics; weights and measures; measurement of time;

y) post and telecommunications; supra-regional television news.

The Regions have legislative powers over all other subjects, on their own, or in combination with central government.

With regard to international relations and trade, alongside central government's legislative responsibilities, the Regions have law-making powers defined in the relevant articles.

In matters where the Regions do not have sole responsibility, central government may make framework laws; these may lay down solely the basic principles of those matters which are relevant for national unity. These skeleton laws are binding on the Regions, not on citizens.

Articles should define how conflicts between Regions and central government regarding the framework laws should be resolved. They should also specify the way in which a referendum over repeal of the framework law in question may be organized. The Standing Conference of Central and Regional Government might be given a place in the Constitution and might contribute to coordinating central and regional policy-making. At the same time, revision of article 117 ought to fix the areas where the Regions have sole powers. This could take place on the following lines:- the Region has legislative powers over all matters not reserved for central government.

The Region has sole powers, within the limits established by respect of the Constitution, in the following areas:

a) encouragement of regional economic development, compatibly with   national economic objectives;

b) town and country planning;

c) tourism and leisure;

d) vocational training;

e) civic and regional police;

 f) promotion of local cultures;

g) museums, libraries and cultural bodies of the Region and local authorities;

h) local and regional transport, and transport infrastructure;

i) river and lake transport and ports;

l) quarries and peat bogs;

m) fishing in inland waters;

n) mineral and spa waters.

In other areas, the Regions will respect the principles fixed by framework laws. Regional laws must not harm the national interest or that of other Regions.

Disagreements on this will be settled by Parliament.

Central government legislation may delegate to the Regions the power to issue norms and regulations putting this legislation into effect.

The question of the size of the new regions

In 1992 when the Foundation started out on its work which combined reform of the state and study of Italy's new economic geography, it seemed to us that the question of the population size of Italian Regions (and hence the question of how many Regions there should be) was a crucial issue which needed to be tackled if we wanted reforms of the government structure which were suited to the needs of the real Italy, and of its economy. It was not acceptable, in other words, to propose a reform which redistributed responsibilities away from the central state and towards the Regions, without tackling the problem of how to build a new relationship between territories and economic development, nor the issue of how to ensure real financial self-sufficiency (or at least movement in that direction for the less developed regions).

We thus discussed the idea of merging the less populous Regions with others - with the result that the total number of Regions would be considerably reduced. We went as far as drawing up a

new map, which had a certain impact on politicians and in the media. This was the plan which, for convenience's sake, we called "Twelve Region Italy".

The reasoning behind the plan involved two criteria of economic rationality, and one observation of fact. The two criteria laid down a number of conditions which Italian Regions ought to meet if they were really to become the main units in a genuinely reformed state. The first criterion stated that if it was manage new, more extensive, responsibilities the Region must be financially self-sufficient. The second criterion specified that the region must be of a suitable size to permit credible, organic plans for development.

Our observation of fact was that, as our research on the state of regional finances had revealed, in Italy in the 1980s and '90s, any imaginable criterion of fiscal equity had collapsed. Four regions could be said to be financially self-sufficient - and indeed, paid much more than they received - while all the others were financially dependent[317].

Fiscal deficits and surpluses in Italian Regions, 1989-1995

In 1998 the Foundation decided to carry out a new study of fiscal deficits and surpluses in Italy's Regions. In our 1992 research - based on 1989 data - the average fiscal balance (the difference between what a citizen pays in the form of taxes and what they receive in the form of public spending) was negative, reflecting a budgetary policy which systematically accumulated ever-growing deficits. Redistribution was thus paid for partly by the richer areas of Italy, but partly by future generations. The 1998 research - based on 1995 data - showed that the average fiscal balance has become positive. In other words, a proportion of the resources collected from the various parts of Italy has not been redistributed in the form of public spending, but has been used to repay the public debt.

The 1998 research made it possible to measure the effects which correcting the budget deficit has had on different areas of Italy. The number of Regions which have become self-sufficient fiscally (regions with a fiscal surplus - shown in white in the maps) has grown, with the addition of three Regions (Lazio, Tuscany and Le Marche), while another two (Liguria and Friuli) are near the threshold of self-sufficiency, and in fact have had surpluses since 1997. Even the Regions which continue to have deficits have reduced these deficits to varying degrees.

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[317] See Maurizio Maggi and Stefano Piperno, *Dal risanamento all'Euro. Evoluzione del residuo fiscale nelle regioni italiane*, Turin, Giovanni Agnelli Foundation, 1998, «Contributi di ricerca», and also *Il residuo fiscale delle regioni italiane, 1989-1995.*

Fiscal deficits or surpluses per capita in Italian Regions,
1989 and 1995 (in thousands of 1995 lire)

fiscal surplus
fiscal deficit 0 - 2 million lire
fiscal deficit 2 - 3.5 million lire
fiscal deficit 3.5 - 5 million lire
fiscal deficit over 5 million lire

1989

1995

It was certainly interesting to observe that the situation could not be portrayed (as it often was, superficially) in terms of a situation where "the North pays for the South". For it was clear that the lack of financial self-sufficiency of the Regions was something which went way beyond the South, being widespread in the Centre and North as well. However, the real discovery was that the Regions which suffered (or benefited) most of all from dependency were (apart from the special statute regions), the Regions with small populations (less than a million). Since these Regions were weighed down by inevitable diseconomies of scale when they were producing services, and also at a disadvantage in competition with other European areas, they seemed likely to find their size a severe handicap. In the kind of federal framework we had in mind, they would find it very difficult to meet our criteria of financial self-sufficiency, or our requirement that they should be able to formulate a credible project of regional development.

Hence our proposals for re-drawing the map of the regions, and for merging certain regions - proposals which were thoroughly consistent with our plan to give the region a central place in a new federal pattern of government. Our proposal received a great deal of attention, much support and (as was only natural given the delicacy of the subject) also much criticism. Most of the criticism, naturally enough, came from Regions which we had "abolished". In reality, in our plans no Region was "abolished"; or rather, all those which were affected by the re-drawing were abolished, whether small or large, and re-emerged in a new form as parts of new units. It should be stressed that we had in mind mergers, not "annexations" as some commentators quite unjustifiably interpreted matters.

More in general (using arguments which are still valid today) we stressed that "creating a new geography - with fewer, but economically and demographically stronger, Regions - fits in well with federalism's need for a system which is balanced in at least three senses.

Firstly, there must be a balance between the weight of individual Regions within the country. It is obvious that so long as there continue to be differentials of the order of 90:1 - like that which

exists between the population or the GDP of Lombardy and those of Molise - this is an obstacle to the creation of a federal system. Federalism presupposes equality between all members of the federation, and requires harmony between members in the pursuit of common objectives. Disequilibria as large as those which currently exist in Italy, on the other hand, could easily give rise to centrifugal tendencies.

Secondly, there must be equilibrium between the Regions and the federal state apparatus. Common sense suggests that the existence of Regions which are too large in terms of their populations or their economies will not encourage dialogue or politically balanced mediation between these large Regions and the central government, especially when interests diverge. On the other hand, Regions which are too small, as we have already argued, are liable to be unable to take up their new responsibilities, and in addition will not represent an adequate counter-balance to the centre.

Finally, it is important that Italy's regions should be large enough to be able to act on the European stage; both in the sense that they must be able to approach and negotiate with European Union bodies, and in the sense that they must be able to compete with regions like, for example, Bavaria, Catalonia or Rhône-Alpes"[318].

Our "proposals for 'twelve regions' obviously were not law and had no pretence to be the last word on the subject. We simply wished to stimulate debate around concrete proposals. The fact that our proposals were merely intended to provide a starting-point for discussion is emphasized also by the fact that they leave open a number of major problems of territorial equilibrium - for example, the problem of the isolation of Calabria. In addition, our proposal simply grouped together existing Regions, whereas it might be more appropriate to think of allocating individual provinces differently"[319].

In broad outlines, these were the plans we put forward for a reform of the state, in the most developed form of our proposal, presented in 1994.

The Foundation continued with the programme up until 1996, and continued to stimulate debate, especially on some of the most delicate and controversial points such as: the relationship between federalism, the idea of the Italian nation and the South[320]; or the links between reform of the public administration and introduction of federal arrangements[321]. In addition, we commissioned surveys and research on the culture of regional elites, and on their policy horizons[322]. And we studied other

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[318] Marcello Pacini (ed.), *Un federalismo dei valori*, op. cit., pp.34-5.

[319] Ibid., p.36.

[320] In particular, the Agnelli Foundation organized a conference on «Nuovo Mezzogiorno e riforme dello stato» (Turin, Agnelli Foundation, 3-4 December 1992). Among the speakers were Carlo Trigiglia, Adriano Giannola, Pasquale Coppola, Lida Viganoni, Rocco Giordano, Mario Deaglio, Gerardo Ragone, Stefano Piperno, Giovanni Somogyi, Alberto Bramanti, Marco Cammelli, Pasquale Macry, Piero Violante and Michele Salvati; the round table session was manned by deputies Silvano Labriola and Sergio Mattarella and senators Gianfranco Miglio and Luciano Guerzoni. On the specific subject of federalism, the Fondation organized the conference «Nazione italiana e riforma dello stato: il nodo del federalismo» (Turin, Agnelli Foundation, 5 December 1993), where the speakers were Ruggiero Romano, Franco Della Peruta, Giuseppe Galasso, Giampiero Brunetta, Silvio Lanaro, Piero Craveri, Gian Enrico Rusconi, Marco Vitale, Massimo Salvadori and Stefano Zamagni. See also Marcello Pacini, Maurizio Maggi and Stefano Piperno, with contributions by Luciano Guerzoni, Silvano Labriola, Sergio Mattarella and Gianfranco Miglio, *Nuove Regioni e riforma dello Stato*, Turin, Giovanni Agnelli Foundation, 1993, «Contributo di ricerca»; and Giorgio Brosio, Giancarlo Pola and Daniele Bondonio (ed.), *Una proposta di federalismo fiscale*, Turin, Giovanni Agnelli Foundation, 1994, «Contributo di ricerca».

[321] See Bruno Dente, Marco Cammelli, Domenico Sorace *et al.*, *Riformare la Pubblica Amministrazione. Italia, Gran Bretagna, Spagna, Stati Uniti*, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1995.

[322] See Ilvo Diamanti (ed.), *Idee del Nord-est. Mappe, rappresentazioni, progetti*, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1998. See also Gustavo de Santis, *Italia, Francia e Spagna: esiste una specificità demografica delle regioni del "Arco latino"?*, Turin, Giovanni Agnelli Foundation, 1997, "Contributo di ricerca"; Umberto Janin-Rivolin, (ed.), *Rapporto Valle d'Aosta*, Turin, Giovanni Agnelli Foundation, "Contributo di ricerca"; Paola Bonora, *Constellazione Emilia. Territorialità e rischi della maturità,* Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1999;

experiences of federalism and de-centralization in a number of Western countries, both in countries where federalism is a long tradition (Switzerland) and others where it is recent (Belgium and Spain)[323].

Lida Viganoni (ed.), *Percorsi a Sud. Geografia e attori nelle strategie regionali del Mezzogiorno*, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1999.

[323] See Bruno Dente, L. Jim Sharpe, Keith G. Banting *et al.*, *Governare con il federalismo*, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1997.

Part Six
From 1976 to 1999

The Foundation and Turin

A constant, complex relationship

A variety of ways of relating to Turin

The Foundation has always felt it had a duty to concern itself with Turin - the city it has always felt is its "home". For the Foundation is Italian, European, but also Turinese. It is therefore natural that we should have a special relationship with the city - a relationship which has taken various forms, and which has always been close to the hearts of all the Foundation's staff.

Apart from this visceral cultural relationship, since the 1970s, our interest for Turin has also been a question of the belief we have had in cities in general[324], and our conviction that cities will play a crucial part in our times and in the near future. We see cities as units which are rooted in the past but look towards the future. Our approach to Turin, therefore, has been affected by this more general assessment of cities (and of Italian cities in particular), and our research on Italian and European cities has fed back into our work on Turin.

Turin has been our headquarters, the place we have held hundreds of seminars and conferences (in the process bringing thousands of scholars and experts to enrich the city's cultural life). We have worked from Turin, then, even though at times it would have been better, from a pure efficiency point of view, to have been based elsewhere: for example, it would sometimes have been useful to be located in Rome, where making contacts with politicians and with the media is more convenient.

Our decision to stay in Turin, therefore has been motivated by political and cultural reasons: we have sought to put down roots in the city. Considering Turin as our city - in spite of the fact that we are an institution with a national and international image - was thus a conscious choice, and also a strategic policy, an anchorage we have often used in all the shifting variety of everyday life. On very few occasions have we made an exception by presenting research results in Milan or Rome, or organizing a conference in Florence.

The Foundation has always tried to have a special relationship with Turin. Obviously we have not limited ourselves to themes which concerned Turin. Nonetheless, from time to time we have set up a programme especially for the city, or added extensions to existing programmes.

The Foundation has always tried to avoid any localistic, parochial approach. So we have always viewed Turin as an essential node in the Italian urban system, albeit one with its own history, culture, and social and economic features. It was precisely considerations of this kind which led to our "*Tecnocity* project" - the plan for a national technological centre.

If we think of the various forms our relationship with the city has taken over the years, we could divide things into periods - which correspond roughly with periods in the Foundation's work in general:

- between 1976 and 1980 we joined others in what at the time was a widespread view (or aspiration?) - the idea that Turin was a "laboratory";
- in 1982 we put forward our *Integrato Metropolitano* initiative - our first proposal for renewal of the city's culture, looking towards the future;
- in 1984 we tried to formulate a real project for the future, with our *Tecnocity* plan. This programme continued until 1991;

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[324] See Marcello Pacini, «Cosa valgono i valori», *Nuova Società*, 98, V, 18 March 1977, pp. 50-53.

- in 1991 the Foundation relinquished its role of making detailed planning suggestions for the time being, and returned to its function of thinking out the general direction in which the city should be moving, with the proposals for metropolitan centres;

- in 1993 the Foundation launched a programme which did have detailed objectives, but which focused on one central, strategic problem - culture and works of art. By the autumn of 1998 this programme had made a good deal of progress, and we felt that it had made a significant contribution to clarifying the situation with regard to the city's museums, and what their future should be.

It should be clear that during all the above phases, we have in addition undertaken investigation of Turin as part of our more general programmes.

Turin as a laboratory city (1976-1980)

In the late 1970s Turin was often described in the press as a "laboratory city". At the time, this phrase did not have the meaning it later acquired of a city which produced new products which later spread elsewhere (as with Turin's innovations in fashion, radio or cinema). It meant a city where social innovations were tried out - so a city which might provide solutions which were of general interest, even to some extent responses to the problems of modernity. The Foundation accepted this working hypothesis, and it added to its general programmes a special focus on the Turin metropolitan area.

As I wrote in 1976, "Turin with its metropolitan area has a strategic place in Italian modernization and it certainly forms one of the most interesting parts of Italy as a "social laboratory" (...) Turin is the place in Italy where industrial culture goes back furthest - a fact which deeply influenced major intellectuals such as Gramsci and Gobetti. It is also the city which over the last twenty years has had to cope with the most massive wave of immigration of any Italian city. Today the cultural life of the city is being progressively hegemonized by the Communist Party, which has not only gained political control of the municipality, but also clearly intends to turn it into a test of its cultural project for a new industrial city.

We need to take full advantage of this centrality of Turin. It can serve to resolve any potential contradiction the Foundation might face between the need to chart where Italy as a whole is going, and the need to have a strong cultural presence in Turin. A number of issues of general interest - ranging from the relationship between schools and industry, to the reorganization of the political-administrative framework of large cities (to give just two examples) - may usefully be tackled by focusing on Turin"[325].

A number of activities were actually undertaken. The research directed by Paolo Farneti on new forms of democracy in the cities is worth mentioning, as is the programme on regional economic planning in Piedmont[326]. The idea of Turin as a social laboratory lasted longer than that which imagined the whole of Italy as such, for it was more well-founded objectively. For Turin really could be seen as an experimental laboratory in an Italy pervaded by social and industrial conflict, whereas the idea that Italy could act as a laboratory for the West was much more airy-fairy, as we have already seen[327]. However, the hypothesis that Turin could be a laboratory city foundered as

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[325] Marcello Pacini, *Relazione al Consiglio d'amministrazione della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli*, 10 February 1976, unpublished typescript.

[326] See above, Part Three; the research on "The experience of urban democracy" was carried out by Paolo Farneti (director of the project), Flavio Bonifacio, Ezio Marra, Claudio Masiero, Riccardo Pinna e Giuseppe Valperga between 1976 and 1978; the theoretical framework is published, with a preface by Norberto Bobbio, as Paolo Farneti, *La democrazia in Italia tra crisi e innovazione*, Torino, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1978.

[327] See above, Part One, section entitled "Reinforcing ties with the United States".

Europeanization and globalization advanced. It became clear that no Italian city could act as a laboratory. By now it is clear that the only Italian phenomenon which has been sufficiently innovative to force itself onto world attention has been that of "industrial districts" of closely inter-linked small and medium-sized firms.

The relationships between the Foundation and the city were affected by the general climate which gripped the country at the time, and between 1979 and 1981 contacts decreased in frequency, and almost disappeared. It would take a historical account of the "years of lead" (*anni di piombo*) to make it clear how much terrorism limited social relationships and cultural exchanges at the time in Turin.

Even apart from terrorism, the Foundation's life in Turin at the time was not easy. The weight of the Agnelli name hung heavily in the city's culture, especially in university circles: the Foundation was seen as exemplifying an industrial culture which was viewed as an antagonist to be fought, to be kept at arm's length, or at least to be suspicious of. This attitude naturally disappeared in the early 1980s - partly due to more general changes in Italian society and politics, partly because our work came to be better known and appreciated.

The Integrato metropolitano *programme*

In March and April 1982 the Foundation organized its first major initiative on Turin, a complex event entitled "*Integrato metropolitano.* New York, Chicago and Turin - three faces of Italian migration"[328].

With this project we started a commitment which we did not abandon in later years - a commitment to encouraging and proposing a culture which looks towards the future, helping the city to develop the means to plan its future.

For many years - at least up until the mid-1990s - we were on our own in this attempt. We did not receive messages of support for what we were doing, except for vague murmurs of agreement. Nor did any alternative projects emerge, with which we might have compared our own[329]. Our plans for Turin have taken many forms - but they have always had the intention of encouraging a future-oriented, innovation-aware culture.

In *Integrato Metropolitano* the link between our American programmes and our initiative on Turin was explicit. This was in fact the first (but not the last) time in which we used our international experience and applied it to Turin.

The arrival in Turin of hundreds of thousands of immigrants had shaken and greatly changed the city. The perception which Turin had of itself was well exemplified by Norberto Bobbio, who gave a speech at *Integrato Metropolitano* ("Dibattito su identità torinese e culture degli immigrati. Quali rapporti?", with Norberto Bobbio and Luigi Firpo), restating the arguments of an essay he had written on Turin's culture between 1920 and 1950[330]. When I was explaining what *Integrato Metropolitano* was trying to achieve, I argued as follows: "In the final pages of an essay on culture in Turin, Norberto Bobbio has described a lost opportunity and an irreversible loss. The lost opportunity he was referring to was the cultural renewal which migration from the South in the 1950s and '60s could have led to, but didn't. The irreversible loss was the end of "Piedmontism" the 'idea of a particular character of the Piedmontese, of which we need to find the historical origin, the peculiarities, and the similarities and differences from other regional characters'.

In Bobbio's view, if Turin 'had had a more enlightened administration it could have become a melting pot where North and South - traditionally divided by old political rancours, psychological misunderstanding, prejudices among the educated and uneducated, and real differences in history, customs and mentality, could have come together'." This was how "one of the leading exponents of Turin's culture summed up a very widespread view. In Bobbio's essay, there seems to be regret for what might have been, but there is certainly no condemnation of either immigrants or the Piedmontese. It is simply that immigration could have led to innovatory change, simply that 'Piedmontese character' once existed and no longer does"[331].

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[328] The programme «*Integrato Metropolitano*» (Turin, 11 March-4 April 1982) took the form of a series of lectures, a series of film projections, two exhibitions of photographs, and a selection of audio-visuals; the cinema part of the programme was planned by Gianni Rondolino, while the photographic exhibitions «Italiani a Chicago» and «Lo spazio di Brooklyn» were planned respectively by Dominic Candeloro and the staff of the «Italians in Chicago» project at the University of lllinois, and by Jerome Krase of the Department of ltalian-American Studies, Brooklyn College, State University of New York. The programme as a whole was presented in Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, *Integrato metropolitano. New York, Chicago, Torino, tre volti dell'emigrazione metropolitana*, Turin, Giovanni Agnelli Foundation, 1982, which contains, among others, the essay by Marcello Pacini, «Perché "Integrato Metropolitano"?», and that by Gianni Rondolino, «L'immagine dell'Italiano nel cinema americano»). See also Giovanni Agnelli Foundation, *1976-1986: dieci anni di attività,* Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1986, pp. 40-41.

[329] Giuseppe Turani stated in 1993 that, in the vacuum of ideas and projects on "the city", the one exception was the "generous attempt constituted by Tecnocity"; see Giuseppe Turani, «Non si vive di sola Fiat e Torino gira a vuoto», *La Repubblica*, 21 February 1993.

[330] See Norberto Bobbio, *Trent'anni di storia della cultura a Torino (1920-1950)*, Turin, Cassa di Risparmio di Torino, 1977.

[331] Marcello Pacini, «Perché "Integrato Metropolitano"?» in Giovanni Agnelli Foundation, *Integrato Metropolitano* op.cit., p. 9.

"It is this kind of resigned attitude that our initiative [*Integrato Metropolitano*] wishes to combat (...) The consequences of such a massive immigration process as that which occurred in Turin can only be known in the long term: it is no good rushing to hasty conclusions, we need time to reflect on the consequences. The extent and nature of the consequences will depend also on the general political and cultural climate of the city, and on the amount of attention which is given to the new phenomena, on how much help they receive when they emerge. This implies that it is crucial to have an aware and trusting general climate, an overall attitude which gives meaning to getting along together, and to relationships between citizens. Finally, it will depend on specific policies to facilitate development and cultural growth - starting with material culture and real behaviour. The general objective of our initiative is to make links with discussion of what the conditions for cultural development are in Turin"[332].

The title of the exhibition provided a key to our intentions: *New York, Chicago and Turin. Three faces of Italian emigration*. For we wished to stress that "American urban culture at its best (...) has been able to create a cultural climate which is capable of turning migration from a community-destroying phenomenon into one into creative opportunities for growth"[333].

The cultural proposal which we put forward in Turin was partly based on the experience of American cities which had flourished through migration, partly on our analysis of Turin society, which showed the existence of two circuits of mobility, which existed side-by-side, without conflict, but without dialogue, against the background of great trepidation over the future of the city of the type exemplified by Bobbio's essay.

Our initiative wished to go beyond "regret" for the "capital of Savoy" city which Turin used to be (something which was by now long gone), and go on to build a more culturally complex city. The future of the city no longer depended on "Piedmontism", nor on some abstract, imaginary culture springing out of rapid convergence between the cultures of immigrants and locals; it depended on the rich regional cultures which came to Turin from Southern Italy with the mass migration of the 1960s. Turin needed to change the city it usually compared itself to. The usual international reference point was Detroit. (Detroit was seen as the exemplar of a company town, so this tells us much about the way Turin perceived itself.) We argued Turin ought to compare itself to Chicago or New York, for although these towns were much bigger, they provided a suitable model of metropolises which had risen to the challenge of social and cultural innovation.

Thinking back to *Integrato Metropolitano* from the standpoint of today leads me to make two remarks. The first concerns the issue of those Turinese who have roots in the southern regions of Italy. Southern immigrants or children of migrants are no longer a cultural problem but social and educational problems remain. The presence of first- and second-generation migrants from the South partly (though only partly) explains why Turin has a percentage of university and high school graduates in its population which is low (especially when one compares it with figures at the beginning of the century, when Turin was high up in the Italian league of educational qualifications).

The second remark applies to migratory processes and how we should assess them. Current migration comes primarily from Asia and Africa - that is to say, from different cultural universes (to use the Foundation's terminology) - and this changes the way the problems need to be tackled. The proposal of *Integrato Metropolitano* was confidently optimistic, and very little worried. However, what was at issue was processes of migration within Italy (towards Turin) or within the Euro-American cultural universe (towards New York and Chicago). Today's situation is quite different, and poses problems of integration and of relationships between people belonging to different civilizations, which are much more difficult to solve[334]. It would thus be a mistake to put forward

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[332] Ibid., p.10.

[333] Ibid., p.11.

[334] See above, Part Four, chapter two, section entitled "Immigration and cultural pluralism in Italy and Europe"

the same logic and the same optimistic and uncritical orientation characteristic of *Integrato Metropolitano*.

Turin as an answer to the future: Tecnocity

Just one year later in 1984 we began the phase of our programme on predictions for the future, *Futurama*, which involved communication to the public. And we put forward a high-profile proposal for Turin - suggesting it should be a "reply to the future".

This was the most important and committing project the foundation has formulated for Turin. It embodied what may be considered the common thread which has always characterized our relationship to the city: the fact that we dispute the widespread opinion that Turin is destined for inevitable decline, and emphasize that it is a strong area, with better human, cultural and technological resources than most cities (a product of the specific form taken by its industrial development).

In the light of this centrality it is worth explaining the project properly. The departure point was research on *Futurama* - our programme of prediction of future trends and analysis of innovative processes. As often happens, instead of providing certainties, this programme led to a series of strategic questions. The most important of these centred on how technology spread, and on "how" Italy could participate to this process "as a scientific and industrial structure".

Did there exist in Italy a fabric of "productive knowledge", capable of successfully participating in the international process for the production and diffusion of technological innovation? "Innovative productive activity (I wrote in 1983) does not depend solely on the initiatives of a few entrepreneurs with particularly good ideas; it is a consequence of the presence of many skills, to which the entrepreneur gives direction, by organizing and coordinating them. No industrial activity - especially if it is innovative - is possible without the contribution of numerous wills and skills - coming from universities, banks, technicians, the work force, trade unions, politicians, local government, etc.

We might add families to the above list (...) for families, too, are essential actors in the productive process, especially when they are planning the kind of education their children will have. Innovation and technological production are "collective adventures", which only take place when numerous factors exist, and these cannot suddenly be created out of nothing. It is this problem which underlies the difficulties many countries have in leaving backwardness behind them, and the lack of success of many industrial initiatives whose siting has been decided by fiscal or financial incentives: in the absence of productive knowledge and know-how everything is more difficult - often impossible"[335].

In order to manage this productive knowledge, and organize the collective adventure of innovation, it is necessary for the main actors involved in the process to adopt a number of cultural and practical working tools. These actors - the entrepreneurs, universities, local government and so on I have mentioned - make up the most crucial fabric of an urban ambiance. They are the essential part of what we have elsewhere called the "city effect"[336].

A sweep through the world's leading innovative areas today confirms this fundamental thesis that there is a relationship between cities and technological perspectives: the centres where innovation is emerging, and from where it is spreading out to the rest of the world, are almost all large cities. Cities are poles of attraction and there is a critical mass effect whereby cities draw resources which are crucial for technological development (human resources, infrastructure, financial resources, etc.). There is no substitute for this, and all attempts to establish technological areas outside the big

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[335] Marcello Pacini, «Perché Futurama», in Giovanni Agnelli Foundation, *Futurama*, Turin, Giovanni Agnelli Foundation, 1983, pag. 55.

[336] See above, Part Five, chapter on "The role of cities".

cities have spent most of their attention on recreating the conditions which exist spontaneously in cities.

Given this, the first concern we should have in Italy is to give life to one, two or three cities which are capable of playing on the same stage as the current major areas of technological innovation, which are so distant and yet so incredibly close to us. This means that a rational policy aiming at encouraging technological progress must be distinct and autonomous from other, equally important, policies with different aims such as redistribution, aid to development, etc."[337].

The results of a study of the Turin area made it feasible to propose Turin as an innovative area aware of its own specialization - the first of two or three Italian leading areas capable of being in dialogue with San Francisco, Boston and Tokyo. "It is worth stressing that this would place Turin in the place of a 'path-breaker', which would benefit the whole country, since diffusion effects would spread out all over Italy. It is thus no parochial proposal, of relevance only to Turin; it is a strategic plan of national importance, on which hangs much of the prosperity of the whole country"[338]. A few weeks previously we had made public the findings of our research on technological areas in the world, and thus we had a clear idea of the criteria which Turin needed to adopt. Among these was the following definition: "The technological district is (...) a geo-economic area in which the following features are particularly prominent: the connections between different areas of research; the circulation of information and the diffusion of innovation; the formation of technical and scientific entrepreneurship and the birth of new firms; the transfer of new technologies and productive processes; relationships between financial capital and industrial capital. Our research on *Tecnocity* has found all these processes at work"[339].

We therefore put forward an idea of the role which Turin might play, centred around three interlinked proposals - a scientific proposal, a political and cultural one, and a working plan. The scientific proposal had numerous parts to it and included economic research, research on the adoption of technologies and on skill requirements in Piedmont[340]. The political-cultural proposal restated the arguments underlying the *Tecnocity* project and the reasons why the whole city should join in.

Right from the beginning the *Tecnocity* project had adopted a number of political or cultural orientations. The first of these concerned the role of the city and the urban environment; the second, the crucial value of people and their skills (for the essential factor of economic development, and *a fortiori* technological development, continued to be people).

Education and training, the labour market - but also recreational and cultural facilities - were directly connected with the problem of how to create a creative, professional environment where people can express their capacities to the full. However, there was another - in some ways more important - reason for seeing the city and people as the central values of our political-cultural

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[337] Marcello Pacini, «Prospettive tecnologiche di Torino: opportunità e bisogni», unpublished paper given at the conference «Lingotto: un'occasione per Torino», Turin, Unione Industriale, 22 June 1984, p. 6.

[338] Ibid.

[339] Marcello Pacini, «Osservazioni conclusive con riferimento al caso di Torino», in Irer/Progetto Milano-Giovanni Agnelli Foundation, *Il sistema metropolitano italiano*, *Atti del seminario nazionale di Varenna (Co), 20 June 1986*, Milan, Franco Angeli, 1987, p. 358.

[340] See Cristiano Antonelli, *L'attività innovativa in un distretto tecnologico*, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1986; Enrico Ciciotti, *Natalità delle imprese e diffusione delle innovazioni di processo in un distretto tecnologico*, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1986; Piero Gastaldo (ed.), *La risorsa sapere. Scolarità, fabbisogni di personale qualificato e ricerca universitaria in un'area tecnologicamente avanzata*, Turin, Giovanni Agnelli Foundation, 1987, with pieces by Guido Ortona and Walter Santagata, Marco Demarie and Nicola Schiavone, and by Vincenzo Pozzolo. See also the research coordinated by Piero Gastaldo 1983-1984, «Presupposti per un accostamento micro-territoriale all'innovazione: la proposta Tecnocity», part of which is published in Giovanni Agnelli Foundation, *Strumenti per l'innovazione. Da Boston a Torino: le aree innovative nel mondo. Verso il Telescience Park*, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione, 1984. See also Giovanni Agnelli Foundation, *Catalogo generale delle attività, 1976-1998*, 1999.

proposal. We believed that technicians, scientists and business people could become more aware of the part they were required to play if they were sited in a definite metropolitan area.

The political-cultural proposal the Foundation put forward was that people in business and in technical and scientific development should themselves take the initiative to plan "what needed to be done" to ensure that *Tecnocity* developed properly. Our proposal was meant to offer business people, technicians and scientists an opportunity, but also to give them responsibility.

The working proposal consisted, naturally enough, in the suggestion that a special body should be set up - an Association for *Tecnocity*. The main players in the business world and in science and technology in the Turin area joined this body. The Association immediately decided to take on a planning and promotional role, thus leaving responsibility for carrying out the individual initiatives to specialized bodies (which might be set up by members of the Association or by others). In that year the Foundation, as a member of the Association, signed an agreement with Turin Polytechnic to carry out research reviewing national and international experience to see what arrangements might be suitable to encourage links between the Polytechnic and industry.

The Association for *Tecnocity* was autonomous, even though it was closely intertwined with the Foundation's normal work (the present author was always the Chairman of the Association). This autonomy was appropriate partly because we had a number of partners, but also because we believed the form of an association was the most suitable one if we wanted to involve other actors and other energies.

I do not intend to draw up a balance sheet of what was achieved, because it would take too long and be inappropriate here. I will simply say that the balance sheet would be complex, varied and from my point of view unsatisfactory. Above all as an approach, *Tecnocity* was before its time, and it had to make its way in a city where flows of communication between the various sectors of the city were slight - Turin was effectively divided into watertight compartments, and mutual understanding between them was the exception rather than the rule. The various circles were usually unaware of the future which awaited the city, and almost all of them were convinced they could solve their problems on their own, quite independently.

The most substantial success achieved was in cooperation with the Polytechnic and the University. Relations with the Faculties of Science and of Arts produced concrete results, which may be seen as the first fruit of a new relationship between universities and private cultural institutions after a long period of isolation[341].

Apart from the university agreements, however, *Tecnocity* had unsatisfactory results in practice. It would be interesting to carry out specific analysis of the reasons why the project never really got off the ground. The working proposal presupposed a framework where what was central was not just economic, technological, or financial factors, nor just the scientific proposal on its own. Culture was also a crucial element - especially civic culture. What was needed was a culture which was capable of sharing a project for the future, organizing a real "coalition for development" to put it into practice. So culture oriented towards cooperation.

Cultural pluralism can be a great resource if the various potential partners cooperate - especially in the context of the intimidatingly huge challenges of world competition. Experience abroad - we cited the example of Pittsburgh in particular - also suggested that a "development coalition" could

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[341] In 1986 we signed a convention with Turin Polytechnic commissioning the Polytechnic to carry out research on relations between university and industry in a number of local areas in the United States, Europe and Italy. The following year we drew up an agreement with the University of Turin for cooperation over research and new teaching methods. In particular, an agreement was drawn up in 1988 between the Faculty of Science of the University and three Turin research centres (Centro Ricerche Fiat, CSELT and the Istituto Donegani) to try out new curricula in Materials Science; a similar agreement was drawn up with the Humanities Faculty to try out new courses in Communication Techniques. Other specific agreements were made to write software to help students choose a university faculty and obtain recognition of qualifications. As a result of these initiatives, the University of Turin obtained official recognition in 1991 for three new degree courses: Communication, Biotechnology and New Materials. See Giovanni Agnelli Foundation, *1976-1986: dieci anni di attività*, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1986, p. 171.

exist (and succeed) only if it was the practical expression of a culture of transformation which was emerging in the city, and involving the whole city. In other words, there had to be real, widespread consensus over the city's future.

"It is this basic consensus on the shape that the city should take - plus realistic assessment of what opportunities are realistically attainable - that needs to form the background (a coordinated, though not necessarily unitary background) for individual projects (whether more specific or more ambitious). It is only in the context of a future-oriented framework of this kind - something which, in this sense, is deeply 'political' - that resources of various kinds (which, today are, fortunately, in some ways more abundant than they were in the past) can be fruitfully mobilized (...) If this happens, we will have made a real and major step towards setting up a shared civic culture - that crucial, indispensable element for building a city where prosperity and quality of life are the birthright of all citizens"[342].

A proposal which fell on deaf ears in 1989: the coalition for development

A few years later we returned to this theme of a civic culture - emphasizing its importance and also emphasizing the problem that it was not present in Turin. For we had come to the conclusion that absence of a "cooperation-oriented civic culture", capable of creating agreement on a common future, was Turin's Achilles' heel.

"The Association for *Tecnocity* has always believed that many of the fields where it was necessary to intervene were not the exclusive domain of this or that body, but involved cooperation between several partners, public and private. An overall strategy of cooperation is necessary when we are facing complex, many-sided questions with roots in several, interdependent sectors, requiring resources and skills which no single actor on their own possesses. We need only think of issues such as training, research, infrastructure, or quality of life.

By an overall strategy of cooperation we mean a flexible process, with many parts to it (...) Cooperation starts to take place when one actor knows what other actors are doing or are capable of doing – when, in other words, ambits of common action are established. It is only when there exists this mutual knowledge of the skills and responsibilities of others that any one actor (whether political, economic or cultural) can carry out their job in a way which is in the best interests of the body they represent and of the collectivity.

Vice versa the quarrelsomeness, or simply the lack of communication, which are often evident in this city and this region lead to paralysis of any capacity for decision-making. When effective channels of communication are open, on the other hand, cooperation can take place, bringing together ideas and resources to achieve specific projects.

In this way, we can move beyond merely sporadic cooperation - cooperation becomes a standard way of proceeding, one which survives changes in the local administration"[343].

Our proposal to form a "development coalition" was perhaps premature. No doubt the responsibility for not taking it up does not lie with the elites of the time, but rather with the general situation. In particular, it was crucial that the municipal governments were weak and incapable of giving any leadership, and also that civil society was so slight. Today, the issue is once again on the agenda – and today, fortunately, it has much better chances of success.

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[342] Marcello Pacini, "Opening remarks" to the conference "Torino: pubblico e privato per progettare qualità e sviluppo della città", Turin, Palazzo Esposizioni, 9-11 November 1988, organized by the Technocity Association and the City of Turin, unpublished typescript, pp.13-14.

[343] Marcello Pacini, «Il distretto tecnologico di *Tecnocity*: le condizioni per la conferma di un ruolo propulsivo generale», unpublished paper delivered at the conference «*Tecnocity* alle soglie degli anni novanta. Bilanci e prospettive del sistema economico piemontese», Turin, Turin Polytechnic, 20 November 1990, Turin, Tecnocity, 1990., pp. 8-9. See also *XXI Secolo*, 1 (1), I, November 1989, pp. 13-16.

The most useful contribution the Foundation made to Turin with the *Tecnocity* programme was probably in terms of self-image. One commentator even included the project in his list of stereotypes of the city: "Turin causes intermittent curiosity in Turin. Turin is thus studied and analyzed like few other cities; yet understanding still seems far off. Simplified, schematic labels are put forward (the city with just one industry and one culture, the city of the massed factory workers, the town of Gramsci and Gobetti, the car town, Pavese's town, Tecnocity)"[344]. It thus seems possible that the idea of *Tecnocity* may have entered into the imagination of Turinese as a significant aspect of the way they think of themselves and present themselves to others.

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[344] Saverio Vertone, «Torino allo specchio, si guarda e non si piace», *Corriere della Sera*, 9 November 1986.

From the metropolitan area to a metropolitan city

In 1991 the Foundation published a study of the future of Turin and Piedmont[345] which took account of the preliminary conclusions of our programme on cities.

This study looked at the future demographics of the city, at its schools and universities, at the labour market, and at the conditions of elderly people. We were thus able to suggest some policy outlines, and some risks facing a city where the population of young people was going to be halved by the year 2008[346]. Publication of the report gave us an opportunity to put forward a number of more general ideas about Turin, of which two are worth mentioning.

First of all, we suggested that prominence should be given to culture. A city "must have its own vision of the future – it cannot simply take over from the outside ideas about the future developed elsewhere. Urban areas which buy everything in from outside are not metropolises or cities but suburbs, however immense they may be"[347]. The second point we stressed was the multiplicity of levels in which Turin was involved. It is a regional capital, one pole in a system of large Italian and European cities, and also a city with an international place. These various collocations all imply particular roles which need to be played, various responsibilities and opportunities.

In 1993, just before the municipal elections which were to change the electoral system and finally bring stable city administrations, the Foundation organized one final policy-oriented conference, where new research was presented on the metropolitan area. The intent of this conference was partly to encourage the setting up of a unified administrative framework of local government for the whole of the "metropolitan city" area.

Concentrating on specific themes (1993-99)

The following year the Foundation started a new relationship with the city. This new relationship had two parts to it. First of all, there was not so much an overall project for a "possible future" as a programme (based on detailed research and planning) of the part played by cultural activities in Turin's development. In 1995 this turned into our programme on the city's museums. Secondly, research projects have been started which include study of Turin within a wider framework of our more general programmes – in particular, those on the network capital, and on cultural pluralism in Italy and Europe.

The main reason we changed our approach was that we hoped the city authorities would become more authoritative and capable of providing leadership as a result of the new system for electing the mayor and the city council (direct election of a candidate for mayor, and a coalition of parties, as against the old system which involved lengthy haggling for posts after the elections, and often produced unstable coalitions). We saw the new electoral arrangements as very positive, since in the past we had often complained that city councils were not really authoritative or representative interlocutors with whom we could discuss Turin's future in any meaningful fashion, and certainly were not able to undertake any long-term planning. In the years immediately after the change in the electoral system for local elections, the scope for our action did, however, become somewhat more restricted as the local political authorities increased in weightiness.

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[345] This research by Piero Gastaldo, Marco Demarie and Stefano Molina, with Florence Baptiste, Maria Teresa De Palma and Angelo Michelsons is published as: Giovanni Agnelli Foundation, *Il futuro di Torino e del Piemonte. Popolazione, economia e società fino al 2008*, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1991; this report applied techniques used in our programme on the future to Turin and Piedmont. See above, Part Three, chapter one, the section on «"Our" predictions by factors».

[346] Giovanni Agnelli Foundation, «Uno sguardo al lungo periodo: il Piemonte che non vogliamo» in Idem., *Il futuro di Torino e del Piemonte* op.cit., p.109.

[347] Marcello Pacini, «Identità e futuro di una metropoli», in Giovanni Agnelli Foundation, *Il futuro di Torino e del Piemonte* op.cit., p.xvi.

A second reason for our new approach was the desire to try out a new kind of relationship with the city, focusing on a broad strategic approach to the future, yet one which would be thoroughly practical.

The perspective we adopted saw culture as a major competitive advantage, for we believed it could not only increase the quality of life in the city but also be an important economic resource attracting significant service activity and tourism. The programme aimed to launch discussion of the various needs and points of view which needed to be taken into account: the use of museums as an economic resource capable of making a significant contribution to diversification of Turin's local economy; ensuring that scientific standards of conservation were maintained in museums and galleries; the ways museums and galleries fitted in with overall town planning issues.

This programme on cultural resources has developed rapidly in the last few years. As I have already mentioned, it came to a preliminary conclusion in 1998. If I had to draw up a balance sheet of what had been achieved, I would say that the programme greatly helped to clarify planning of how Turin's museums could be made best use of[348].

Today: recent developments and plans

This chapter on the Foundation's work in, and commitment to, Turin would be incomplete without some mention of current developments.

Turin has the problem of all cities with a great past. Like other similar cities, it needs to find a place for itself in the world geo-economy and re-create from within competitive advantage so that it is able to cope with international competition and give its citizens prosperity and a high quality of life. These are issues on which the Foundation has expended much effort, and which have been referred to many times in this book[349].

The Foundation has always given great importance to the role played by cities in society. Today globalization makes this role still more central. All major cities need to take up new responsibilities, and thus need to acquire new skills. They need to learn how to make themselves visible internationally, need to organize a welfare society, need to create and maintain competitive advantage, need to have their own geo-economic policy. These new responsibilities call for a renewed identity, one which is rooted in history but not limited by it.

The new responsibilities mean that all need to participate, in their own way, in building the future. All components of the city need to see themselves as being involved, and as active participants. So not just the large institutions of the public and private sectors, but also (for example) associations and charities. Each kind of organization naturally needs to find the most suitable way to participate. So, for example, industry needs to ensure technological innovation, while charities need to move towards the building of a welfare society.

In this framework, culture is crucial in allowing a city to fulfill its role in the age of globalization. First of all, it is essential that there is a culture of governability. This will only come if there is a feeling of shared interests, and a feeling that there is a genuine rationality at work, not just orders coming down from the institutions at the top. Secondly, culture can help the city to find a satisfactory way of adapting to European and international trends.

Any town, and especially any large town, has to live within a highly competitive environment. Its project is inevitably compared with that of other cities. By definition, the outcome of competition is uncertain. The success of any given project is decided in practice on the playing field of competition. Each city therefore needs to try to give cultural breadth to its project for the future,

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[348] See, among other works, Fitzcarraldo (ed.), "Musei e beni culturali a Torino. Problemi di settori, problemi di sistema: tra gestione e valorizzazione delle risorse", Turin, Giovanni Agnelli Foundation, 1997, *Contributi di ricerca.*

[349] See above, Part Five, chapters 1 and 2.

and this can only be done by inserting the project into a genuine geo-politics of culture, which also treats the cultural organizations of the city as active protagonists.

The kind of culture which is really useful to a city is not that which is necessarily useful here and now in everyday planning or short-term political or economic action. It needs to be different from this and more than this. It needs to be long-sighted and needs to be able to measure itself against the projects of other, similar cities. It must be capable of working out its own viewpoints and helping to find adequate responses to the major cultural, political and social issues which are on the European and international agenda. In other words, it must make sure that it has a seat in the forums and ambiances where major decisions of general interest are made.

In 1991 I argued that "Turin needs to increase its ability to be a place where the great cultural issues of the times are given shape – that is to say, it needs to be an active subject in the working out of cultural solutions, and in the planning not only of its own future, but the future of everyone"[350].

This remains true. The Foundation has often stressed that in the 21st century cities will be more autonomous – which also means more alone – and that they need to become self-governing to an extent which was scarcely conceivable in the past (even the recent past). Luckily, we in Europe will have the friendly, if strongly competitive, umbrella of the European Union. The right way to take part in Europe is to see it as an "opportunity-challenge". Europe will be a friendly place if Turin is able to tackle it with the appropriate style, efficiency and methods.

These are problems which the Foundation has grappled with to some extent in the past, and which have been discussed in this book. Other aspects of the future are blank pages which we still need to fill in with appropriate thinking.

Turin's cultural traditions offer it great opportunities to become an active part of the new European and international cultural fabric. It is useful to think of four levels - regional, Italian, European, and international – when describing the role of the city in its provision of public and private services, in the economy, but also in culture. An optimal situation is attained when there is synergy between these four levels, so that they all enrich each other.

The Foundation's experience, which I have tried to describe in this book, leads to one conclusion. None of the four levels should be ignored, but the European and international levels are those we should worry about most, for it is those which will be the real testing ground of the adequacy of Turin's cultural resources.

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[350] Marcello Pacini, «Identità e fututo di una metropoli», in Giovanni Agnelli Foundation, *Il futuro di Torino e del Piemonte* op.cit., p.xvi.

Final remarks

An account of the work of a cultural foundation can have no conclusion. At numerous points in this book it should be clear that I have been discussing a dynamic process of an institution which is continuing its work and continuing to learn and enrich itself via its programmes.

To illustrate this I might point out that, when I was finishing the Italian version of this account, in the winter of 1998-9, we were returning to the theme of regional finance, showing how the system of transfers between individual Regions, and between the Regions as a whole and the central state, had changed over the last few years. At the same time we were finishing the first stage of our programme on Turin's system of museums, and commencing a new programme on Eastern Europe (focusing particularly on Russia); and we were taking a significant step forward in our dialogue with the Islamic world by organizing an encounter with Iranian Shiite culture. All these are developments of work I have described or mentioned in the book, which gives a fairly realistic idea of the ongoing nature of the Foundation's work – dynamic and flexible cultural reflection, oriented towards policy concerns, organized in programmes, and operating on a day-to-day level as a permanent "work site".

However, a book has to come to an end, so I must close even though the Foundation has already moved on, in its programmes and activities – even though, in other words, my account already has a sequel in a number of public events we have organized, newspaper articles or books we have published.

The book is divided into chronological periods: the Distant Past, the Recent Past, and the Present. The distant past of the 1970s is genuinely remote – another age. Nonetheless, it might be remarked that there is a strange circularity in "Italian time". For a number of themes and problems – such as the reform of the state and the question of how to reinforce the powers of decentralized authorities – have never been solved over the decades, and still remain very much on the agenda. However, one only obtains this impression that time might be circular if one restricts one's view to Italy. If we look outside, we cannot avoid the impression that the velocity of time has increased, and has carried us an enormous distance from the 1970s.

In Part Four and Part Five of the book, I sought to describe how we at the Foundation saw this great transformation, which first became noticeable at the end of the 1980s. I decided to signal this change by making 1989 the beginning of the Foundation's "Present".

In 1989 I made the following comment, which I have already cited, but which I wish to restate: "We are now at the watershed between two centuries. It has already been the case in Europe's history that the transition from one century to another has been of exceptional significance. We might think, for example, of the closing years of the fifteenth century, and the first years of the sixteenth (the discovery of America, the arrival of Europeans in the Far East, the broadening of the horizons of European man, and the triumph of humanism). There are many signs that we are living through similarly exceptional times at the turn of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries"[351].

Events in the decade which followed my remark have confirmed the fact that these are, indeed, exceptional times: evidence of transformation, and of the beginning of a new epoch, has become so overwhelming as to constitute certainty. I wish to draw out the parallel I made with the end of the 15th century.

We currently find ourselves in a situation somewhat similar to that which followed the first great voyages of exploration across the Atlantic. At that time Europeans knew that the island of Hispaniola (Haiti) existed, along with a number of nearby islands, and they knew of the existence of a few stretches of the coast of the Americas, such as Florida, Yucatan, and Brazil. Map-makers were thus starting to draw the first outlines of a new world.

We are in a rather similar position vis-à-vis the twenty-first century – trying to interpret and describe signs of the "new world" which is taking shape. We know little of this new world, but a number of essential points are already clear – for example, the changed importance of "space". What is happening is the exact opposite of what happened in the 15th century. At that time, space widened enormously, whereas today it is shrinking, almost to the extent of eliminating physical distance. What will the consequences of this new spatial dimension be? In my view (as I have already said), they will be no less revolutionary than those which we experienced at the end of the 15th century. We are currently beginning new voyages of discovery which will take us towards new dimensions and towards cultural, scientific, social and economic realities which were until recently quite unforeseen and un-foreseeable.

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[351] Marcello Pacini, "Perché XXI Secolo: raccontare le idee", *XXI Secolo*, 1, (1), I, 1989, p. 2.

On the basis of this observation, I would like to say something about Italy, and its society and culture. Fernand Braudel argues[352] that the sidelining of Italy after the discovery of America (which is usually considered the root of our country's economic and political decline) was not an automatic consequence of the shift of the most important sea routes away from the Mediterranean and towards the Atlantic, but was rather a process which had cultural causes – the inability to formulate a new project. As Braudel says, Genoa was no further from the New World than Amsterdam or Antwerp, and if it had been capable of formulating a new cultural project it could have had a role as a great power in the new 16th century geo-economy. Yet neither Genoa nor any other Italian city proved itself capable of inventing a strategic project. For some time afterwards, Italy remained a land of great culture, and continued to produce some exceptional intellectuals. But since no city or region (the collective units of the time in Italy) was able to formulate a coherent project for the future, slow but inexorable decline ensued.

The risk of decadence is a recurrent one, and one which becomes greater in the great passages from one epoch to another, like that we are currently experiencing. Today, as in the sixteenth century, the only adequate response is cultural adaptation and the formulation of a cultural project. Today, as in the 16th century, the collective actors which need to find a response to changed conditions are cities and regions. Naturally, similarities stop there, for the current situation is also totally different: today cities and regions are situated within national states, which in turn make up part of the European Union. We live inside a complex organizational structure – one which sometimes involves hierarchically organized decisions and processes, but more often ones which derive from competition and cooperation between local bodies taking their own decisions independently. Coping with this complexity has become part of our conditions of existence.

I mentioned Braudel's assessment of the causes of Italy's decline in the epoch which school textbooks call early modern history because it brings out the need to have a project which is adequate to the new times. It raises a number of questions about Italy's culture and politics, regarding whether or not they are able to comprehend and grasp the new world which is taking shape.

A culture is adequate to the times when it is able to formulate a project vis-à-vis the future, in other words when it is long-sighted, able to set itself long-term objectives, yet at the same time exercise firm, intelligent governance over processes which lead to the rational attainment of these objectives. The experience which lies behind the story I have recounted permits me to end this book by expressing the hope that Italy will very soon throw itself into formulating a project for its future, and for how this future should be governed.

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[352] Fernand Braudel, "L'Italia fuori d'Italia. Due secoli e tre Italie" in *Storia d'Italia*, vol. II, *Dalla caduta dell'Impero romano al secolo XVIII*, Turin, Einaudi, 1974, p. 2241.